


English Records of Maratha History

Poona Residency Correspondence

General Editor—Sir Jadunath Sarkar



No. of Volume.	Title of Volume.	Price.
No. 1.	Mahadji Sindhia and North Indian Affairs, 1785-1794	Rs. 5-8-0 or 9s.
No. 2.	Poona Affairs, 1786-1797	Rs. 7-12-0 or 13s. 6d.
No. 3.	The Allies' War with Tipu Sultan, 1790-1793	Rs. 7-4-0 or 12s.
No. 4.	Maratha-Nizam Relations, 1792-1795 ..	Rs. 4-0-0 or 7s.

In the Press

- No. 5. Nagpur Affairs, 1781-1818.
No. 6. Poona Affairs, 1797-1801.

*(Government do not assume any responsibility for the
comments and views expressed by the editors)*

*(Available at the Government Book Depot, Bombay, and other prominent
Booksellers in Bombay and outside)*

English Records of Maratha History
Poona Residency Correspondence

Volume 4

Maratha-Nizam Relations
1792-1795

CHECKED 1988

Edited by
V. G. DIGHE, M.A.

BOMBAY
PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRESS
1937


[Price—Rs. 4-0-0 or 7s. net.]

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Government of Bombay take this occasion to acknowledge their obligation to the Shivaji Memorial Committee whose contribution of Rs. 3,900 has enabled the body of the Poona Residency Records to be typed and made available for printing, and to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Kt., C.I.E., and Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai, B.A., who are rendering their services as editors without remuneration or honorarium and are also travelling at their own expense in connection with the editing and publication of these volumes.

CONTENTS

	PAGES
INTRODUCTION	i-xvi
CONTENTS OF LETTERS ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED ..	xvii-xxii
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS	xxiii
THE ABORTIVE TREATY OF GUARANTEE	1-72
BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS PESHWA-NIZAM DISPUTE ..	73-124
MEER ALAM'S EMBASSY TO POONA	125-198
BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS	199-217
TOPOGRAPHICAL NOTES	218
THE BATTLE OF KHARDA	219-278
PEACE TERMS	279-314
APPENDIX	315-325
INDEX	327-330
ILLUSTRATIONS—	
Portrait of Capt. William Kirkpatrick ..	<i>Frontispiece.</i>
Portrait of Meer Alam, the Nizam's envoy ..	<i>To face page 125</i>
Map of Kharda campaign	,, ,, 218





CAPT. W. A. KIRKPATRICK.
RESIDENT, HYDERABAD, 1794-1797.

Peshwa's Court Malet had become a past master of oriental politics, had intimately acquainted himself with the policy and ambitious projects of the Marathas and knew their strength and foibles. When he first arrived in Poona in 1786 the Peshwa's power was disorganised and struggling with a powerful enemy in the south ; Sindia had yet to acquire the strength that was to give him supremacy in the imperial politics of Delhi. Nine years later the southern enemy of the Marathas, Tipu, was grovelling in the dust ; Sindia's power had reached its apogee. Malet's clear vision saw that however desirable it might be in the interest of the Company to prevent the annihilation of the Nizam's independence, armed support given to him was sure to draw the English into hostilities with the Maratha confederacy at an ill-chosen moment. He, therefore, strongly advocated the policy of watchful non-intervention, which the Governor General accepted and acted upon, setting aside the contrary views suggested by the Resident at Hyderabad.

The correspondence so far available on this subject was mostly in Marathi and failed to bring out the significance of the issues involved. It treated it as a dispute between the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad, that was decided in the traditional way of abortive negotiations followed by fighting. Hastings Fraser, the author of "*Our Faithful Ally the Nizam*," betrays his sympathies by the very title of his book and seems to have overlooked the correspondence of the Poona Residency.

To understand properly the issues involved, a survey of the past relations between the three Powers is absolutely necessary.

Peshwa-Nizam rivalry.—The main objects of Maratha policy throughout the 18th century were expansion towards the north, expansion towards the east and expansion towards the south. The first brought them into conflict with the northern Powers. In the second is to be sought the cause of Maratha-Nizam rivalry. In the pursuit of the third their progress was impeded by the rise of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan. The last phase of the second object forms the subject matter of the correspondence embraced by this volume.

The inveterate enmity between the Nizam and the Peshwa needs no explanation. The sanads of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi granted by the Sayyads and confirmed by the Emperor in 1719, gave the Marathas claims over practically the whole of Southern India and opened a wide field for their restless ambition. It could not be expected that these claims would be peacefully submitted to by those Powers who were affected by them. Chief among them was that of Hyderabad founded by Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah in 1724. As a result of the ever recurring warfare between it and its Maratha neighbour from 1727 to 1763, it was shorn of large parts of its territories, made to submit to various demands of the Marathas in the form of Chauth, Sardeshmukhi, Sahotra etc., and thus reduced to the position of a tributary of the Maratha Empire. The Nizam's opportunity came in the last quarter of the century when availing himself of the domestic embarrassments of the Marathas during the interregnum following Narayan Rao Peshwa's death and the infancy of his son Madhavrao Narain, the Nizam regained much of the territory lost in the previous regimes and successfully evaded compliance with several of the Maratha demands. The sudden rise of Haider Ali and the aggressive activities of his son Tipu, however, alarmed and drove him into an alliance with the Peshwa. The joint war of 1786-87 waged by the two on Tipu could produce little impression on him, and both were glad to be invited by the English to co-operate with them against the ruler of Mysore. This triple alliance of Cornwallis's regime carried everything before it, put an end to Tipu's career of conquest, dismembered his territories, and laid on him a heavy indemnity which almost crushed him (1792).

The amity that had marked for a time the relations between the two neighbouring Powers of Poona and Hyderabad disappeared with the disappearance of the menace that had endangered their existence. The claims of the Poona Court that had lain dormant during its domestic troubles were again revived and brought forward for accommodation. With his power augmented by the new acquisitions from Tipu, the Nizam was in no mood to submit tamely to the

renewal of these vexatious claims. In this attempt to reject the long standing demands of the Peshwa, the Nizam was counting on the support of his new ally the English.

Anglo-Nizam relations.—Anglo-Nizam cordiality was of recent origin. Their success over the French in 1763 gave the English the possession of the Northern Circars which was confirmed to them in 1765 by a farman from the Emperor. By the treaty of 1766 negotiated by General Cailaud, the Company's Government agreed to furnish the Nizam as overlord of the Karnatak with a subsidiary force when required and to pay nine lakhs as peshkash for the Northern Circars. The treaty was modified in 1768, when the Nizam joined Haider in an attack on the English; the tribute was reduced, the military assistance was confined to two battalions, subject to the conditions that the Nizam would defray the cost of the force and that it would not be employed against any Power in alliance with the English. Out of the five districts that formed the Northern Circars, Guntoor was given by the Nizam in jagir to his brother and was to go to the English after his demise. The occupation of the district by the Company's troops in 1779 without reference to him, so enraged the Nizam that he originated the quadruple alliance so ably directed against the English by Nana Fadnis. The Nizam proved a lukewarm supporter of the alliance, but this in no way ingratiated him with the English. The first regular contact with them was established as a result of Cornwallis's demand for the district of Guntoor.

In 1788 Cornwallis sent a diplomatic mission under Kennaway to the Nizam to demand the cession of Guntoor. The mission eminently succeeded; the dignity and restraint of the English made a deep impression on the Nizam's mind, who thought that the cession of Guntoor would help him to interest the English in his behalf. An envoy, Meer Allum, was dispatched to Calcutta to survey with the Governor General the political situation and to sound him if he was prepared to enter into a new treaty of defensive and offensive alliance. Hemmed in between two powerful neighbours, the Marathas and Tipu, who threatened his very existence, it was but natural for the

weak Nizam to look around for allies, who, in their own interest, would be anxious for the preservation of his independence. The Nizam thus began to play the age-long diplomatic game of playing one rival against the other, of setting the English against the Marathas.

While the Nizam sought protection both from Tipu and the Marathas, the English had marked out Tipu as their avowed enemy and were cautious to avoid giving offence to the other Powers. Their policy pressed towards an encirclement of Tipu and was careful not to form engagements that would be distasteful to the Marathas. Cornwallis plainly conveyed this meaning to the Nizam in his letter of 7th July 1789 in which Tipu's name was excluded from the list of the friends of the English.

The treaty of Mangalore (1784) between the English and Tipu had proved indecisive. That struggle had added immensely to the prestige of the Sultan and increased the dread felt for him by his neighbours. Immediately hostilities ceased with the English, Tipu directed his arms against the Marathas and the Nizam. When their armies appeared in the field, he avoided a decisive struggle and turned towards the Malabar Chiefs. The all round expansion of his power aligned his enemies against him and helped Cornwallis to build the iron ring round him. Malet, the English minister at Poona, succeeded in inducing the Poona Court to forget for a time its traditional jealousy of the Company's power and join in an alliance against Tipu. The Nizam, seeking safety at any price, was only too glad at being invited as an ally on a footing of equality. Tipu was no match for such a strong combination, and though he held his adversaries at bay for two years, he had, in the end, to agree to a humiliating treaty. Through all these transactions it was obvious that the Nizam was slowly moving towards a closer union with the English and trying to rid himself of the influence which the Poona Court had exerted in his councils so far.

Treaty of Guarantee.—At the end of the Second Mysore War, before the allied armies parted at Bangalore, there were, as natural for the allies, talks of perpetuating the alliance and

thereby securing their defence against the faithless Tipu. These talks gave rise to the much discussed but abortive treaty of guarantee. The treaty aimed at defining and clarifying the defensive articles of the treaties concluded in 1790 on the eve of the last war. The negotiations about this proposal bring out clearly the aims and objects of the three parties. The objective of the English was to continue Tipu in a condition of isolation in which he would be incapable of any mischief. The Nizam was anxious for his safety both against Tipu and the Marathas, and saw in the proposal the opportunity for engaging the English in his behalf ; he therefore became a warm advocate of the proposal.

But the Poona Court was in no mood to accept further engagements with its rival, the English. Only fifteen years back it had been involved with the Company in a deadly struggle and the knock-out blow just now given to Tipu was not calculated to lessen its jealousy. " The collapse of the House of Timur, had opened the road of conquest to any strong integral Power ", and the hegemony of India was a prize for which both the English and the Marathas were now contending. After Tipu's defeat in 1792, the rivalry for supremacy in India between these two became more marked. Before the actual clash of arms came in 1803 the two Powers were manoeuvring for position. It was therefore natural that the Poona Court should take alarm at the growing friendliness between the English, its rival, and the Nizam, its tributary and dependent, whose councils it had influenced over a long period and who had now turned to another direction for guidance. Tipu, the Poona Court held, was sufficiently humbled and needed no watching any more. It therefore looked upon the proposed engagement as " a shield held between it and its dependent the Nizam ".

The more reluctant became the Poona Court to the proposal, the more solicitous became the Nizam for its ratification. The draft suggested by the Poona Court was unacceptable to the Nizam ; that proposed by the Governor General was unpalatable to the Marathas. It was agitated by the Hyderabad Resident that if the Marathas were averse to the proposed engagement, a separate treaty might be concluded with the Nizam. But this

contention of the Resident was stoutly opposed by Malet, who held that in a defensive engagement directed against Tipu with the Nizam alone the advantages accrued to one party, while the Company was liable to be involved more and more in the intrigues of native Powers. He regarded the Nizam as too weak to support a separate defensive engagement. In his despatch of 20th December 1793 he says " It will, I conceive, be clearly understood that this Court (Poona) could support defensive engagements with us independent of the Nizam, yet the Nizam could not do the same independent of this Court and contrary to its will, mixed with and in a great measure subject to the indigenous influence of this State, from which however desirous we may be of extricating him, wisdom, good faith and the most deliberate investigation of consequences demand that we should be extremely guarded and attentive to opportunity in the pursuit * ". Again, in a lengthy dispatch to Kirkpatrick he showed how a separate engagement with the Nizam might involve the British Government in controversy leading to hostilities with the Marathas under unfavourable circumstances. The Nizam's situation was too unstable to make him desirable as an ally. As Malet puts it, " In the first place the interior financial part of his administration is radically faulty and tending to dissolution; the evils of his family and ministry are equally alarming and such as to deprive his Government of every basis of fidelity at home and confidence abroad. His minister's acts seem inseparably connected with temporizing expediency and palpable chicane, in which whatever share circumstances and situation may have, much is doubtless to be attributed to the bents of his mind and disposition. At all events the fact is irrefragable and the conclusion is clear that Faith cannot exist where expedient domineers over system and where neither Genius nor Order exist to control or overcome the despotism of circumstances. In a Government so flimsy as that of the Nizam, which could boast neither prescriptive strength of hereditary permanence nor the more essential firmness of vigour and ability, there is nowhere to lay the foundation of separate engagements † ". Against such an overwhelming

* No. 50 of 20th December 1793.

† No. 54 of 6th January 1794.

argument it could not be expected that the Governor General would accept the proposal of a separate engagement with the Nizam ; on the Maratha side the proposal was denounced by Mahadji Sindia,* who had then attained to a preponderating influence in the councils of the Peshwa, and under his advice the Peshwa informed the Resident that he regarded the former defensive engagement as adequate and saw no necessity for a new one.† The proposal was therefore dropped.

The protracted discussion of the guarantee proposal was not the only occasion when the Nizam's designs were exposed. They were disclosed on many others as well. Sindia's visit to Poona in 1792 offered the Nizam one such occasion to embarrass the Poona authorities and thus flout their long-standing claims. It was thought that the serious differences of Sindia with the Poona Ministry were beyond adjustment and would lead to cleavage and revolution. Such a prospect was welcome to the Nizam's minister Azim-ul-Omra who was now at the helm of affairs ; he decided to handle it as a lever for his own ends. He made advances to Sindia, bribed him with money to fan his rivalry with the Poona Ministry, and in support of his designs began a threatening move in the direction of Poona. The march to Poona was discountenanced by the Governor General,‡ who instructed the Hyderabad Resident to tell the Nizam's minister that he considered as "totally unjustifiable in any member of the alliance interference in the internal disputes and dissensions that unfortunately prevailed among the Chiefs of the other States". The Minister however persisted in his course and tried to do away the impression of the Governor General's strictures on the Nizam's mind by telling him that the English were averse to seeing the union of two such strong persons as Sindia and the Nizam. Sindia's loyalty was beyond question ; he made a dupe of Azim-ul-Omra. While he had no qualms of conscience in receiving money from Azim-ul-Omra, he composed his differences with the Poona ministers and divulged to them the secret intentions of the Nizam. Nana Fadnis thought that the time

* No. 56—Malet's dispatch of 24th January 1794.

† No. 23A.

‡ No. 16.

for an amicable settlement was past, and pressed the Nizam with his famous eight demands* about long standing arrears.

While these demands of the Poona Court were under discussion, the Poona Ministry received an accession of strength by the death of Mahadji Sindia, whose successor Daulatrao Sindia, a young boy of 14, and his Minister Aba Chitnis, a Brahmin, were for some time to come incapable of resisting the Poona Ministry. Nana Fadnis thus secured complete control over the vast military resources of Sindia, which he could now direct to his own ends. Holkar was severely shaken by the set back he received at Lakheri and had become completely subservient to Nana. The Bhonsle of Nagpur had been estranged by Azim-ul-Omra's arrogant behaviour in withholding his share of revenue from Berar. Towards Nana Azim-ul-Omra had been indiscreet enough to use discourteous language unbecoming in a minister of a State. Tipu had nothing but contempt for Azim-ul-Omra as being mainly instrumental in cementing the co-operation with the English that had proved fatal to his ambition. His ruin he now watched with feelings of jubilation. In this alarming situation the Nizam turned to the English for protection.

The Nizam's claims for British protection.—What was the nature of the claim of the Nizam on the English for protection? Was it derived from treaty or did it originate in the peculiar relative position of the parties? The Nizam took his stand on the promises given him by Lord Cornwallis when the latter was courting the Nizam's co-operation before beginning the war against Tipu. Cornwallis in his dispatch of 31st May 1790 writes to Kennaway, the Hyderabad Resident,—“ It is however possible that the apprehensions of the Nizam and his Minister of the hostile intentions of the Marathas may again revive. . . . and although I should wish you to avoid a discussion of this delicate subject if it was practicable, yet if you find the Nizam seriously alarmed, you may repeat in the most explicit terms, that so long as His Highness acts heartily with us and fulfils his engagements we shall think ourselves bound to defend him against attacks from any quarter whatever”.

* Printed in the appendix of his book by Hastings Fraser.

Again, to prove to the Nizam how anxious he was to go every justifiable length in showing his regard to his interests and in gratifying his wishes, he authorized the Resident to tell the Nizam, "that provided the Marathas do not positively object to it, the Governor General will agree to its becoming an additional article in the present treaty (1790), that should differences arise between any two of the confederates the third party would be bound to interpose its good offices and to take means to bring those differences to a just and amicable settlement". He was also to add that should an article to that effect be assented to by the Poona Government and any case should arise in which the Governor General's interference should be called upon in consequence of it, the Nizam would always find him in the best disposition to endeavour to save him from the necessity of submitting to mortification or injury. Though these remarks have a reference to the negotiations in 1790 when Cornwallis was anxious to secure the neutrality if not the co-operation of the Nizam, they appeared to the Nizam as exemplifying the attitude of the English and indicating the line of conduct they would adopt towards the Poona Court in his behalf. Considerations of his own safety taught him to embrace every opportunity by which he could cement his alliance with the English and thus prevent the Poona Court from proceeding to extremities in the enforcement of their claims. He conveyed to the Governor General his belief that though ostensibly the Poona Court gave out that its object did not extend beyond the revival of its ancient claims, it would not stop there but would attempt to establish a sort of protectorate over his State so as to put an end to the friendly intercourse subsisting between him and the English Government. He believed that in the incompatibility of the interests of the Company with those of the Poona Government his safety was assured and his independence guaranteed. The guarantee treaty was another occasion when the solicitude of the English for his independent existence was exhibited, and only the firm stand taken by the Poona Government in opposing the proposal of a separate engagement prevented its ratification. "The Nizam had long before 1794 been conveying to the Poona Court weighty

innuendoes drawn from the appearances of his friendship with the English that could hardly be supported either by previous engagements or any resolutions of the English taken in his favour, and assuming a tone of independence in the discussion of the claims. Considerable stress was frequently laid by the Nizam's Minister on the merit of the Hyderabad Government in withdrawing itself from its former connection and dependence on the Court of Poona and connecting itself closely with the Company, and it was alleged by it that the peculiar predicament in which it was placed with respect to the Poona Court was in a great measure to be attributed thereto. An inference from it was drawn that in duty or candour it was incumbent on the English to relieve the Nizam from the distress in which he was involved by his connection". This position the English positively denied: Malet pointed out that it was true that the Court of Hyderabad had at times thrown itself in some measure on the English, not however in a frank, manly and candid way, but for the purpose of averting evils or acquiring advantages in predicaments in which it had been involved by its own imprudent and short-sighted policy. He gave it as his opinion that "the conduct of the Court of Hyderabad towards the Company was not entitled to the Company's good offices further than policy and its own interests may suggest, and that, that should be the principle on which the Company's disposition to mediate between him and the Peshwa should be founded". In the course of discussion it was suggested to the Governor General that as in an open contest the Nizam had little chance of prevailing against the Peshwa, he should secure his emancipation from the latter's thralldom by commuting the arrears and the current claims into the cession of a tract of territory. He should consider no sacrifice of territory as too great, because it would secure his dominions and councils from the influence of the Poona Government.

British attitude.—Sir John Shore was called upon to decide a very delicate issue. He understood that the revival of its old claims was the thin end of the wedge by which the Poona Government sought to dominate the Nizam's councils, which would react unfavourably on the amity existing between the

Nizam and the Company. That the Poona Court was not prepared to recede from any of its claims so long as it had no doubt of the Company adhering to its former engagements, was also known to him. There was in addition the prescription of the British Legislature not to involve the Company's affairs beyond what was implied by existing engagements. To have countenanced openly the Nizam's rejection of the Poona demands would have meant declaration of hostilities with the Maratha Confederacy, and to this length the Governor General was not prepared to go at a time when the Confederacy, once more united under Nana Fadnis, appeared almost irresistible, and when Tipu smarting under his defeat, was nursing thoughts of revenge against the Company. He also could not afford to forget the alarming situation in Europe, where England was involved in a mighty struggle with revolutionary France which precluded any hope of getting substantial reinforcements from Home. The Nizam was a weakling and offered little advantage to the Company as an ally. Thus circumstanced, the Governor General was unwilling to risk an immediate war in anticipation of future dangers likely to result from Maratha aggrandisements at the expense of the Nizam. The finances of the Company, depleted by the contest with Tipu, could ill bear the additional heavy burden of a costly war with the Confederacy. He therefore chose to follow the policy of strict non-intervention, advised the Nizam to liquidate the Maratha demands by a fair accommodation, and instructed the Poona Resident to make a friendly expostulation with the Poona Durbar on the ground of the common interests of the three allies. In pursuance of this advice, he gave his approval to the deputation of an envoy to Poona by the Nizam to discuss a settlement of the dispute.

Meer Alam's Embassy.—The failure of Meer Alam's deputation—a concession wrung from the Minister Azim-ul-Omra unwilling to share his authority with others, and yielded only with a view to inducing the English to follow their friendly advice with a substantial gesture—was a foregone conclusion. No ample instructions were given to the ambassador about the mission he was setting out on, nor was

he made thoroughly acquainted with the issues he was to discuss with the Poona Ministers. Later, in the course of the negotiations, verbal messages coming from Azim-ul-Omra often countermanded written instructions given to the envoy. In contrast to the large retinue accompanying him, his plenipotentiary powers were inadequate, nugatory and extended not beyond the adjustment of minor detail or Juziat claims, decision regarding which even needed confirmation from Hyderabad. After two months had been spent in settling the preliminaries, the Adoni article was taken up. It was discovered that while the Poona Durbar claimed from that district about 1,75,000 Rs. annually, the Hyderabad Court was not prepared to go beyond even half of that amount. The Bidar article met with no better fate. The Poona Ministry was more anxious about 'Faisaleh Kuleat' or general claims, and when it pressed their settlement it was told by the Nizam that they could be settled only after friendship had been established between the parties, clearly conveying the impression that he had no mind to recognise them at all. Throughout the discussion it was perceptible that Meer Alam laboured under the impression of being engaged in a bad cause and under a distrust of the real disposition and intentions of his superiors. He made it plain to Malet that "an advantageous or even an amicable settlement of the dispute was desperate but in the Poona Court admitting the persuasion of its ultimately drawing the Company into the support of the Nizam".

The Poona Court declines British mediation.—The Governor General had expressed his willingness to act as umpire in the dispute, provided both parties were agreeable to it and promised to state their claims without colour or prejudice and produced documents in support of their contention. Such a proposal was unacceptable to the Poona Court, which in dealing with the Nizam professed to be only treating with one of its 'Mamledars' and brooked no outsider to sit in judgment on its dispute. The Nizam's original allegation that the claims of the two parties were reciprocal and as amounting to a balance of accounts between them, was later on abandoned and he pleaded his inability to meet them fully if insisted upon.

To the last the British Resident was kept ignorant of the Kuleat or general claims based on the Treaty of Edgeer (1784), as that would have exposed the Nizam's intrigues inimical to the Company's interests and would have lost him English support. British mediation being thus out of consideration, the utmost that the Resident could do was to expostulate with the Poona Minister for proceeding to extremities with a member of the triple alliance. To the Resident's remonstrance the Poona Durbar replied that the dispute was an affair between them and the Nizam, that envoys from the latter were discussing the causes of the dispute, and that the Maratha Court had no intention to resort to extreme measures if its demands were recognised and equitably accommodated. The message added that should the Nizam however decline a fair settlement, it had no other way but an appeal to arms.

Neither of the parties was sincere in its desire for an amicable accommodation. The Poona Court had accepted Meer Alam's deputation in order not to offend the susceptibilities of the English ; to sound their real intentions in the dispute and to gain time to perfect its military preparations ; the Nizam fondly hoped that the Poona Court would be embroiled in difficulties with its feudatories or that his extreme plight would induce the English to rush to his assistance. His last minute appeal evoked the following observation from Sir John Shore (2nd March 1795) :—

“ When we reflect on the vices and imbecility of the Nizam's administration, the impossibility of directing his politics without usurping his government and the dangers of perpetual war, the consequence of such interference, when we consider the difficulty of making any effectual impression on the Maratha state by our forces, the comparative facility with which they might injure us, the magnitude of their resources and exertions, as well as the number of troops, both native and European, which would be required to oppose the united efforts of the Marathas and Tipu, and the inevitable ruin of a long protracted war—the inducement to support the Nizam at the hazard of such impending circumstances ought to

be much stronger than the apprehension of future evils from the subversion of his power.

“But, above all, it is indispensably necessary to advert to the situation of affairs in Europe, which precludes the expectation of receiving any considerable reinforcements of troops during the continuance of the war, and impresses the necessity of preserving by every effort peace with all the Powers in India.

“Our political consequence might lose something of its importance in the estimate of the native Powers by leaving the Nizam to his fate, but it cannot be placed in competition with the greater evils attending a war with Tipu and the Marathas which, I consider the unavoidable consequence of supporting singly the Nizam against Tipu if that prince should attack him while engaged in hostilities with the Peshwa . . . in weighing motives whether to help the Nizam or leave him to his fate, and the result of such a policy we must attend to self-preservation including the permanency of the British possessions in India.”

The Peshwa went into tents after the Dussera on 26th December 1794. He gathered round his standard for the last time almost all the principal feudatories of the empire. Tukoji Holkar with his Pindari hordes had reached Poona in the preceding week. Parashuram Bhau had joined with his horse in October. Bhonsle's contingents had effected their junctions in December. Sindia's battalions under the command of Perron and Jiwba Bakshy joined the main army in February. The vast army raised by the Nizam to oppose the Marathas was no better than a rabble with the exception of Raymond's battalions. The two armies drew near each other in the vicinity of Kharda, when the Nizam committed a tactical blunder. In seeking to march his army to the protection of the fort of Parinda, he made a flank movement in face of the enemy's advance. His right flank was attacked by the Maratha horse under Parashuram and Sindia's battalions on 11th March 1795. Instead of keeping his ground, the Nizam in a moment of weakness retired to the fort of Kharda for shelter. This act proved his ruin. Scared by the cannonade of Sindia's guns, his troops fled away under cover of the darkness of the night. The next morning the Maratha horse besieged the fort, which was

insignificant and ill-equipped to stand a siege. After protracted negotiations the Nizam made an abject surrender and submitted to a humiliating peace.*

Nothing could be more advantageous to the Marathas than the treaty signed on 0th April 1795. It confirmed the various demands of the Poona Court, secured to it territory worth 33 lakhs of Rupees annually, and promised it three crores of rupees in indemnity. But the most important advantage reaped by the Poona Government was the surrender of the Nizam's Minister Azim-ul-Omra. It was this man who had kept in view the emancipation of his Government and sought to rescue it from the absolute subservience to the Poona Government into which it had fallen by the superior power of its neighbour and the inept policy of his predecessors. He had availed himself of whatever means came to his hand; fomented intrigues in the Poona Court, and cleverly made use of the conflicting interests of the Marathas and the English. His design was well planned, but it failed in the hour of execution by reason of the superior tactics of the Poona minister.

The results of the disaster to the Nizam soon became apparent. The detachment of English troops hitherto employed in his service was ordered to be sent back. The French influence in his army became more marked. The Nizam's authority reached a low ebb and induced his son to rebel. Envoys began to travel between Seringapatam and Hyderabad. To all outward appearances the dissolution of the Nizam's power appeared imminent.

The letters of General Raymond have been given in translation at the end of Vol. III. No report by him on the battle of Kharda has been found. His army organisation as described near the end of the present volume may be compared with that of De Boigne, which is given in Vol. I of this series.

14th January 1936.

V. G. DIGHE.

* Maratha accounts magnify this conflict as a great victory; the English version, as can be gathered from these despatches, is different.

Contents of Volume IV

(Arranged alphabetically)

No.	From	To	Date	Page
Appen. 2	Azim-ul-Omra	Meer Alam	11 August 1794	321
145	"	"	8 December 1794	201
149	"	Parashuram Bhau	17 December 1794	205
86	Behro Punt	Malet	27 July 1794	108
10	Cornwallis, Earl	"	5 February 1793	17
16	"	Kennaway	23 April 1793	20
21	"	"	20 June 1793	25
24	"	Malet	6 July 1793	27
28	"	Kennaway	31 July 1793	31
29	"	Malet	"	32
30	"	"	"	32
8	Kennaway, Resident Hyderabad	"	18 January 1793	14
9	"	Cornwallis	28 January 1793	16
11	"	"	23 March 1793	18
13	"	Malet	3 April 1793	19
15	"	Earl Cornwallis	22 April 1793	20
17	"	"	27 April 1793	21
19	"	Malet	1 June 1793	23
22	"	Earl Cornwallis	30 June 1793	26
26	"	"	12 July 1793	29
41	"	Malet	6 November 1793	42
42	"	Sir John Shore	"	42
43	"	"	19 November 1793	43
44	"	Malet	26 November 1793	44
46	"	Sir Charles Oakley	5 December 1793	48
48	"	Malet	12 December 1793	49
49	"	Sir John Shore G. G.	17 December 1793	51
158	Kirkpatrick William, Resident, Hyderabad	Sir Charles Malet	1 January 1795	216
159	"	"	4 January 1795	219
160	"	"	19 January 1795	220
161	"	"	22 January 1795	221
163	"	"	4 February 1795	224
164	"	Governor General	10 February 1795	225
165	"	"	15 February 1795	227
166	"	"	23 February 1795	228
167	"	"	"	230
168	"	"	"	231
169	"	Sir Charles Malet	24 February 1795	232

No.	From	To	Date	Page
170	Kinkpatrick, William, Resident, Hyderabad,	Sir Charles Malet	1 March 1795	232
171	" "	" "	"	233
172	" "	" "	2 March 1795	234
173	" "	Governor General	3 March 1795	234
174	" "	Sir Charles Malet	5 March 1795	235
175	" "	Governor General	6 March 1795	236
176	" "	" "	7 March 1795	236
177	" "	Malet	8 March 1795	237
178A	" "	Governor General	11 March 1795	238
180	" "	" "	12 March 1795	243
184	" "	Sir Charles Malet	13 March 1795	251
185	" "	Sir John Shore, G. G.	15 March 1795	252
188	" "	Sir Charles Malet	16 March 1795	254
189	" "	Governor General	17 March 1795	255
191	" "	" "	19 March 1795	257
192	" "	Sir Charles Malet	20 March 1795	258
193	" "	Governor General	"	259
194	" "	" "	22 March 1795	259
195	" "	Sir Charles Malet	23 March 1795	260
197	" "	Sir John Shore, G. G.	24 March 1795	262
198	" "	" "	25 March 1795	263
199	" "	" "	27 March 1795	264
200	" "	" "	28 March 1795	265
201	" "	" "	30 March 1795	266
203	" "	Sir Charles Malet	1 April 1795	279
204	" "	Governor General	"	279
205	" "	Sir Charles Malet	2 April 1795	280
206	" "	Governor General	6 April 1795	281
207	" "	Sir Charles Malet	10 April 1795	282
208	" "	" "	23 April 1795	283
209	" "	Governor of Madras	"	284
210	" "	Sir Charles Malet	30 April 1795	284
211	" "	" "	3 May 1795	285
212	" "	Governor General	6 May 1795	287
213	" "	Sir Charles Malet	10 May 1795	288
216	" "	Governor General	22 May 1795	291
218	" "	" "	24 May 1795	303
220	" "	" "	2 June 1795	305
196	Kinkpatrick's Munshy	23 March 1795	261
1	Malet, Sir Charles, Resident, Poona,	Earl Cornwallis, G. G.	8 June 1792	1
2	" "	Kennaway	29 October 1792	2
3	" "	"	30 November 1792	3

No.	From	To	Date	Page
4	Malet, Sir Charles, Resident, Poona.	Kennaway	30 November 1792	4
5	" "	"	26 December 1792	6
6	" "	"	28 December 1792	13
7	" "	"	11 January 1793	13
12	" "	"	27 March 1793	18
14	" "	"	15 April 1793	19
18	" "	"	8 May 1793	22
20	" "	"	14 June 1793	23
23	" "	"	5 July 1793	26
34	" "	Lt. Steuart	25 August 1793	37
36	" "	"	2 September 1793	38
47	" "	Kennaway	6 December 1793	49
50	" "	"	20 December 1793	52
51	" "	"	23 December 1793	54
54	" "	Kirkpatrick William	6 January 1794	56
56	" "	Sir John Shore G. G.	24 January 1794	64
57	" "	Governor General	31 January 1794	66
58	" "	Kirkpatrick William	12 February 1794	66
59	" "	Governor General	24 February 1794	66
60	" "	" "	3 March 1794	68
61	" "	" "	21 March 1794	68
62	" "	Kirkpatrick William	4 April 1794	70
65	" "	" "	21 April 1794	76
66	" "	" "	9 May 1794	77
74	" "	" "	13 June 1794	91
75	" "	Governor General	"	93
89	" "	" "	2 August 1794	116
90	" "	Kirkpatrick William	"	118
91	" "	" "	5 August 1794	120
95	" "	" "	12 August 1794	125
97	" "	" "	16 August 1794	130
98	" "	Sir John Shore, G. G.	17 August 1794	132
99	" "	Kirkpatrick William	"	132
100	" "	Governor General	19 August 1794	136
102	" "	P. shwa	"	140
Appen. 1	" "	Kirkpatrick William	23 August 1794	318
103	" "	" "	26 August 1794	141
3	" "	" "	30 August 1794	324
4	" "	" "	6 September 1794	324
106	" "	" "	"	146
107	" "	" "	9 September 1794	147
108	" "	" "	"	149
110	" "	" "	21 September 1794	154

No.	From	To	Date	Page
111	Malet, Sir Charles, Resident, Pcona.	Kirkpatrick William	23 September 1794	160
112	" "	Governor General	"	160
115	" "	Kirkpatrick William	27 September 1794	162
117	" "	Governor General	30 September 1794	165
120	" "	" "	4 October 1794	169
121	" "	Kirkpatrick William	"	169
122	" "	" "	"	170
123	" "	" "	11 October 1794	173
124	" "	" "	21 October 1794	175
125	" "	" "	* * *	177
126	" "	" "	25 October 1794	177
127	" "	" "	28 October 1794	179
129	" "	" "	3 November 1794	181
130	" "	" "	7 November 1794	182
132	" "	" "	10 November 1794	185
133	" "	" "	14 November 1794	186
134	" "	Governor General	21 November 1794	187
135	" "	William Kirkpatrick	"	187
136	" "	" "	"	189
137	" "	" "	28 November 1794	190
138	" "	Lt. Steuart	29 November 1794	192
139	" "	Governor General	1 December 1794	193
140	" "	Kirkpatrick	"	194
141	" "	" "	5 December 1794	196
144	" "	" "	8 December 1794	199
146	" "	" "	12 December 1794	203
147	" "	Sir Jhon Shore, G. G.	15 December 1794	203
148	" "	William Kirkpatrick	18 December 1794	204
150	" "	Sir John Shore	19 December 1794	206
152	" "	Governor of Madras	22 December 1794	209
153	" "	William Kirkpatrick	"	209
154	" "	Sir John Shore, G. G.	26 December 1794	210
155	" "	Lt. Steuart	"	210
157	" "	Governor of Bombay	27 December 1794	215
162	" "	Governor General	1 February 1795	222
179	" "	" "	12 March 1795	242
187	" "	" "	16 March 1795	254
202	" "	" "	March 1795	266
182	Malet's Munshy	Malet	13 March 1795	249
183	" "	" "	"	250
31	Meer Alam	Kennaway's Munshy	2 August 1793	35
113	"	Azim-ul-Omra	25 September 1794	160
128	"	"	31 October 1794	180

No.	From	To	Date	Page
143	Meer Alam	Azir-ul-Omra	4 December 1794	197
156	"	"	26 December 1794	213
131	Mustakeem-ud-daula	Meer Alam	5 November 1794	184
45	Nizam, the	The Peshwa	26 November 1794	46
142	"	Meer Alam	5 December 1794	196
151	Parashunam Bhau	The Nizam	20 December 1794	206
32	Poona Durbar	"	8 August 1793	36
55	"	Sir Charles Malet	9 January 1794	63
92	"	"	8 August 1794	121
96	"	"	12 August 1794	130
101	"	"	17 August 1794	139
105	"	"	4 September 1794	145
214	"	"	11 May 1795	289
215	"	"	14 May 1795	290
221	"	"	"	313
52	Secretary to G. G.	Kennaway	24 December 1793	55
53	Shore, Sir John. G. G.	"	"	55
62A	"	Sir C. Malet	17 February 1794	71
62B	"	"	25 March 1793	72
63	"	Sir Charles Malet	7 April 1794	73
64	"	William Kirkpatrick	14 April 1794	75
68	"	"	19 May 1794	79
73	"	"	9 June 1794	89
80	"	Sir Charles Malet	3 July 1794	98
81	"	William Kirkpatrick	"	99
93	"	Sir Charles Malet	8 August 1794	121
95	"	William Kirkpatrick	"	122
104	"	Sir Charles	1 September 1794	144
109	"	William Kirkpatrick	18 September 1794	150
116	"	Sir Charles Malet	28 September 1794	164
118	"	"	1 October 1794	167
119	"	William Kirkpatrick	"	167
25	Steuart, Lt., Assistant Resident, Hyderabad.	Kennaway	7 July 1793	28
27	"	Sir Charles Malet	16 July 1793	30
33	"	"	9 August 1793	36
35	"	Earl Cornwallis	1 September 1793	37
37	"	"	29 September 1793	38
38	"	Sir Charles Malet	7 October 1793	38
39	"	"	26 October 1793	39
67	Uhthoff, J., Assistant Resident, Poona.	William Kirkpatrick	12 May 1794	79
69	"	"	26 May 1794	80
70	"	"	30 May 1794	83

No.	From	To	Date	Page
71	Uhthoff, J., Assistant Resident, Poona.	William Kirkpatrick	6 June 1794	84
73	" "	" "	9 June 1794	85
77	" "	" "	16 June 1794	93
78	" "	Sir John Shore, G. G.	23 June 1794	94
79	" "	Kirkpatrick	"	95
80	" "	"	27 June 1794	97
83	" "	"	15 July 1794	102
84	" "	Sir John Shore	20 July 1794	103
85	" "	William Kirkpatrick	23 July 1794	105
86	" "	Sir John Shore	"	106
88	" "	" "	27 July 1794	108
89	" "	" "	29 July 1794	109
178	" "	Sir C. W. Malet	12 March 1795	238
181A	" "	" "	20 March 1795	246
190	News-letter	Kirkpatrick	17 March 1795	256
219	Convention of Kharda.	"	10 April 1795	303
Appen. 1	Treaty of Egheer	"	20 June 1784	315

Chronology of important events.

Treaty of Salbye . . .	17th May 1782	Sir John Shore assumes office . . .	Oct. 1793.
Treaty of Mangalore . . .	11th Mar. 1784.	Death of Mahadji Sindia	12th Feb. 1794.
Treaty of Edgheoi . . .	20th June 1784.	Nizam's embassy arrives in Poona . . .	26th July 1794.
Treaty of Cdjendraquad . . .	26th Feb 1787.	Peshwa enters into tents	19th Dec. 1794.
Treaty of Poona . . .	1st June 1790.	Sindia's battalions join the main Maratha army . . .	Feb. 1795.
Treaty of Pangal . . .	4th July 1790.	Nizam descends the Moon Ghaut . . .	4th Mar. 1795.
Treaty of Seringapatam . . .	18th Mar. 1792	The Battle of Kharda . . .	11th Mar. 1795.
Mahadji Sindia arrives at Poona . . .	12th June 1792.	The convention of Kharda signed . . .	10th April 1795.
Nizam's march to Bidar . . .	15th April 1793.		
Poona Government declines further engagements with the Co. . .	3rd July 1793.		
Maratha demands presented to the Nizam . . .	Oct 1793.		

SECTION 1

The Abortive Treaty of Guarantee.

No. 1—The paper recalls a talk between Haripant and Cornwallis in which the latter promised he would instruct his Resident at Hyderabad to advise the Nizam to discharge the Maratha claims.

8th June 1792.

Extract of a letter from the Resident at Poona to the Governor General dated 8th June 1792.

To the foregoing official message Behropunt* added the following in a confidential form, from himself, viz., "that Hurrypunt† having made several communications to the minister, he (the Minister) had ordered Behropunt to attend, when Hurrypunt repeated the following articles in his presence as those that had been agitated by him with Your Lordship, but without instructions from this Court for so doing.

Article 1st. "That the Peshwa's Government had great demands of Chout on Nizam Ally Khan, particularly in the quarter of Adoni, in the recovery of which rigour had yet been avoided; but as it was probable there would be a necessity for rigorously enforcing the demand, he (Hurrypunt) hoped Lord Cornwallis would have no objection thereto and would instruct Sir John Kennaway‡ accordingly, to which his Lordship replied that he would instruct Sir John Kennaway, if consulted, to advise Nizam Ally Khan to discharge what was due."

* Behropant Mehendale, Minister of the Poona Court charged with transaction of business with the English Resident.

† Haripant Phadke, statesman and warrior, died 1794, Nana's right hand man.

‡ Resident at Hyderabad.

Extract of a letter from the Governor General to the Resident at Poona dated 24th June 1792.

"The subject of article 1st which is not correctly stated, passed to the best of my recollections, in presence of Appa Bulwantrao* and Buchajeeput†, but it is a matter of no great consequence. The demand of the ordinary Chout, in all my conferences with the Mahrattas, I have uniformly refused to hear of, and treated as entirely inadmissible. The payment, however, of Chout by the Nizam for the country near Adoni was confirmed by treaty, as Sir John Kennaway informed me, and stood therefore on the ground of peshkush; and at the time it was mentioned whether in private with Hurryput or in presence of the others, I gave some such guarded answer as Behropunt reported."

No. 2—Malet advises Kennaway to await instructions from the Governor General before proposing the treaty of guarantee to their respective Courts.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART., RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Poona, 29th October 1792.

My ideas relative to defensive arrangements with our respective Courts have been so frequently and so fully explained in the course of our correspondence, that it must be unnecessary to acquaint you of my unwillingness to proceed a single step in an affair of so great moment, and pregnant with consequences of so great importance to our own country and the future Government of this, without specific instructions, or at least till the receipt of an answer to the reference you have advised of the subject to the reconsideration of Government, and till furnished with an answer to my letter to the Governor General of the 26th ult. which, by suggesting a retrospect of what has formerly passed on the subject of guarantee, may have induced Government to give such a direction to the future negotiations regarding it as by leading our respective Courts to the necessity of coming to categorical decision on certain points of positive reciprocity, may, by their hesitation to enter into such a predicament, leave us the alternative of continuing or dissolving all further defensive connexion.

I may venture to predict, that (abstracted from its present domestick embarrassments in which its neighbours may reasonably rejoice) neither promptitude nor candor are to be expected from this Court in the negotiation of a defensive league. The Sovereignities of our two states, I mean the British and the Mahratta, have already a strong tendency to rivalship in many parts, and our power is now become the object of its most anxious jealousy. It will of course scan with singular caution every step, that involving the Nazim in a general defensive arrangement may emancipate

* Appa Balwant Mehendale, Peshwa's counsellor, died 1798.

† Brother of Behropant Mehendale.

him in some degree from its present influence and its views of further subjugation.

By a parity of reasoning it is obvious that the Nazim's Minister will be as anxious to promote, as this Court to avoid, arrangement that may be expected more or less conducive to giving him a security, which his own power is inadequate to. But as I doubt not this Court and the Nazim's have distinct engagements with each other, I presume, it will be as necessary that they should be submitted to our pre-investigation to enable us to judge of the practicability of making a defensive arrangement with him, jointly with or separately from this Court, as that all the agreements of the two Courts with Tippo should be fairly exposed to our inspection as ours may be to theirs; since without these previous measures to clear our grounds, every negotiatory step will be liable to the difficulty of involving the parties in inextricable misunderstandings.

Should this Government decline any more specific engagements or further explanations of those already subsisting, I am of opinion, that (beside ascertaining the nature of his connection with this Government mentioned in the former paragraph) it would be expedient to ascertain the Nazim's power of acting defensively with us, either actually against this State or "which would be tantamount" against Tippo contrary to the inclination of this State, and in the event of those points being satisfactorily cleared up, I presume, no further objection would rest to a separate defensive arrangement with him, and, *vice versa*, should the nature of his territorial possessions, the state of his family, the genius of his government and the force of his army be found such as to disqualify him or his heir from the effectual discharge of such an independent connexion, the agitation of which would excite this Court's keenest jealousy.

No. 3—Malet sends Kennaway material for the treaty of guarantee to be proposed to the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad and discusses with him the mode in which it should be presented.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART., RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 30th November 1792.

Agreeable to the promise in my last, I have now the pleasure to enclose in specific articles (founded on His Lordship the Governor General's orders of 20th August and 27th October and on what has passed between you and me on the occasion) such materials as may, I presume, with the addition of such suggestions as may occur to you, be easily modelled unto an instrument of defensive engagement agreeable to the intention of Government, or at least lead us by a fair and short road to the discovery of the disposition of our respective Courts on the subject.

This being granted, I take the liberty (in consequence of the latitude delegated to us as to the time and mode of prosecuting our negotiations and agreeable to his Lordship's commands of consulting freely with each other on the important subject) to propose that we present to our respective Courts copies of the defensive articles in the last Treaties of Poona, Hyderabad and Seringapattam, and that we accompany them with a written memorial stating, that as those articles require definition and precision to render them efficient, it is incumbent that a negotiation be immediately commenced for that purpose to obviate all ground of future cavil or imputation on the good faith of the Parties.

In the event of your acceding to this preliminary measure, I have to propose your advising me thereof, and fixing such a date for the delivery of your memorial as may give time for the arrival of your letters and for my presenting a similar one on the same date to this Court.

This mode appears to me to tend to a simplification of our future progress in the event of our Courts' encouraging the negotiation while it will afford us the requisite leisure for a full and frequent interchange of sentiment, and on the other hand, must lead to an early discovery of their sentiment should they be averse to such a line of perspicuity, which, however repugnant to their politics, is absolutely necessary and will, I hope, be always congenial to ours.

No. 4—Material for the treaty of guarantee sent by Malet.

30th November 1792.

Objects of pursuit in the negotiation of a defensive treaty of alliance between the Honourable English East India Company, the Peshwa and Nazim on one part and Futteh Ally Khan commonly called Tippoo Sultan on the other :—

(1) To ascertain what will be just ground of complaint on the part of the allies against Tippoo Sultan on the foundation of the last treaties of Poona, Hyderabad and Seringaputtan, the spirit of which is not to be exceeded.

(2) To secure a latitude for investigating and thereby securing an opening for settling all disputes by amicable negotiations, to which end a stipulation to be entered into for a clear communication of the cause of dispute being made to the other contracting parties by the party offended.

(3) To ascertain the mode of coercion in the event of the failure of negotiation.

(4) To ascertain the time and force of the co-operation of the allies in the event of coercion becoming necessary.

(5) To stipulate for the definement of a plan of co-operation in the event of the adoption of hostilities.

(6) To stipulate against separate negotiations during hostility and against the conclusion of separate peace on the principle of the present article of the treaties of Poona and Hyderabad on that subject.

(7) To procure a stipulation for the employment of the whole respective force of the allies led by the respective head of the alliance.

(8) To remove all ambiguity and doubtful construction of the defensive articles of the late treaties, namely, 13th article of the treaty of Poona and 10th article of the treaty of Hyderabad, and 7th and 8th articles of the treaty of Seringaputtan.

(9) To ascertain the present engagements between Tippoo Sultan on one part and the Peshwa and Nazim on the other, also their boundaries, dependants, and respective claims, since thereby only can a judgment be formed of the aggression in future disputes.

(10) To ascertain whether Tippoo Sultan's molestation of Ram Raja (*alias* Raja of Travancore) is to be construed by the allies an attack on the Company, as at present he does not appear to be included in the Company's defensive engagements with the Peshwa and the Nazim, unless the construction of the general articles of the treaties of Poona and Hyderabad be admitted to extend to him. (On further consideration he does appear to be included for being specifically included as an ally of the Company in the 2 articles of the treaty of Mangalore of 11th March 1784, and that being confirmed by that of Seringaputtan jointly by the allies, the Raja is clearly included therein.)

(11) To ascertain the engagements subsisting between the Peshwa and the Nazim, and in like manner to submit to them our engagements with each.

(12) In the event of their declining such an explanation, to insist on a stipulation generally cancelling all separate engagements between them incompatible with the spirit or letter of the proposed defensive alliance.

(13) To ascertain the expediency and the practicability of our entering into separate or joint engagements with the Peshwa and Nazim's Government.

(14) To ascertain the expediency or practicability of entering into a defensive league with either of them, without the accession of the other, against Tippo Sultan.

(15) To define and as far as possible place the true meaning and faithful execution ofbeyond the.....

(16) To discover, without betraying the appearance of need by importunity, the disposition of our allies relative to the present defensive engagements as the ground of more particular ones.

(17) To consult with each other as to the time and mode of carrying the instructions of the Governor General into execution.

To determine from the success of our negotiation on the expediency or not of delivering a written Declaration of our sense of the meaning and extent of the present defensive articles.

To avoid with the utmost solicitude all implications of our troops (that in the discharge of our defensive obligations to the allies) in the domestic troubles for that purpose especially of this state, since its obnoxiousness to the neighbours rests in a peculiar manner of its authority over the aristocratical members of the Empire, whose independence, though we may not promote, we ought not to control.

To stipulate for free access and exemption from duties of the agents of each Government to the respective countries of the contracting Power for the purchase of grain, horses and bullocks and for raising recruits.

No. 5—Draft of the treaty as proposed by Malet.

26th December 1792.

Treaty of Defensive Alliance between the Honourable United English E.I.Co., the Peshwa Souae Madarou Narrain Pundit Purdhan Bhadur and the Nabob Nizam Ally Khan Asof Jah Bhadur, for the clear ascertainment of the meaning and extent of the 13th article of the Treaty of Poona and 10th article of the Treaty of Paungul, to the end of enforcing a faithful observance of the Treaty of Seringaputtan, and the mutual maintenance of the contracting Powers, their Allies and Dependants in secure possession of all the rights, interests and territories ceded to and held by them on the conclusion of the said Treaty of Seringaputtan against Futteh Ally

Khan known by the denomination of Tippoo Sultan, settled by etc. etc. as per usual form.

Article 1.

By the article 13 of the Treaty of Poona and article 10 of the Treaty of Paungul it is stipulated that, "if after the conclusion of peace Tippoo Sultan should again infringe it with either of the allyd powers the others should unite to punish him." It is, therefore, hereby settled for the better ascertainment of the act of aggression and commencement of injury, against which alone the defensive engagements of the allies are intended to operate, that the allies shall reciprocally furnish each other with an instrument specifying all their subsisting engagements with Tipoo, their frontier towns and stations, their rights, royalties and dependancies contiguous to Tipoo Sultan's borders, which being properly investigated and established on the basis of the late Treaty of Seringaputtun shall be adopted in the form of a schedule as a necessary part of this Treaty and as the rule in conjunction with the Treaty of Seringaputtun for the guidance of the allies in deciding on the act of aggression, overt or covert, in all cases of difference or altercation between any of the allies and Tipoo Sultan.

*The following are Lord Cornwallis's orders on this subject under 20 August—viz.

"The allies are bound to guarantee against Tipoo the territories that each of them might possess at the conclusion of the war, but it must always be adverted to that the stipulation is merely defensive and cannot operate unless Tipoo should attack either of them without just provocation." And again His Lordship says "the greatest care must be taken that no vague or ambiguous expression shall be admitted into this new instrument, and that the stipulations shall in no shape go beyond the spirit of the articles 13 and 10 of the Treaties of Poona and Hyderabad" upon which they will be founded,—and again, "It must be clearly expressed that the allies shall not be considered as bound to take up arms in his (the other ally's) favour until they are convinced that he has justice on his side and all means of

Article 2.

In the event of cause of complaint^{re} being given by Tippu Sultan to either of the allies, it shall not be allowable for the party supposing itself aggrieved to prosecute its resentment beyond defence or simple retaliation until after applying for and receiving or waiting (2) months, in which the determination of the other allies on the cause of complaint might be received, and in case of the supposed aggrieved party prosecuting resentment to invasion or conquest in Tippu Sultan's country previous to the receipt or without having waited the prescribed time for the receipt of the determination of the other allies on the reference made, the parties applyd to shall be at liberty to co-operate or not at option, or to interpose or not with their good offices to accommodate the difference between the disputants.

Article 3.

Differences arising between any of the allies and Tippu and the cause being represented by the ally concerned to the others, they are immediately to make an offer of their good offices to effect an accommodation with an injunction to both parties to refrain from hostility. When, should the complaining ally not listen to the injunction, the optional stipulation of the foregoing article is to have force, but should Tippu neglect the injunction by the prosecution of hostility to the detriment of the said ally, he is to be looked on as the aggressor and to be proceeded against accordingly by the other allies.

Article 4.

In the event of any dispute between either of the allies and Tippu being referred to the other allies, its investigation (after taking the previous step mentioned in the above

article of admonishing the disputants and offering their good offices) is to be immediately entered on and prosecuted with all possible speed, and on ascertainment of the origin of complaint the judgment * of the allies, to whom the dispute is referred, is to be signified as soon as possible to the disputants, and the mode of accommodation to be prescribed. When in the event of its being declined by the ally concerned, he will have no further claim to the assistance of the other allies. But if it be rejected by Tipoo, he must be proceeded against by the allies jointly as the aggressor.

* What is to be done in case of a difference of opinion amongst the allies ?

Article 5.

In the event of hostilities becoming unavoidable, after trying every possible mode to avoid them agreeable to the just and pacific principles and defensive engagements of the alliance, the allies shall within () months or sooner, if possible, from the ascertainment of aggression, enter the enemy's country or bring into actual service by invading his country, by defending their own or by marching to join one or both of the other allies *viz.*

[The strength of the Detachment to be specified here.]

Suppose the Company, 12 Battalions of Infantry Europe and native with their usual field artillery and 2 Regiments of Cavalry, and each of the allies 20,000 horse to be respectively numbered by Commissaries of each State.

and within month increase the said quotas to their whole respective force commanded by the Principals in person, and in the interim of completing the last general equipment, or sooner, if possible, of the whole force of the respective states, the general plan for the conduct of the war shall be concerted and definitively settled by the allies.

Query. How is the force of the great Feudatories of this Empire to be accounted for, and what to be construed our whole force, whether that of Madras only or jointly with Bengal and Bombay ; if the latter, how

Article 6.

Enter Sir John Kennaway's 4th article.

Article 7.

Hostilities being actually entered on, the allies shall be guided in the conduct of the war and conclusion of peace by the 8, 9, 11 and 12th articles of the treaty of Poona answering to the () articles of the treaty of Paungul, and tho' it is never to be forgotten that the object of such hostilities is entirely defensive, and to cease as soon as possible in the cause of complaint being redressed and satisfaction given, yet in case of conquests being necessarily made the allies shall be guided by the 9th article of the treaty of Poona and () article of the treaty of Paungul in the partition thereof.

Article 8.

Either of the allies seeing good ground to apprehend hostile designs on the part of Tippu Sultan, shall, without delay, make a full disclosure thereof to the other allies, who on receipt thereof shall immediately caution the said Tippu against such designs, and offer their mediation to bring about an accommodation of any existing or impending disagreement with a plain intimation of the consequence and as provided for in this Treaty. Should he in neglect of the said offer of mediation proceed to any act of injury or aggression, and in the event of a sudden unforeseen attack by the said Tippu Sultan on either of the allies, the 5th and 6th articles of this treaty shall be faithfully abided by and fulfilled.

Article 9.

The best security against sudden attack and for the general preservation of peace being a constant preparation for war, the strictest attention shall be paid by the contracting

parties to keeping themselves in such a respectable state of readiness, and to promote this desirable end it is agreed that they shall mutually grant to each other in their respective dominions the privilege of raising recruits of men, and of purchasing, free of duty, elephants, horses, bullocks and grain, carefully providing that such purchases be strictly and *bona fide* on account the respective Governments only.

*Query. Is this privilege to be always or only on the breaking out of or during the prosecution of War ?

Article 10.

Enter Sir John Kennaway's 7th Article.

Article 11.

Enter Sir John Kennaway's 8th Article.

Article 12.

In case of any of the Company's troops ever serving again with either of the allies on the footing of the auxiliary corps of last war, it is agreed, over and above the stipulation of the treaty of Poona on that head, that they shall be paid at the rate of Rs. p. m. for a battalion of Native Infantry including guns, and that the said payment shall be punctually and faithfully discharged every month upon the spot in the currency* of, and in the event of the said corps falling two months in arrear it shall be allowable for the Co.'s Government to recall them without giving umbrage* to the State with which it was serving.

*Query. Would not the station where the battalions were serving be the best ?

*Reserving the claim to the said arrears.

Article 13.

Any body of the Company's troops serving as above shall be entitled to all the indulgences*, privileges and distinctions of the most favoured of the national troops of the ally, with whom they are serving in all honorary and emolumentary cases.

*Particularly with respect to plunder, gratuities or enam, allowances for wounds or murrum puttee, presents on recovery, etc.

Article 14.

Any acquisition of territory, dependency, royalty, or any addition of right or pretension connected with the said Tippu Sultan falling by purchase, cession, heritage or any other mode into the possession of either of the allies after the conclusion of this treaty, shall be immediately and fully communicated with all its circumstances to the other allies, that on due examination and admission of its rectitude it may be added to the specification of rights particularized in the first article as requisite to the formation of this treaty, or if found wanting in the requisite qualification of rectitude, it may be rejected.

Article 15.

All the former treaties between the contracting parties, not repugnant or contradictory to the articles of this defensive treaty, are hereby confirmed and strengthened. But all engagements of the said parties separately with each other or with Tippu Sultan*, that may be contrary to the true spirit and meaning of the whole or any part of this treaty, are hereby cancelled and annulled.

*This clause will be unnecessary by the establishment of the definition of rights prescribed in the 1st article, and was not a part of the 12th art. of my dispatch of 30th November to Sir John Kennaway, tho' referred to as such in Sir John's letter of 7th December. My 12th Article only adverted to engagements between the allies. My 9th article of that dispatch requires a specific ascertainment relative to Tippu's engagements etc. with the allies.

Conclusion as usual.

Poona, 26th December 1792

C. W. Malet

No. 6—Malet proposes a meeting of plenipotentiaries at Bijapur to discuss the defensive arrangements.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART., RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

28th December 1792.

2. Probably there could not be a readier or easier mode devised of terminating our present negotiations than by a congress of plenipotentiaries at the city of Bijapore, whose central situation and abundant accommodations point it out as a most eligible place.

3. Tho' I cannot judge how far this idea might be acceptable to our respective Courts, yet should it seem feasible and desirable to you, it might be worth while to collect the sentiments of our own Government and of our two Durbars on it.

No. 7—Malet impresses on Kennaway the inadvisability of effecting a separate defensive engagement with the Nizam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY.

Poona, 11th January 1793.

2. In my dispatch of the 28th ulto. you were acquainted with my having made the communication (that we had agreed on relative to further defensive arrangements) to the Minister of this Court on the 26th, and as the Governor General's instructions of the 9th December enclosed in your letter of the 28th following did not reach me till the 2nd inst., I was of course precluded the power of acting on them in the first instance. But as this Court seems to be in no hurry to bring on the explanation, and as I have heard nothing from the Minister on the subject since my communication, I shall, conformable to the spirit of His Lordship's letter to you of the 9th ultimo, avoid all further appearance of solicitude for an answer to my communication, and should be glad to know if you have made one of the same kind to your Court, as none is mentioned in your letters since the signification of your intention of making it in your letter of the 28th ultimo, and from that of the 31st ulto. it should seem that you then intended to make none, I take the liberty of noticing this to you, as I think it very likely that the Minister had made known to the Nazim what has passed with me here.

3. In my letter of 29th October, I mentioned some points relative to separate engagement with our respective Courts or rather with that of the Nazim, which I thought highly worthy of consideration. My sentiments have been very frequently and explicitly declared on this important subject, that however desirable it may be to preserve His Highness's

Government from falling into a state of utter thralldom and dependence on the dangerous power of this State preserving to ourse'ves a freedom to act in this pursuit as sound reason and fair policy might dictate, yet am I very doubtful whether the state of the Nazim's councils, his military force, the genius of his government or the circumstances of his territory place him in an adequate state of independence to support fairly and effectively the stipulations of a separate defensive engagement with the Company.

4. On a principle of duty for the elucidation of the important subject of defensive arrangement, I trouble you in a separate paper with what has occurred in answer to your observations on the draft of a treaty enclosed in my letter of 24th ultimo, which draft was, I believe, by mistake dated 26th instead of 24th December.

5. The greater reason we have to lament the want of correctness in our allies the more strenuous should our endeavours be to obviate its bad effects, and on this principle I am of opinion that, we should by all possible means endeavour to surmount their objections to precision in the ascertainment of force in the settlement of a new treaty. It will be better to urge this point at a season of 'eisure than to complain of deficiency and the impracticability of remedying it in the hour of need and emergency. Reciprocity is my datum and my most increasing attention shall be directed to its attainment.

NO. 8—Kennaway tries to impress on Malet the necessity in the British interest of preserving the independence of the Nizam.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET.

Hyderabad, 18th January 1793.

I have to acquaint you that my communication to this Durbar, respecting the proposed defensive arrangements, has been nearly in the same general terms with that which you made to the Poonah Minister: on its being demanded of me afterwards why I did not follow it up with any particular propositions, I confined my reply to observing that I was in expectation of further letters from Lord Cornwallis.

In answer to the 3rd paragraph of your letter, I have only to observe that my sentiments on the subject of preserving the Nizam's Government from falling into a state of thralldom and dependence on the Marrattah Power, are the same as they were when this point was more fully discussed between us, at the time the alliance against Tippoo was negotiating. It is an object, I think, which it behoves us ever to keep in view; always, no doubt, with the exception, you mention, of reserving to ourselves a freedom to regulate our conduct in the pursuit as reason and sound policy may

dictate ; in weighing the policy of defensive arrangements between the Company and the Nizam and the question of affording him our support, the great inconvenience which would result to us, should his country become the prey of the Marrattas, is the first point, I think, that deserves consideration. As a leading step towards obtaining that footing and recovering the sort of connection which subsisted between the two Governments previous to the cession of Guntoor, Balajee's first attention, after the contest between him and Sindia shall be at an end, will probably be directed to intriguing for the removal of Azem ul Omrah ; but even this, I think, defective as Azem ul Omrah's character may be, should be watched by us with a jealous and wary eye, for it is to be remembered, that the councils and genius of a government and its ministers are things which in a great measure depend on the character of the Prince who governs, or the state to whose influence he is subservient ; that the Nizam is sickly and nearly in his dotage ; and that Ali Jah the eldest son, difficult as it is from the circumstance of his situation to appreciate his real character, has given proofs of a firmness and liberality of disposition, which speak in his favour ; while the dominions possessed by His Highness are so extensive, that if properly administered, they would, from their situation and intrinsic value, certainly attach to this Government no small degree of weight and consequence in the political balance.

With respect to your replies to the observations I took the liberty of making on your draft of the treaty, I should have no objection to accommodating, as far as possible, my judgement on the points therein taken notice of to yours ; but the subject and everything that has passed on it being so completely before the Governor General, there being sufficient time to wait for his decision on it, and even to hope that a draft of such articles as he may be desirous we should regulate ourselves by, may be transmitted for our guidance, I do not conceive it necessary at present to enter further into the subject than to observe, that considering the art and venality of our allies, I think, it will be more for our interest that the general provision, which prescribes that we are not bound to engage in an unjust quarrel in behalf of each other, should stand, and that it is preferable to the specification, which subjects the party that may have a dispute with Tippoo to the arbitration of the other two, or in the event of his rejecting their decision, allows them to recede from the alliance, thereby expressly holding out a temptation, which may be too apt to bias them in the judgement they are to give.

Persuaded that we have but one common object in the discussion we have been engaged in, I will freely acknowledge to you, that one reason for my preferring the above, and such other general provisions as may be reckoned sufficiently strong and binding in arranging the guarantee, in addition to those which I mentioned to you in my letter of the 31st ultimo, is a wish to preserve to ourselves as great a freedom of action as may be

consistent with provisions of the above description in the peculiar situation we are in with respect to our allies, where with a weight and superiority acknowledged by all, and entitling us now, and I hope always, to give the law, we find it necessary instead of prescribing terms to confine ourselves to reciprocity, under the disadvantage of being morally certain that the conditions which may be agreed to on that principle, while they will be binding on us, and while we shall be exposed to bear the chief brunt of any conflict we may be engaged in with Tippto, will only, as interest or indolence may dictate, be attended to by them.

No. 9—Kennaway reports to the Governor General the Nizam's illness and asks for instructions in case of the latter's demise.

FROM—KENNAWAY, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Hyderabad, 28th January 1793.

I am sorry to acquaint Your Lordship that the dropsical swellings the Nizam has been for some time afflicted with, which seemed to have been reduced to his ankles and in a manner got the better of, have again acquired force and now extend to his belly, accompanied with other symptoms of an alarming nature. It is possible that a temporary relief may be again obtained over them, but the disorder has, I am afraid, taken too deep root to admit of a hope that he can long survive it.

Considering the time that must elapse before I shall be able to receive Your Lordship's commands for the guidance of my conduct in granting or withholding the services of the Detachment on this event taking place, I should be glad, as soon as possible, to receive, such general instructions from Your Lordship with regard to the part you wish to take, and such powers to admit of the employment of our force in behalf of one party or the other as circumstances may render expedient, as you may think it proper to entrust me with. Such powers, Your Lordship may be assured, shall be exercised with the utmost caution and circumspection by me, and as far as may be, should Your Lordship entertain any view of deriving public benefit from this event, for the advantage of the Company. Meer Allum hinted to me lately that Buxey Begum had withdrawn her countenance from Secunder Jah in favour of Ali Jah his elder brother, which, I should imagine, will go nearly to determine the scales in his favour. The support of our Detachment would probably make it decisive, and if promptly granted may be the means of firmly attaching him to us, if productive of nothing else.

No. 10—Cornwallis sends to Malet a new draft of his own for the proposed treaty and advises him not to press the engagement should the Poona Durbar be averse to it.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Fort William, 5th February 1793.

I have received your letters dated the 21st, 24th and 28th of December 1792 with their enclosures, on the subject of the proposed treaty of guarantee, and I have paid particular attention to the drafts of the proposed treaty transmitted by you and by Sir John Kennaway, with the remarks upon them as contained in your respective correspondence.

I have thought that I could not communicate my general sentiments on the whole subject in a more precise manner, to you and Sir John Kennaway, than by annexing remarks to the different articles of the two drafts of treaties that were respectively proposed by you, and by framing another draft of a treaty, which appears to me to be upon the whole most suitable to the interests of the Company.

These papers are accordingly enclosed; but having great confidence in the zeal and ability, both of yourself and Sir John Kennaway, I wish it to be understood by you that the draft is only intended to convey to you my idea of the general principles on which the treaty should be founded, and that it is left to your discretion to agree to any additions or alterations, or to any modifications in detail arrangements that may not be inconsistent with those principles, and that may appear to you to be necessary in the course of your discussions with your respective Durbars.

As the season is now far advanced, and exclusive of the alarm which it might give to Tippoo, many inconveniences might otherwise attend the meeting of a congress, I should be extremely unwilling to give my assent to that measure; and if the Poona and Hyderabad Ministers are sincerely inclined to frame a plain and clearly defined treaty of guarantee, I conceive that there can be no great difficulty in arranging the terms of it by correspondence.

On the other hand, should there be an aversion on their part, for any reason whatever, to frame a specific instrument of that nature, it could answer no useful purpose to press it upon them, and you will, therefore, in the event of their avowing such aversion, or of your observing an evident backwardness to enter into negotiation, treat it as a point of great indifference to me, and immediately profess your readiness to withdraw your proposition to that effect; but in that case, I desire, that you will at the same time make the declaration in writing that I directed in my letter to Sir John Kennaway dated the 27th of October 1792.

No. 11—Kennaway informs the Governor General of his having delivered to the Nizam a complimentary letter and presents from the King of England.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Hyderabad, 23rd March 1793.

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I yesterday delivered to the Nizam His Majesty's letter and the present of lusters, accompanied by such expressions of His Majesty's regard, as I thought suitable to the occasion.

Kulbul Omrah, who is related to the Nizam by the double tie of being his sister's son and son-in-law to the deceased Soubah Nasir Jung, his eldest brother, was deputed by His Highness to conduct me from my house to the Durbar, and as soon as His Majesty's letter had been read his Highness presented me with a serpahow or complete dress, and jewels consisting of a Jegah, a surpech, a turrah, a pair of bracelets for the arms, a pair of bracelets for the wrists, and a string of pearls with a drop for the neck. The gentlemen who accompanied me were also honoured agreeably to their ranks with a Jegah and Surpech together or one of these articles separate.

With some difficulty I had previously got one of the lusters hung up in the Hall of the Palace where the pair are to be placed, for which I was indebted to the assistance of His Highness's European artificers; the sergeant whom I had procured for the purpose, after wasting a considerable time in new gilding and cleaning the parts which had been injured by the sea air or salt water, having absconded on finding himself unequal to arranging and joining the pieces together.

I have the honour to enclose copy of the translate of His Majesty's letter which I delivered with the original, in rendering which Your Lordship will find only such liberties have been taken as the manners of the people and the idiom of the different languages rendered necessary, and I conceived were authorized by the tenor of Your Lordship's commands of the 3rd February 1791 and the enclosures which accompanied them. Your Lordship's letter to the Nizam, which was forwarded to me with that from His Majesty was delivered along with it.

No. 12—Malet gives Kennaway intimation of his shortly starting negotiations for the proposed treaty with the Poona Court.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY.

Poona, 27th March 1793.

This serves purposely to acquaint you that I have this day had a conference with the minister of this State, at which I acquainted him that in four or five days I should be prepared to meet him with the articles proposed by

His Lordship the Governor General to form the treaty of defensive alliance between the Hon'ble Company, this State and His Highness the Nazim, and my object in deferring it to that time was by this express to give you timely notice to act exactly in concert.

No. 13—Kennaway informs Malet of his having presented to the Nizam for his approval the Governor General's draft of the treaty of guarantee.

FROM—S^R JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—MALET.

Hyderabad, 3rd April 1793.

I had yesterday morning the pleasure to receive your favour of the 27th ultimo, in consequence of which I immediately transmitted to the Durbar a copy of the articles proposed by the Governor General for forming the guarantee treaty, which, Meer Allum acquainted me, should be laid before the Nizam without delay; and he this evening waited on me with the satisfactory information that they had been submitted to His Highness, who had approved of them, but observed that he considered the Nabob of Kurnoul as included among the dependants of his Government, as such he was unobjected to by Tippe when the treaty of Seringapatam was concluded.

On Meer Allum's demanding whether in consequence of the Nizam's acquiescence it would be advisable to proceed to drawing out the treaty fair, or whether the sentiments of the Poonah Durbar should be waited for, I told him that, as the treaty equally referred to the three States, the Peishwah's approval of it would be first necessary, but that I thought the business might be expedited if His Highness would signify to the Peishwah that the articles had been presented to and approved of by him, which, Meer Allum said, His Highness could have no objection to, and that it should be accordingly done.

No. 14—Malet writes to Kennaway of the Poona Court resenting the Nizam's march to Bidar.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—KENNAWAY, BART.

Poona, 15th April 1793.

Having this day received some very delicate and important communications from this Court on the subject of His Highness the Nazim's intended movement, permit me to recommend your observing the utmost caution in the intercourse with your Durbar on that measure,* which is decidedly objected to here, till you hear further from me, which will, I hope, be in the course of tomorrow.

* The differences between Nana Fadnis and Sindia had come to a head at Poona and the Nizam moved on to Bidar to avail himself of the dissensions.

No. 15—Kennaway communicates to the Governor General the assurance of the Nizam's Minister that the move to Bidar had no sinister object in it.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Hyderabad, 22nd April 1793.

I have been favoured by Sir Charles Warre Malet with a copy of his address to Your Lordship of the 16th instant, and am happy to observe that Balajee Pundit has at length departed from the reserve he has observed towards us in respect to affairs between this and the Poonah Durbar, as by such conduct he will, I trust, enable Your Lordship to bring about an accommodation between him and Azim-ul Omrah without difficulty.

In the course of my conversation with the Minister detailed in my letter to your Lordship of the 16th instant† he informed me of the Nizam's proposal to Balajee Pundit to visit Poonah for the purpose of being present at the Peishwah's nuptials; but that those having been concluded before an answer could be received, he had desired the ceremony might be gone over again, which was declined on account of the season propitious for it having elapsed.

The Minister also with his assurance that the present movement should terminate in its declared object of a change of air, added it was possible that the Nizam might soon be tired of his residence at Bider, which I think likely to be the case as well from a great want of water as the natural barrenness at that place, in which case he would return to the city, or try a further change at Gulberga.

In reply to the question he proposed to me, of which of the parties your Lordship was disposed to favour, I should not have hesitated to give a decisive opinion had I not reflected that the Minister's present professions of neutrality were too sudden, and too much at variance with the part he has hitherto taken in Sindia's favour, to be entirely confided in, and that considering the perseverance and ability natural to that Chief in the pursuit of any undertaking he has once embarked in, it is not looking too far to guard against giving him any cause of dissatisfaction, which he might be disposed to remember, should he ever acquire the supreme management of the Peishwah's affairs.

No. 16—Cornwallis asks the Resident at Hyderabad not to support either the Nizam's move to Bidar or his interference in the domestic affairs of the Peishwa.

FROM—LORD CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART., RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fort William, 23rd April 1793.

I received your letter dated the 6th instant,‡ informing me of the communication that had been made to you by Meer Allum of the wild and

† Vide No. 178 of Vol. II of the Poona Residency Correspondence.

‡ Vide No. 176 of Vol. II of the Poona Residency Correspondence.

extravagant idea, which the Minister entertained of the Nizam's movement to Poonah.

I approve entirely of the sentiments which you express on that subject in the 4th paragraph of your letter and wish them to be conveyed to the Minister in firm language, but in terms of as little exception as the nature of the business will admit ; and you will, in the event of his persevering in the intention to embark his Master in this weak and dangerous enterprize, convey that you are instructed by me to declare that, I consider as totally unjustifiable in any member of the alliance interference in the internal disputes and dissensions that so unfortunately prevail, either at the Durbar or among the Chiefs of the other States, unless explicitly requested by all the contending parties to endeavour to compromise their differences by a friendly mediation ; and that such being my sentiments, I cannot suffer any part of the Detachment of our troops to accompany him, and that neither yourself nor any gentleman belonging to the Residency can enter the Mahratta territories without receiving a specific invitation from the Peishwah and his Ministers.

No. 17—Kennaway informs the Governor General of the Nizam's Minister having disavowed hostile intentions towards the Poona Court.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—LORD CORNWALLIS.

Hyderabad, 27th April 1793.

I have the honour to enclose a translate of a letter which I received the 25th instant from Meer Allum and of the enclosures that accompanied it, and Your Lordship may rest assured that, I shall not delay joining the Nizam a day longer on account of my health than may be necessary to ensure my continuance with the camp after I repair to it.

From the above letter I am inclined to think the Minister really sincere in his assurances detailed in my letter of the 16th instant. I am sorry, however, to observe the despondency of Balajee Pundit as indicated by his sudden and earnest application for Your Lordship's interference, and his entertaining an idea of trusting in any shape for aid in his distress to the promises of the very man whose arm is in fact raised against him, but I should hope that this despondency is more owing to a disposition too apt to take alarm than to any just cause he has to sink into that despair, which his conduct seems to intimate.

To enable Your Lordship to regulate your conduct in the part you may think proper to take for effecting an accommodation between the two Durbars, or rather the Ministers of them, I have desired Meer Allum to furnish me with a more exact account of the particulars of the Nizam's complaint against the Rajah of Berar, and also of the other subsisting causes of litigation ; and a similar application I conceive should be made by Sir Charles Warre Malet to the Poonah Minister.

No. 18—*in this letter to Kennaway Malet condemns the line of conduct pursued by Azim-ul-Omra in connecting himself with Mahadji Sindia.*

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART

Poona, 8th May 1793.

I have been duly favoured with yours of the 1st instant, and exceedingly lament that the seeds of so great weakness should appear to be so thickly sown in the Nabob's family and Government, which, it is so much our interest to wish, should be established on firm and permanent principles. I apprehend, however, that it will be almost impossible to restore a declining Mahomedan Government (of all others perhaps the most pregnant with the seeds of dissolution) to such a desirable consistency. I scarce see any mode by which the Nabob's government can be snatched from the evils, with which it seems threatened on His Highness's demise, but by the difficult task of effecting a reconciliation between the minister and Ally Jah. But the difficulty of this work (ever extremely great) must, I presume, be exceedingly increased by the length to which the views and animosities of all parties must at this time be carried. Let the Minister of the Nabob flatter himself with what present advantages he may, either in the prosecution of his enmity against this Minister or of those of his party at home in his connexion with M. Sindia, the footing that will be gained by that artful and encroaching Chieftain cannot but be derogatory to the welfare and dignity of His Highness's government in the first instance, and more so in future when all the pretensions that Mahadji Sindia may establish will be acceded to by this Government. It is another very awkward circumstance to our interposition that, the only ground (this Government's demand on the Nabob) on which it can be introduced seems totally out of question as the cause of the late jealousies, which have certainly a much more remote origin than that or than will be remedied by our interposition, were it advisable to remove that cause of difference. In a word, Azim-ul-Omra must have a patron to support at all events his desperate cause through thick and thin. How unfortunate is it, that, that cause should give this Minister the specious appearance of being in the right in countenancing His Highness's eldest son and thereby secure to himself in the eyes of the world and of the Nazim, or at least a large part of his family, the vantage ground of supporting the real interests of His Highness's house and government against the views of a vicious faction. Were the case reversed, our part might perhaps be simplified and adopted with decision.

You will perceive (perhaps too plainly) that this is a very hasty letter, but should you think anything in it worthy of comment or of notice of H.s Lordsh p the Governor General, permit me to vex your goodness with its communication, as also with the substance of your favour of the 1st instant, as it is now past ten and I set off post for Bombay at one in the morning.

No. 19—Kennaway intimates to Malet the Nizam's refusal to agree to the proposed treaty of guarantee on the ground of his demand over Kurnool not being recognised.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Hyderabad, 1st June 1793.

I enclose for your information a copy of my address to the Governor General of this date, and the enclosures that accompanied it; as you will perceive by them that the Nizam's Minister had declared his resolution of not agreeing to the guarantee treaty till his master's request concerning Kurnool has been complied with, I beg to be favoured with your sentiments concerning the declaration prescribed by the Governor General, which under such circumstances it may be necessary we should deliver to our respective Durbars. As the Minister's violence, however, is of a nature that in general subsides when opposed by a firm and temperate conduct, I should hope that he will recede from the above resolution when he finds that we are prepared to meet it, unless he may be encouraged to persevere by your Durbar.

No. 20—Malet discusses with Kennaway the course they should adopt in case their Courts refused to accede to the proposed treaty.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART.

Poona, 14th June 1793.

Since my last dispatch of the 10th instant I had carefully perused those parts of our correspondence and His Lordship the Governor General's commands relative to the definement of the defensive engagements of the three States, that composed the late alliance against the Nabob Tippu Sultan, which appeared to me necessary to the regulation of our conduct in the event, which, from your letter to me of the 1st instant appears probable, of the branches of the alliance declining further specification of those engagements.

From this retrospect and particularly from the tenor of His Lordship's commands to you of the 27th October 1792 and to me of the 5th February 1793, I draw the following conclusions.

1st. That, it is the object of His Lordship's Government to place the national faith beyond the reach of fallacy by the most perspicuous stipulations.

2nd. That, should the other allies decline (or betray a disinclination to) the execution of such stipulations, we are then to avoid all importunity in urging them thereto and to profess our readiness to withdraw any propositions that may have been advanced.

3rd. In the event of the allies declining further elucidation of defensive engagements by specific stipulations, they are to be called on to affix a determinate sense to the defensive articles of the treaties of Poona and Hyderabad.

4th. That, on the failure of further explanation on the part of the allies, a written declaration is to be given on our part, that we consider the three Powers to be bound to each other to act with their whole force against Tippo in the event of his attacking either of them without clear and just provocation, but in no other case whatever, war shall appear to be inevitable.

From these data and from the discretional latitude delegated to us by His Lordship, I am of opinion that the conduct of our respective Courts already justifies us in immediately proceeding to the work of ascertaining their ultimate intentions, by first categorically demanding whether they will or will not treat on the articles proposed to them by us. If they assent, I see no such ground of altercation as can reasonably long protract the negotiation. If they decline, we should, I think, in the same categorical style demand the meaning they affix to our present engagements, and any delay or evasion in giving a satisfactory answer will, in my humble opinion, be tantamount to a clear discovery of a disposition to use them only to their own advantage and convenience. In that case permit me, Sir, to submit to you and through you (for the benefit of your sentiments) to His Lordship the Governor General the expediency or not of our making, on the part of His Lordship's Government, the explicit written declaration prescribed in His Lordship's letter to you of 27th October and repeated in the 4th Art. of conclusions in the former part of this letter, since it appears to me, that by making such a declaration while the other parties remain silent as to their interpretation of the present defensive engagements, we shall rivet their claim of future assistance on us as far as the declaration goes without establishing a similar one on them.

Should you accede to the two previous steps herein suggested for bringing our Courts to a discovery of their disposition, your intimation of the mode and time of prosecuting them shall be punctually adopted by me, and in the mean time leisure will be afforded for His Lordship's decision on the reference that I have taken the liberty to propose to him regarding the ultimate declaration.

No. 21—Lord Cornwallis refutes the objection raised by the Nizam to the proposed treaty on the ground of the Kurnool peshcush.

FROM—LORD CORNWALLIS, G. C.,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART., RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fort William, 20th June 1793.

I have received your letter dated the 1st inst. with its enclosures, informing me of the Nizam's intention to write again to me on the subject of Kurnoul, and the declaration of Azeem-ul-Omrah respecting the guarantee treaty.

When the Nizam's letter arrives, I shall, in civil terms, repeat my resolution not to interfere in the business of Kurnoul. But no time should be lost in answering the declaration of Azeem-ul-Omrah that the Nizam would not accede to the guarantee treaty, unless I agreed to support his claims upon Kurnoul.

You will, therefore, be pleased to remind the Minister, that the proposition of framing a guarantee treaty did not originate with me; but that it was made to me by Hurry Punt and himself, previous to the separation of the confederate armies, in reply to which I observed, that it would be difficult to adjust a matter of so much nicety in the hurry of a camp life, and that it would be more advisable to defer the consideration of it until we should be quietly settled at our respective homes.

Considering myself, therefore, as peculiarly called upon to bring forward a business that had been postponed at my request, and feeling myself at all times anxious to manifest my desire of strengthening and cementing the union amongs the Confederate Powers, I sketched out a draft of a guarantee treaty, having for its basis the treaties of Hyderabad and Poona, and consisting of distinct articles of stipulation which I believed would be satisfactory to all parties; and in so doing I conceived that I was complying with the wishes of our allies, and particularly with those of His Highness the Nizam and of his Minister.

If, however, I have so far mistaken the intentions of Azeem-ul-Omrah, that instead of a guarantee treaty of a most strictly defensive nature, he supposed that I was to bind the Company to support him in his wild views of ambition, and in projects, which he would not have dared to think of, before his head was turned by the successful event of the war, you will notify to him that I have not the least desire to press a guarantee treaty upon him; and, relinquishing all further discussion upon that subject, you will give the explanation of the defensive article in the existing treaties, which I before directed, and you will, at the same time, express in the clearest terms that I do not hold myself to be engaged to defend any part of His Highness's territories, if the attack should be occasioned by the prosecution of his ill-founded claims upon Kurnoul.

Sir Charles Malet will be authorized to leave it optional with the Peshwa's Ministers either to enter into a Guarantee Treaty, or to be contented with our natural defensive engagements in the present form.

No. 22—Kennaway communicates to Cornwallis his fears about the intrigues carried on by A. O. with Mahadji Sindia.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—LORD CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Hyderabad, 30th June, 1793.

The Nizam's Minister continues intent in pursuing his intrigues with Sindia and preparing for the rupture with the Poonah Ministry, to which his measures must speedily and unavoidably lead. Including the sums which I formerly mentioned to Your Lordship he has advanced to Sindia, in all thirty lacks of rupees, I am informed, he is now preparing to make him a remittance of four or five lacks more.

I have directed Lieutenant Steuart to take every opportunity of recalling to the Minister's recollection his promise to me to take no important step with respect to the Marattias without previously advising with Your Lordship, the confidence you repose in his strict adherence to it and the policy, which has on so many occasions been pointed out to him, of not embroiling his Master in a quarrel with the Marratta Government; but I must confess to Your Lordship, I am of opinion that, neither promise nor policy will check him in the career he is running, and that nothing short of a firm and solid reconciliation between him and the Poonah Minister founded on an adjustment of their mutual differences, is likely to re-establish the wished for harmony between the two States.

No. 23—Malet informs Kennaway that the negotiations for the treaty of guarantee were in such a condition as to allow of his departure to the sea-coast.

FROM—C. W. MALET;

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART., RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 5th July 1793.

I was favoured with your letter of the 26th June on the 3rd inst., and sincerely hope that the answer of this Court to Marquis Cornwallis's propositions for a defensive treaty contained in the enclosed copy of my address of this date to His Lordship, will enable you to pursue without further hesitation your intention of proceeding to the sea coast for change of air, which, I sincerely wish, may be attended with the most salutary effect.

I beg you to accept my thanks for the perusal of your Munshy's conversation with Meer Allum, which is very descriptive of the dilemma to which the Minister is reduced to gloss over measures, which he can neither account for in reason nor pursue with safety, and of which I expressed my apprehension in my address of the 6th May to Marquis Cornwallis.

N.B.—The declaration of the Poona Court, alluded to in the above extract, is dated 3rd July 1793 and is to the following purport.

(23A) With respect to a new treaty on the foundation of the 13th article of the Treaty of Poona, and of which (new treaty) a draft of particular articles has been delivered (to the Durbar) by you, and an answer thereto been required by you, what occasion is there for a new Treaty? The Treaty was concluded for the late war with the Nabob Tippo Sultan. Three States act agreeable. It is not meant wilfully to lay the blame on Tippo, and on that pretence, attack and punish him.

If a breach of engagement on the part of Tippo with respect of the allies, let that ally inform the other allies thereof; when, having understood the said breach (The rest of the letter is in a mutilated condition)

No. 24—Lord Cornwallis explains to Malet why he thought it necessary to define the defensive articles of the previous treaties by a declaration.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART., RESIDENT AT POONAH.

Fort William, 6th July 1793.

If I had not thought the defensive articles in the treaties of Poonah and Hyderabad too loose and indefinite, I should have endeavoured to avoid any further discussion on that subject, and to convince our allies that a Guarantee Treaty was totally unnecessary.

My objection to these articles was not that I did not consider them to be sufficiently binding on all parties, but that I was apprehensive, lest by a strained interpretation, they might be supposed to bind too extensively, and to give our Allies a right to call for our assistance in quarrels in which they might have engaged from other considerations than those of self defence.

I must, therefore, confess that I cannot see how it is possible that the declaration prescribed in my letter to Sir John Kennaway, dated the 27th of October, which puts the most limited construction on the articles of the existing treaties that the words will admit, can tend to rivet the claims of the other Powers upon us, or how their silence can release them from their actual engagements.

I trust that our Allies will show no hesitation in making a similar declaration ; but I do not think it of much consequence if they should decline it. On our part, we shall have the satisfaction of giving an unequivocal proof of our sincerity by a plain explanation of the construction that we put upon the meaning of the defensive articles, contained in the treaties of Poona and Hyderabad.

No. 25.

7th July 1793.

*Extract of a letter from Lieut. Steuart to Sir J. Kennaway, dated
'Bider, the 7th July 1793.*

I delivered the Governor General's letters to the Nizam last night, who, after Meer Allum had read the one on the subject of our war with France, turned round to me and said, that by Lord Cornwallis's means the friendship he had for the English Nation was arrived to such a pitch that he was ready to join them in every business that occurred, that he hoped, the French, who instead of following the example of their forefathers and of ages back, were planning a government for themselves and for others, without having even a precedent for their guide, would soon meet the punishment their crimes deserved ; that, however, should they send any considerable force to India, he was ready to make our cause his own, and to afford us the aid of his Government against them ; and that considering the extent of his friendship for our Nation he had barely done it justice in the above declaration ; for that he conceived, sincere friendship should always be able to stand such trials. I replied that I was happy to hear so strong a declaration in our favour.

His Highness in a low voice added, that Ragojee Boonsla in direct violation of a Treaty between them had made many encroachments which could not be longer put up with ; that he meant to negotiate by fair means as far as possible in the first place, and in the second, in case of failure, to use force ; and that he wished to know from me whether it were possible that our Government could interfere as a mediator, or afterwards in the event of negotiation failing, we could aid him by attacking Cuttack ; Azem-ul-Omrah, who had stood aloof, interrupted His Highness, for he seemed to have more to say, and desired Meer Allum to explain to me, which the latter did by a simple repetition. I then told Meer Allum plainly and desired him to tell His Highness, it was impossible that our Government could interfere in either of the modes he had mentioned ; that however much His Lordship might be inclined to aid His Highness, the principles on which our conduct and Government were founded did not admit of such an interference ; that being at peace with all the Powers of India and desirous of continuing so, we could not preserve

this system if we were to become a mediator at the request of one party, as that was in fact declaring war against the other.

His Highness turning round asked Meer Allum what I said. The latter told him very distinctly, that I had observed our Government could not interfere at the request of one party, as that would be the same as declaring war against the other, and has instanced the Governor General's offer in Mysore, which required, though the disputants were even two of the confederates, that both of the parties should make a previous written request of his mediation, without which it was impossible he could interfere, but that in case of all the parties making written and explicit requests for our mediation, I did not see the same objections to our compliance. His Highness, without any signs of displeasure, merely replied that my answer was considerate, and, placing his hand upon his breast, assured me that the friendship he felt for us extended his aid to every point in which we could be concerned.

No. 26—Kennaway proposes to the Governor General a separate engagement with the Nizam.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—LORD CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Hyderabad, 12th July 1793.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's letter of the 20th ultimo, any particular answer to which with respect to Azem-ul-Omrah has been rendered unnecessary by his conduct in regard to the Guarantee Treaty subsequent to my address of the 1st ultimo.

But as it appears from Sir C. W. Malet's address to Your Lordship of the 5th instant that, Balajee Pundit has declined in his turn, and probably with a resolution less liable to be overcome, to enter into new guarantee engagements, and as the Nizam's Minister has lately professed his readiness to close on Your Lordship's draft without waiting any longer for Balajee Pundit's determination, I should not hesitate to proceed in concluding with him on the intimation, contained in the last paragraph of Your Lordship's letter of the 20th ultimo, of the directions you intend to give Sir Charles W. Malet in regard to the offer to be made his Court, in the case of a refusal on the part of this Durbar, did I not doubt whether Your Lordship might esteem the mode in which Balajee Pundit has declined entirely to enter into new engagements as a reason equally strong with

Azem-ul-Omrah's former flat refusal, to close with one party without the concurrence of the other ; or whether you might not now be inclined to take advantage of the conduct they have both held in the business to relinquish any farther discussion on it. I shall therefore wait Your Lordship's commands upon this point before again entering on the subject with the Nizam's Minister.

Having received from Mr. Cherry Your Lordship's letters addressed to the Nizam and his ministers intimating our rupture with France, and the cause of it, I transmitted them to Lieutenant Steuart to be delivered to His Highness. For an account of the conversation which passed on the delivery of them, I beg leave to refer Your Lordship to the enclosed extract of Lieutenant Steuart's letter of the 7th instant.

The state of my health having declined so much as to render any longer delay in resorting for a change of air to the sea coast totally unadvisable, I have determined to avail myself of Your Lordship's permission and to proceed to Masulipatam on the 15th instant. I hope, I shall find sufficient benefit from the change to be able to return to my station by the time I formerly mentioned, in a condition more suited to meet the increase of business, which may then probably be incident to it, than I am in at present.

I shall leave the general charge of the office with Lieutenant Steuart, directing him to be guided in any points respecting the defensive propositions by Sir C. W. Malet, should the business, in consequence of his recommendation, be resumed at Poonah.

No. 27—Steuart informs Malet of Kennaway having delivered over the charge of the Residency to him.

FROM—W. STEUART,

TO—SIR CHARLES W. MALET, BART.

Bider, 16th July 1793.

I have the honour to acquaint you that Sir John Kennaway marched from Hyderabad the 15th instant after delivering over the charge of the Residency at this Court to me, in consequence of which I have altered the Dawk to Bider in such manner, as though the distance is six coss additional, yet the new stages being much nearer than before no extra delay may occur.

No. 23—Cornwallis declines Kennaway's proposal of a separate engagement with the Nizam.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART.

Fort William, 31st July 1793.

I am glad to find that you determined not to proceed on the business of the guarantee treaty until you had further communication with me on that subject.

Balajec Pundit's mode of declining to enter into new guarantee engagements differs so widely from the flat refusal given by Azeem-ul-Omrah, that it would by no means justify a similar conduct on our part, and as the former's explanation of the existing engagements between the allies agrees almost entirely with that which I had directed Sir Charles Malet and yourself to give, I am clearly of opinion that it would be highly imprudent for us to proceed in framing a new treaty of guarantee with the Court of Hyderabad.

The appearance, however, of openness and cordiality, which Azeem-ul-Omrah has manifested (notwithstanding his disappointment about Kurnoul) by professing his readiness to close with my propositions, without waiting for the determination of the Mahrattas, gives him a claim to a suitable return of attention and good humour on our part; and I should, therefore, wish that without laying more stress than may appear to be necessary on his former refusal, you would state to him, that I drew out propositions for a guarantee treaty more to please Hurry Punt and himself, than because I thought there was any absolute occasion for such a measure; that I am of opinion that it is of material importance that the relative connexion between the three Powers in alliance should be exactly the same in form as well as substance; and that as the declaration of the Poona Durbar is perfectly clear and satisfactory, I conceive that a similar explanation of the intent and meaning of the former Treaties would answer every good purpose, that could possibly be derived from any new engagements of guarantee.

Lieutenant Steuart judged perfectly right in declining to take any part, by mediation or otherwise, in the disputes between His Highness the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar; but I think it was unnecessary to assign any other reason for our not interfering than the dependence of the latter on the Mahratta State.

I shall probably embark in about ten days for the Carnatic, and I request that you will send copies of such of your letters as may possibly not arrive here in that time, and of all your subsequent letters, to Madras.

No. 29—Lord Cornwallis accepts the declaration by the Poona Court of the intent and meaning of the defensive articles* of the treaty of Poona, and asks Malet not to pursue the subject further.

FROM—LORD CORNWALLIS,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Fort William, 31st July 1793.

My sentiments respecting the guarantee treaty, and my indifference in regard to the adoption of that measure by the Allies, are so fully explained in my letter to Sir J. Kennaway dated the 20th ultimo, (a copy of which has been transmitted to you), that I think it unnecessary to add any thing further on that subject except to desire, that you will state to the Minister that the proposition for a guarantee treaty did not originate with me, but with Hurry Punt and Azeem-ul-Omrah.

The declaration of the Poona Durbar is, in my opinion, perfectly satisfactory, and goes in substance full as far as mine, and if, after they have considered your representation, they shall persevere in their first resolution, you will look on the business as at an end, and notify to them from me that I am perfectly satisfied with the construction which they have given to the intent and meaning of the 13th article of the Treaty of Poonah, and that it accords entirely with the sense in which I have understood it.

You are sufficiently acquainted with the language which this Government has uniformly held to the Court of Hyderabad on all points that, in any degree, concerned the Mahratta State, to be able easily to remove from the minds of the Poona Ministers all grounds of suspicion that, under the present circumstances, we should permit A.O. to levy men in the Carnatic, or that we should encourage or abet him in any schemes that could be hostile or even offensive to the Peshwa's Government.

I shall probably embark, in about ten days, for the Carnatic, and I request that you will send copies of such of your letters as may possibly not arrive here in that time, and of all your subsequent letters to Madras.

No. 30—Lord Cornwallis's draft of the Treaty of Guarantee.

31st July 1793.

Draft of a Treaty of defensive alliance between the Hon'ble United English East India Company, the Peshwa Seway Madharow Narain Pundit Purdhaun Behader and the Nawaub Nizam Ally Khan Asof Jah Behader, for the clear ascertainment of the meaning and extent of the 13th article of the Treaty of Poona dated 1st June 1790 and of the

*See article 1st of Cornwallis's draft.

10th article of the Treaty of Paangul, dated 4th July 1790, corresponding with 20 Showal, 1204 Hejeree, to the end of enforcing a faithful observance of the Treaty of Seringapatam, dated 18th March 1792, and for the mutual maintenance of the Contracting Powers and their Allies and Dependants in secure possession of all the Rights, Interests and territories ceded to and held by them on the conclusion of the said Treaty of Seringapatam against Futteh Ally Khan, known by the denomination of Tippoo Sultaun, settled by etc. etc. as per usual form.

Article 1st.

By the 13th article of the Treaty of Poona and by the 10th article of the Treaty of Paangul above mentioned, it is stipulated that, "if after the conclusion of peace with Tippoo, he should molest or attack either of the contracting Parties, the others shall join to punish him, the mode and conditions of effecting which shall be hereafter settled by the contracting Powers". Accordingly, it is hereby settled, that in the event of such attack or molestation occurring, the nature and ground of it shall be clearly explained by the Party conceiving himself injured to the other contracting parties, who will act conformably to their mutual stipulations.

Article 2nd.

The true spirit and meaning of the contracting parties by the articles of the Treaties of Poona and Paangul referred to in the 1st article of this treaty, and likewise of this Treaty itself, being strictly defensive, it is hereby agreed that in the event of friendly negotiation proving abortive, and it shall have appeared to the other allies from the explanation of the nature and ground of the injury which the party conceiving himself injured shall have furnished to them, according to the 1st article of this treaty, that Tippoo Sultaun is the aggressor, and the party complaining the aggrieved, and not till then, the others shall unite with the aggrieved to obtain redress by force of arms, and in that case, and to that end, the contracting parties respectively agree to prosecute the war against Tippoo Sultaun, seriously and vigorously, with potent armies well appointed, and equipped with the requisite warlike apparatus, and commanded by Commanders of high rank, and to use every possible exertion to harass and distress the enemy, and to bring the war to a speedy and honourable conclusion.

Article 3rd.

In order for the clear and distinct comprehension of the 2nd article of this treaty, it is agreed that the territories and the rights and immunities of trade ratified and confirmed, by the aforesaid Treaty of Seringapatam to the contracting parties, shall be considered to be ratified and confirmed and guaranteed mutually by each to the other of the Contracting Parties against Tippoo Sultaun, by virtue of the present engagement.

Article 4th.

It was agreed that on a war becoming certain, the present Instrument shall be sufficient and no other engagement shall be necessary ; and in conformity to the present engagement, the distress or danger of the party injured or attacked being entitled to the earliest attention, while no time shall be lost by the allies in preparing themselves respectively for a vigorous prosecution of the war, agreeably to the 2nd article of this treaty, every immediate assistance that may be practicable shall be afforded him by the others with such troops as may be in readiness for service, either by detaching them direct against the most valuable parts of the enemy's country or by sending them to the support of the party attacked, and that while they are engaged in preparations for the exertions of their respective force, a plan shall be settled by the mutual consent of all parties for the general conduct of the war.

Article 5th.

In the event of a war having been commenced against Tippoo Sultaun, the Contracting Powers agree that, in order to preserve, as far as possible, consistency and concert in the prosecution of it, a vakcel from each party shall be permitted to reside in the army of the others, for the purpose of communicating to each other their respective views and circumstances, and they further agree, that during the continuance of the war neither of them will enter into separate negotiations with Tippoo Sultaun ; but on the receipt of any advance or message from him by either party, it shall be communicated to the others, and whenever peace may be determined on, it shall be settled by the mutual consent of the contracting parties, none of them introducing unreasonable objections.

Article 6th.

A constant readiness for war being the best security for the continuance of peace, the strictest attention is to be paid by the allies to keep their armies on a respectable footing so as to be prepared at a short notice for service, and with a view to this end, it is agreed that the contracting parties shall allow to each other in their respective dominions the privilege of raising recruits of men, of purchasing elephants, horses, camels, bullocks and grain, duty free.

Article 7th.

The true intent and meaning of this treaty being to guarantee each of the contracting parties conformably to the articles thereof, and not to involve them in unnecessary quarrels with Tippoo Sultaun, it is further stipulated, that either of the contracting parties seeing good ground to apprehend hostile designs on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, shall, without

delay, make a full disclosure thereof to the others, who on receipt of such disclosure shall immediately caution the said Tippoo Sultan against such designs, and shall offer their mediation to bring about an accommodation of any existing or impending disagreement, with a plain intimation of the consequence of his persevering in such hostile designs, according to the spirit and meaning of the present engagement. This treaty of defensive alliance, consisting of seven articles, being settled and concluded by, etc., etc., etc. It is agreed that it shall be exchanged, etc.

No. 31 —The conversation reported in this paper refers to the rejection of the proposed treaty by the Poona Court.

Hyderabad, 2nd August 1793.

Translate of a conversation which took place between Meer Allum and Mahomed Ikram, the 2nd August 1793.*

In the course of conversation Meer Allum told me that by intelligence from Poonah he heard, that Balajee Pundit having caused the draft of the new treaty to be translated, he had examined it in company with Hurry Pundit, Mahajee Sindia and others; that Sindia said the former treaty was quite sufficient, that these articles concerned details, that it was not now necessary to adjust them, and that they should be settled when occasion occurred for them; and that on this account Balajee Pundit delays giving any answer: he added that, he has also learnt that the Chiefs at Poonah having settled their differences, Sindia's dismission to return to Hindostan after the Dessarah is a matter resolved on. I asked Meer Allum whether Nizam Ally Khan after Sindia's departure would return to Hyderabad or persevere in his intention of attacking the Rajah of Berar; to which he replied what can he do except returning, his own troops being inadequate, on whose aid or strength can he undertake that expedition, since the alliance of the Company is entirely out of the question, and no hope of obtaining their assistance on this occasion be entertained. He afterwards observed that Nanna was a man of judgment; that he had settled his plan in such a manner that he might obtain a plea for acting without showing any appearance of being prompted by his own personal grievances; that accordingly with this view he had given a hint to the Bhonsla to cause disturbances in Nizam Ally Khan's Talooks and at the same time assurances of his support; that whenever Nizam Ally Khan should begin to attack the Bhonsla he (Nanna) will also prepare for war, and declare that Nizam Ally Khan has infringed the treaty by attacking a dependant of the Marratta State; that Azem ul Omrah is neglectful on this subject; and that time would show what would happen.

* Resident's Munshy,

No. 32—The Peshwa writes to the Nizam proposing a fresh draft of the treaty of guarantee.

8th August 1793.

Translate of copy of a letter from Row Pundit Perdhaun to His Highness the Nizam, delivered to the latter the 1st of Mohurram 1207 answering to the 8th August 1793.

Formerly between this Sircar, you and the English Company, treaties were concluded for the late war with Tippto Sultaun. In the 13th article of that of this Sircar and the 10th article of yours it was thus stipulated, that hereafter if the Nabob Tippto Sultaun should commit any thing of the nature of a breach of engagement, the three Powers should unite and should settle with each other the manner of punishing and correcting him.

At this time the copy of the writing on the part of the Governor General delivered to you by Sir John Kennaway, which you gave to Govind Row Kishen to be forwarded to me, has been received from the latter; the contents correspond word for word with the writing at this time delivered here by Sir Charles Malet. It is thought by my discerning judgment that the real purport of the treaty at first concluded is that, if the Nabob Tippto Sultaun commits an act of ill-treatment the redress and retribution of the same shall be incumbent and necessary; therefore, having fixed the mode of obtaining this redress in one article, the same was shown to Sir Charles Malet, who in the course of conversation expressed a desire that His Lordship's writing should be adopted, as the modes to be settled by the advice of each other as mentioned in the 13th article are all comprehended in the paper * * * * *. One article has therefore been resolved on, the said paper has been sent to you, and I am hopeful you will send me a speedy answer to it. Particulars have been written to Govind Row Kishen who will explain them to you. What more shall I write?

No. 33—Steuart writes about the Nizam's willingness to close on the draft of the C. G.

FROM—W. STEUART,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Bider, 9th August 1793.

I have the honour to acquaint you that Meer Allum came to me yesterday with a Persian translation of a Mahratta paper (copy of which is enclosed), which he said had just been received from Govind Row Kishen, who declared it was the answer Balajee Pundit intended to give you, provided His Highness approved of it. Meer Allum told me, that he imputed this answer either to a desire of gratifying Tippto in consequence

of the correspondence, (the subject of which he could not inform me), that has passed between him and Mahajee Sindia, or to the confidence which the Mahrattas place in their own prowess, which might induce them to decline tying themselves down to a treaty of seven articles; he added that His Highness's situation was very different, and that neither being confident nor strong it was his interest to close on the draft and to induce the Poonah Durbar to do the same: I have some reason to think that a recommendation to this effect will be sent to Poonah, but should Balajee Pundit ultimately decline closing on the Governor General's draft, I do not think it impossible but that he may also influence His Highness to follow his example, notwithstanding all the offers that have been made here.

No. 34—Malet conveys to Stuart the Poonah minister's denial of the Nizam having ever signified to his Court his readiness to adopt the G. G.'s proposal.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—LT. WM. STEUART.

Poonah, 25th August 1793.

I have to acquaint you that this Durbar has deferred a definitive reply to my memorial of the 10th, till it receives from the Nizam an answer to the reference of reconsideration of Marquis Cornwallis's defensive proposals, made to him in consequence of my recommendation.

In the meantime the Minister has assured me, in answer to what is observed in my memorial and has also been at times verbally urged relative to the Nizam's disposition to adopt the said proposals and recommendation of them to this Court, that in no stage of the business has such a disposition been signified to this Court by His Highness either by letter or verbally through Govin Rau or any other channel.

I have thought it of consequence to make you acquainted with what appears so diametrically opposite to the communication of your Court.

No. 35—Steuart informs the G. G. of his having received assurances that the Nizam intended no hostile measures towards the Bhonsla.

FROM—W. STEUART, ASST. RESIDENT,

TO—LORD CORNWALLIS.

Bider, 1st September 1793.

It having been detailed in the newspapers of this Durbar that His Highness proposed forming a camp near Nandere to overawe the Bhonslah, I made enquiry of Meer Allum on the subject, pointing out the

impolicy of the measure and how contrary it was to the promise the Minister made to Sir John Kennaway in April last. In reply he assured me that, though the report prevailed here, there was no foundation whatever for it, and that the Minister would never deviate from the promise I alluded to.

No. 36—The two Residents exchange notes.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—LT. WILLIAM STEUART.

2nd September 1793.

I have been duly favoured with your letters of the 23rd and 24th ultimo, and thank you for the copies of the letters said to have been lately written by Baborou and Govinrow to the Peshwa and Mahadjee Sindia, which (without letting this Court know of their receipt) I shall endeavour to use to the discovery on which side the falsehood lies, between your Court's assertion and this Court's denial, of such advices having been sent or received.

From the enclosed copy of my address of 31st ultimo to the Governor General you will learn the conduct I mean to observe in future on the subject of the defensive treaty, and you shall be immediately informed of any new occurrence relative to it.

No. 37—Steuart informs the G. C. of attempts being made to effect a reconciliation between Nana and Azim-ul-Omra.

FROM—W. STEUART,

TO—LORD CORNWALLIS.

Bider, 29th September 1793.

Babah Row and Her Row are to set from hence in a few days for Poona for the purpose, as Meer Allum informs me, of adjusting all points in discussion between this Court and the Peishwah's and to bring about a reconciliation, through Mahadjee Sindia, between Azeem-ul-Omrah and Balajee Pundit.

No. 38—Steuart reports to Malet the heavy floods at Hyderabad.

FROM—W. STEUART,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Bider, 7th October 1793.

After eight days constant rain the Moossa river on the 30th ultimo became so high that great part of the suburbs of Hyderabad, part of the Shehr

Punna and City, together with the habitations of several of the gentlemen of our Residency, were washed away. By accounts under date the 5th instant I find the weather was beginning to clear up and that the river was expected to be fordable in a day or two. The bund of a large tank which supplies seventeen villages with water near Hyderabad gave way, but by the aid of about 1000 workmen in opening all the sluices and cutting trenches to carry off the water in different directions the fears of the inhabitants of the city from that quarter are now done away; however, I hear the water still oozes through every part of the bund.

No. 38A---Floods and heavy rains at Hyderabad.

Bider, 8th October 1793.

From the great delay that has already taken place in our receipt of letters from the eastward in consequence of the very heavy rains and swelling of the Nullahs further increased, as I just now learn, by the banks of some tanks giving way on the east side of Hyderabad near Ibrahim pait, I think it proper without further loss of time to advise you of these circumstances, as from the slight rains here and in your quarter you may not be aware of them.

A party of sepoys left Hyderabad the 1st instant to hasten the hircarrahs and swimmers, and I trust that our packets, though late, will arrive safe.

No. 39—Steuart communicates to Malet the objections urged by the Nizam to the Poona draft.

FROM—W. STEUART, ASST. RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Bider, 20th October 1793.

I have the honour to acquaint you that on the first six articles of the Poonah draft this Durbar made, in my presence yesterday, nearly the same remarks as you have, and, instead of those articles, highly preferred the whole of His Lordship's draft of seven, on which they declared their readiness to close. The Minister laid some stress on the difference between His Highness's wish to stipulate for the immediate aid of the allies to any one of them who might be actually invaded unjustly by Tippe, and that part (namely "but agreeable to what is heretofore written" etc.) of the second article of the Poonah draft, which you have, I observe, made a query on, in your remarks of the 18th ultimo.

With respect to the seventh article of the Poonah draft, this Court says that it does not concern them, and that it should be regulated equitably between us and the Peishwah.

With respect to the 8th article this Court's remarks coincide with those in your proposed answer of the 22nd ultimo.

From the above it will appear to you that this Court is anxious for the adoption of His Lordship's draft as it stands, or to add thereto by way of an eighth and ninth article, to please the Peishwah, the subsidy and division articles, the former of these in such manner as we may settle, and the latter with the conditions you have pointed out.

With regard to the ninth article of the Poonah draft, the Minister objects to it as being unnecessary; however, with the limitation you propose, I have no hesitation in saying that I am persuaded this Court will agree to it, if we do.

With respect to the tenth article the Minister told the Nizam before me, that it was an offensive one in a defensive treaty; that Tippo formerly had to pay about fifteen lacks of rupees *for the whole of his country*, that as he had less now, a new settlement was meant, which could not be admitted after the Treaty of Seringapatam; the Nizam replied, that he had relinquished all his claims on Tippo of a similar nature when he concluded the late Treaty of Seringapatam, and that no demand of the kind could be advanced by either party.

With respect to the eleventh article this Court made nearly the same remarks as you have in your proposed draft of an answer under date the 22nd ultimo.

The Minister informed me yesterday that he had not received a copy from Poona of the Peishwah's draft, but that he expected it daily; draft of a letter is on its arrival to be prepared to the foregoing purport by this Court to the Peishwah, which, as it is to be shewn to me previous to being written out fair, I shall endeavour to accommodate to our purpose and will send you a copy of it.

I am happy to inform you that Sir John Kennaway is to resume the charge of this Residency on his arrival here about the end of this month, until which time it may be better to protract the transmission of this Court's letter to Poonah, though, I hope, the information herein contained will enable you to proceed immediately in your negotiations at Poonah, particularly on account of our mutual anxiety dictated by the expediency of the case, to get rid of this tedious business.

No. 40—Cost of the British contingent with the Nizam.

General Abstract of an estimate of the average annual expense of a Detachment serving with His Highness the Nizam consisting of one Company of European artillery, four companies of Mascars, six field pieces, and two Battalions of Native Infantry,

800 privates in each, with the necessary staff and other appointments, the whole being equipped for field service calculated for one year of 365 days.

No. 1 Estimate of the average annual expense of a Company of artillery serving with the Nizam. 1,10..†

Star Pagodas.

„ 2	Estimate of the average annual expense of four companies of gun lascars serving with the Nizam.	10,0..
„ 3	Estimate of the average annual expense of two battalions of sepoys. 800 privates in each, serving with the Nizam.	8,914
„ 4	Estimate of the average annual expense of the Commanding Officer and staff to the detachment serving with His Highness the Nizam, calculated for a year of 365 days.	2,290
„ 5	Probable annual expense of camp equipage and packallies for the Commanding Officer and staff of the Nizam's Detachment.	36..
„ 6	Probable annual expense of the Quarter Master's department with a company of European artillery, including stores, the wear and tear of arms and accoutrements, bullocks, lascars, artificers, camp equipage, doolies and packallies.	463..
„ 7	Probable annual expense of the ordnance department for 6 field pieces, including ordnance stores, officers of ordnance, Mamotymen, bullocks, lascars, artificers, camp equipage and packallies.	75..
„ 8	Probable annual expense of the wear and tear of arms and accoutrements for two battalions of 800 privates in each.	123..
„ 9	Probable annual expense of camp equipage, ammunition and stores for two battalions of 800 privates in each.	3,414..
„ 10	Probable annual expense of bullocks, lascars, artificers, dooly bearers, and coolies for two battalions of 800 privates in each.	10,462
„ 11	Probable annual expense of the magazine at present with the Detachment, including the carriage of it.	8,821
„ 12	Average expense of contingencies and of sundry inferior charges that may have been omitted or cannot easily be included in estimate, say pagodas 300 monthly equal to.	3,600

Total Star Pagodas* .. 1,76,591-30-35

† N.B.—The figures are incomplete as the edge of the page is worn away.

* 365 Arcot rupees = 100 star pagodas.

No. 41—Kennaway suggests to Malet the advisability of availing himself of the Nizam's disposition to close separately on the G. G.'s draft for inducing the Poona Court to accept it.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Bider, 6th November 1793.

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letters to Lieut. Steuart of the 29th ultimo.

Having perused the correspondence that has passed during my absence on the subject of the defensive propositions, I am sorry to observe that the negotiation appears as far from drawing to a close as when I left Hyderabad. Every disposition has been shown by this Durbar to accelerate its termination; a decided preference appears to be given by them to His Lordship's draft over that proposed by the Poonah Durbar; and it occurs to me that the most likely, if not the only means of bringing the business to a close on the basis of the former, will be the appearance of a disposition, avowed or implied, on the part of the Nizam to close with us on it, without waiting any longer for the Peishwah's concurrence, when the latter, if it is ever done, is transmitted to him by the Poona Minister; the assistance which a similar conduct in His Highness was of to you in negotiating the original alliance seems to confirm the above conclusion.

No. 42—Kennaway presses on the G. G. his suggestion of concluding separately with the Nizam the much discussed treaty of guarantee.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., G. G.

Bider, 6th November 1793.

I have the honour to acquaint you of my arrival at this place from my excursion to the sea coast, on the 1st instant.

I beg leave to refer you to the enclosed copy of my letter of this date to the Resident at Poonah for my opinion of the most likely mode of bringing the tedious negotiation of our guarantee engagements to a conclusion. That mode would perhaps be more likely to succeed were we actually to conclude with the Nizam on Lord Cornwallis's draft, without waiting any longer for the Peishwah's concurrence; but this I shall not think of doing without the express sanction of your authority. This Durbar is of opinion that it would be effectual, but Sir Charles Malet's

sentiments, which you will be furnished with no doubt in course of dawk, will better enable you to judge of its probability than either theirs or mine.

My correspondence with the Governor General during your former residence in India, and the various transactions which have taken place since, must have left you sufficiently master of the views, characters, and politics of this Durbar ; to which I have only to add that His Highness seems rapidly advancing in his dotage, and that his Minister's power, which has been increasing fast since the death of his rival Shumse-ul-Omrah, is now at a pitch as absolute and uncontrollable as it can well be. I am sorry I cannot add a word in praise of any action, virtue or good quality, with which this high authority is exercised by him.

I beg leave to congratulate you on your accession to the supreme Government.

No. 43—Kennaway reports to the G. G. the resentment felt by the Nizam over the demands made upon him by Mahadji Sindia in the Emperor's name.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., G. G.

Camp at Bider, 19th November 1793.

Having yesterday accepted of an invitation from the Minister to celebrate the birth day of His Highness's (the Minister's adopted) son who has completed the first year of his age, the Minister acquainted me it was reported that Sindia had brought with him from Hindostan a Tunka or order on His Highness's Government from Shah Allum for two crores of rupees, that as such an order was equally unjust and vexatious, it was His Highness's determination to resist it to the utmost ; and he requested to be informed whether, in case of its being brought forward, the Nizam might depend on our mediation to render hostilities unnecessary, or our support if he should be obliged to engage in them.

I replied that, as it was impossible I could be acquainted with your sentiments on the question proposed to me, it was equally so that I could give an answer to it. That it was the wish of our Government that His Highness should remain unmolested, and by that means unmolested ; and that I could say no more without being previously acquainted with your pleasure on the subject.

The Minister replied that no demand of the kind had yet been hinted at, and that he had no authority but report for supposing it to exist ; that he did not wish me to commit myself by giving a decided opinion ; and only desired I would give a sort of guess what part we should take, in case of its being brought forward.

I told him that in so nice a point I could offer no guess, or give any other answer than what I had before offered ; and that considering the intimate connection that was said to subsist between His Highness and Sindia, I should conceive the latter would be the last channel through which such a requisition would be preferred. The Minister said it was very true, and he did not imagine Sindia would undertake a business of the kind. I enquired if it formed one of the eight requisitions which were formerly mentioned to me ; Meer Allum said no ; that those eight requisitions were restricted to arrears of disputed chout for various districts ; and that if an order for the enormous sum above mentioned did exist, it would be reserved with that of a demand for the cession of the pergunnah of Beer, which was likewise reported to be in contemplation till Balajee Pundit and Sindia had satisfactorily adjusted with each other, and with His Highness all other inferior concerns.

The Nizam proposes moving on a hunting party in the course of a few days to a spot about three coss distant, which is said to abound in game. On my mentioning to Meer Allum a report which prevailed of its being with an intention to proceed to Gulberga, he assured me it was without foundation and that His Highness would return to this place in a month or six weeks. He informed me at the same time that Assud Ali Khan, who is here with a party of three or four thousand horse and who was intended for the command of the Detachment proposed to be sent to the Berar frontier, was about to be sent back to his district of Kurpah.

No. 44—Kennaway expresses to Malet his impatience at the delay shown by the Poona Court in ratifying the proposed engagement.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Bider, 26th November 1793.

I was not unmindful of Lord Cornwallis's sentiments of the 31st July to which you refer me, in reply to my letter of the 6th instant, on this subject, but I did not then nor do I now apprehend, that after having exercised our patience for a period of eight or ten months to procure the Peishwah's concurrence to so fair a definition of our defensive engagements, there would be that majesterial pressure on him in closing with the Nizam, (leaving an opening in the instruments by which we might so close, for him to accede whenever he is disposed to do so) which you attach to it, nor did I think His Lordship's sentiments above referred to applicable to the late conduct of the parties concerned. On the contrary, it appeared to me that closing with the Nizam might be the surest mode of procuring

that general concert, which Lord Cornwallis had at heart ; and that the act was in a manner sanctioned by His Lordship's having authorized you to conclude with the Poonah Government without the Nizam when a rash and hasty declaration of his Minister (hardly more objectionable than the systematic delay of the Poonah Ministry) made it doubtful if His Highness' concurrence would be given.

The Poonah draft appears in general so exceptionable, that I doubt if it will be possible to combine any of the stipulations of it with His Lordship's articles, but should you think differently and find it necessary to introduce any part of it, I have little doubt of obtaining the acquiescence of this Durbar to any modification which you may recommend.

The fifth article of it, if it is allowed to stand by the restriction of " should it be necessary for the prosecution of the war to purchase horses, etc.", would deprive the parties of all the advantages meant to be derived from it, of being prepared for the prosecution of war, when it happens. I see no objection to the supply of horses being fixed to an annual number. Our cavalry establishment including the 19th Regiment of Dragoons consists of 3,000, which at present wants 1,500 horses to complete, and when it is completed an annual supply of 300 will be necessary to keep it so. Therefore, though it would be better to leave the number unlimited, yet if you should find it necessary, I conceive, permission for us to purchase annually as far as 400 or 500 in each State being stipulated for, would provide for the present deficiency, the current casualties, as well as any eventual increase of our cavalry establishment.

With regard to the eighth article of the Poonah draft stipulating for one or two of our battalions, if the Peishwah should have occasion for them, I think, the option of calling for only one battalion should be done away ; the occasion restricted to a joint war against Tippo ; and the condition added of its being convenient to us to spare such a force. The Peishwah has no claim for it but what may arise from our liberality, and it is to be considered, that without any increase of military establishment the Bombay Presidency has now a much larger tract of country to look after than it had at the breaking out of the last war, which may render parting with such a force inconvenient to us.

In respect to the aid of a body of horse with which you propose to check the above 8th article of the Poonah draft, I should be doubtful, after the experience we have had of the enemy's cavalry, if such an aid, considering the expense we should be put to for it, is an object worth being solicitous about. If it is to be granted at the rate you propose, of 1,000 horse for the sum which the Peishwah will pay for one battalion and three guns, the amount computing by the estimate of the corps serving with the Nizam would be for every 1,000 horse 26, 85, 6-10-7 rupees per month.

Should you be of a different opinion with respect to the value of the object, I would recommend, in order to secure the more ready obedience

and good behaviour of such an aid, its being defined that the payments for it shall be made to the officer or officers commanding it, and also that the particular description of the horse to be granted should be specified. To a certain amount perhaps the Beyde horse would best suit our purpose, as being more likely than any other to relieve us from the trouble and expense of supplying them with provisions and keeping the enemy's horse of a similar description at a distance from our line of march and encampments. But I think, that Poonah demand on us for Battalions and ours on them for Horse, would more properly be deferred to the period prescribed for adjusting the plan of the war.

No. 45—The Nizam in a letter to the Peshwa states his objections to the draft proposed by him.

26th November 1793.

Translate of Draft of a letter from His Highness the Nizam to Row Pundit Perdhan.

The draft of the treaty proposed by you and forwarded by Sir Charles Malet was delivered to me near two months ago by Mr. Steuart; it is surprizing that to this time I have not received the above draft through Govind Row Kishen. The negotiation of this treaty having been on the tapis ten months with our two Sircars, and it being very incumbent after such an elapse of time that it should be closed, further delay for the arrival of the draft through Govind Row Kishen is deemed unnecessary. Having compared your draft with the one proposed by the Governor General consisting of seven articles, in words as well as meaning, the propriety of closing on which I formerly fully expressed to you in writing, I now proceed to represent to you fully the evils that have occurred to me as being attendant on your additions to and deductions from it.

In the preamble of your draft the words "for the regulation of our respective Governments" are inserted; what has this to do with this Treaty? The words "for the due fulfilment of the stipulations of the Treaty of Seringapatam" and the words "heirs and successors of each" are omitted. It is necessary that both these omissions should be supplied.

In the 1st and 2nd articles of your draft though there is a difference in words from those of His Lordship's yet the sense is the same, then what occasion is there for changing His Lordship's words?

The 3rd article of His Lordship's draft, which is meant clearly to define the meaning of his preceding article, is totally omitted in your draft; as this article is a confirmation of the Treaty of Seringapatam, which is the basis of the present Treaty, its insertion is necessary.

The third article of your draft agrees in sense with the 4th of His Lordship's, except that by the latter the speedy attention of the Allies to the Ally aggrieved immediately on notice being given of his being so, is provided for, which so far from being the case by the former, seems to be the reverse ; it is therefore necessary to adopt the words of His Lordship's 4th article.

In the 4th article of your draft it is written that, " Vakeels should be entertained for the purpose of explaining their own and their master's views and wishes " ; it is not mentioned where they should be entertained. In the 5th article of His Lordship's it is thus written, that " permission shall be given for a Vakeel from each party to reside in the army of the others for the purpose of communicating their respective views and circumstances " ; therefore the superiority of His Lordship's sentence is very evident.

In the 5th article of your draft, in regard to the purchase of horses, it is added that " the number should be specified ", and the " entertaining of recruits of men " is omitted. Sir John Kennaway represents that the horses which suit the Company require to be of a particular age and size, and that such are very scarce in this country ; therefore what necessity is there for specifying the particular number ; and as to the confirmation of that part regarding the raising recruits of men it is advantageous for each of the three Sircars ; never think of doing it away.

It appears from the 6th article of your draft that Tippo is permitted to molest any one of the allies once, that is to say that it is not necessary to punish him for a first molestation though the said ally may be entirely destroyed by it, but only to admonish him on such an occasion not to do the like, and to tell him that if he does so again, it will not be well ; therefore the foundation of the defensive treaty between the allies for the purpose of obtaining retribution from Tippo, in case of his causing disturbance, is weakened if not destroyed. It is better and more proper that the words of His Lordship's draft in this article, the advantages of which are evident, should be adopted.

In the 7th article of your draft it is written, that agreeably to the present plan of the war which has been resolved on if it should be necessary to go to war, whatever country and forts shall be taken from Tippo shall be equally divided amongst the three allies. This is a defensive and not an offensive treaty, and it is evident that the three Sircars being as one and the same each will receive an equal share of the divisions ; therefore, it is proper that this matter should be settled after a war shall have been resolved on ; but if its insertion right or wrong is insisted on, it should be in this manner, that the division of country, forts etc., which may be obtained from Tippo in exchange for peace, shall be made with due attention to each of the parties relatively to their respective frontiers, in the same manner as was observed in the last war between the three Sircars and Tippo.

The 8th article stipulates for a battalion or two from the English Company ; this negotiation rests with the Company and has no concern with my Sircar.

In the 9th article of your draft it is written that in the country which shall be ceded by Tippoo, the three Allies shall continue whatever was previously in practice regarding Brahmins, Fakeers and Mausoleums ; what has this to do with the stipulations of this treaty ? Each of the allies will do as he likes in regard to his own grants for charitable purposes.

The 10th article, which concerns your peishcush from Tippoo Sultaun, has nothing whatever to do in this treaty of defence between the allies, and is even contrary to it. In case of inserting this article, the treaty will no longer be a defensive but an offensive one. If you wish to make an offensive treaty, my peishcush which in virtue of sunnuds has been due for a long time past should also be inserted ; but this article is clearly in opposition to the basis of the present treaty, which being merely for security and for expelling disturbances raised by Tippoo, it would be entirely confused, and its insertion would render it necessary to enter on an immediate war ; this being the case, the omission of this article is necessary, more necessary.

The 11th article specifies that should the Sircar have occasion for powder, balls, guns, musquests, and other warlike stores, leave should be granted for purchase from the Company or from merchants, free of customs. Sir John Kennaway represents that it is not customary for the Company to sell warlike stores, that the merchants are strictly prohibited from doing it, and that the Governor General cannot issue orders in regard to generally allowing such sales ; for the present such apparatus is not much wanted in my Sircar ; if you are in want of any, you can ascertain likewise by enquiry of Sir Charles Malet how far Sir John Kennaway's representation is just.

No 46—The Nizam applies to the Governor of Madras for purchase of military stores.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART., GOVERNOR OF MADRAS.

Camp near Bider, 5th December 1793.

I have the honour to acquaint you that, in consequence of an application received from His Highness the Nizam for a letter to your address requesting permission might be granted to Monsieur Raymond to purchase at Madras 3,000 musquets, from such as have been condemned by Government as unserviceable, or were captured at Pondicherry, 100,000 flints, 200 maund

of lead, 20 of copper, and 20 of fine iron, and 100 pieces of broad cloth of various colours for the use of this Government, I beg leave to request he may be allowed to purchase them, and that passports may be afterwards granted him to prevent their being stopped on the road.

No. 47—This letter informs Malet of Kennaway's retirement and of his being succeeded by William Kirkpatrick as Resident.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—KENNAWAY.

Poona, 6th December 1793.

You will observe that in the answer to the Peshwa's 10th article, I have omitted all mention of the comparison between the Nazim's and this Court's claim of peshcush on Tippto, as inserted in the Nazim's draft of a letter to the Peshwa, because from the great difference in the circumstances of those claims, I think the assumption of a similarity is more calculated to prolong cavil on a point of considerable delicacy than to answer any good end in all other points. I have paid as much attention to your recommendation as I thought compatible with the consideration due to this Court's wishes and our own interests.

In reply to the notification of your intended return to Europe this season, I have only to assure you that my best wishes will attend you, while my regret at Government's being deprived of a continuance of your services is in some measure removed by the hope that the loss will be less felt under the exertions of such a successor as Capt. Kirkpatrick.

No. 48 In this letter to Malet Kennaway maintains that readiness to close separately with the Nizam would also induce the Poona Court to agree to the proposed defensive engagement.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Bider, 12th December 1793.

I am sorry, you should have considered a difference of sentiments on a speculative opinion of mine, with regard to the effect which closing with the Nizam on our Guarantee engagements might have on the Poonah Durbar, sufficiently important to require a reference to Government; I submitted it to the Governor General, as you cannot but recollect, with the express reservation that your sentiments would better enable him to judge of the feasibility of it than either this Durbar's or my own; but as

the reference has been made and introduced with an observation that, the latter part of the fourth paragraph and the whole of the 5th of my letter to you of the 26th ultimo differ widely from the spirit and letter of Lord Cornwallis's instructions to us of the 31st July and from your sentiments thereon, I think it necessary to add, in addition to what is stated in those paragraphs, as reasons why I did not conceive His Lordship's instructions to me of that date (for those to you I never received) applicable to the present conduct of the parties, that the attempt of the Poonah Durbar to draw in the Company as Guarantees for their claim on Tippo for choute by inserting it in their defensive draft, and at the same time seeking to leave themselves an opening by the 6th article of it to evade the guarantee engagement altogether, would probably have cancelled that forbearance and moderation by which His Lordship was guided, when he sent us the instructions you have alluded to ; if his Lordship's orders are to regulate our conduct, without attending to any change which may have taken place subsequent to the time when they were given, which I by no means conceive it was his intention they should do, the negotiation we are now engaged in ought at once to stop, since the repugnance of the Poonah Court to accede to the object of it, as mentioned in the 2nd paragraph of your letter before me, is pointed out by his Lordship in his commands of the 27th October 1792, as a circumstance under which he was not desirous it should be proceeded in.

I was not a warm advocate for this negociation being commenced as my letter to you of the 15th September 1792 will testify, but having engaged in it, observing the art and evasion betrayed by the Poonah Court in the draft above mentioned, and reflecting on the difficulty we might have to encounter should the same be practised, as it more probably would be, when the exigency of affairs might require that all parties should proceed to immediate action instead of discussing the terms on which they were to act, I wished the business might be settled during a season of leisure and security more favourable for it. I wish so still, but am humbly of opinion that its being adjusted on any principles but those of His Lordship's draft, would leave it in nearly the same state as it was before, and that therefore we should endeavour by all practicable means to get through with it on that basis. The opinion of His Highness and his Ministers concurring with mine as to the most like'y mode of this desirable point being effected, and the probability of that mode being further sanctioned by the assistance which a similar conduct was of to you in your negotiations of the Poonah Treaty, I thought my duty required my mentioning it in the manner I did to the Governor General, and if any excuse is necessary for my having done so I trust he will deem this a sufficient one.

In perusing the Persian copy of your intended answer to the Poonah Durbar, it occurred to me, that if you decide for making what the Nizam pays for our Detachment the standard of what is eventually to be paid for the same force by the Peishwah, in preference to stipulating that it shall

be what it costs the Company to maintain such a corps in the field, as I submitted to you in my letter of the 6th ultimo, it would be better that the specific sum which His Highness now pays for it should be mentioned, as well for the sake of being candid and guarding against the possibility of future cavil as to induce them to desist from preferring this demand.

I think you were perfectly right in your answer to the Peishwah's tenth article to avoid all comparison of your Court's claim on Tippto for choute with the Nizam's for peishcush. I do not myself see much difference between them, though if His Highness can produce sunnuds for his as he asserts he can, it would, barring the Treaty of Seringapatam, stand on nearly the same footing as that which is acknowledged and paid him by the Company.

I beg you will accept my thanks for the wishes you have expressed on my approaching departure from this Durbar, which, the continuance of your successful services at a Court so much connected with this, and the exertions of the able successor that has been appointed to me, will enable me to quit in perfect confidence that any advantage with which my experience may have enabled me to fulfil the duties of my station will not be missed.

No. 49—Kennaway asks the G. G. whether in face of the opposition of the Poona Court he was to proceed with the negotiations or drop them altogether.

FROM—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp near Bider, 17th December 1793.

I should be very glad to prove the mistake, as it does not appear probable to me that the Poona Durbar will allow the opportunity to escape them of settling their Guarantee Engagements on the advantageous principle of their Declaration of the 3rd July, even though it should be at the expence of assenting to our concluding with the Nizam on Lord Cornwallis's draft, I beg leave in that case to learn your pleasure, whether I am to close with His Highness on the said Draft, or to be guided by the latter part of the fourth paragraph of His Lordship's commands to me of the 31st July to conform eventually to the aforesaid Declaration.

His Lordship very justly observes in the paragraph of the letter above alluded to, that it is of material importance that, the relative connection between the three Powers should, in form as well as in substance, be exactly the same, and my idea of closing separately with the Nizam on the draft had no other view than the hope of inducing the Poonah Durbar to follow

His Highness's example in adopting so clear and fair definition of our defensive engagements.

But as the Poonah Declaration for the reason stated in my correspondence with Sir Charles Warre Malet is of a very different nature, and seems from every material point extremely exceptionable, * * * (torn) wish to wait for the sanction of your authority. I recommend its being adopted here, and I further beg leave to submit it as my humble opinion, that it will be preferable to drop the negociation altogether than to conclude it on the basis of the above Declaration.

No. 50—Malet does not approve of Kennaway's suggestion of a separate engagement with the Nizam, as he thinks the latter incapable of supporting defensive engagements independently of the Poona Court.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—KENNAWAY, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 20th December 1793.

In my letter of the 16th I had the honour to acknowledge receipt of yours of the 12th instant, and in my reply to it now shall endeavour, as much as possible, to regulate myself by the same desire of avoiding embarrassing your approaching departure or the councils of Government with an unnecessary protraction of those ample discussions which are already before Government. That which induced my simple reference unclogged with comment to the decision of our Superiors in my letter of the 6th, and which I thought in every respect the most eligible as the most summary mode of bringing points to a determination that have been suffered too long to fluctuate in our correspondence, and in the entire propriety of so doing I am further confirmed by observing, that as every one of our letters is submitted to Government and thereby every opinion placed in fact in a constant state of reference, so the most certain mode of drawing on a decision was by direct appeal on specific points of instruction, and, as in my last, I had the honour to transmit you the copy of Marquis Cornwallis's letter to me of 31st July last containing part of those instructions, I trust, its perusal will have had every good effect in reducing our conduct to the same standard, but for the purpose of exemplifying at one glance the difference mentioned in my letter of the 6th instant, I take the liberty to enclose extracts from His Lordship's and your letters on the points in question, which I think it necessary to accompany with my humble opinion that, nothing that has since passed renders His Lordship's instructions less applicable now than when they were communicated to us; nor, frankly and candidly speaking, can I think that any greater degree of culpability with respect to us attaches to this Court's endeavour of including the recovery of its demands on Tippoo (call it either by the denomination of Chouth, kundnee, or Peshkush or tribute) than attaches to us with respect to it for the

exclusive mention of our prior covenants with the Mysore Government in the Treaty of Puttun, and as to the dissimilarity of this Court's claim on Tippto to any obsolete pretension of the Nizam, permit me to repeat what has, I believe, been more than once noticed in the course of my letters, that the claim of this Court on Tippto was actually acknowledged and confirmed by Tippto himself in the Treaty that took place between him, the Nizam and Peshwa at the conclusion of the war of 1787, and was likewise actually paid to the time of the breaking out of the last war, which constitutes a predicament exactly similar to that subsisting between this Government and the Nazim, on which His Lordship's sentiments are expressed in the enclosed extract of his letter of 24th June 1792 and its appendage.

I know, Sir, full well that His Lordship's instructions on the subject of this Court's claims of the same nature on Tippto differ widely from those here quoted, and I know likewise that by its not being specifically provided for in the Treaty of Puttun, ground is furnished us of disallowance which I shall take every advantage of, avoiding as long as possible all retrospect or investigation of so delicate a subject.

It was my wish to have passed over in silence your former mention of "the benefit to be derived from closing separately with the Nazim, as sanctioned by the assistance derived from a similar conduct on a former occasion". But by its repetition and the stress laid on it in your letter of the 12th, I find myself necessitated to remark, that while the appearance may be cautiously used and has been used, the consummation of the act, as you propose, seems inadmissible, and that in my opinion, even admitting for argument's sake the assistance you allege, the cases are not parallel; for that concert, which was optional (though the exercise of the option was scarcely practicable by the Nazim) in the formation of original engagements, certainly becomes indispensably necessary in the continuation of those engagements, after their having been prosecuted in concert; and, while I can safely leave to your judgment to decide on the wisdom or policy of our entering into separate engagements with such a Govt. as that of Hyderabad in opposition to the wishes of this Court, which has been pretty fully discussed in the course of our correspondence, I must beg leave to refer you and Govt. to a retrospect of our negotiation in settling our former treaties for a full description of our mutual aids and obstructions, but more especially for the origin and progress of the defensive article by which we have been, and I fear shall be, involved in so much and so vexatious discussion, and in the course of that retrospect the views and interests, the Forte and Foible of our respective Courts, in such an arrangement, will be fully collected, and it will, I conceive, be clearly understood that this Court could support defensive engagements with us independent of the Nazim; yet the Nazim could not do the same independent of this Court and contrary to its will, mixed with and in a great measure subject as his exotic Government is to the indigenous influence of this State, from which

however desirous we may be of extricating him, wisdom, good faith and the most deliberate investigation of consequences demand that we should be extremely guarded and attentive to opportunity in the pursuit, more especially as this Court has been formally acquainted that our defensive engagements to His Highness do not extend to his protection against the Head or Members of the Mahratta empire.

Having written thus far I am honoured with your letter of the 14th, and, as conformity of opinion between us is extremely desirable, shall be happy, if after perusal of the foregoing explanation of my sentiments on the different points of actually closing separately and appearing to close separately with the Nazim, you can continue to reconcile the latter part of the 4 para of your letter of the 26 ult. with my opinion.

The circumstances mentioned in the 2nd para of your letter of the 14th afford in my opinion a new proof of the necessity of concert in the ultimate settlement that may take place, and of which we shall be able to form a better judgment on being furnished with this Court's answer to my last propositions.

I have the honour to enclose copy of my letter of this date to the Governor General and to be, etc., etc.

No. 51—Malet offers reasons why a separate treaty with the Nizam was in his view disadvantageous.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—KENNAWAY, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 23rd December 1793.

If by dropping (as you suggest) the negotiations we can drop the influence of the defensive articles that now stand on our Treaties, not only with this State and that of Hyderabad but in some measure with that of Puttun also, I shall most readily accede to the position assumed in the close of your letter of the 17th to the Governor General. But the evil, I fear, is, neither by our declining accession to this Court's Declaration of the 3rd July nor by this Court's declining accession to the late Governor General's proposition now under its reconsideration, can we rid ourselves of those adhesive stipulations, which have been and will continue (unless obviated by expunction or some expedient equivalent thereto) a source of constant uneasiness to our Government, and probably soon or late involve us in serious difficulties, either in support of those whose interests we are bound to defend or in claiming in the hour of need the aid of those equally bound to defend us, but whose defence will, I fear, be hindered by no bonds but those of their own interest, convenience or perhaps caprice.

No. 52—The G. G. approves of the advice given by the Resident to the Nizam not to pursue hostile measures towards the Raja of Berar.

FROM—SECRETARY TO THE G. G.,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART., RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fort William, 24th December 1793.

The Governor General desires me, in reply to your letter under date the 13th November, to express his approbation at the opinion which you gave to Meer Alum on the 8th of that month, in reply to the application made to you relative to the employment of troops by His Highness the Nizam against the forces stationed on the frontiers of his territory by the Rajah of Berar, and he is much pleased to observe that the preparations which were making to collect this force had considerably abated. It is certainly the policy of the Minister to avoid every measure not indispensable, that may have a tendency to inflame the jealousies already existing between the Courts of Hyderabad and Berar.

No. 53—Shore turns down the Nizam's request for British support against Mahadji Sindia.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART., RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fort William, 24th December 1793.

I have the pleasure to reply to your letter of the 19th of November.

I entirely approve the caution with which you answered the application of the Minister, regarding the mediation of this Government, or its support, in case the apprehended demands of Sindia should terminate in hostilities between the two Powers.

I sincerely wish that nothing may occur to occasion a renewal of the reference, and that this Government may not be subject to the necessity of a formal reply to it.

But if His Highness the Nizam or his Minister should repeat the application, you may inform him that the friendly connection subsisting between Sindia and this Government must necessarily preclude any interference, on our part, for the support of the Nizam against Sindia, in the event of hostilities between them; that, with respect to our mediation, it is impossible for this Government to offer it, and that an application from the parties, requesting our interposition, must precede any deliberation on the propriety of granting it.

In the communication of this determination, in case of necessity, you will of course adopt the most conciliatory language to express my concern that the embarrassments of the Nizam's affairs should have made any reference to us on such a subject necessary, that I sincerely hope, his own wisdom and prudence will be sufficient to extricate him from the disagreeable predicament in which he represents himself to be involved, and that I heartily regret any appeal should be made to my friendship under circumstances which render it impossible for me to act up to its dictates.

No. 54—In this weighty document Malet exposes the impolicy of encouraging advances from the Nizam for a closer connection. Such a connection, he urges, would rouse the jealousy of the Marathas, and would involve the Co.'s Power in hostilities which, the situation required should be avoided at all costs.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPT. W. KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 6th January 1794.

Having endeavoured to answer Sir John Kennaway's letters of the 26 and 28 December, and thereby elucidated, as I trust, the inexpediency of venturing any engagements with the Nazim that might involve us in controversy probably leading to hostility with this State, under predicaments so strongly counter to the induction of such hostility as our general interests that require hon'ble peace as long as possible, our positive declarations to this Government that our defensive arrangements with His Highness do not extend to an operation against this State or its members, and the necessity of not breaking the concert in which the engagements in question have hitherto been prosecuted by the three States, I shall, by way of supplement to that answer and from a desire of throwing some light on my general objections to endangering hostilities with this State by entering into any obnoxious engagements with His Highness, endeavour, by a free enquiry into His Highness's power to support such engagements, at once to explain the obstacles and their remedy.

In the first place, I hold the interior financial (for it can hardly be called civil in a Government founded purely on military principles tho' inefficient) part of His Highness's administration to be radically faulty, and almost incorrigibly tending to dissolution. I hold the evils of his family and Ministry to be equally alarming and such as to deprive his Government of every basis of fidelity at home and consequently of confidence abroad. His Minister's acts seem inseparably connected with temporizing expediency and palpable chicane, in which whatever share circumstances and situation may have, much is doubtless to be attributed to the bents of his mind and disposition. At all events the fact is irrefragable and the conclusion is clear, that

Faith cannot exist where expedient domineers over system, and where neither genius nor order exists to control or overcome the despotism of circumstances ; in a Government so flimsy as that of the Nazim, which, boasting neither the prescriptive strength of hereditary permanence (being but the 2nd generation from its founder, while some of the pretenders to the family domains are long under this Govt.) nor the more essential firmness of vigour and ability, is exposed to every shock incident to a disputed succession so destructive to all Mahomedan dynasties on the death of the present incumbent. Where then amidst this choice of difficulties are we to take our stand and where to lay the foundation of separate engagement ? Is it on any fair option given by the latitude of treaties of entering into such an engagement ? No. Is it on a confidence in the strength and vigour of His Highness's present life and Government ? No. Is it in a clear prospect of an undisputed succession of His Highness's heir to the maxims and dominions of his predecessor ? No. Is it on a confidence founded in experience of the virtue and abilities of the minister ? No. Having thus sought for grounds of confidence in His Highness's Government throughout its financial and civil construction to bear us through a connexion, how can it be sought for in his military strength, which as necessarily depends on the regularity of financial arrangement as the proper movement of the animal members rests on the just organization of the Body. But were this a doubtful point, the contemptible state of His Highness's army would elucidate it. For, in it, instead of that beautiful and vigorous exhibition of energy and vivacity that characterizes the flow of political vigour from a pure source through a beautiful body to its extreme members, we meet here with nothing but the sickly appearances of debility and inanity, for energy languor, for exertion indolence, for modesty arrogance, for courage insolence ; in short, a timid swollen up body in which every member is too great to be good, and in which high sounding names and titles are too generally substituted for moderate deeds. For how can it be otherwise where labour is ignominious, and the arrogations of the most contemptible vanity respectable ? May the construction of a corps of infantry, in which I understand His Highness's Minister has been lately engaged, tend to alter this disagreeable picture, to which I should be happy to administer some relief by bringing forward a description of His Highness's foreign Politics, which since the late peace with Tippo, rest, I presume, entirely between our Government and this ;—those with our Government under the management of the respectable characters delegated by the Governor General cannot (actuated as all our measures are) but be dignifyd. As to his affairs with this State including M. Sindia, let others form a judgment of the degree of confidence they merit on our part, when it is understood that they are carryd on through Govinrow Kishun, alias Bappo, alias Kalla, this Court's delegate at Hyderabad, whose looseness of conduct has been frequently notorious. His (Govinrow Kishun's) delegate, Govinrow Pingla, alias Mamma, here acts as far as it meets the views of this Court in concert with

Ragotim Rou, the Nazim's own agent here. While His Highness's agents with M. Sindia are Cullian Rou, a relation of Sindia and Babarou a dependant of Cullian Rou. All these are Hindoos and four of them Bramins, all busily engaged in the conversion of their situations to their respective individual emolument with, as we may suppose, a natural bias of a preference in so doing to the interests of their own sect and their own relations, under whose Government their acquisitions would be more eligible and more permanent. With every possible allowance for that fairness which Sir Jn. K. is so fond of assuming for the Nazim in his intercourse with us, let others judge of the stress to be laid on it in negotiations that equally concern this Court, considering the character of his Minister Azim-al-Omra and the circumstances of these agents, through whom His Highness's and his Minister's objects are negotiated.

After taking this summary view of the circumstances of the Nazim's Government, in a great part of which it escaped me to mention that this Government's claims and even aumils are fixed and established under a variety of denominations as Choute, Mokasa, Deysmooki, Sir Deysmooki, Saotra, Babut, Kundnee etc. etc., it may be asked in what point this State's Government is more formidable? But tho' this is no the question at issue, I may safely answer and with much concern, in every point. For exclusive of the embarrassing circumstance of encompassing, as this State does, so large a part of His Highness's territory and having such an indigenous interest in its very soil, whereby and by this State's better government a large part of His Highness's subjects are interested in the success of this State, the prescriptive and very powerful claim which the Brahmanical character of the Peshwa gives him to the respect of the Hindoo World, is strongly supported by the almost invariable circumstance of Bramins being in the management of affairs of every Hindoo family of consequence throughout the Deccan. This Government then has the advantage of a more stable foundation at home, and a more confidential ministry abroad; of a more systematic administration, of greater simplicity in its manners, of a more prudent and rigid economy, of more laborious habits in its soldiery, of whom large armies are constantly in the field, and lastly, in that general spirit of depredation, by which hosts might soon be roused to inundate His Highness's territories and annihilate his resources, and, all this might be done, I humbly presume, by the Poona Government as easily as it carryd on the late war against Tipoo with forces under Hurry Punt and Pursaram Bhou far superior to those of the Nazim, while distinct armies under Ally Bhadur and of the two Chieftains Holcar and Sindia were employed in the north of India as much at their leisure as tho' no commotion existed in the south.

From this comparative view it should follow that the Nazim is not equal to a contest with this State; nay more, that his independence, if not existence, is sooner or later exposed to extreme danger from its too powerful neighbourhood. As, therefore, my object in exposing to view

His Highness's weakness and this State's power is not to degrade the one or aggrandize the other, but rather with a view from exposing to remedy the serious evils of the one's weakness and the other's strength, in which Sir John Kennaway seems to differ with me in opinion, the next thing to be considered is to meet, and if possible surmount the danger, the first step to which, I humbly presume, would be so to organize His Highness's financial and military government (and that, if possible, without the appearance of our interposition) as by degrees to give it an energy and consistency that might ensure the corporate exertion of its component parts in such a manner that, should on any future occasion, wisdom and sound policy on the basis of self-preservation teach us the necessity of interposition in His Highness's favour, we may at least have the satisfaction of doing it under the confidence of a sincere and effective cooperation, instead of tying a mill-stone round our neck. I have already mentioned in my letter of yesterday my presumption of His Highness's wanting to implicate us in his defence, and while he is endeavouring to fix on us that burthen by some obligatory mode, I doubt not but he is deriving every assistance from the appearance of it in his present negotiations with this Court, and under the credit of it he long has endeavoured and will continue to endeavour not only to evade compliance with the new pretensions of this State and Mahadji Sindia arising from the title of Vackeel-al-Mutluck, but with those claims which have been acknowledged, and were advised to be liquidated by Marquis Cornwallis; nor will he be backward on the same appearance of support, in the style of Mogul arrogance, even to assume a lofty tone and thereby attempt to work on any tendency in this Court to avoid extremities for the present, tho' with an unchangeable resolution to resume them on the first favourable opportunity. I need not observe that, while these measures of His Highness may give a temporary relief to his affairs, they must in the degree of their success subject us to an exact proportion of jealousy as the virtual cause of that relief by standing as it were between them and their object, and the present attachment of a body of our troops to His Highness and the late frequent supplies of Arms, etc. (not usually granted) that he has drawn from Madras, tend strongly to confirm the various modes by which His Highness will not fail to convey a persuasion of our devotion to his interests, the support of which, if it could be effected consistent with good faith and the safety of our own honor and interests, I am as strong an advocate for as Sir Jn. K. can possibly be. But that safety may be best judged of from the foregoing picture of the two States, which I sincerely believe to be near the truth. At all events, if His Highness is desirous of becoming usefully connected with us, let him immediately convince us of it by putting his domestick Government and its succession in such a state as to assure us that it may be relied on, by putting his foreign ministry in hands worthy of our confidence and his army on a footing in point of numbers and equipment entitled to the respect of his friends and enemies. This once effected to

our satisfaction, it is to be hoped that so respectable an appearance would in itself prove a sufficient check on the evil designs of this Court, or any other ; but should it not, it would at least furnish some firm foundation for us to proceed on, should necessity—and no other plea can justify it agreeable to our present Treaties—call for our serious interposition in the course of constructing an effectual check, should such be thought requisite on the formidable power and dangerous spirit of this State. I would likewise suggest and warmly recommend, as the most powerful and least exceptionable aid that could be given to the improvements in His Highness's Government, the early establishment of that respectable military force, which has been dissipated as far as relates to its influence on this State by the large proportion drained from Bombay for the new stations on the Mallabar coast. Nor should the expense be objected to, when it is considered that such a force was thought expedient when we had not those additional revenues on the coast that will (or ought to) fully pay the troops already there, and those that in their lieu may be established at B'bay, where a strong force will be so effective in checking the designs of this State, by endangering immediately not only the province of Guzerat and all its favourite possessions on the sea coast and in the Cokun, but even Poona itself ; that, were it a necessary alternative, even the reduction of an equivalent part of the Bengal army to furnish the funds for its establishment might be found a wise measure, as I am convinced as above all that the appearance of such a force at B'bay would be more efficient as a check to prevent and by its operations to overcome the actual hostility of this State,—that of Tippo out of the question in this discussion,—than the appearance or operations of a similar one in Bengal. Nor can I omit this opportunity of suggesting, in the strongest terms, the reestablishment of the Company's Marine at B'bay, if not on its once very respectable footing, at least in such force as completely to overawe not only the naval force of this State but that of the Dessye of Warree, the Raja of Colapur, the remains of the Angriah Family of Colabba, and all the numerous pirates, by whom our valuable trade on this Coast and the still more valuable honour and lives of our country and our countrymen are constantly endangered and violated ; and in the vindication and revenge of which various causes prevent that prompt employment of the King's Ships (even allowing them to be on the spot) which the emergency may require, and by which we have been already subjected to severe losses of lives, property and reputation. To this respectable construction of our land and sea force on the Mallabar Coast, I need not add the necessity of the most unrelaxed and unremitting attention to the effective state of our force on the Northern Frontier of our Bengal Provinces (Madras being still out of the question as above, immediately with respect to this State) in which the most unbiassed regard should be paid to the executive military merits and abilities of the Commanders of the stations in preference to the claim of seniority, a principle pregnant with the most deadly stupor that affects

the very vitals of the body politic, the evils of which may be fatal in a moment to our dearest interests in the Country, as the openings arising from it are ever anxiously sought after and may be seized in the twinkling of an eye by the prompt spirit of despotism, which in the hands of ability with myriads at its devotion is ever to be dreaded. Nor can I pass over unnoticed the absolute necessity of the maintenance of a respectable *Body of Cavalry* on the above frontier, by which I do not merely mean men on horses, but men severely trained to the use of arms on horseback, and horses as rigidly habituated to labour and the exercises of war as the men not merely on the parade but by the habits of marching, foraging, encamping, etc., circumstances which I am led to insist on, by observance and experience. That excellent smart cavalry in cantonments or on the parade may be very much out of the habit of subsisting themselves and horses on a range ground without previous collection of grain and forage after long marches, in which the *Marratta Cavalry* are such complete adepts. as with, in general, despicable horses and very indifferent horsemen, to render warfare in a country that they can traverse absolutely so desirable to them as to keep the field for years without interruption, thereby subduing countries rather as locusts than as soldiers, tho' with the same effect. This branch of military equipment alone is wanting to render our dominions absolutely impervious to the attempts of any Power in the East, and the acquisition of it either by the conversion of the Vizier's or our own resources to the object is certainly worthy of utmost exertion of political wisdom, whose most desirable pursuit is the safety and tranquility of that portion of mankind entrusted to its charge. The peculiar circumstances of the construction of our Government in the East, afford likewise the strongest arguments, where by the actual and vigorous state of our preparation we should rather check and prevent hostile designs than invite them by any flaw or weakness in our system. Amongst these circumstances are to be reckoned the temporary nature of our Government, in which the principal object of the Government will necessarily be the avoidance of the embarrassment and serious responsibility of war in many cases, it may be apprehended, at almost any rate. This predicament contrasted with the circumstances of advantage possessed by an ancient hereditary absolute Prince, for instance, the Peshwa, trained from his infancy to a knowledge of his interests and to a watchful pursuit of them, at all events without responsibility and by every opportunity possessed of the most accurate information of every state in India by means of his tribe, as intriguing, as artful, as industrious and much more numerous than the Jesuits ever were, is strongly to the point. Nor should we place too much reliance even on that rational confidence in the attachment of our subjects arising from the liberality of our Government. The knowledge of mankind should teach us to expect that vices will grow up indiscriminately with the virtues of our subjects. The bulk of those subjects will perhaps, with their progression in freedom and wealth, rather pine for imaginary

goods that they have not, than sit down contented with the real ones they have. They may look round on their rulers, and contemplating their paucity admit in their breasts those unfavourable comparisons with themselves, to which, I fear, the prejudices, the arrogations of individual purity and distaste which the Asiatics of all descriptions generally entertain for our personal manners, have a strong tendency. If so, may we not rationally conceive, that artful discontented men may arise to disseminate or foment unfavourable sentiments? May they not under the powerful influence of an ambitious restless spirit see themselves and teach others to see the puissance of the Peshwa (a chief of their own tribe whose sway they have never felt and which therefore may be painted amiable) in the delectable light of protection and redemption? In fact, divided between the great question of general philanthropy and particular love for my country, I am doubtful of the policy (confining the term to the object of retaining our Dominions in the East) of those great and indulgent attentions now introducing into the Bengal Provinces, since with the enlightenment and new energies that will derive therefrom to the mind of the natives, unchecked by a proportionate progress in moral duties, the greatest dangers to our authority present themselves to my mind. Dangers that whenever they occur will not only involve our Empire in imminent peril, but expose to utter destruction even that goodly fabric of universal toleration and unbounded liberality, which we had been gratifying ourselves in erecting, and which might again fall a prey to the Iron Hand of tyrannizing prejudice and prescription. In this point of view, even on the ground of general philanthropy, I query whether the Legislature should not be rigidly careful to apportion the concession of enlargement from those strictures to which the Mind has hitherto been accustomed to the progress of moral rectitude, rather than by too precipitate a removal of those bonds, by which the society has hitherto been connected, expose our extensive Empire to the irregular movements of the Human Mind in the critical season of novelty and agitation. At all events, the conclusion arising from the consideration of these domestic circumstances strongly, in my humble opinion, corroborates that, above drawn from foreign premises, of the strong expediency of placing our Government on the only foundation that can possibly give it permanence or stability, viz., "a most vigorous and executive military force by land and sea, the energy of which, invigorated by the rigid justice and exact Finance of a most vigilant civil administration of which we have so fair a prospect under the present Govt., should never for a moment be subjected to relaxation (on the baneful principle of personal indulgence at the dear expense of general and individual danger) by the succession of incapable seniority to the command of those important stations, on the vigorous and able direction of which depends our political existence". If want of ability presents itself in the routine of succession, it would surely be much more economical to pay it for withdrawing out of

the way of doing mischief, than for continuing in a station where its presence cannot even claim the cold merit of innocent neutrality, without implying the incidence of every danger that can possibly assail the safety of the Commonwealth.

No. 55—The Poona Court takes objection to a separate engagement between the Company and the Nizam.

Poona, 9th January 1794.

Answer of the Peshwa's Durbar to the reply of Sir C. W. Malet of the 6th Decr. 1793 to the Peshwa's proposition of defensive engagement received by Sir C. W. M. on the 9th January 1794 from his Munshy as communicated to the said Munshy by Behro Pundit from a Marratta writing and taken by him, Sir. C. W. M.'s Munshy, in person.

You have presented a memorial to the Circar, stating that you had received Durbar's 11 articles and in consequence therefore represented what was proper to Sir John Kennaway, who, at a proper time and with a proper regard to the relation of the three States in the affair, had submitted the said articles to His Highness the Nabob, and that as your answer was framed in concert with the Nabob you doubted not it would meet with the Circar's approval and that the Circar would execute the original propositions of His Lordship the Governor General; but if in case the Circar should not think proper to accede to those proposals, doubtless there would be no objection on the part of the Pundit Purdhan to their being executed by the Hon'ble Company and the Nabob, because their substance was conformable to the Declaration formerly made to you by the Circar. But should not the Circar think proper to accede to the Governor General's propositions, you require that a written instrument containing the purport of the Circar's former Declaration properly signed and sealed be given to you, and that you would deliver a similar one into the Circar duly executed on the part of your own Circar. This is the substance of your memorial, to which the following is an answer.

A draft of 11 articles was presented to you by the Circar, to which you should first have given an answer to the Circar, and after deliberating thereon the Circar to write the Nabob. This has not been done. And you have now required in your memorial, that should not the Circar accede to the Governor General's proposition, an executed instrument of the Circar's former Declaration should be delivered to you, in consequence of which the delivery of the said instrument has been taken into discussion.

As to what you write relative to the Circar's having no objection to the execution of the treaty between the Hon'ble Company and the Nabob,

it is to be observed that the Nabob is an associate, (Ruffeek a word signifying in the common acceptation something inferior to Ally and superior to Dependent) who is not separate from the Circar. How then can it be that the Circar should not write to him? Whatever is the council of the Circar is his council. And when the treaty against Tippu was settled, it was agreed on here and conformable thereto was settled with the Nabob. With this you are well acquainted. Notwithstanding which your having made known the Circar's propositions to the Nabob without first replying to them yourself, was very extraordinary.

No. 56—Malet reports to the G. G. Mahadji Sindia's hostility to the proposed defensive engagements and his advice to his Court to reject the proposals.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 24th January 1794.

The interesting communications, contained in the translations of Ragotim Rou's letters to Azim-al-Omra forming a part of Mr. Steuart's last despatch, strongly corroborate the intelligence, that has reached me here, of the part M. Sindia has taken in the late deliberations of this Court on my answers to its propositions, and which was cautiously hinted in my address of the 17th, when, aware of the probability that the art of these people might induce them to shift the burthen of an exceptionable measure from themselves to the Patell, I did not, on one hand, think myself entirely at liberty to slight the credible channel through which such strong traits of the Patell's disposition had been conveyed to me, so on the other I did not chuse to adopt or transmit the terms of asperity, scarce short of hostility, in which, I was assured, M. Sindea had expressed his disapprobation of the Nazim's closing with us in a defensive engagement separately from this State, and which terms were softened into the form under which they were communicated to me and transmitted to you in my address of the 13th instant by the moderation of the Minister, who, through the same channel of intelligence, I am assured, is extremely averse to the violent language and councils, by which he is apprehensive of a design in the Patell to subvert his (the Minister's) authority and establish his own as more equal to the task of counteracting the dangerous increase of our power, an object, which, I have also learnt from other very respectable quarters, he has much at heart, and which I should have been extremely cautious of mentioning, but that the same spirit is evidently betrayed in the official communication of M. Sindia's own words by one of the Nazim's Ministers at this Court to his Master.

Perhaps, the most eligible mode of dropping this subject for the present would be by a declaration, that as this State is fully and exclusively pledged by the 10th article of the Treaty of Salbyhe for the prevention of all molestation to the Hon'ble Company from the Mysore Govert., and as the three allied States are fully and mutually pledged to

each other by the 13th article of the Treaty of Poona, the 10th of Hyderabad, and by the tenor of the whole treaty of Puttun in prevention of molestation to each other from the same quarter, and as unexpected obstacles have arisen on the part of this Court to the reduction of the stipulations of those several treaties to the simplicity of specific defensive engagements, that had been proposed by His Lordship the late Governor General on the purest principle of good faith at the instance of Azim-al-Omra and Hurry Punt Furkia previous to the separation of the allied armies, it appears expedient to drop for the present all further agitation of a subject, which in the event of its actual occurrence is so fully provided for collectively and separately by the above mentioned treaties, not to mention the natural interests of the Parties.

It has not, Hon'ble Sir, escaped my recollection that your noble predecessor on one or two occasions waived the use of the 10th article of the treaty of Salbyhe, but my conviction that the application of it on the present occasion would give us the advantage of affording our friends at the Durbar an excellent argument against the violent language of M. Sindea drawn from a treaty of his own construction, not to mention its intrinsic value, has induced my converting the hint contained in my last address into an unreserved recommendation of its adoption, should the qualified mode here suggested of dropping the further prosecution of defensive engagements be preferred to any more decided one of annulling them entirely, which perhaps is rendered extremely difficult by their general implication with the whole tenor of the treaty of Puttun. The tenor of that treaty, the 10th article of the treaty of Paungul and the previous specific engagements by which we are bound to His Highness the Nizam, would, I should imagine, with proper explanations on the occasion relieve him from all uncasiness and obviate every objection.

Govinrou Guykwar has signifyd to me that, contrary to custom, Tukojee Holcar has been directed by the Durbar to make a circuit of collection usually called Muluckgheery in Guzerat, against which he, Govinrou, had remonstrated to the Durbar, but hitherto without effect, and if persevered in by Holcar and the Durbar, would be productive of much dissatisfaction to him (Govinrow), if not actual disagreement with the conduct of the force employed on the service by Holcar.

Govinrou has also acquainted me that his son Kannoba's conduct (who had taken charge of affairs in Baroda soon after the death of Mannaji Rou) having been imprudent, he had been put under constraint by Naro Gunnessh (the confidential Minister dispatched from hence some time ago) in concert with Seajee, who though deranged in his intellects, has much respect paid him as the elder male of the family.

Some time since the present Head of the Angria family (the disputed points of whose succession are not yet settled with this Govert.) applied

by letter for my good offices in his behalf, which (having no foundation) I civilly declined by reference to the Government of Bombay whose near neighbourhood and frequent intercourse rendered them better Judges of his claim to the Company's interposition.

No. 57—In this dispatch to the G. G. Malet criticises Stuart's suggestion of a separate engagement with the Nizam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,
TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART.

Poona, 31st January 1794.

Mr. Stuart seems to have a predilection for the measure of entering into separate engagements with the Nazim, so unequivocally objected to by this Court, that its adoption would virtually produce the defensive connexion with His Highness in support of that engagement in opposition to this State, of which he—the Nizam—has been so long and so perseveringly in pursuit, but hitherto so decidedly declined by our Government.

Mr. Stuart in the last part of his address to you of the 22nd conveys a strong picture of that very rivalry between our Government and this State, the idea of which Sir J. K. so warmly rejected. In fact the predicament is too obvious to be concealed or dissembled, but I much doubt whether Mr. Stuart's prudent suggestion of "supporting the Nizam without committing ourselves" in the course of that rivalry, can be reconciled to the objectionable measure of closing independently with us on Lord Cornwallis's draft, for which a predilection is expressed in the 5th para of his letter.

No. 58—Malet congratulates Kirkpatrick on his succession to the Residency at Hyderabad.

FROM—C. W. MALET,
TO—WM. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 12th February 1794.

Accept my hearty congratulations on your safe arrival at Bidder and assumption of the charge of the Residency work with His Highness the Nizam as signified in your favour of the 6th instant, which with Mr. Stuart's of the 4th reached me the 11th.

No. 59—Malet suggests the propriety of pressing the treaty of guarantee on the Poona Court in concert with the Nizam at the favourable moment of Mahadji's death.

FROM—C. W. MALET,
TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 24th February 1794.

Since my last address of the 21st instant nothing material occurred here, nor have I received any official intimation either from this Court

or the deceased Patell's ministry, that the investiture of Doulut Rou with the Keellat of succession to the Chiefship of the Family of Sindia is resolved on, though reports are circulated of such communication having been made to the Nizam's Vackeels. I have also reason to think that a similar intimation to me was proposed, but declined.

From the reason I had to think that the last official communication of this Durbar on the subject of defensive arrangement, which struck so deeply at His Highness the Nizam's independence, derived its spirit chiefly from M. Sindia, I took a mode of sounding a leading member of the Durbar on the probability of the tenor of that answer being converted into an amicable coincidence in the joint propositions of the Company and the Nizam, on my explaining in a moderate and conciliatory answer to the Durbar's last communication the good policy and real expediency of so doing.

In answer to this application (made in a private and confidential manner) I have been told that as letters to the same purport were written to the Nizam about the time the above answer was given to me, it will be necessary to see what effect those letters to His Highness and answers to me will have on the Governments of Calcutta and Hyderabad, before anything decisive can be said as to any alteration in the last communication of this Court.

From this trait I draw an inference corroborative of the idea ventured in my late addresses, that the present is a favourable opportunity both for the Nabob to assert a reasonable degree of independence in maintaining his opinion on a point of common concern, and for our countenancing His Highness thereon by supporting the superior eligibility of the original propositions, should the further agitation of specific defensive articles be found expedient.

Permit me also, Honourable Sir, to suggest on the persuasion with which I am strongly impressed, of the actual existence at this moment of a rivalry of interest between our Government and this for ascendancy in the Nazim's councils—on our part, only for the honourable purpose of maintaining His Highness's independence and thereby our own, and the general tranquility; on the part of this Durbar with the dangerous view of confirming its ascendancy over his Dominion—permit me, I say, Honourable Sir, to suggest that there would not be a fairer opportunity of promoting His Highness's efforts for emancipation, nor one less exposed to commitment in the prosecution of our objects on principles of equity, than continuing in concert with him to urge in a firm and moderate manner the admission of the articles in which two of the grand contracting Parties have acquiesced, and which on any reasonable objection being made by the Board and this State, may be modified and accommodated. In this suggestion, however, I must beg to be understood as still writing under the proviso of "the further agitation of defensive arrangements being found

expedient," and that the temper of His Highness the Nizam's Government give just ground of confidence to prosecute that agitation in concert with him.

No. 60—Malet suggests to the G. G. the idea of encouraging a cordial intercourse between the Nizam and Tipu as a counterpoise to Maratha influence.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 3rd March 1794.

If it could be clearly ascertained that a cordial intercourse would be established between Tippu Sultan and the Nabob Nazim by the liberal mode of proceeding advised by Capt. Kirkpatrick, (and doubtless some return may be expected for generous acts), surely the backwardness of His Highness's ministry is to be lamented, particularly as the establishment of such a cordiality would place His Highness's Government in a situation of greater security to withstand the unfriendly designs of this Court, originating in a jealousy of his apparent close connexion with us and that tone of independence, in which from a reliance on the appearance of our support and on his late intrigues with Sindia, he has for some time past conducted himself to this Court, and avoided compliance with its demands.

No. 61—In this letter to the G. G. Malet reports the settlement between the Peshwa and Govindrao Gaikawad.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., G. G.

Poona, 21st March 1794.

Since my last address of the 10th instant it has been signified to me by the Durbar that the insurgent Doanjee Waug, having been defeated in two actions by the Peshwa's troops in the last of which on Tippu's frontier he was wounded, has fled and taken refuge in the district of Toorkunhully in Tippu's territory, that having on former occasions done the same and under the security of that asylum reassembled his followers and put himself in a condition to repeat disturbances against this State, it has been deemed expedient to communicate to me a circumstance so contrary to the amity subsisting between this Court and Tippu for the information of the Honourable Company's Government,

It is reported that the Nazim has expressed an expectation that the large sums advanced by him to the late M. Sindia shall be carried to his credit in the Peshwa's demands on him, which, as might naturally be expected, is disputed by this Court, while the Ministers of the late Patel desire that the agents charged with the execution of the Nazim's orders on this subject may be referred to them for an answer.

On the 15th instant I had the honour to receive your commands of the 17th ultimo. The late departure of Rouba, Govinrou's Minister, has happened rather malapropos; for discovering the probability of success in the desirable object of simplifying the Government of the City of Surat by transferring the authority exercised by the Guykwar Choutea to the Company's Chief, on condition of our being responsible to the reigning Head of the Guykwar family for a specific sum in lieu of the present litigious mode of collecting that share of the Mahratta impositions on the revenues of the city, this desirable object would be greatly increased, could the vexatious exercise of the Mahratta authority in the city be entirely abolished by this State likewise relinquishing on a similar plan as the above, or for any other equitable equivalent, its collections within the City, an object which I had once instructions to pursue and which has never been absent from my mind, tho' hitherto this Court's extreme tenaciousness of any inlet that it has established for the future prosecution of those views of encroachment by which it is constantly influenced, has obstructed the success of all my wishes and endeavours. I shall not, however, entirely relinquish them, nor fail to communicate any circumstance that may appear promotive of their accomplishment.

Nothing material has lately occurred between this Court and Doulut Rou. The Ministry of the latter begins, however, to show signs of a desire to quit Poona, while the former, true to its point, will not, I suspect, fail to convert the presence of the young Chieftain to the attainment of all its objects on his power and family, before it may be pleased to dispense with his attendance. The enclosed translation (mentioned in a former address) of the late settlement made with Govinrou Guykwar is a curious document of this Court's mode of conduct on such occasions. It is to be recollected that Govindrou's sacrifices to the Circar are exclusive of the immense sums exacted by the ministers and M. Sindia.

A kind of counterpart of this Instrument was presented by Govindrou to the Durbar confirming (with some immaterial variations in order and terms) the Peshwa's articles, which is the mode of interchanging agreements practised by this State in its negotiations with its own members or native Powers.

In the course of Govindrou's counterpart, I observe, he mentions in answer to the Durbar's claim of jewels, that much of the treasure and valuable property of his family was dilapidated on the death of his brother Monnajee Rou, part of which he has reason to think has been purchased

in the cities of Surat, Broach, and Cambay, a circumstance that leads me to suspect that what was mentioned to me by Rouba as the intention of this Court against Cambay, may have a closer connexion with his master's own views than he was pleased to mention, while desirous of gaining a knowledge of my sentiments. He thought proper to use the name of this Court to effect his purpose, in which, however, he did not succeed ; for ignorant of the extent of Bombay Government's connexion with the Nabob of Cambay I was silent on the subject, but as 'advised in a late letter I have applied to the Bombay Government for information.

It escaped me to mention in my late addresses that an agent from Cheytsing has been here sometime and was lately admitted to an audience of the Minister, who, I understand, gave him hopes of admission to the Peshwa, which however has not yet taken place.

You may rest assured, Honourable Sir, that on every future occasion, where the agitation of defensive arrangements may occur, the closest attention shall be paid by me to your sentiments and instructions so explicitly conveyed, particularly in your last commands of the 17th ultimo.

No. 62—Malet explains to Kirkpatrick how the death of Mahadji Sindia, instead of weakening the position of the Poona Court, had actually strengthened it by its getting control over his resources.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 4th April 1794.

I freely acknowledge the force of your argument as to the influence of the notoriety of the existence of defensive engagements to restrain the restless ambition of Tippoo, as far as relates to his designs against this State and the Nazim (in which he will certainly be checked, were he in a condition to form hostile designs, by his respect for our interposition) ; but I doubt whether his respect for the fidelity of this State and the Nazim, in the discharge of such engagements in our behalf, would restrain him, or whether that fidelity would be proof against his arts, had he the power of again attacking us. On the other hand I am doubtful, as before observed, of the policy of this State's being placed in so perfect a degree of security as to his designs as to enable it to prosecute its northern views of conquest and ambition at leisure ; whereas, as mentioned in my last, I am of opinion that His Highness's security, the only object that immediately interested us or that would in my opinion be exposed to much danger from Tippoo's present power, was previously provided for, consequently required not the notoriety of a subsequent article.

I certainly agree with you in the idea of a great mass of burthen having devolved to this State by the death of so able a servant as Mahadji Sindia

But we must not forget, that by the same rule an immense accession of power has lapsed to it by the absolute direction of the newly formed force of that extraordinary man. By this lapse all the revenues etc. etc. that were lately talked of being ceded to M. S. in liquidation of his demands, will remain to Government, and it will be at liberty either to employ Ally Bahadur, Holcar, or young Sindia in the unrivalled prosecution of its views in the north, and of strengthening its force in the Deccan with the quotas of the other two either offensively or defensively.

I am not ignorant of the incessant dangers to which a feudal power so desultory, so oppressive, so superficial, so distant from its source as that of the Marrattas north of the Chumbal is exposed, tho' I confess that the total want of compactness and energy in the Rajpoot Government, and the absolute annihilation of every active or manly principle amongst the Mahomedans, seem to incapacitate them either for council or execution in the prosecution of their most obvious interests. May we not hope for some amendment and thereby a respite from the unbounded views of these people?

How unfortunate it is that the state of His Highness's Government should be inimical to the mediation his minister proposes, and to our wishes in his favour? How much more unfortunate that every future hour seems pregnant with greater weakness and greater embarrassment than the present. Thus circumstanced, may I not submit to you whether the arguments derived from the defensive articles of Paungul and Puttun in favour of his support are not strongly in proof of the embarrassment of those articles?

I am really sorry to be deprived of the pleasure of answering your query as to the state of the barometer by there not being a sound one belonging to myself or any gentleman of my party.

No. 62A—Sir John Shore's views on the proposed guarantee engagement.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE.

TO—C. W. MALET.

Fort William, 17th Feb. 1794.

Very strong arguments, in my opinion, oppose the concluding a separate engagement with His Highness the Nizam. The object of the proposed stipulations is merely explanatory, and the terms of them ought, of course, to be settled with the consent and concurrence of those who were parties to the original treaty. It may be doubted whether the concurrence of the Nizam and the Company would have the effect, suggested by Sir John Kennaway, of inducing the Peshwa to accede to the articles proposed by Marquis Cornwallis. He has already expressed his dissent from them; and the jealousy of the Mahrattas has taken alarm at the intimation of a separate agreement with the Nizam. It seems equally imprudent and impolitic to augment it by a determination which would probably be imputed to motives and intentions that have no foundation.

The advantage of a separate treaty with the Nizam on the principles of a defensive engagement, without the concurrence and participation of the Peshwa, would be little, in comparison with the embarrassments in which we should be involved by it. The independence of the Nizam on every principle of policy is of importance to the interests of the Company; but if the obligation of supporting his independence were thrown upon the Company alone, considering the actual weakness of his Highness's Government and power, they would find it an arduous task to maintain.

If any reliance is to be placed on the motives assigned to the Peshwa for refusing his acquiescence to the articles proposed by Marquis Cornwallis and on the arguments attributed to Sindia, they ought naturally to suggest to us a desire for a more specific definition of the defensive stipulations in the treaties of Poona and Paangul, and this definition is contained in the proposed articles; but as I am convinced that they will be resisted in proportion as we appear anxious for forming them into an engagement, I am therefore disposed to abide by the opinion expressed in my letter of the 9th of December, that the negotiation for the conclusion of the explanatory Guarantee Engagement should be dormant until the Peshwa should himself think proper to renew it, and that the negotiation should only be renewed on the articles proposed by Marquis Cornwallis, with the alteration suggested in the 6th article.

The concurrence of His Highness the Nizam in the draft alluded to, as long as he maintains his present opinion, may be opposed as a sufficient argument to any proposed alteration by the Peshwa, and the principle stated in my letter of the 9th December should be invariably attended to, if the Peshwa should bring forward a new draft.

No. 62B—Shore's judgment on the Nizam's position.

25th March 1793.

The Power of the Nizam, on a comparison with that of Tippoo and the Mahrattas, must be deemed far inferior to both, and would probably sink in a contest with either of them. Whatever his political abilities may have been at an earlier period, the vigour of his mind and body is debilitated by sickness and age. The variety, profusion, and inconsistent conduct of his Minister Azim-ul-Omrah, who has obtained a complete ascendancy over his Master, are ill-calculated to support the dignity of his Government externally, or to promote the happiness of his subjects and conciliate their affection. The numerous rabble whom the Nizam calls his army, are ill paid and worse disciplined, nor does the Nizam appear to have any Generals of military knowledge or abilities.

SECTION II

British attitude towards the Maratha-Nizam dispute.

No. 63—Shore defines his attitude to the Maratha-Nizam dispute. He instructs Malet not to commit the British Government in trying to save the independence of the Nizam.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE,

TO—SIR CHARLES MALET.

Fort William, 7th April 1794.

Enclosed I send you an answer to an address from Doulat Rao Sindia, and as he has now received his investiture from the Peshwah, I recommend that you take an early opportunity, either on the occasion of the delivery of the letter or otherwise as you may think proper, of congratulating him in my name on his accession; you will at the same time assure him of our disposition to preserve with him the good understanding which has so long subsisted between the Company and Madajee Sindia.

I have not notified to him the intention of this Government for the continuance of a Resident at his Court, as I conceive it requisite that a previous intimation should be made by him of his wishes to this effect; but it is proper that you should be apprized of it for the purpose of meeting any advances that he may make on this subject. I consider the diplomatic functions of Major Palmer to have expired with Madajee Sindia.

The following amongst other considerations have led to this decision, that the situation of a Resident at Ougeen affords us an opportunity of acquiring authentic intelligence of the designs of the Mahrattas in the North of Hindostan and of the degree of connection and correspondence between the Courts of Ougeen and Poonah; that the influence of a Resident may be occasionally employed to impede or dissolve a combination unfavourable to the British interests; and that it will generally tend to

a disunion of the Mahratta interests by diverting the political connections of Doulat Rao to two objects and by diminishing the necessity of his dependence on the Court of Poonah. That Sindeah derived consequence and even success from the notoriety of his established connection with us cannot be doubted; but whilst it is possible that his abilities have not devolved upon his successor, and that, at all events, considering his youth and inexperience they cannot be presumed dangerous at present, the assurance and notoriety of our friendship may prevent the subjection of his power to that of the Poonah Government, which I think most to be apprehended.

I do not see any necessity for a deviation from the tenor of my last instructions on the subject of defensive engagements with the Nizam and Peshwah. The notification which you communicated under date the 17th January 1794 that the Peshwah had no territorial claims upon Tippoo Sultaun, with the subsequent information of the receipt of the last Kist, I deemed a sufficient declaration from the Court of Poonah as far as its rights were concerned, to justify the restoration of the hostage princes.

On considering the relative situation of the Nizam and Peshwah I am of opinion that we should neglect no fair opportunity of assisting him to maintain the independence of his Government, as far as it can be done without implicating ourselves in the consequences of an improvident interference, and under a caution, that his minister be not encouraged by the expectation of our support to engage in measures from which our interference cannot extricate him. If the Nizam be too severely pressed by the Mahrattas and is neglected by this Government, he must be weakened by the extortions of the former, or may be led to enter into negotiations with Tippoo.

As parties to the Confederacy for the object of mutual defence against Tippoo Sultaun, the principle of the alliance is not fairly observed if either of the contracting parties attempt to invade each other's rights, and this is an assumable ground for our interposition in favour of the Nizam against the usurpations of the Mahrattas. The position, however, must not be extended too far, nor too vigorously maintained, but I see no objection to make it the ground of an amicable and conciliatory expostulation under the preceding cautions and limitations with the Court of Poonah, if it should push matters to extremity with the Nizam. I have communicated the same sentiments to the Resident at Hyderabad with whom you will correspond on this subject when necessary, and although I should wish in all practicable cases a reference to myself previous to any expostulation as above, I do not desire it to be deferred if the emergency of the case should be such as to render delay hazardous.

But without proceeding to the length of representation or expostulation, I would recommend to you, whenever any fair opportunity

occurs in the course of your communications with the Peshwah or the Ministers, to impress them with an idea of the importance of cordiality amongst the confederate members of the defensive alliance and my wishes for the confirmation of the friendly connection established between them and the Nizam.

It is not possible for us to interfere for the restoration of the Guikwar share of the Broach collections which were ceded by this Government without any limitations to Sindia, still less to support Govind Rao in any attempt for that purpose. The establishment of his own authority seems the first object which it would be prudent on him to accomplish, as you justly remarked.

P.S.—Enclosed I also send an answer to an address from the Peshwah on the subject of the Raja Sindeah's death.

No. 64—Shore asks Kirkpatrick to ascertain the particular grounds of dissension between the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona and to convey in plain terms to the Nizam's Minister the unwillingness of the British to be involved in the dispute.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK.

Fort William, 14th April 1794.

As the object of our interposition is, if possible, to reconcile the contending parties, and to prevent a contest that must be prejudicial to both, detrimental to the interests of the confederacy and more particularly to those of His Highness the Nizam, it is scarcely necessary to point out to you the propriety of endeavouring to penetrate through the imperfect and obscure statements and hints of Azim-ul-Omrah and ascertain with all possible accuracy the real and pretended grounds of dissension, which, I am disposed with you to believe, exist rather in the enmity of the Ministers* of the two Courts than in their respective interests. My instructions, to which I have above referred, are formed upon the supposition of meditated encroachments on the part of the Poona Government, but it is equally necessary to have in view the possibility of provocation on the part of Azim-ul-Omrah, that our interposition may be applied with equity and with all the weight that it can derive from this and its reasonableness. The general tenor of Azim-ul-Omrah's character suggested great attention, that no encouragement be given to his disposition for adopting offensive measures.

* For the causes of enmity between Azim-ul-Omrah and Nana, *vide* No 178 of vol. II., Poona Residency Correspondence.

To the questions proposed by Meer Allum I recommend the following replies :—

1. That this Government, as well-wisher to the Nizam and the Peshwah and as party to the triple confederacy, is willing to interpose its good offices for the friendly purpose of bringing about an amicable adjustment of the differences subsisting between the two States, but that to do this with propriety and judgment it is necessary to have a candid and particular exposition of the grounds of the differences without colour or concealment.

2. That if either the Peshwah or His Highness the Nizam should decline acceding to our mediation or refuse to conform to our advice and opinion, we shall content ourselves with pointing out the consequences of their ill-advised dissensions, and leave the termination of them to themselves. To the third query with regard to the tone and temper which it was proper for the Minister to assume in discussing what he considered to be unreasonable demands on the part of Balajee Pundit, whether an air of defiance or moderation, you have already replied with propriety, and it may only be necessary to add, that it is incumbent on the Minister to be assured that the demands of the Peshwah are unreasonable before they are refused, and upon this conviction dispassionately formed that they are better opposed by firmness and moderation than by intemperate defiance. I also concur in the distinction which you point out between an arbitration and mediation, and your remark founded on this distinction may obviate the necessity of communicating my answer to the second query.

These instructions with those of the 7th instant, will furnish you and Sir C. W. Malet with sufficient information as to your conduct, and it is unnecessary to enter into a detail of the arguments which may be urged in an amicable and conciliatory expostulation if the increasing dissensions of the Nizam and Peshwah should render it expedient. For them I rely with perfect confidence on the judgment and discretion of yourself and Sir C. W. Malet, to whom I shall send a copy of this letter.

No. 65—Malet informs Kirkpatrick of the growing ill-will between Nana Fadnis and Azim-ul-Omra.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET, POONA,
TO—CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 21st April 1794.

I am credibly informed that agents from Azeem-al-Doula have lately arrived at this place ; it is also intimated to me from a quarter that merits some attention that the ill-will between the Minister of this Court and Azim-al-Omra has arisen to the height of putting a stop to the intercourse of letters, and that this Minister is employing every means in his power to weaken or entirely overset the other's influence in His Highness's councils.

No. 66—Malet suggests to Kirkpatrick that they should continue to exhibit appearances of amity at both Courts, as such appearances of friendship with the Nizam would deceive the Marathas as to their real intention and would restrain them from taking extreme steps against him (the Nizam).

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPT. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 9th May 1794.

I am with you of opinion that the points in discussion between our respective Courts are not likely to come to an immediate eclaircissement, and even were there a prospect of it, it appears to me from the very guarded terms of the Governor General's late instructions, that our avoidance of commitment should keep pace with the danger of involution in an open fracas, which avoidance cannot perhaps be prosecuted with greater certainty and effect than by continuing to exhibit on all occasions at your Court and here (should the Nazim now enable me so to do by instructions to his present or future Ministers to hold a confidential intercourse with me, none having yet been practised,) those appearances of amity and cordiality, which I am inclined to think have hitherto been as beneficial to His Highness's interests with this Court as any open part we might have taken in his behalf, under our present ignorance of the rectitude of his cause, our uncertainty of either party abiding by our opinion, and the restrictions by which we are at all events prevented from serious interposition in His Highness's support. For I am disposed to think that the Nazim's Ministry in the true style of Indian Politics has long conveyed indirectly to this Government more weighty innuendoes drawn from the appearances of our friendship than this Court, on the smallest explanation that might ensue on our openly engaging in the negotiation, would find can be supported by our resolutions in His Highness's favour. This veil perhaps had better not be withdrawn. It likewise occurs to me that by the removal of that ground of subterfuge and evasion, which Azim-al-Omra purchased at so dear a rate in the person of M. Sindia, he will, should we not be extremely cautious in granting him a latitude, be now forward to throw himself still more than hitherto on the convenient support of our entire protection to screen himself from the effects of his past evasions and his Master from the consequence of an investigation of the claims of this Government, by an open admission of which in the course of a declared mediation we might probably be involved in the acknowledgment of rights, the admissibility of which had better not be agitated, much less acquiesced in by us.

From these sentiments you will collect that I can have no possible objection to the deputation of Meer Allum to this Court. On the contrary

from his reputation for wisdom and from those habits of correctness and rectitude, which he must have contracted in his intercourse with our Government, I am inclined to think that it may be the most likely mode of effecting the desired accommodation either temporary or permanent. While in the course of his embassy he shall, for the satisfaction of his Master and the promotion of his object, possess every possible manifestation of our countenance and friendship that he may be inclined to derive from the most cordial intercourse with me, in the course of which, however, and of my good offices at this Court, I shall carefully steer clear of all commitment by open expostulation with or declaration to this Govt. on the principles above detailed, which, you will observe, perfectly correspond in issue with the instructions of the Governor General in avoidance of the dangers so justly adverted to in the last paragraph of your letter of the 1st instant.

Having given you this general description of my sentiments and intentions in the prosecution of the system of interposition now adopted by Government, the practice of which must be regulated by a variety of circumstances impossible to foresee or detail, that can only be provided for by our mutual suggestions arising from the occasion, and as nothing critical is likely to occur in less than one month, I shall in the interim take advantage of the Governor General's permission to visit the extraordinary excavations of Ellora in the neighbourhood of Aurangabad, for which place I propose setting out on the 10th or 11th, instructing my asst. Mr. Uhthoff, in whose knowledge and experience I have perfect confidence, to keep you regularly informed of events here, and on all occasions that may relate to the two Governments, to guide himself carefully by your sentiments and the late instructions of the Governor General. I have the additional satisfaction of thinking that nothing material can occur in this interval from the departure of Govinrou Pingle to some distance on some marriage ceremonies that will, I think, at least detain him as long as I shall be absent, and without him, I believe, little will be agitated by the Minister relative to the Nazim. From this circumstance and the shortest possible period in which Meer Aalum can arrive, it is fair to conclude from the approach of the rains, that at all events nothing hostile can take place till after that season, which will, I hope, afford time for every possible good effect of negotiation.

I am informed that on the Peshwa lately declining the Nazim's invitation to his son's nuptials, His Highness has again repeated it in a very complimentary way urging that the ceremony shall be deferred till a season propitious to the Peshwa's visit, in answer to which another letter has been sent by the Peshwa in which the appearance of another inauspicious star is adduced as the ostensible cause of the Peshwa's not being able to partake the happiness of the nuptial ceremonies, yet is the tenor of the apology calculated to remove the expectation of his Presence.

No. 67—Uthoff writes to Kirkpatrick of the advisability of deferring British mediation in the dispute till the return of Malet.

FROM—J. UTHOFF,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN

Poona, 12th May 1794.

It affords me much satisfaction to observe, that the line of conduct you had determined to adopt in respect to the mediation between this Court and yours, corresponds so exactly with the guarded line proposed by Sir Charles Malet in his last letter to you of the 9th instant. It is also an additional satisfaction to me to reflect on the probability that it will not be necessary for me to take any part in this very delicate affair during Sir Charles Malet's absence; since, exclusive of the advantage that would be derived from Sir Charles Malet's superior management, it seems peculiarly advisable, that, in the conduct of so important a negotiation, and which is likely to be drawn out to some length, the person who will have the conduct of it in the later stages should also have the conduct of the first, that he may not be shackled by the steps taken by others, which may perhaps be somewhat different from what he would himself have adopted, if he had had the conduct of the whole negotiation from the first.

Permit me at the same time to assure you that agreeably to the directions of Sir Charles Malet, I shall most cheerfully regulate myself by your sentiments, should it become necessary to commence the negotiation previous to Sir Charles Malet's return hither.

No. 68—Shore recognises the justice of the Peshwa's demands upon the Nizam and instructs the Resident to advise Azim-ul-Omra to adjust them equitably.

FROM—GOVERNOR-GENERAL,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fort William, 19th May 1794.

I have received your letters of the 17th April and 2nd May, Nos. 10 and 11, the former containing the communications of the Durbar on the litigated points between the Nizam and the Peshwah.

On this communication it is only necessary to observe, that it does not appear to me to contain any claims on the part of the Peshwah, which ought to be the source of any serious disagreement between the two Courts, as the ground of the claims is in general admitted by the Nizam,

and the question relates principally to the quantum of the demand upon him. But it appears to me at the same time, that there is not only a reluctance but even evasion on the part of Azim ul Omrah in bringing the claims of the Peshwah to a fair and final adjustment, and the correspondence upon the whole, as far as I can understand it, affords no grounds for the Nizam's appeal to our interposition, as it requires nothing more than good intentions and suitable exertions on the part of Azim ul Omrah to adjust the claims of the Peshwah in a satisfactory manner. The discussion is not, however, throughout sufficiently clear to decide this point with certainty.

With respect to this communication and any others of a similar nature, the only general line of conduct that I can prescribe is that, in all cases where the Peshwah appears to have justice on his side or where the right of his claims is admitted, you will strongly urge Azeem ul Omrah to a speedy and fair adjustment of them; where, on the other hand, the demands of the Mahratta Minister appear to you unreasonable or unjust, that you will advise Azeem ul Omrah to discuss them with temper and moderation, as it is in such cases only that we can interpose our good offices with propriety in favour of the Nizam. The jealousy and enmity subsisting between Balajee Pundit and Azeem ul Omrah require the strictest attention to this line of conduct.

I perfectly agree with you, that the contest between our Allies has not yet by any means reached that critical point at which alone it would be proper for us to interfere in a direct and explicit manner, and I shall be happy if that necessity should never exist. The moderation of Meer Allum seems well calculated to effect the desired adjustment between the Nizam and Peshwah, provided the instructions of his Commission are fair and explicit, and at all events you should endeavour, as favourable opportunities offer, to impress Azeem ul Omrah with a conviction that his embarrassments will increase in proportion as that adjustment is retarded.

No. 69—Uththoff reports to Kirkpatrick that the Poona Court was silent towards him about its negotiations with the Hyderabad Court, and was in no mood to recede from its claims.

FROM—J. UTHTHOFF,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

Poona, 26th May 1794.

Just as the last post was setting off to the eastward, I had the honour to receive and acknowledge your letter of the 19th instant.

In mentioning, in my letter to you of the 12th instant, the coincidence of sentiment between you and Sir Charles Malet in the delicate and important affair of our mediation between this Court and yours, I alluded in particular to the guarded mode which you had both adopted on the occasion, and which would in all probability render it unnecessary to agitate the question here during Sir Charles Malet's absence. As to any particular point in which there may be a difference of opinion between you, it will of course be discussed in your correspondence, and it is unnecessary for me to say anything on the subject.

This Court is so tenaciously silent towards us with respect to its negotiations with yours, that it is very difficult to penetrate its views or measures, and you will probably be the first to learn from your Court, should a requisition be made by this for the dispatch of a confidential person for the purpose of negotiating an adjustment of the existing differences, or of any further steps that (about four lines mutilated)....

.....inclined to think that
Govind Row Kisen
I believe at least as
interests, than to those
Allum, who it may be
exclusively attached to His Highness. I am
 also inclined to think, that this Court is not at present at all disposed to recede from any of its claims on His Highness, nor to make any concessions in the course of the negotiation while this Court can depend on our not using armed support in favour of His Highness, and while Tippoo continues as little formidable as he has been since the late peace. I am inclined to think that a rupture with His Highness would, at the present juncture, be rather desirable than otherwise to this Court, and indeed an expedition against His Highness is talked of here as far from improbable after the rains. Levies of troops have been some time on foot here, and still continue, professedly for the services against Angria, the Raja of Colapore, Doanjee Waug and the Dessaye of Kittoor, but it is thought by some to be for the additional object of the probability of a rupture with His Highness.

Our mediation is no doubt an object of essential importance to His Highness, and tho' I imagine this Court will dislike it, it will, I think, still have so much regard to the Triple Alliance (and to propriety or at least to preserve such appearances) as to acquiesce so far in it, as not to sacrifice any of its just claims.....allow me however to express my apprehension.....the unreasonable and.....

should however the sickness of Hurry Punt Furkia terminate soon in his demise, which from the nature of it, his age and broken constitution, is far from unlikely; it will be, I think, some check on this Court, for it could not easily find a commander so desirable in every expectation for an expedition against His Highness, more especially, when, at the same time, it would lose the benefit in its councils of Hurry Punt's advice and experience, which have of late years had considerable weight, particularly on military subjects.

Permit me to observe, that I agree generally in opinion with you as to the sentiments and conduct of Azim al Omra, and that, I think, the movement to Beder last year may be accounted for (as far as one can pretend to account for so strange a measure) on similar principles. To which may be added, that Azim al Omra might expect, that such an appearance, with the reports that were circulated on the occasion, would have the effect on the Poona administration to induce it to recede from some, or all, of its claims on His Highness, to avert the impending danger; particularly, as from the constant intercourse by Vackeels and letters between Sindea and His Highness, and the payments to Sindea by His Highness, this Court might apprehend that His Highness's movement to Beder was in concert with Sindea (lines mutilated).....
I think it not unlikely that Sindia might
for the purpose of
with the hope of
some points of his
of the very ex-
under discussion
I am however of
 opinion, that it never was the deliberate intention either of Nizam Ally Khan or Sindea to proceed, at the period in question, to the extremity of hostilities with the Poona administration; and that the spurious hostile inclination of Azim al Omra, which you mention (though on another occasion), must have been damped by the declared disapprobation of the movement by our Government.

Another object of Azim al Omra in assembling a large body of troops at that juncture might, perhaps, have been, as mentioned in the correspondence between Sir Charles Warre Malet and Sir John Kennaway, to facilitate the establishment of Secunder Jah as successor to His Highness, whose life was at that time very precarious. And this seems so favourite an object with Azim al Omra in prosecution of his own interests that, notwithstanding the versatility of his conduct in general, he at all times appears to keep this point in view: for instance, the superiority in point of style of living that Secunder Jah, by the countenance and support of Azim al Omra, (who, I understand, takes every means to prejudice Ally Jah in the eyes of his father, and with some success) is enabled to

maintain over his elder brother, the conspicuous station in which Secunder Jah was placed in the late war, the recent.....
with a grand daughter

 would have been given to it by the presence of the Peshwa on the occasion, had he accepted the very pressing entreaties that have been made to him to that effect by the Court of Hyderabad.

I trust you will not take amiss the liberty I have used in the above discussion. You will be the best judge of the correctness of my ideas, and will of course controvert them, should they be erroneous and should you think them worthy of so much attention.

No. 70—Ulthoff writes to Kirkpatrick how Meer Alam's mission to Poona was being misrepresented by A. O. as a concession to Nana's fears of the Nizam's military preparations.

FROM—J. UTHOFF,

TO—CAPT. WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

Poona, 30 May 1794.

On reperusal of my last address to you of the 26th instant, I observe an obscurity which I beg leave to explain.

On delivering my opinion that, though this Court would dislike the mediation of our Government between it and Nizam Ally Khan, yet, for reasons therein stated, it would acquiesce in it so far as not to sacrifice any of its just claims, I beg leave to correct the latter part as follows: "But without sacrificing any of what it may consider its just claims, and indeed, it may perhaps introduce other claims of a still more objectionable nature." "Allow me, however, to express my apprehension," etc.

Permit me to submit to you, whether there is not room for doubt of Ballajee Pundit's having expressed a desire for the mission to Poona of Meer Allum or any other confidential person on the part of His Highness, for the purpose of negotiating an adjustment of all differences between the two States. Even the slight appearance of concession by such a measure seems to me far from the purpose of this Court in the affair; and the light in which Azim-al-Omra affects to consider (and, indeed, proclaim) it (though, perhaps, even the idea of it, on the part of Ballaji Pundit, is without foundation) must obstruct it, if it ever existed; and will probably tend to induce this Court to reject such a mission,

even if it is proposed as an advance on the part of Nizam Ally Khan ; so that Azim-al-Omra will, perhaps, have been the means of precluding the only (or most likely) mode by which an accommodation could be effected ; for His Highness's interests, I fear, will not be much studied, if the negotiation is to be conducted by Govin Rou Kishen.

On reference to your letter to the Governor General of 23rd March last, you will observe, that at that time it appeared to be the wish of Azim-al-Omra to depute Meer Allum to Poona without any idea of an advance to that effect from Ballajee Pundit. Azim-al-Omra may, perhaps, now desire to carry this into execution, and therefore affects to introduce it to His Highness and (by the conspicuous mode of so doing) to the public in general under the plausible appearance of a concession from the Poona Court ; whereas, at the utmost, it probably is no more than an acquiescence by Ballajee Pundit in a suggestion of the Court of Hyderabad or of Azim-al Omra himself.

Admitting, for argument's sake, that Ballajee Pundit has made the advance, mentioned by Azim-al-Omra, for the mission on the part of His Highness of a confidential person to Poona, for the purpose of negotiating and accommodating the differences between the two States, it seems to me to prove no more than a favourable disposition to accommodation on the part of Ballajee Pundit, which, in my opinion, should be cultivated to the utmost by Azim-al-Omra as a most happy occurrence for His Highness ; for as to the idea of its being suggested by the fears of Ballajee Pundit, raised by the formidable appearance of His Highness's military preparations, it appears to me that Azim-al-Omra could hardly flatter himself that such a thing were possible in the present state of affairs, though such an idea might not have been so unreasonable, had the Patell last year seriously and sincerely connected himself with His Highness against the Poona Administration ; but I am much inclined to think that, if any connection did at that time subsist between them, the Patell's object was to make His Highness the dupe to his own (the Patell's) views at the Poona Court.

No. 71—Uththoff informs Kirkpatrick of the Poona Govt. taking measures to secure the co-operation of the Berar Raja.

FROM—J. UTHTHOFF,

TO—CAPT. WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

Poona, 6th June 1794.

Sreedur, one of Ragojee Bhonsla's Vackeels at this Court, is said to be about to proceed to Naugpore on Sirkar business. The object of his journey I have not been able to ascertain. There is an idea here that

in the projected expedition after the rains against Nizam Ally Khan Ragojee Bhonsla will be employed, or at least some of his troops; and, indeed, perhaps an attack may be made on His Highness from the Berar quarter.

No intimation whatever has been given to me by this Court of an expedition against Nizam Ally Khan being in agitation. I mention merely reports and ideas that exist here, and which seem to derive some support from the present posture of affairs.

My last letter from Sir Charles Malet is dated the 3rd instant, when his health was not completely established. He had left Aurangabad the 2nd, and will probably arrive here the 10th or 11th instant.

No. 72—In this important document Uthoff surveys the grave situation between the Peshwa and the Nizam and makes suggestions for allaying the tension.

FROM—J. UTHOFF,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 9th June 1794.

Among the present points in dispute between the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad, most of the claims are on the part of this Court, and as the selection of an agent for the negotiation and adjustment of them will in a great degree be at the option of this Court, it seemed to me that it would prefer the ministry of Govin Rou Kishen to that of Meer Allum; because I thought the former more devoted to its interests than the latter; and my observation that Meer Allum was exclusively attached to Nizam Ally Khan, was rather a compliment to him (he being a subject and servant of His Highness) than a reflexion, that, as such, he would persist in the maintenance of wrong for his Master's apparent advantage; but his being so attached to His Highness, would, I should presume, render him a less desirable instrument to this Court for the negotiation of the points in dispute than Govin Rou Kishen.

As to the sincerity of either party for an amicable and equitable adjustment of their differences, I apprehend, that, on the one hand your Court would readily, if it could by any means, evade compliance with all of the claims of this Court; and, on the other hand, that this Court is not seriously disposed to confine itself to those claims that are really just. Exclusive of this disposition in both Courts, so inimical to an equitable accommodation of the existing differences, the personal enmity between the acting Heads of the two Parties (Azim-al-Omra and Ballajee Pundit) will, I fear, increase the difficulties of an accommodation, to

which difficulties is to be added, the general unaccommodating temper of Azim-al-Omra.

As to the points in dispute abstractedly from the persons concerned in them, I apprehend they are much more important and intricate, and will be much more difficult to adjust than Meer Allum affects to consider them. This seems to me evident even from the statement furnished by Nizam Ally Khan himself, and forwarded by you to the Governor General under date 17th April last. But it seems not unfair to presume that, that paper did not contain a very exact state of all the claims that this Court may have to make on Nizam Ally Khan; for having been furnished in a manner spontaneously by His Highness and apparently with the view of interesting our good offices in his behalf, His Highness may have been careful to withhold some of the claims from a desire to avoid exposing to us his distresses in their fullest extent, and from an apprehension, that the difficulty of adjusting them might appear so great as to induce us to relinquish the mediation altogether. It is also to be presumed, that this Court keeps in view the resumption of the country of 60 lacs of Rupees per annum, which was in a manner extorted from the Marratta State by His Highness during the confusions that existed among the ministers in the time of the interregnum and infancy of the present Peshwa, and which, having been acquired by His Highness from the distress of the Marratta State, this Court will have but little scruple to resume when enabled so to do by the comparative distress of His Highness or his successors. And it must be confessed that even if this point cannot be effected by this Court during His Highness's life time, there is but too much reason to fear that on his death (an event not likely to be long protracted) a most favourable opening will be afforded not only for the attainment of this object, but for the still further encroachments of the Marratta State. I need hardly say, that I allude to the probability, amounting perhaps almost to a certainty, (from present appearances) of a disputed succession.

But even admitting the present points in dispute between the two Courts to be settled, the annual current claims of the Marrattas, under various denominations, on His Highness's country, seem to be pregnant with constant altercation, and will, I fear, ere long again bring about a predicament similar to the present, unless they are relinquished by this State, or that they be simplified, and the total amount with the periods of payment fixed and abided by. This State will not, however, I apprehend, readily relinquish its annual current claims on His Highness's country, since exclusive of the intrinsic pecuniary value of them, they afford a favourable opening at all times for this Court to interfere in the general or particular affairs of His Highness's country and Government as its interests may suggest. It might, perhaps, be advisable for His Highness to commute these current claims for a sum of ready money, or even for the cession of a tract of country; and the best mode of settling

the claims in arrear would perhaps be by a similar commutation. Could His Highness at the same time be induced to dismiss Azim-al-Omra, or to allow him to retire from the superintendence of affairs, it would probably essentially facilitate an accommodation between the two Courts. And could His Highness appoint as a successor to Azim-al-Omra a person of weight, ability, and moderation, the sacrifice of Azim-al-Omra would probably be highly advantageous both to His Highness and to us, for it would appear that our views and His Highness's real interests (in respect to a check on the Marrattas) are to be prosecuted and attained by the same means. A link of this chain should, I think, be the appointment by His Highness of Ally Jah, his eldest son, as Wully Ahd (his apparent or eventual successor) in the most public and effectual manner.

Meer Allum, from the general character he bears, seems the most proper person that His Highness could select for the negotiation and adjustment of the points in dispute between the two Courts, in whatever manner they may be accommodated. And if an equitable and effectual accommodation can be attained by him without our interposition it seems to be a point highly desirable to us. The Poona Court might, perhaps, be induced to acquiesce in an accommodation, if His Highness would concede the two points of sacrificing Azim-al-Omra (who seems to be extremely obnoxious here particularly to Nana) and commuting the current claims and those in arrear for the cession of a tract of country. The first point, as already observed, would probably be rather advantageous than detrimental both to His Highness and to us; but the Poona Court should, on no account, either have the nomination or the option of a negative, or any kind of influence in the appointment of a successor to Azim-al-Omra. As to the second point, those claims of the Peshwa on His Highness, which, on the principle of Indian Politics, may be considered just, are to a large amount, and are of such a nature as in my opinion to be pregnant with the most serious evils to His Highness and his successors; and it would perhaps, be politic in His Highness to sacrifice even a very large and valuable tract of country as a commutation, if the point cannot be attained on more favourable terms. Should the negotiation be ultimately submitted to the mediation of our Government, (which, as already observed, it is much to be wished by us may not be the case) the minute investigation and settlement of the claims in detail will be a task of infinite delicacy and difficulty, and which, for many reasons, it seems highly desirable that we should avoid, if possible.

It may be asked, why, as some of the claims of this Court on that of Hyderabad are of many years standing, they have not been settled before; and why this Court has so long forbore to insist on a settlement; and having so long forbore, why it should now be so extremely urgent as to threaten hostilities? It is to be recollected, that for upwards of twenty years this Court has not been in a state to urge its claims on His Highness with effect. The confusions among the ministers during

the interregnum and the infancy of the present Peshwa, the encroachments on the Marrattas by Hyder Ally Khan, and our wars totally precluded it for many years. The necessity afterwards of uniting itself closely with His Highness as a defence against Tippoo precluded its pushing its claims on His Highness to extremities. The late war against Tippoo was also an unfavourable season. But, now, everything seems propitious to this Court to urge its claims with effect, and perhaps to go to the length of resuming the sixty lacs of territory, and even to still further encroachment. The cement that united the two Courts is dissolved by the great reduction of Tippoo's power by the late war and the proportional aggrandisement of this Court, to which may be added our guarantee against all apprehension from Tippoo. The domestic check on this Court's views that existed in the Patell is also now removed by his death.

It may be urged, that the terms of the sacrifice of Azim-al-Omra and the cession of a tract of country to the Peshwa, would bear too hard on Nizam Ally Khan, and that he would not accede to them. The amount of the Peshwa's annual current claims on His Highness's country and the arrears of them are to be considered together with the evils with which they are pregnant to His Highness and his successors, the advantage that His Highness would derive from his emancipation from the Marratta influence, which could result from the commutation of all the Marratta claims, also averting the innumerable evils to be now expected from a disputed succession and which, it is to be apprehended, cannot be effected while Azim-al-Omra maintains his present influence. At all events, I very much fear that His Highness would not be able to resist with success the above claims should they be made by the Marrattas, or even claims to a much greater extent, and of a more exceptionable nature. An accommodation after a war with the Marrattas would, I fear, (including the evils of war) be infinitely less favourable to His Highness.

Could a good understanding be established between us and Tippoo or indeed the present disposition of Tippoo maintained, which is, I believe, more favourable to us than to either Nizam Ally Khan or the Marrattas, and were Tippoo to become more formidable than he has yet been since the late peace, it might, perhaps, induce the Poona Court again to cultivate such a connexion with Nizam Ally Khan, as would preclude its proceeding to the extremity of hostilities with him in prosecution of its claims. But this is not very likely, for the power of the Peshwa within these four years is very much increased, and that of Tippoo reduced in a still greater proportion; added to which, the Poona Government has now an additional defence against Tippoo by the Triple Alliance. At all events, this would be but a temporary relief to His Highness. Still, however, the power of Tippoo is something in the scale against that of the Marrattas, which is a substantial argument in favour of the wisdom of the late peace having been concluded

without too much weakening Tippoo, in the prosecution of which we should probably have lost many valuable lives, and have been involved in great additional expense; while an arrangement, at a later period, with our two allies, would, in all probability, have been attended with many difficulties and evils.

You will not, I trust, take amiss the freedom of the above discussion, into which I have been led by the frankness and fullness of the communications with which you have honoured me; and, by the idea, that the subject of a negotiation of so important and delicate a nature as that in which we are likely to be involved, cannot, in the first instance, be too minutely canvassed, nor the difficulties of it too fully laid open, in order that means may be devised for obviating them. At all events, the above discussion can do no harm, since, as it will be open to the comments of yourself and Sir Charles Malet (should it be thought worthy so much attention) the Governor General cannot be misled by any vague or ill founded ideas of mine.

The probability of a rupture between this Court and that of His Highness seems every day to increase in the opinions of people here. Military preparations are talked of as coming from authority, and among other plans, it is said to have been agitated and determined on between Nanna and Abba Chitnavees: that a body of Sindea's Regular Infantry shall be sent for from Hindostan to be employed on the occasion. Report goes so far as to say that the Peshwa will take the field in person after the rains. Abba Chitnavees has still the principal management of the Sindean affairs, which he seems likely to maintain, and it is thought that he acts in concert with Nanna. A general muster of the Peshwa's Cavalry now here took place yesterday, and it is said that they amounted to ten or twelve thousand.

There is a report here, that Tippoo has a body of five or six thousand horse and foot at Buswapatun about twenty miles from Hurrupur on the Tumbuddra, which river is in that quarter the boundary between Tippoo and the Marrattas.

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that Sir Charles Malet will be here tomorrow morning. He is now pretty well.

No. 73—Shore instructs the Resident to urge upon A. O. an equitable accommodation of Maratha claims. The object of his policy he lays down as "prevention of rupture between the two Courts of Poona and Hyderabad, and not to support one against the other".

FROM—GOVERNOR-GENERAL,

TO—CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fori William, 9th June 1794.

The extravagance displayed by Azeem-ul-Omrah on the occasion of the vague manifestation of the Poonah Government's disposition

towards an accommodation, is a sufficient proof of the levity and inconsistency of his character, and of the little reliance to be placed on any expectation that his conduct will be regulated by any fixed principles.

The conduct of the Peshwah on the other hand appears moderate and firm, and I see little reason to doubt that he will ultimately compel the Nizam to an adjustment of his several demands upon him.

My letter of the 19th ultimo communicated to you my sentiments on the general justice of the demands of the Poonah Government, and no opportunity should be omitted to impress Azeem-ul-Omrah with a conviction of the propriety as well as the necessity of bringing them to a speedy adjustment, nor have I any objection to your informing him that the good offices of this Government can only be interposed on the principles of Justice and common friendship for the two States with which we are allied, and the object of it must be to facilitate and promote, and not retard an adjustment, which the interest and honour of the Nizam equally require should be effected as soon as possible.

It is unnecessary to point out to your notice, that the suppositions on which I first authorized our interposition are so far varied, that the demands of the Peshwah, as far as I can judge from the communications which have hitherto reached me, are founded in Justice and upon agreements and cannot therefore be considered as exactions, and the tenor of our interposition, if it should take place, must be accordingly modified. It is our object to prevent a rupture between the two Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah, and not to support one against the other. I do not, however, imagine that the Peshwah will proceed to attack the Nizam without a previous communication with our resident Sir Charles Warre Malet, but I shall at all events instruct him, in the event of appearances indicating hostilities on the part of the Peshwah, to interpose his endeavours to prevent them by offering the friendly advice of this Government for an amicable termination of the matters in dispute between the two Courts on the grounds of our mutual connection and alliance with both.

With respect to Sir C. W. Malet and yourself, in this and my former letters having sufficiently explained the principles of our interposition, which you both appear thoroughly to understand, I leave you to act upon them according to the exigency of circumstances and the information which you may possess, adding only that it is by no means my wish to interfere as long as it can be prudently avoided.

No. 74—Malet tries to seek the ulterior motives for the persistent unaccommodating attitude of Azim-ul-Omra.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPT. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 13th June 1794.

As from Mr. Uthhoff's dispatch of the 9th instant you will have learnt the certainty of my arrival here on the 10th, I thought it of no import to mention it but in course of Dawk.

I have always understood it as a thing long since settled during the ministry of your predecessor, that Meer Aalum's deputation to this Court rested solely on the previous arrangement of the detail of the points in dispute so far, as that his embassy should be introduced merely to give eclat to the conclusion and ratification of the ultimate settlement between the two Courts.

Thus impressed I have been a good deal surprized to learn from your late letters that, in addition to the extraordinary pretences for procrastination resorted to by Azim-ul-Omrah in the discussions between the two Courts, he has now assumed it as a necessary point of etiquette, that this Court should previously signify its wish of the deputation of Meer Aalum. Without remarking on this extraordinary aberration from the original intention with respect to M. A.'s deputation, or on the novelty of such an expectation on the part of A. O. in the usage of Courts, I am led by a general consideration of the uniform evasion of A. O.'s conduct with respect to a settlement in which he has not omitted the most dangerous and irritating arts and intrigues towards this Government—both in his connexions with Mahadji Sindia and his attempts to involve us in his cause, the whole of which may be pretty clearly traced in a disgusting series of alternate confidence and reserve, equally artful and affected throughout the correspondence of your predecessor and me; I am led, I say, by a general consideration of all these circumstances and a combination of them with the real interests of the Nazim, which clearly pointed out an early and amicable settlement in preference to the vast expenses that have been incurred by a menacing ostentation of military parade, to submit to your better information whether this studyd and, it should seem, systematic evasion of the Marratta claims, and show of supporting the same by arms, may not, whatever may have been the original design, be now subservient to the necessity which A. O. must feel, of keeping up an army devoted to his will, with which (should the occasion of the Nazim's demise occur) he may enforce the pretensions that he has so decidedly and perhaps so unprudently adopted of his grand son-in-law, Secundar Jah, to the Musnud.

This conjecture derives some weight from the consideration that in the event of a settlement with the Marhattas everything at His Highness's Court must necessarily subside into tranquillity; great part of the army would be disbanded, most probably the new levies that may be supposed most at the Minister's devotion; and the Nabob, relieved from the political anxieties by which his mind has so long been kept in a state of agitation, would return to reflect at leisure on the true state of his family in his Capital at Hyderabad, where, perhaps, the friends of Ali Jah may be more numerous and may have easier access than at the new Court of Bidder, modelled, it may be supposed, under the more immediate influence of the Minister.

As to the introduction of our interposition at this Court, I feel myself extremely delicately situated not only by my total diffidence founded on experience of your Court's sincerity and the total absence of any clear statement from it of the points in dispute and its ultimate resolution thereon, clouded as, I believe, that resolution is by causes foreign to these disputes, but by the total silence of this Court on the ground, which I am inclined to think it assumes, of an independent right to treat exclusively with one of its Mamuledars, in which light it affects (and who can controvert it) to hold the Nazim, a ground which, should it be maintained, would expose any advance of mine to a failure, that on principles of public and national dignity would grieve me. To these points of difficulty in making any interpository advance, is to be added the very cautious and reserved tenor of the Governor General's instructions on this delicate point.

Thus circumstanced, I could wish and shall endeavour to bring it about, that this Court could be brought to make some previous intimation to me either of the Nazim's unconquerable procrastination or of its intention seriously to assert and enforce its claims; such a declaration would give me a fair and desirable opening to introduce with considerable effect, the whole display of our friendly intentions to both Govts., and of our wish and expectation, on principles of public Good, that every cause of altercation should be removed, and our readiness to assist with our good offices in so desirable a work.

Notwithstanding the show of preparation and the reports so confidently circulated here of insuing hostilities, it is evident that nothing serious of that kind can be entered on till after the rains, a season favourable to the measures of the promoters of peace, which it will be our business to improve. But events may happen in this interim that may totally alter the present political aspect, which in these regions of revolution is incessantly assuming a new appearance with new personages. To give eclat to the present co-operation of this Court and that of Berar the Peshwa yesterday accepted of an entertainment from the Bhosla's agents.

No. 75—Malet reports to the G. G. the military preparations of the Poona Court against the Nizam and its accession of strength by the authority it had established over Sindia's family and resources.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Poona, 13th June 1794.

As mentioned by Mr. Uthhoff in his letter to Captain Kirkpatrick of the 9th I returned to this place the 10th instant.

Perceiving from a perusal of the papers that have passed in my absence, that you have been regularly and minutely acquainted with circumstances here, it only becomes necessary to confirm the accounts furnished by my Assistant of the warlike preparations making here, that are confidently reported to be directed against the Nizam, for my intended conduct in which delicate predicament permit me to refer you to the enclosed copy of my letter of this date to the Resident with that Prince.

My advices since the death of Mahadji Sindia will have conveyed to you pretty clearly the probability of the power of that family falling under the immediate direction of this Government through the ministry of Abba Chitnees, and the peculiar state of parties in the members of the administration of that Government. That probability is, I apprehend, completely fulfilled, for while by the influence of the Peshwa's ministers Abba Chitnees has for the present established an absolute predominance over the powerful Sinee party, this Government has by the same rule fixed its influence over him and his Master's interests.

No. 76—Uthhoff informs Kirkpatrick that Malet was looking for a favourable opportunity to introduce his mediation in the dispute.

FROM—J. UTHHOFF,

TO—CAPT. WM. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

Poona, 16th June 1794.

Sir Charles Malet having a return of his indisposition has directed me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant since closing his last dispatch to you of the 13th.

Observing from your letter to the Governor General of the 8th instant, that Nizam Ally Khan had come to the determination of dispatching confidential agents to Poona for the purpose of negotiating and adjusting the existing differences between the two Courts, Sir Charles Malet directs me to acquaint you that, in consequence thereof, he shall for the present maintain a strict silence towards this Court on the subject of our

interposition in which resolution he is confirmed by some ground given him to think, that it is in agitation at this Durbar to make a representation to him on the subject of the differences between the two Courts. The arrival of His Highness's agents here, or the above representation on the part of this Durbar, will afford Sir Charles a more favourable opportunity for introducing the subject of our mediation (should it ever become necessary) than he at present possesses.

The illness of Hurry Punt (who is still at Sidda Teyk) is reported to increase.

No. 77—Uthhoff on behalf of Malet solicits from the G. G. instructions regarding the intercourse to be maintained by him with Meer Alam, the Nizam's envoy to Poona, on the latter's arrival.

FROM—J. UTHHOFF,

TO—SIR JOHN SEORE, BART., GOVERNOR-GENERAL, FORT WILLIAM.

Poona, 23rd June 1794.

Sir Charles being much reduced both in strength and spirits by an intermittent fever, which has been for some time past and is now very prevalent in this quarter, Mr. Cruso the Surgeon here strongly recommends to him to go to Bombay for change of air, as the most promising means of removing his fever should it still continue, or of restoring his constitution should the fever even soon be put a stop to. He directs me therefore to intimate to you, that he thinks it very probable he shall shortly be under the necessity of adopting * * * advice.

I am directed by Sir Charles Malet to solicit your instructions as to the kind of intercourse he is to maintain with Meer Allum, in the event of the embassy now in agitation taking place. This seems to him the more necessary from the circumstance of no intercourse whatever having hitherto subsisted between this Residency and any of His Highness's ministers here, and from the nature of his general instructions, which are to avoid communication with any person or persons here that should be in any degree exceptionable to the Peshwa or his ministers, and also from the guarded nature of your orders on the subject of our interposition between this Court and His Highness. Sir Charles is extremely well inclined (even before the receipt of any specific instructions from you in answer to this reference) to show all those external marks of respect and attention towards Meer Allum, that from his public and private character he seems entitled to, as far as he can do so without giving offence to this Government, but he is apprehensive that any conspicuous marks of a close connexion between us and His Highness's Minister might, on the present occasion, be offensive to this Court.

No. 78—Uththoff tries to explain to Kirkpatrick how necessary it was in the Nizam's own interest to dismiss his minister, A. O. Such a measure, he thinks, would go a long way to pacify the Marathas.

FROM—J. UTHTHOFF,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALY KHAN.

Poona, 23rd June 1794.

Sir,

I beg leave to observe that you must be the best judge of the probable sincerity of your Court for an amicable and equitable adjustment with this, and most heartily hope that that sincerity does exist. My idea was founded generally on the little credit due to the professions of Indian Courts, and particularly on the system of evasion which His Highness (or his Minister) appears to have practised for many years past, and which he seems to have continued even to so late a period as the recent discussion between the two Courts, a statement of which was forwarded by you to the Governor General on the 17th April last. That His Highness has been enabled so long to maintain this system of evasion may appear strange, but may perhaps be accounted for on the principle noticed in the 7th paragraph of my letter to you of the 9th instant, viz., "That this Court has not hitherto been in a state to urge its claims on His Highness with effect, by being precluded from proceeding to the extremity of compulsion with him. The present threatened hostilities, on the part of this Court, for the prosecution of which the posture of public affairs in general seems at this juncture very propitious, may, however, perhaps, render it impossible or at least inexpedient for His Highness by any means to continue to evade compliance with the claims of this Court."

"In your remark on the idea I presumed to start "of His Highness being induced to dismiss Azim-al-Omra, or to allow him to retire, from the superintendence of affairs," you lay great stress on the argument to be adduced against such a measure "of the impolicy of sacrificing Azim-al-Omra at the instance of the Marrattas". I admit that it would be highly impolitic in His Highness to dismiss Azim-al-Omra solely because it may be the wish of this Court that he should do so, and it would, I think, be most arrogant and unreasonable in either the Marrattas or us to propose or expect such a sacrifice. But I beg leave to repeat, that the point of view in which I conceived this measure as attended with advantage to His Highness and to us, was "averting the evils to be now expected from a disputed succession, and which, it was to be apprehended, could not be effected while Azim-al-Omra maintained his present influence." Also "His Highness's appointing as a successor to Azim-al-Omra a person of weight, ability and moderation," by whom I conceived His Highness's affairs would probably be better conducted than by Azim-al-Omra, to

which was added, "that it would probably essentially facilitate an accommodation between the two Courts, but that the Poona Court should not have any kind of influence whatever in the appointment of a successor to Azim-al-Omra." To facilitate an accommodation between two foreign courts at variance, many instances might be adduced of a change of ministers having taken place at one or both Courts, without the independence of either court being affected thereby. And so far from even the most distant idea on my part of suggesting anything that could possibly be prejudicial to His Highness's independence, I most heartily wish that it were infinitely more firm and secure than it now is; and on that principle suggested the "commutation of the annual current claims of this Court on His Highness, from which would result his emancipation from the Maratta influence," which I understand now actually exists in many parts of His Highness's country and government, and to a certain degree, pervades the whole. My suggestion of "the appointment by His Highness of Ally Jah, his eldest son, as Wully Ahd (his apparent or eventual successor) in the most public and effectual manner" was also on the principle not only of maintaining, but strengthening, His Highness's independence and that of his successors.

It is not, however, likely that this Court should make a formal proposition for the dismissal of Azim-al-Omra. Should his removal be deemed a feasible and eligible measure, it might be introduced as a free and independent act on the part of His Highness, and in a manner as little offensive or disgraceful as possible to Azim-al-Omra.

In my letter to you of the 26th ultimo, I have observed that "should the then sickness of Hurry Punt Furkia terminate soon in his demise, it might perhaps prove some check on this Court in prosecuting its claims on His Highness to the extremity of hostilities." At that period this Court did not seem so decidedly bent on hostilities, as it has since appeared to be; and if the late report be true, "of the intention of the Peshwa to take the field in person after the rains," the death of Hurry Punt (which happened on the 19th instant as already advised) may not perhaps affect the projected expedition. At all events hostilities are not likely to commence during the three ensuing months of the rainy season, and within this period, the negotiation between the two Courts or the military preparations will, in all probability, have assumed such an appearance as to enable us to form a more correct idea of what is likely to take place after the rains than vague conjecture or surmise can now afford. It is said that Pursaram Bhou has been summoned from Tasgaon to attend the Durbar.

In the discussion respecting the removal of Azim-al-Omra from His Highness's councils, I beg leave to be understood as not having presumed to mention such a measure as proper to be proposed and

prosecuted by us at the present conjuncture. My object was, by a previous description of the subject, that we might be prepared for a change of His Highness's minister, should it ever be agitated, or should Azim-al-Omra's removal take place, by death, or in any other manner. And it was a subject that seemed to be very closely connected with the two important points of the existing differences between the two Courts and of the maintenance of His Highness's independence.

No. 79—Uthtoff writes to Kirkpatrick that the Nizam had no more claim to the support of the English than what regard for their own interests suggested.

FROM—J. UTHTOFF,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

Poona, 27th June 1794.

I had the honour last post to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, to which I now proceed to reply by Sir Charles Malet's directions.

Sir Charles agrees entirely in opinion with you as to the eligibility of the deputation of Meer Allum on the part of His Highness to this Court; but it was a matter of surprise and concern to him, that in an affair so necessary or at least expedient for His Highness, and which had been so long in agitation and intended to take place after the arrangement of some preliminaries, Azim-al-Omra should have affected to put it off on the footing of an etiquette that this Court should make an advance for such a deputation, and that such advance was to be considered as a concession on the part of his Court.

Considerable stress has been frequently laid by Azim-al-Omra on the merit of the Court of Hyderabad in withdrawing itself from its former connexion and dependence on the Court of Poona and connecting itself closely with us, and it is pretended that the present predicament in which it is placed with respect to this Court, is solely or in a great measure to be attributed thereto. An inference is drawn, that in duty or candour it is, in a manner, incumbent on us to relieve His Highness from the distress in which he is involved by his connexion with us, founded, as it is pretended, on the present principles, on the part of His Highness, of friendship and attachment towards us. It is true that the Court of Hyderabad has at times thrown itself in some measure on us, not however in a frank, manly, candid way, but for the purpose of averting evils, or acquiring advantages, in predicaments in which it has been involved by its own imprudent, short-sighted and interested policy. While the policy's propriety and incumbency must be admitted as well among

states as among individuals of a liberal return on one side for a liberal advance on the other, it must be confessed that, treaties out of the question, the conduct of the Court of Hyderabad towards us does not seem to entitle to our good offices further than policy and our own interests may suggest, (which is considerable), and that this is the principle on which our disposition to mediate between it and the Court of Poona, should be and doubtless is founded.

No. 80—Shore instructs Malet to interpose his good offices only in the last extremity of the dispute and on the ground of not weakening the confederacy against Tipu.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—SIR C. W. MALET, BART., RESIDENT AT POONA.

Fort William, 3rd July 1794.

You will observe both from the tenor of this and my former despatches that it is by no means my wish to interpose between the Nizam and Peshwah as long as it can be prudently avoided, that is, until their disagreements shall attain such a length as to threaten immediate rupture and hostilities. Whenever you may judge that event unavoidable or highly probable, I recommend you to obtain a conference with the Minister, and urge the following topics to him in such terms and with such additions as you may judge proper.

That as a common friend and ally of the Peshwah and the Nizam, I have long received with the greatest concern and uneasiness the differences which have prevailed between them, and that in this capacity I cannot avoid expressing to both my sincere wishes for an amicable termination of their mutual claims; that being united by treaty in the same confederacy, motives of interest concur with my regard for the welfare of the two States to prevent a disunion, which cannot take place without injury to the interests of the Confederates, and which for a time at least, if pushed to the length of hostilities, would retard the object of that alliance, if a necessity occurred for carrying into execution the conditions of it; that hostilities between the Nizam and Peshwah might prove a temptation to call forth that necessity, and at all events must weaken the parties engaged in it; that I do not wish to give any opinion on the rights or claims of the Peshwah or the Nizam, or to interpose further than as a common friend; that as such the present representation becomes an obligation which I discharge with the more confidence, as it can only originate in the motives I profess, that of a regard for both parties and an anxiety to preserve the means of carrying into effect the stipulations in the treaties of Poonah and Paangul, if necessity should require it.

I have no doubts that Meer Allum, if his intended deputation to Poonah should actually take place, will have instructions to endeavour to avail himself of all the support which your countenance can afford him. Your conduct in this respect may require some delicacy, and must be regulated by your judgment of its impression on the Minister. It might be prejudicial to the interests of the Nizam to show any discountenance to his representation; on the other hand, it is by no means evident that his cause would derive advantage from any appearances that could be interpreted into a declared support. Under the determination not to support the Nizam at the risque of any serious disagreement with the Court of Poonah, your general line of conduct with respect to Meer Allum should be such, that whilst you avoid the appearance of taking any part in the Nizam's affairs, his agent should be treated with the attention due to an ally of the Company; and that you shew all the countenance to Meer Allum that can be done without irritating the jealousy or enmity of the Court of Poonah.

No. 81—Shore in unmistakable terms defines his attitude to the Maratha-Nizam dispute.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fort William, 3rd July 1794.

Having reconsidered with great attention all the correspondence and information relating to the disputes between the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah and to our eventual interposition, I shall now communicate to you the sentiments suggested by a more comprehensive view of these important subjects.

The annihilation of the independency of the Nizam, whether by the power of the Peshwa or Tippoo Sultaun, cannot be effected without danger to the Company's possessions in India, and it is therefore our interest to afford him support. With respect to Tippoo Sultaun, the Nizam derives a security from the Confederacy, which he does not possess in himself. With respect to the Mahrattas, he has no such protection, and they have every advantage over him, both from the wisdom of their councils and superiority of actual force.

Without discussing the question how far it would be wise or politic to afford him support against the Peshwah at the risque of hostilities with the Mahrattas, it is sufficient to observe that, as we are not bound by any existing treaty to defend the Nizam against the Peshwah, we could not engage in a war with the latter on his account without a direct violation of the prescriptions of the Legislature. Thus, admitting the propriety

and policy of supporting him against the Mahrattas, the limitations for our conduct are positively defined, and these considerations pointed out the subsisting confederacy between the three States as the most eligible ground of amicable interposition to prevent a rupture between the Nizam and the Peshwah.

When my first instructions upon this subject were communicated to you, I had reason to suppose that the Mahratta Minister, exasperated by the conduct of Azim-ul-Omrah in connecting himself closely with Mahadjee Sindia, at a period when that Chieftain was attempting to assume a predominancy in the Poonah administration, instigated by the long subsisting enmity between himself and Azeem-ul-Omra and tempted by the weakness of the Nizam, had advanced claims upon His Highness founded in motives which I have stated rather than in right, and, as such, that they were liable to be considered exactions. But the claims of the Mahrattas, whatever modifications they may be liable to, even from the statement which the Nizam has given of them, appear to have a reference both to right and agreement, and although the principle of our eventual interposition is not affected by this explanation, it is necessary to attend to it if that interference should take place. This suggestion was also communicated to you in my instructions of the 9th June.

From the general tenor of Azim-ul-Omrah's character it was obvious to conclude, that whilst he entertained hopes of our support, and could suppose the Poonah Government would be influenced by an idea that it would be granted, he would not be serious in his endeavours to bring the differences between the Nizam and Peshwah to a termination. This conclusion has been proved by his conduct, which appears to have been a compromise between his apprehensions, his pride and his vanity; and whatever reliance he may affect to have upon the power of the Nizam opposed in hostility to that of the Peshwah, he is but too sensible of the superiority of the latter. This conviction, combined with other motives, naturally suggests the endeavour on his part to obtain the support of our mediation as umpire in his disputes with the Poonah Minister. The latter on the contrary will be equally disinclined to such interposition.

I should by no means wish, even with the consent of both parties, to undertake the decision between them, except, as the only means of preventing hostilities, and without their mutual consent the offer of our mediation as umpire might expose us to the discredit of rejection. If, however, in the course of discussion between the Peshwah and the Nizam they should both express a wish for our Umpirage, an event which I consider highly improbable, I will not object to undertake it as the only means of preventing war between them, upon this condition, that they previously agree upon the statement of their claims and differences, which is to be referred to the decision of this Government. Without such a statement accompanied by the documents appealed to, it would be impossible ever to decide.

Whilst these reflections so evidently show the delicacy and difficulty attending any interposition on our part, the probable necessity of it is as great as ever, as there is reason to apprehend that the advantages which might have resulted from an earlier deputation of Meer Allum will not now be attainable in an equal degree. Late as this measure has been adopted, I think it the only resource which remains to the Nizam, and his Minister will, I hope, see the importance of it, and furnish Meer Allum with such instructions as may enable him to act in a manner most conducive to the real interests of his Master.

I have directed a copy of this letter to be sent to Sir C. W. Malet, and have written instructions to him in conformity to the principles which I have laid down, of which a copy is also enclosed for your information.

Whilst I consider it expedient to afford the Nizam all the support which this Government can with propriety grant, the character of Azim-ul-Omrah renders it necessary to discourage that propensity to evasion, which he has shown upon the slightest appearance of any opportunity to indulge it, and which would probably be resumed upon any appearance of our support ; acting from the impulse of his feelings rather than from principles of sound policy, his conduct has been inconsistent, and it has unfortunately happened that on the most material points of reference from the Minister to this Government we have been under the necessity of deciding against his wishes and inclination.

At present, however, he appears sincere in his determination to accommodate the differences between his Master and the Peshwah ; with a view to strengthen that determination I wish you to take an early opportunity of expressing my satisfaction at the measure, which he has adopted for this purpose, of deputing Meer Allum, informing him that I consider his selection as a proof of his discernment ; that I have long received with the greatest concern and uneasiness the subsisting disputes between the two States, with whom we are equally connected by friendship and by treaty, but that I trust they will now be speedily and amicably settled, and that their common enemies will no longer have an opportunity of rejoicing at the prospect of a contest, which would inevitably weaken the parties engaged in it. Convinced as I am that the Minister must ultimately yield to the claims or power of the Court of Poonah, the dignity of the Nizam will be better consulted in a timely acquiescence in all reasonable claims than by evasions or protraction, which may only tend to render them more exorbitant, and at all events to augment the difficulties of adjustment.

I have only to add that you evaded with great propriety the proposition of the Minister for the attendance of Lieutenant Stewart on Meer Allum, which could not have been admitted, and that I approve generally the tenor of your communications with the Minister.

No. 82—The personal character of A. O., his extravagances, are ruining what little prospect there is of a friendly accommodation between the two Parties.

FROM—J. UTHOFF,

TO—W. KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 15th July 1794.

I am directed by Sir Charles Malet to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 3rd instant.

After so full a disquisition as has already passed of the character and conduct of Azim al Omra, should it be necessary to say anything more on the subject, Sir Charles Malet directs me to submit to you whether the extravagance and levity, that so frequently mark his conduct, are not in a very high degree criminal in a personage in so elevated a station, when the baneful influence they have on foreign states (particularly the Marrattas) and on so large a part of mankind as His Highness's subjects is considered. And even admitting these extravagances to be "no more than the ebullition of a transient fit of vanity, a passion," how highly unbecoming and impolitic (perhaps, I might add, ruinous) are they in a person in such a station, more especially when it is considered that they are fully exposed and most industriously communicated to this Court under circumstances probably of exaggeration, if the reports circulated here may be credited.

The drift of Azim a' Omra in the merit he claims for the close connexion he affects to have found with us, seems sufficiently evident, though he may not yet have pointedly declared, that it is incumbent on us to relieve His Highness from the distress in which, he pretends, that he is involved thereby. The time for urging such a claim will be when he is seriously pressed by this Court; and he will, perhaps, then in the same strain reproach us as the advisers and authors of Meer Allum's deputation, should it by that time have proved unsuccessful.

When it is recollected that the affairs between the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona have for many years past been under the sole management a'most of Govin Rou Kishen and his Deputy, Govin Rou Bugwunt, and that the embarrassments in which His Highness is now involved, are in a very great measure to be attributed to the act and intrigue of those agents, it is to be feared that the measure of "Meer Allum's transacting all the business of his present negociation with the knowledge and assistance of Govin Rou Bugwunt," is a fresh instance and proof of the present existing dependence of Nizam Ally Khan on the Marrattas, and of the thralldom and embarrassments in which Meer Allum's deputation is likely to be involved.

On the treaties, engagements, and letters between the Court of Hyderabad and the Marrattas, enclosed in your letter to the Governor

General of the 1st instant, Sir Charles Malet has directed me to observe, that while they seem sufficiently to evince the great amount and intricacy of the Marratta claims on His Highness, they are very incomplete, being confined almost solely to the claims of the Berar Marrattas. The only paper respecting the Peshwa (or Poona Marrattas) is the 8th Article of the Treaty of Edgheer,[†] which refers to a Treaty in regard to the management of detail matters, such as Chout and Sirdaismooky, etc., nor one article of which is yet made known to us, though it is no doubt, under the present circumstances, of great importance, and indispensably necessary for our information, if we are to be involved in a mediation between the two Courts. The Berar papers show that His Highness's territory in that quarter is in such a state of dependence even on the Bhonsla, a subordinate branch of the Marratta empire, as to amount nearly to equal participation, and that the royalty of granting cowl is actually equally exercised by the Bhonsla with His Highness; which, even should a settlement be now effected, presents a prospect, almost inevitable, of constant annual altercation.

Sir Charles Malet continues on the recovery, but not so rapidly as could be wished, having feverish symptoms every second day.

No. 83—Uthhoff reports to the Governor General of Sir Charles Malet having been officially told by the Poona Durbar that its military preparations were directed against the Nizam.

FROM—J. UTHHOFF,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., G. G.

Poona, 20th July 1794.

I have now the honour to acquaint you that Sir Charles Malet seems to be so much recovered that he will, I trust, in a few days be enabled to give every requisite attention to public business, which his indisposition has for a long time past precluded.

Sir Charles Malet having made such progress in his convalescence for some days past as to have enabled him paying some attentions to business, directed his Munshy in a visit that he lately paid to Behroo Pundit to enquire, though not officially, whether the reports that had been some time in circulation, of the military preparations being on foot here, were well founded, and what might be the object of such preparations. Behroo Pundit replied that he would speak to Nanna on the subject, and appointed a time for the Munshy to wait on him to receive an answer.

The Munshy waited on Behroo Pundit agreeable to appointment, but from his being engaged in his devotions and somewhat indisposed, he did not meet him. Basker Pundit, however, the son of Behroo Pundit, and who for some time past has had the conduct of many of his father's

[†] See Appendix p. 315.

affairs, was present and observed to the Munshy though not officially that Sir Charles Malet's enquiry had been made known to Nanna, who had consulted on the occasion some of those persons with whom the deliberations on the affairs of the two Courts have been of late usually carried on by him, but principally Govin Rou Pingleh (Bugwunt) the agent of Govin Rou Kishen, the Peshwa's Vackeel at the Court of Hyderabad; and that at the particular recommendation of Govin Rou Pingleh, it had been resolved that an evasive answer should be given to Sir Charles Malet to the following purport, "That the Marratta affairs towards Cutch Bhuj in the north-western parts of Guzerat being in some confusion, it was necessary to send a military force into that quarter for the restoration of tranquillity and order, and that it was for that reason that military preparations were now on foot here."

Basker Pundit observed to the Munshy, that his father was averse to delivering so evasive a message to Sir Charles Malet, which he should notice to Nanna and endeavour to obtain a more satisfactory answer.

The Munshy waiting on Behroo Pundit again for an answer on the subject after this further communication with Nanna, Behroo Pundit delivered the following message for the information of Sir Charles Malet, observing, however, that it was to be considered as a confidential communication from himself, not officially from the Durbar, tho' it was evidently constructed.

"That in the settlement of the Peshwa's territorial rights and demands on the Nizam's Government great delay had occurred, which had been very prejudicial to the Peshwa's Affairs and became still more so every day. That for five or six years past Govin Rou Kishen had been employed at His Highness's Court to effect an adjustment, yet hitherto without success. That the character and conduct of Azim al Omra were of certain stamp, too well known to need particular explanation. That last year, without any provocation on the part of this Court, His Highness's movement to Bidder had taken place. That if that movement had been merely for the purpose of inspection and domestic arrangement why were new levies of troops made by His Highness, and why were councils held of a nature too obvious to need any remark? It is not proper that the Peshwa's territorial rights (Amil) should suffer in this manner, and it is therefore necessary to make preparations for remedying this evil. On the receipt of intelligence by Nizam Ally Khan of the preparations on foot here, His Highness had determined to depute Meer Allum and the Roy Royan to Poona, which had been already noticed to Sir Charles Malet. If by the deputation the affairs between the two Courts could be settled, it was well. If not, it would be necessary to take effectual means for the establishment of the rights (Amil) of the Sirkar (Peshwa's). That also between Ahmedabad and Cutch Bhooj in the north western parts of Gujerath, the country was in a state of confusion, and that it was

necessary to take some measures for the re-establishment of tranquillity and order. That the military preparation now making here were with a view to the two objects above mentioned."

Meer Allum is said to have been three days ago within 25 coss of Poona, but delayed by the rains which have of late been very heavy.

No. 84—Uthhoff in this letter to Kirkpatrick exposes the falsehood of A. O. and refutes his claim to British assistance on the strength of past treaties.

FROM—J. UTHOFF,

TO—CAPT. WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 23rd July 1794.

As to the military preparations on foot here, and the probable extensive hostile views of this State towards that of Nizam Ally Khan, they have been fully and regularly communicated to you from hence for these two months past; and so long ago as the 12th of June, you observe "that Azim-al-Omra also had received through his own channels the accounts of the preparations and military equipments on foot here, but that he would not be thought to regard them in a serious light."

That Azim-al-Omra begins now to betray his alarm is sufficiently obvious and will no doubt be taken advantage of by this Court. I, however, see no new cause for this alarm; but it would appear that Azim-al-Omra must always be in extremes, and that he is a stranger to dignified firmness and moderation. The extent of the military force preparing here and of His Highness's means of repelling it, as asserted by Azim-al-Omra to you through Mustakeem-ud-Doula, is a palpable misrepresentation on the part of Azim-al-Omra; and though a piece with his conduct in general, how ill does it accord with the consistency that ought to be professed by a personage in so elevated a station. On the 29th May at your visit to Azim-ul-Omra he pretended to treat an actual war with the Marattas as an issue which the experience of former times gave His Highness no reason to shrink from. On the same occasion he observed, "That the reciprocal claims of the two States were, in truth, extremely inconsiderable in themselves, and perhaps, nearly balanced each other".

On our Government alone is it that Azim-al-Omra can depend to extricate his Master from the embarrassments in which he is now involved with the Marattas, and Azim al Omra at length seems to acknowledge this himself; yet does he still persist in these palpable misrepresentations and extravagances.

Where is now the pusillanimity of Ballajee Pundit, with which Azim-al-Omra has so constantly affected to reproach him?

When Azim-al-Omra put the question of the obligation comprehended in certain treaties, under the declaration that the friends and enemies of one of the contracting parties were to be deemed the friends and enemies of the other, it might have been asked, what obligation His Highness felt himself under towards us during our two last wars with the Marattas and Hyder Ally Khan; wars which, it has been repeatedly said with confidence, His Highness boasted of having originated and fomented against us; and this while the stipulations of the treaty of 1768 were in force; whereas, at present those stipulations are annulled, as far as they could operate against the Marattas, by Lord Cornwallis's letter of 7th July 1789, the conditions of which have been long since fully communicated to this Court by order of the Government General, so that this Court is perfectly acquainted with the length to which we can, without a violation of good faith, carry our interposition in favour of His Highness.

No. 85—Malet remonstrates with the Poona Durbar for carrying matters to an extreme and offers his good offices for settling amicably the points at issue.

FROM—J. UTHOFF,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART.

Poona, 23rd July 1794.

Soon after the receipt of Behroo Pundit's message, as mentioned in that letter, Sir Charles Malet sent a reply to the following purport.

"The message you have sent me I have understood, and on the subject of it have a friendly remonstrance to make to you. At the time that Nizam Ally Khan made the movement to Bidder, you, on the part of your Sirkar, made a particular representation to me on the subject; observing, that on account of the friendship of the three States the Durbar requested I would write to Sir John Kennaway (the Company's Resident at His Highness's Court) that the Nabob might not move forward, as it was not agreeable to the Peshwa; and that the Peshwa had written in the same terms to the Nabob. Agreeable to what you desired, I wrote to Sir John Kennaway, who made a representation on the subject to the Nabob to the following purport, "That as the three Sirkars were as one, it was proper for him to represent to the Nabob, that tho' His Highness was then in his own country, yet as the movement was offensive to the Peshwa, it was advisable that His Highness should desist from it." Whatever else also was proper on the occasion, Sir John Kennaway represented to the Nabob. This is known to your Sirkar (Peshwa's). Whether from the representation of the Peshwa, of Sir John Kennaway, or of both, His Highness desisted from those proceedings that were offensive to the Peshwa, and has remained to the present day at Bidder.

Nanna assured me that, whatever might hereafter pass between the two Courts should be fully communicated to me. I have now made enquiry as to the object of the military preparations at present on foot here, and you tell me that it is on account of the Nabob. When His Highness made an excursion in his own country, you were very particular in your representations to me on the subject, and in your requisition for the introduction of our good offices in prevention of proceedings on the part of His Highness that were offensive to the Peshwa; and now that the Peshwa is making warlike preparations against His Highness, you say not a word to me on the subject, notwithstanding the assurances of the Minister that I should be made fully acquainted with whatever might pass between the two Courts. This is a cause of friendly remonstrance that I have to make to you. I am sensible that in the fulfilment of promises there will be no deviation on the part of the Minister, but your having been indisposed, and my absence at Ellora and subsequent illness, may have been the cause of the silence that has been observed by the Durbar, or you would no doubt have communicated to me what has occurred on the occasion. But what is past, is gone. If you now acquaint me with the particulars of the difference between the two Courts, it will be agreeable to friendship, and in every respect proper. In this the good of the three Sirkars is obvious; for when the Nabob on a former occasion heard the representation of our Government, it made impression on him favourable to the Peshwa as it will no doubt again, and the differences that exist between the two Courts may be accommodated, and the good of the three Sirkars thereby effected. And I, who am a well wisher of the three Allied Powers, shall be very happy to use my good offices on the present occasion as far as may be in my power, which is no less my duty than the sincere wish of my heart."

On the receipt of the above representation by Behroo Pundit, he said he would consult the Minister on the subject, and proposed the 24th instant for paying a visit to Sir Charles Malet for the communication of the Minister's answer, and a discussion of the subject.

While Captain Kirkpatrick in his letter to you expresses some impatience at the silence that has hitherto been observed by Sir Charles Malet towards the Durbar on the subject of the differences between this Court and that of Hyderabad, Sir Charles Malet is apprehensive that, from the very guarded nature of your instructions on this delicate subject, he may already have gone too far, but considering the approaching important crisis of the arrival of Meer Allum at this Court, it is to be hoped that, tho' Sir Charles Malet's representation may not have full effect on the Durbar that could be wished, it will still have some influence to the introduction and object of Meer Allum's embassy.

It is said that five days ago Meer Allum and his suite were crossing the river Bhima in the neighbourhood of Sidda Teyk.

No. 86—Bahiropan on being questioned by Malet replies that the military preparations by the Peshwa were undertaken to stop the troubles created by the Nizam's failure to give satisfaction to the Poona Court regarding its claims and his subsequent aggressive attitude as evinced by his march to Bidar.

FROM—BEHROO, NOT FROM SIRKAR,

TO—THE RESIDENT.

Poona, 27th July 1794.

The revenue affairs between the two Sirkars have experienced great delay in settlement, and the country suffers in consequence every day more and more. On this business Govin Kishen has been five or six years at Hyderabad, yet nothing has been settled. Azim-al-Omra's ways are of a certain fashion. Without any provocation on the part of this Sirkar, the Nabob moved to Bidar. If it is said that he came to visit and travel in His Highness's country, why should he raise troops and enter into deliberations which are known to the whole world? The revenue of the Peshwa's Sirkar being ruined is not right. Therefore it is proper to make preparations to remedy these evils. On the receipt of this intelligence by His Highness he determined to depute Mir Allum and Roy Royan, which has been communicated to you. If by his deputation affairs can be settled, good. If not, it will be necessary to make preparations and take means to re-establish the affairs of the Sirkar by taking the Amil. From Ahmedabad to Cutch Booj, the country is not in a state of tranquillity and settlement; therefore, it is necessary to consider means to put that country in a state of order. On these two accounts the preparations are making.

No. 87—Uthoff reports to the Governor General the arrival of the Hyderabad deputies, Meer Alam and Roy Royan, at Poona.

FROM—J. UTHOFF,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 27th July 1794.

Meer Allum and the Roy Royan arrived here yesterday, having been latterly hastened in their advance by this Government under the pretence of an auspicious hour for the first audience, which was fixed for today and has taken place accordingly, but there is some reason to think that the Durbar's late hurry on this occasion has been caused by what has lately passed between it and Sir C. Malet, the particulars of which are too voluminous to prepare and send by this dispatch. And in this persuasion Sir Charles Malet argues, that should this Court continue in its disinclination to admit our mediation, the offer of it may possibly have the good effect of accelerating a settlement with Meer Allum to avoid our further importunity and the difficulty of getting rid of it without dissatisfaction.

No. 88—Uthhoff reports to the Governor General, that in the discussion with Bahiro Pant over the perplexing situation Malet collected that the Poona Court was desirous of proceeding to hostilities and that it was averse to the mediation of the English for settling the dispute.

FROM—J. UTHHOFF,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 29th July 1794.

Behroo Pundit on the 24th instant paid a visit to Sir Charles Malet agreeable to appointment, as mentioned in my address to you of the 23rd.

The following is the official message with which he was charged by the Durbar in answer to Sir Charles Malet's last representation on the subject of the differences between the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad.

“The answer to your remonstrance of the deficiency of communication is that we saw no matter or cause for communication. The conduct of Nizam Ally Khan's Minister is not proper and has left no opening for amicable accommodation. Therefore military preparations having been deemed necessary, have been made. It is agreeable to friendship to make a communication of this, but (ill-health) has prevented it. In the way of friendship it was proper to make you acquainted with this, but ill-health intervened and caused delay. And it was a matter of no secrecy. Take this for granted. In the participated territory of the Nizam's domains, let every sharer act circumspectly. This is incumbent. The military preparations were not of a secret nature. In the Government of Nizam Ally Khan there is a participation (Sherakut), and those who are concerned in this participation will know best how to act in all cases respecting it, and will do what is proper. Meer Allum and Roy Royan are coming. After their arrival we shall learn their object and act accordingly.”

In the course of conversation a vast deal of interesting matter occurred, the most material part of which I shall endeavour to convey to you.

Behroo Pundit hesitated not to declare that this Court was much bent upon proceeding to hostilities with Nizam Ally Khan, as the only means of prosecuting with effect the claims of the Peshwa on His Highness and inducing His Highness to conform to the stipulations of treaty and to the relations that His Highness bears to this State. He very particularly animadverted on the general conduct of Azim al Omra, which was extremely offensive to this Court, and in which nothing but hostilities could effect the requisite change. He also observed that the exceptional conduct of Azim al Omra was not confined solely to the Peshwa, but extended to the Bhonsla, the consequence of which had been that both parties had long advanced large bodies of troops to their respective frontiers.

4. And while he remarked that the late triple alliance against Tippo had ended happily for all parties, it could not escape notice, that His Highness's exertions and expenses had not been proportionate to that of the other two allies, which was to be imputed to the insincerity and misconduct of Azim-al-Omra.

5. Sir Charles Malet used the most forcible arguments to impress Behroo Pundit with the importance of the parties to the Triple Alliance remaining on terms of mutual friendship, and the advisableness of accommodating the differences between the two Courts. Behroo Pundit observed that while His Highness's affairs remained under the management of Azim-al-Omra, it seemed impossible that the differences could be accommodated, or that any plan could be adopted for the future that would not be subject to the same causes of constant altercation and detriment to the Peshwa's rights. Sir Charles Malet observed, that he could take upon himself to say that Nizam Ally Khan was disposed to adjust the present differences in an amicable and equitable manner; and finding from Behroo Pundit's conversation that this Court was bent on proceeding to the extremity of hostilities in the prosecution of its claims, and influenced thereto by the assurances that Azim-al-Omra has given to Captain Kirkpatrick and by the consideration that, if hostilities commence, this Court will in addition to its other claims require an exorbitant reimbursement for its military expenses, Sir Charles Malet went so far as to say that our Government would for the present occasion take upon itself to ensure His Highness's satisfying all the just claims of the Peshwa; and as to the conduct of Azim-al-Omra, should he continue to give unreasonable cause of offence to the Marrattas, his Master's eyes would not be shut to it, and he would no doubt take effectual means to remedy it; but that in the event, scarce possible, of just cause of offence still continuing to be given by the Court of Hyderabad, we should leave it to the fate that never fails to attend a bad cause; for that our interposition on the present occasion was on the most disinterested principles of preserving friendship between two States, whose mutual interest it was to be on terms of amity, and that the tender of our good offices to effect so desirable an end to an affair that had become very intricate from a long series of accumulated claims and demands, was incumbent on us as a third party to the Triple Alliance, which had been attended with such happy effects to the three States, but which could not fail to be much prejudiced and endangered by hostilities, or even by altercations between any two of the parties; that the influence of our representations on Nizam Ally Khan had been already evinced in a manner perfectly agreeable to the Peshwa's wishes at a time when the Peshwa was under some apprehensions from that quarter; and that now when the power of the Peshwa appeared to be predominant, there could not be the smallest doubt of our interposition having the effect on His Highness to induce him to satisfy all the just demands of the Peshwa.

6. Behro Pundit was then very pointed in his enquiries as to the length we would go in support of our mediation ; observing that, when during the late war, Hurry Pundit and Azim-al-Omra had in person made a representation to Lord Cornwallis on the subject of the differences between the two Courts, His Lordship had exhorted them to maintain friendship, and had promised to use his influence with Nizam Ally Khan to satisfy the just demands of the Peshwa ; but that His Lordship had at the same time expressly declared that, should those differences unfortunately terminate in hostilities, he should not side with either party.

7. You will observe, Honourable Sir, that this is the point to which Sir Charles Malet has been always apprehensive of being brought and to which it was impossible to give a direct reply ; this Court having introduced it in the first conference on the subject, there is but too much reason to fear the extremity to which it will proceed after satisfying itself that we shall not support our mediation by arms. That the present is a most favourable crisis for this Court to pursue its established policy and favourite object of encroaching on its neighbours, particularly so weak a one as Nizam Ally Khan (its just claims out of the question), has been already fully observed on ; and it must be confessed that, even were this Court more amicably disposed than it is to be feared it now is, the conduct of Azim-al-Omra has given ample cause for this Court to distrust the faithful execution of any professions or engagements that he may now enter into.

8. Waiving fully therefore any answer or discussion of this delicate point, Sir Charles Malet confined himself to drawing all his arguments in favour of our interposition from principles of political expedience, the perfect amity of the States, and the necessity of preserving it by reciprocity, good offices, and mutual attention. Sir Charles enquired the amount and nature of the Peshwa's claims on His Highness. Behroo Pundit answered that he was not accurately informed, but that it was not less than two crores of Rupees, inclusive of the Bhosla's claims, and that the Maratta sherakut (participation) under various denominations extended throughout the whole of His Highness's country with the sole exception of the Suba of Hyderabad, the late acquisition from Tipu being out of the question. Sir Charles Malet remarked on this system, that it was pregnant with constant altercation and could not but be detrimental to both States, and that, it seemed advisable to simplify it by one party resigning to the other the exclusive government and collection of a certain portion of country for a similar concession on the other's part. Behroo Pundit observed, that each party considered the whole in the light of Wuttun (native country or hereditary property), and that neither was disposed to make a cession of any part of it. And indeed, that the claims of the Jagheerdars and Zemindars of both States were so intermixed and complicated in the country, that such an arrangement seemed impracticable. It must be confessed that, while the system suggested by Sir C. Malet would in fact be the most eligible for both parties

(particularly Nizam Ally Khan) if they consulted their real interests, which, as Princes (they) should, for the flourishing state of the country they rule and the happiness of their subjects, there are many difficulties attending the establishment of such a system, exclusive of those mentioned by Behroo Pandit. For instance—the patronage so flattering and dear to both parties, that now exists in the numerous offices that are established by both parties through such an extensive tract of country, a much smaller number of which offices would be sufficient were the country under one Government, the general system of the Marattas of establishing an inlet for their influence wherever they possibly can and which they maintain most tenaciously, the proud and arrogant spirit of Mahomedan Governments, from which His Highness cannot be deemed exempt, which prefers a large extent of domain, however difficult to be managed with success, to a smaller portion, however happily situated for its own true glory and the felicity of its subjects.

9. Behroo Pundit noticed that the points of difference in the two Courts were not even in a train of adjustment, and he very unequivocally acknowledged that the deputation of Meer Allum was not likely to facilitate it unless supported by our most serious interposition. Sir Charles asked whether this embassy was not with the assent of this Court, and why such assent was given, if it was also deemed evident that the object of the embassy could not be attained? Behroo Pandit answered that, the Nawab had written to this Court that he purposed deputing Meer Allum to Poona, and before an answer could be sent from hence, a letter was received from Govind Rou Kishen mentioning that the embassy was fully determined on by His Highness, and that Meer Allum was preparing for his journey. This Court finding the length to which the matter had proceeded had assented to it.

10. Among the indications of the averseness to our mediation and the light in which it is received by this Government, Behroo Pundit asked, what we should think of the interference of the Peshwa between us and the Nawaub Asoph ud Doula or Walau Jah? Sir Charles Malet replied that the two cases were very dissimilar. That with Nizam Ally Khan we had independent treaties totally unconnected with the Peshwa's, and the Triple Alliance rendered our friendly interposition on the present occasion not only warrantable but incumbent, and had even been sanctioned by the Peshwa's own application to us on the occasion of the movement to Bedar, and by the application of Hurry Pundit to Lord Cornwallis on the very point now in agitation; that our connexion with those two Nawaubs was very different from the Peshwa's connexion with Nizam Ally Khan; that with respect of Asoph-ud-Doula, his predecessor had waged a war of aggression against us, and that after we had defeated him, and taken possession of his country, we had restored it to him and had since cemented our inseverable connexion by numerous treaties. That with respect to Walau Jah, we had embraced and supported his cause when he

was totally destitute, and had established him as Nawaub of the Carnatic at the expense of our blood and treasure and subsequently cemented our connexion in the same manner with the Vazeer. That Nizam Ally Khan was not indebted to the Peshwa either for the foundation, establishment or support of his Government, though in the vicissitudes of human affairs Fortune had now given the Peshwa a superiority, which, his confidence in the magnanimity of this State led him to trust, would not be taken ungenerous advantage of. But though Sir Charles Malet has said so much in support of Nizam Ally Khan and will, on every future occasion on principles of duty, policy and inclination, endeavour to support the sinking importance of his deranged Government, he is sensible that His Highness's country is in such a state of total dependence on the Marrattas, that it will be a most arduous if not impracticable task for us to extricate him from his present embarrassments, or from those perpetual altercations which the Marratta current claims on His Highness cannot fail to produce, all which difficulties are greatly increased by the conduct of His Highness's ministry.

11. Behro Pundit remarked on the largeness of Meer Allum's retinue, which he said consisted of 1,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry, with even some guns. He enquired whether there would be any intercourse between Sir Charles Malet and Meer Allum, to which Sir Charles observed that the friendship of the two States rendered it in every respect proper and indispensable, to which was to be added the circumstance of Meer Allum's personal connexion with us from his former embassy to Calcutta, his situation with us during the late war, and his office in the English department at His Highness's Durbar.

12. Though the greatest part of the above conversation is not to be considered as an official communication from the Durbar, yet it may be depended on as strongly indicative of the disposition of this Court.

13. While Sir Charles Malet strongly pointed out the bad appearance that the neglect of this friendly interposition on the part of our Government would have in the present state of amity between us, he endeavoured to conciliate the personal good offices of Behro Pundit by impressing him with an idea of the great credit and advantage, that he (Behro Pundit) would derive from becoming the instrument of the mediation of our Government between the two Courts, of which he seemed to be sensible, and well inclined personally to promote our object, and expressed his earnestness to know the length he might go in the prosecution of it, founded on knowledge of the extent to which we would carry on mediation; but the discovery of which, as above noticed, was waived in throughout the conference.

14. It is to be collected from the above conversation, 1st, that this Court is very desirous of proceeding to the extremity of hostilities with Nizam Ally Khan; 2nd, that it is much incensed against Azim-al-Omra, and 3rd, that it is averse to our mediation.

15. On the 25th instant Sir Charles Malet made the following representation to the Durbar in answer to the message received the day before from Behroo Pundit.

16. "You observe that there appeared no matter or cause for communication. When the Nawaub merely made an excursion in his own country and consequent apprehension arose on the part of the Peshwa, you then made a communication to me; yet when you make positive warlike preparations hostile to the Nawaub you say there is no occasion for communication. This certainly has a very extraordinary appearance and has left no ground for amicable answer. You remark that the Nawaub's Minister's conduct is improper. When you made a representation on the Nawaub's movement to Bidder, it was the same Minister, the same disposition, and yet it has been obvious to you that the representation of our Government on the occasion did make an impression on him. Whence then have you drawn a conclusion that the several differences are not susceptible of accommodation, and that our representations will not be attended to? You say that the military preparations were not a matter of secrecy. The affairs of Government are always to be looked upon as secret, and even on the present occasion you acknowledge that there are two causes for their preparations, one, hostility against the Nawaub, and the other the settlement of Guzerat. Thus, how then those, who are uninformed of the springs of action, should know the cause of the preparations that were on foot? As to your observation that those who have a participation in His Highness's territory should act circumspectly, this is exactly the light in which our Sirkar views it, and your conforming to which will afford great satisfaction to our Sirkar, that whatever is proper shall be done. Therefore, in the way of friendship, we have made an advance, that the differences of the two Governments may be accommodated and friendship increased. And I am sensible that, it is entirely the wish both of the Sirkar of the Peshwa and of Nizam Ally Khan, that the present difference may be accommodated on principles of justice and friendship. You will not have forgot that when the armies were on their return from Seringputtan, Hurry Punt Furkia and Azim-ul-Omra on the part of their respective Sirkars, made a mutual application to Lord Cornwallis with a view to an accommodation of the differences, and Lord Cornwallis replied that he would do all in his power to effect it, and agreeable thereto His Lordship and Sir J. Kennaway wrote to me to use my utmost exertions to effect an accommodation. The wish of my heart in this interposition is, that on principles of equity the friendship of the two States and the good of their subjects may be effected. And consider well that the burthen I now take is solely for the maintenance and improvement of friendship. What other object can I have on the occasion? What can be now acceptable to all parties than that, without this trouble or expense

to the Peshwa of military preparations his just claim should be satisfied, and the friendship of the three States increased? You say that after the arrival of Roy Royan, Meer Allum, you will learn their object, and act accordingly. What is proper to be done will be done. My question was in the way of friendship, to which this is no answer. I asked what was the intention of the Peshwa and what was the cause of difference, and the arrival of their Vakeels can make no alteration in that. I am the well wisher of the three Sirkars. If before the arrival of Meer Allum you give me a full explanation of the affair it is conformable to friendship, for with respect to the friendship of the three States, there is no difference between Meer Allum and myself. In fine, the utmost wish of my Sirkar and of myself is that the differences between the two Courts may be amicably accommodated and friendship increased. And I am persuaded that the Peshwa's Sirkar is of the same way of thinking."

17. After a very full consideration of the whole subject of the differences between the two Courts Sir Charles Malet is decidedly of opinion that, it will be advisable for Meer Allum to be authorized to settle the pecuniary demands of the Peshwa by composition; for, from the long protracted and very complicated state of the claims, it seems utterly impossible to go through the examination and settlement of them in detail, in the course of which there will be perpetual obstacles from the want of materials and disputed claims. This mode will likewise give an opening for the introduction, with greater ease and effect, of "Durbar charges", which are in fact douceurs to the ministers and officers of government, constantly received and admitted of in the avowed venality of this Court.

18. The Minister at this Court is encouraged in his hostile disposition by assurances given him (as Sir Charles Malet is confidently informed) by Govin Rou Kishen, *ne plus ultra** of our mediation.

20. It was Sir Charles Malet's intention to have sent a confidential person to compliment Meer Allum at the distance of one stage from hence, which was expected to be at the village of Lony about 5 coss from Poona, but Meer Allum's arrival being unexpectedly hastened by the Durbar, he did not stop at Lony as had been intended, but came on straight to Poona, immediately on learning which, Sir Charles Malet sent a confidential person to compliment him and to assure him of his wish for a meeting.

21. On the morning of the 28th Motimin Khan waited on Sir Charles Malet with a return of compliments on the part of Meer Allum, but though Sir Charles on this occasion repeated his wish for a meeting with Meer Allum and to communicate with him the differences between the two Courts and what has passed here on the subject, he has received no answer from Meer Allum nor has any intercourse yet taken place between them.

* The uttermost point.

22. The negotiations of Meer Allum will probably experience some delay from the approach of the Mohurram and the occurrence of some Hindoo holidays.

23. Sir Charles Malet has not yet received any answer to his representation to the Durbar of the 25th instant.

24. The dissensions among the Ministers of Doulut Rou Sindia seem to increase daily.

No. 89—Malet analyses the state of the various members of the Maratha Confederacy and forwards to the Governor General his conclusions bearing on the Maratha-Nizam contest.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.

Poona, 2nd August 1794.

Having, from my desire of being on the spot during the present actual conjuncture, preferred awaiting the slow progress of my convalescence here to trying the more certain mode medically recommended to me of change of air, I have at length the pleasure of feeling my strength sufficiently recovered to attend more closely to business than for some time past it has been in my power, during which, however, the ample communications of my assistant will, I trust, have precluded every idea of a deficiency of information from this station.

2. Mr. Uhthoff's last despatch of the 29th will have made you fully acquainted with my late proceedings at this Court on the delicate subject of countenancing His Highness the Nizam's cause in the disputes between the two Courts, in which I am encouraged to hope your approbation, as the public language I have used seems to be nearly a literal anticipation of your commands of the 3rd ultimo.

3. I am also inclined to flatter myself that the commencement of my representations to this Court will not, when all circumstances are considered, be deemed mis-timed either by you as too early or by Captain Kirkpatrick as too late, notwithstanding that gentleman has again shown some symptoms of impatience in his address to you of the 22nd ultimo, at which time he could not have received Mr. Uhthoff's letter of the 20th, advising my prefatory demand of the object of the Peshwa's military preparations.

4. You will also observe, Honourable Sir, that both in my conversation with Behro Pandit of the 24th and in my last message to the Durbar both detailed in Mr. Uhthoff's letter of 29th, I have, by endeavouring to prepare the Minister for my intercourse with Meer Allum on the general ground of the union and amity of the three States and on the particular footing of his personal connexion with our Government and individual

friendship with many of the Chiefs of our nation, felt the delicacy of the predicament so forcibly pointed out in the 5th paragraph of your letter of the 3rd ultimo, and attempted to surmount the difficulty of it.

5. Mr. Uhthoff's last letter will likewise have conveyed to you my advance to a more intimate acquaintance with Meer Allum and the only return I have yet experienced, tho' from Captain Kirkpatrick's communications I had expected and provided for a visit, the non-occurrence of which (as it did not take place the 28th) I can only attribute to the intervention of the Mohurum on the 29th, which will, I suppose, on his part, preclude all matters of show or state for the 10 ensuing days. As the Dakshina or grand annual distribution of alms to the Bramins is also now commenced by this Government, I apprehend, the negotiations of the parties will thereby suffer a short suspension.

6. Were the power of the Sindia family in a state of sufficient weight and respectability to give that efficacy (or even a much more moderate degree) to its representations that was commanded by the late head of it, its good offices judiciously applied for and introduced might be resorted to on the present occasion by Meer Allum with every prospect of advantage, since the embarrassment into which the discordant ministry of that family is already thrown by the prospect of the immense expenses incident to its quota of the projected equipment against His Highness, and the dangers that threaten the power and interests of the family by withdrawing so large a force from Hindostan to be employed as subordinates in reducing a Power that can only lead to aggrandize the Peshwa and rivet his authority over his own Jagheerdars, must render the war extremely obnoxious to the Sindean chiefship.

7. But I am concerned, Honourable Sir, to repeat that from the circumstance of the late Patell dying at this place, and from the subsequent unfortunate and, I fear, irreconcilable dissensions that ensued amongst his ministers, I am of opinion that the power of the family is now in a state of absolute subservience to this Court, and that Nana in his double character of Furnaveese to this Durbar and that, is equally absolute in both.

8. It seems likewise peculiarly unfortunate and much to be lamented that the conduct of the Nazim's ministry should have driven the Bhosla family into a coalescence with the Peshwa to His Highness's detriment, since the preservation of the respectability of His Highness's Government, placed so happily as a barrier between this State and that, has (I have been given to understand) generally been an object of the Nagpore policy.

9. As to the Holkar family, the incapacity of its executive ruler Tukojee (under Aliabyhe* the acknowledged Head) and the recent disasters that it has encountered in its unequal contests with the late Mahadji Sindea, little is to be apprehended from its exertions, and the causes of the

*Ahalyabai Holkar.

late return of Tukojee to Indore after crossing the Nerbudda on his way hither are beneath ridicule.

The force of the Putwurdhun family led by Pursaram Bhou is entitled to much greater respect and is also summoned on the present occasion, but whether to remain stationary on the southern frontier, in a state of preparation against Tipoo whose designs are ever to be suspected, or to act separately against His Highness's south-western frontier, or to make a part of the rumoured equipment, time must discover.

These, Hon'ble Sir, are the branches that, with the domestic force of the Peshwa and the Bhosla who may be looked on as the principals in the present dispute, are to form the mass of the armament said to be under orders to assemble, but in the variety and contrariety of whose interests there appears to me the seeds of such discordance and delay, as even under the utmost exertion of this Court's authority may be productive of some advantage to His Highness's affairs.

No. 90—Malet discusses the nature of the dependence of the Nizam on the Poona Court and criticizes the dishonest conduct of Azim-ul-Omra.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 2nd August 1794.

Mr. Uhthoff having already acknowledged receipt of your letter to him of the 20th, it remains for me to endeavour to satisfy you on the points contained in it that seem to require explanation ; And first as to the " sense in which I wou'd have the word dependence understood when I apply'd it to the relation in which the Nizam stands connected with the Marrattas ", I must confess to you that I am not acquainted how far authors on the Law of Nations would technically justify me in the use of the term applied to a Tributary even under the accumulated ? circumstances of subjection unknown in Europe or perhaps anywhere else arising from the assumption of territorial possession, authority and royalty by this Government and that of Nagpore in the Nazim's Dominions. But without involving the subject in the subtleties of European distinctions in a case hitherto, I believe, unknown, nor supposing that you or myself can wish to have recourse to any refinement in terms in bar of the matter of fact, it is my humble opinion that the authority established by the introduction of this Court's and the Bhosla's participation of the Nabob's territories, and enforced by their officers under a variety of denominations throughout his country, have reduced His Highness's Government to such a state of weakness and subjection to the infinitely superior force of this State as actually to constitute dependence and thralldom.

I admit, however, that nothing can be more desirable than that His Highness's present altercations should be settled amicably, either through

the honourable and d'sinterested countenance of our Government or by its influence, even at the expense of some share of this Court's cordiality. But in the event, which I sincerely deprecate, of the failure of our good offices, I need not to you attempt a description of the innumerable evils that would inevitably result from Azim-ul-Omra's application to Tippoo, as hinted at in some of your late letters, and which without effecting liberation from the attacks of one robber would ensure those of another, and that at the expense of guarantee articles of the Treaty of Puttun. But tho' I have so bad an opinion of Azim-ul-Omra's resorting to so desperate a remedy, the possibility of it has not been neglected as an argument in my late intercourse with this Court.

My remark on the incompleteness of papers furnished by Azim-ul-Omra arose from the extraordinary circumstances of the detail articles between this State and the Nazim being omitted tho' referred to, while those of Nagpore were given, tho' the grand and immediate object was with this Court, where the negotiations were on the point of ensuing. I certainly looked upon the circumstance as a new instance of the suspicious and uncandid mixture of confidence and reserve with which Azim-ul-Omra has uniformly treated us, and to which the non-communication of his private and confidential instructions to Meer Allum may perhaps be added, and on which point I shall be happy if we are not subjected to future cause of complaint and dissatisfaction.

While I lament this occasion of again mentioning Azim-ul-Omra's name in terms of reprehension, the repetition of which from your letter to the Governor General of 10th July appears exceptionable to you, I am free to confess that from his being the principal and most conspicuous character in the presant serious crisis, and as his daily conduct is at least likely to be a continuation of that by which thro' a 12* years ministry he has suffered his master's affairs to run into disorder, instead of taking advantage of so long a season of leisure to place them (though possessed of 60 lacs additional annual revenue ceded by this Government and the long accumulated arrears of the Maratta claims) in such a state of wealth, strength and respectability as might have prepared him for the day of reckoning with this Court, and enabled him to have discharged its claims with honesty or controverted them with dignity and effect ; from these circumstances (permit me, Sir, to say that) I think it not improbable, that frequent occasions may occur during the future discussions between the two Courts, of noticing for the information of our Superiors the traits of his genius and conduct that may fall under our observation.

From the manner in which Meer Allum's intention of negotiating with this Durbar through the channel of the two Govinrows was mentioned in your letter to the Governor General of 1st July and his (M.A.'s)

* Since 1782.

character for candour, I confess that I was induced to believe it sincerely intended, and gave my sentiments accordingly; but from your explanation under 19th July to the Governor General I am glad to find Meer Allum's assurances, tho' perhaps a little at the expense of his candour, are not to be rigidly the rule of his conduct; while I lament that the necessity of having given such an assurance to Govin Rou Kishen is a new proof of the entanglement, if not dependence, of His Highness's councils, I shall be happy if no more exceptionable instances of it to us occur in the mission and negotiations of Meer Allum.

While I may agree with you that Azim-ul-Omra can have no just cause of reproaching us as the advisers of Meer Allum's embassy, permit me to observe that justice seems to be scattered in a very small proportion throughout that Minister's composition, and I must leave to you to determine whether in Musta-keem-al-Doula's communication stated in the 5th paragraph of your letter to the Governor General of 14th July, he has not already betrayed a strong disposition thereto.

In your letter to the Governor General of 14th July you mention the probability of this State's assuming claims on His Highness derived from the Peshwa's character of Vackeel-al-Mutluck, which you may recollect having been long since noticed by me, but tho' I think it very likely that they may employ such a claim as a convenient instrument of negotiation, I am inclined to hope they would not ultimately insist on its admission.

No. 91—Malet informs Kirkpatrick of the intimate relations established between Roy Royan, the Nizam's second agent, and the Poona Court.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 5th August 1794.

Since my last letter of the 2nd instant I have not heard a syllable from Meer Allum which I am still inclined to hope arises from the Mohurum Ceremonies, tho' I think it necessary to acquaint you that they have not prevented his paying a fresh visit to Dadjee Furkia, Hurry Punt's son, and having a second audience of the Peshwa.

It may likewise be proper to mention to you that the closest intimacy and most constant intercourse subsists between Govin Rou Pingle and Roy Royan, whose houses are contiguous and at a considerable distance from Meer Allum.

This Government affects to look on Roy Royan as nearly, if not quite, on a footing of equality with Meer Allum, and whispers are circulated of his being entrusted with some private and separate instructions, but I have no ground for confidence in these stories.

No. 92—The Peshwa's Durbar gives evasive replies to Malet's queries about the dispute.

Answer from the Peshwa's Durbar to Sir C. W. Malet's message of the 25th July 1794. Received 8th August in the evening.

You observe, "that military preparations are evident and still say it is not worthy communication. This is extraordinary".

The answer is, that it was not said in our former message that military preparations are unworthy of communication. Previous to the orders for assembling the forces, no such matter appeared as to be worthy communication.

You observe, "that you apply for a knowledge of the cause of altercation and the Circar's intentions, an answer to which did not depend on Meer Alam's arrival, and that were a communication made previous thereto, it would not be inconsistent with friendship. For being a well wisher of the three Governments, you were desirous of promoting your Government's wish (which was also your own) of preventing a rupture."

In answer to this we have to observe, that the (Aumil) participated territory and many other causes of rupture exist, and if the person to whom these matters relate, whoever he may be, will act rightly a rupture will be prevented.

You observe, "that if in avoidance of hostility and the evils of having recourse to arms an amicable settlement can be made it certainly would be highly eligible". For that purpose Meer Allum and Renou Rou Doondajee (Roy Royan) have arrived with full powers. They are negotiating. The termination of the Circar's negotiation is good.

The studied evasion of any reply throughout these nugatory and designedly obscure answers to my proffered good offices is evident, as also the embarrassment into which the Durbar is thereby led in endeavouring to convey a belief that a pacific termination may possibly be effected by the parties concerned without our interposition, since it would be harsh, even for this Court, at once to remove all grounds for hope in its own intention, and reject all the good offices of others.

No. 93—The Governor General allows Malet to offer his interposition for settling the dispute.

FROM—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Fort William, 8th August 1794.

Enclosed I transmit you copy of a letter which I have this day written to the Resident at Hyderabad.

In addition to my instructions of the 3rd ultimo I have only to say that, if you should have reason to judge that our interposition will be favourable to the Nizam in accelerating the amicable termination of the matters in dispute between the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona, I leave it to yourself to urge it as far as your prudence may suggest, consistent with the cautions which I have so often repeated, that the Company be not implicated in the disputes between the two parties, nor their credit committed or a disunion required with either of them.

No. 94—Shore instructs Kirkpatrick not to encourage in the Nizam the least hope of receiving British assistance, and says that his action was in perfect conformity with existing treaties.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK.

Fort William, 8th August 1794.

I have received your letters of the 27th June, 1st, 14th and 19th July.

The very satisfactory detail contained in the first of these letters on the present state of the Nizam's family and probable succession to his Government has fully answered my immediate wish for information on this head. Should your enquiries lead to any further and more certain knowledge hereafter you will of course communicate it.

The credentials given to Meer Allum appear to me sufficient to enable him to make an equitable adjustment of the several matters in dispute between the two Governments, as far as depends upon the Nizam, and notwithstanding appearances are unfavourable to the success of any negotiation, I still hope the deputation of Meer Allum will not be unprofitable.

Under the uncertainty, however, of the real views and intentions of the Marhatta Government, it would be unreasonable to expect the Nizam should supinely wait the event of negotiation without taking precautions to provide against the most unfavourable result, and such preparations would probably furnish the most effectual means of securing the object of the negotiation. Neither the Nizam nor his Minister can have overlooked this obvious consideration, and the communications on their part, which you notice in your correspondence above referred to, seem principally calculated to implicate us by any means in the dispute between the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona, either by obtaining our direct interference or by soliciting advice with a view of engaging us in the support of it or of imputing to us the consequences of following it. Our caution should therefore be proportioned to these suppositions, that no advantage may be taken of our communications with the Nizam or his Minister. The terms of your proposed intimation, as mentioned in your letter of the 14th July, are conformable to these principles, and have my approbation as well on this account as from the caution with which

they are expressed, for altho' it be proper to impress the Nizam with a sense of that danger which apparently threatens him if he were really insensible of it, the communication should be made in terms that cannot be construed into encouragement or direction.

This is necessary as well to obviate any future misrepresentation of the Nizam or his Minister on the one hand, or any misconception of the Poona Government on the other.


You are so well apprized of the limitations under which an interposition can take place that no further explanation can be wanting on this point, and my letter of the 3rd ultimo, with these instructions, will enable you to regulate the terms of future communications with the Minister, upon any repetition of questions similar to those stated in your letters, which I now reply to.

I entirely approve your answers to Mustakeem-ud-doulah on the subject of the treaty of 1768, and desire you will on any similar occasions refer to Lord Cornwallis's letter to the Nizam of the 7th July 1789, as containing every necessary explanation of the several stipulations of that treaty after the fullest discussion of them with Meer Abul Cossim.

It may be further remarked that the terms of the 6th article of the treaty of 1768 clearly evince, that it was not intended to form an alliance with the Nizam which could entitle him to more than forbearance to assist his enemies against him, and to this we are equally bound by our treaty of alliance with the Peshwah in 1782. It is also expressly declared in Lord Cornwallis's letter that, the body of troops to be granted to His Highness, whenever he may apply for them, is not to be employed against any Power in alliance with the Company, viz., Pundit Purdhan, etc.

The injunctions of the Legislature are on the present occasion perfectly reconcilable to the terms of our treaties with the Nizam, and to support him by arms against the Mahrattas would be equally contrary to those injunctions and to our treaties with them. You have already so clearly, as noticed in your letter of the 19th July, explained to the Nizam the principles by which we stand, that he cannot be at any loss to know them, nor have any plea to mistake them.

After all I am still induced to think that if Azeem-u'-Omrah preserves his present disposition for an amicable negotiation, the contest between the two Courts will be settled without an appeal to arms. That the Mahrattas have claims which they are determined to maintain, I must, from appearances, conclude. That they are so unlimited as the Nizam suggests, I doubt, and I am of opinion that their preparations are rather founded on their suspicion of Azeem-ul-Omrah's sincerity than from a resolution to overturn the Nizam's Government. A serious contest is not agreeable to the general tenor of Bala'ee Pundit's politics; the arrival of Meer Allum at Poona will, however, soon verify or disprove my conjectures.



MEER ALAM BAHADUR

SECTION III

Meer Alam's Embassy to Poona.

NO. 95—Malet sends to Kirkpatrick a detailed account of his first meeting with Meer Alam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Poona, 12th August 1794.

It escaped me to acknowledge in my last letter of the 10th instant my receipt of your favour of the 4th.

I must confess that I have no better reason for not contradicting Behro Punt's assertion relative to Meer Allum's embassy than a bad memory, but on a retrospect of what passed on the subject of the overture from this Court I find it involved in so much doubt, and I have had such frequent occasion to distrust the veracity of the two Govinrous, that I question whether the materials would have supported me in the contradiction; at all events I shall not be unmindful of it in future, when it may serve either to fix on this Court the imputation of inconsistency in inviting a special embassy to settle matters that it had previously resolved should never be accommodated, or, if the overture is disavowed by the Durbar, to fix on Govinrou Bugwunt the criminality of having exceeded his powers, and I confess that I should be happy if by such culpability we could over-set his further instrumentality in the present negotiations which, having been brought to their present crisis by him and his superior, it cannot be expected they should be very zealous to accommodate them in subordination to the superior agency that is now introduced. I am sorry, however, to acquaint you that Govinrou Bugwunt hitherto appears to be exclusively the channel of intercourse between

the Durbar and Meer Allum, tho' should the offer of my good offices ever meet with any degree of admission, it will necessarily be attended with the introduction at least in some degree of the agency of Behro Punt, who, I have reason to think, is sincerely desirous of pacific measures.

The inability of the Nizam to withstand this State's power is so generally known and confidently mentioned here as to be susceptible of no change from any language I might adopt of a different tendency. I, therefore, with a reserve as to my opinion of the Nana's puissance, have occasionally had recourse to the unmanliness of attacking a Prince desirous of peace and whose incapacity for war they themselves acknowledge, thereby betraying a noxious spirit, ungenerous in itself and alarming to all its neighbours.

Under the impression that I entertain of the immediate cause of Meer Allum's deputation, and my knowledge of the time of its annunciation as connected with the rumoured designs and preparations of this Court, I am of opinion that I should not have consulted the Nabob's dignity by making it a matter of discussion to have placed it in a more conspicuous point of view.

I shall now endeavour to detail to you what has passed relative to or between Meer Allum and me since my letter of the 5th, in which, should I be minute, it will be in the persuasion that from the smallest sparks considerable light is sometimes conveyed to attentive observers, and the present extreme delicacy of our political predicament requires the most intense application and attention to the minutest circumstances as marks to conduct us through it, if not with success, at least with decency and respect; nor must it be forgotten that my endeavours to convey intelligence to you are equally directed to the information of the Governor General.

In an official communication made to my Munshy on the 5th at night, Behro Pundit took an opportunity of expressing some impatience at the meeting between Meer Allum and me not having yet taken place, hinting that it would throw disrepute on my previous insinuations to the Durbar. To this friendly solicitude, I replied that the intervention of the Mohorrum had been the only cause of prevention. From the same quarter I received the first confidential intimation of this Court's requiring a fuller or more satisfactory declaration of Meer Allum's Powers. On the 7th in the evening I had intelligence of Meer Allum's having received letters from Bidder, and the 8th in the morning the day after the conclusion of the Mohorrum I received a message from him signifying his intention of visiting me the next day. By the messenger I expressed my impatience of the pleasure of seeing him, and in the afternoon by my Munshy begged to know if he meant to bring Roy Royan, and if so whether it would be proper that I should give him a separate invitation. This he discouraged, without attempting to conceal a disinclination to meet

him with a knowledge of the subjects that might be discussed between us : my Munshy having other business with Behro Punt called on him after leaving M. A., and made known to him that the next morning was fixed for the first interview, with which he seemed well pleased.

While my Munshy was reporting to me in the evening the business of his visits to Meer Allum and Behro Punt, a message arrived from the former that his visit in the morning must be deferred as the Peshwa had desired to see him at that time. In answer I advised him by all means to wait on the Peshwa as invited, but seeing through the finesse, I sent my Munshy to him early in the morning with the following message :—

“ That the Peshwa's sending for him at an hour quite unusual at the Durbar and after he must have been acquainted with our intended meeting, was improper, as tending to throw some light on me, and thereby to create some dissatisfaction between us. That, however, as it could not be expected that he (M. A.) should yet be thoroughly acquainted with this Court's character and style of conduct, it became my office as more habituated to its modes (laying aside all other considerations but the common good of all) to guard our intercourse against any awkward circumstances, designed or accidental, that might assail it. As, therefore, I had been desirous of a meeting with him previous to his further intercourse with the Durbar, for the purpose of imparting to him what had passed between me and this Court relative to the subject of his mission, thereby enabling him to preserve the requisite consistency and unity of character assumed in my messages on the ground of the triple alliance, so now as the Durbar had, in a manner somewhat exposed to the imputation of a sinister intent, interrupted our meeting, I had, to prevent as far as in my power any evil consequence, thought proper to send for his inspection the papers that I had previously intended to reserve for our meeting, being the substance of the late messages between me and this Durbar.”

Meer Allum replied it was true ; he could, in answer to the Peshwa's summons, have alleged his prior engagement, and have offered to come at another hour ; but that anxious as he was to see me he wished to bring with him all possible information and to add to what he possessed that of another conference ; that in his intercourse with the Durbar he should never lose sight of the polar star of our support. On reading the papers he observed on the Durbar's language relative to the Nabob's Ministry, that it scarce fell short of a declaration of hostility. On returning the papers he charged my Munshy with his best acknowledgments for their perusal and, with expressions of concern at the difficulties in which he was involved, said, he would certainly see me the next morning.

While my Munshy was with him he received a message from the Durbar changing the early hour appointed yesterday to the afternoon,—thus

developing its finesse, since having called on Meer Allum at the inconvenient hour assigned for his meeting with me and thereby interrupted that meeting, the usual Durbar hour is again resumed. This was too palpable not to attract Meer Allum's notice, but his admiration of the trick must have been increased by a subsequent message transferring his visit from the Peshwa to the Minister which was the climax of the Durbar's art on this important occasion, for apprehending that the summons of the Minister would not have weight enough to stop the intended meeting, the Peshwa's name had been used, and when the end was answered a change was made in the person as well as in the hour of the visit to suit the Durbar's convenience.

From a private quarter of entire credibility I have since learnt that on the Minister's first hearing the intended meeting of Meer Allum and myself, he seemed exceedingly desirous of stopping it entirely, that much consultation was held on the occasion. When that being found too difficult, the expedient of interrupting it and giving it the appearance of dependence on the Durbar was substituted, which was pursued in the manner above detailed down to Meer Allum's visit to Nanna on the afternoon of the 9th, at which he contrived to get an intimation from Meer Allum of his intention, and placing it on the footing of an application, he with his assent took the opportunity of introducing Behro Pundit's son as his companion in the visit, and, if my information errs not, with an assurance from Meer Allum that he should be admitted to a participation of any private conversation we might hold; but that he, Nanna, expressed much dissatisfaction on receiving the young man's report to find our whole conversation had been in Persian, of which he did not understand a word. From the same channel it has reached me, that my late messages on the subject at present on the tapis have caused great embarrassments and perturbation to the Minister and his coadjutors in the present measures, who tho' convinced of the difficulties of proceeding or receding, still think it at all events necessary to keep up the appearance of preparation and to hold a high tone of decision.

To complete the web which the Minister had been so ingenuously weaving for the last two days, early on the morning of the 10th I received a message from him, that Meer Allum had been with him the preceding evening and having expressed a desire to visit me, he had assented, so that he, Meer Allum, accompanied by Bhaskar Pundit, Behro Pundit's son, would wait on me this morning. It is necessary also to mention that my Munshy having had occasion to visit Behro Pandit the preceding evening, he in a friendly and confidential way advised my giving all possible eclat to my meeting with Meer Allum, meaning that it would be expedient to convey thereby a strong idea of the cordiality of the two States.

About 10 a.m. on the 10th instant Meer Allum accompanied by his son and a very large suite and retinue arrived at my bungaloes. After the

usual compliments on such occasions Meer Allum entered into a general detail of his proceedings since his arrival ; that his first visits to the Peshwa and Minister were mere'y ceremonial ; that the second to the Peshwa was to produce his credentials contained in the Nabob's letter which was canvassed very closely, but, it should seem, was not deemed satisfactory, as they had demanded from him a further writing the purport of which he had transmitted to his Court that the subsequent days of the Mohorrum having been devoted to the duties of his religion, he had been prevented visiting me, but had embraced the first day of liberation to do himself that pleasure ; that he already began to find his situation disagreeable and inefficient from the difference of the real and ostensible grounds of this Court's dissatisfaction ; that his proposals to remove the latter reached not the former, while the silence of this Court rendered it difficult to make conciliatory offers on points which Azim-al-Omra had directed him to wait for an advance. He thanked me for the communication of the papers that had passed between me and this Court, expressed his concern at the causes that had brought affairs to the present pass, seemed to think blame rested with the Govinrows, but did not in candour think his own Court free from it. I took notice of the intrigues with Mahadji Sindia and movement to Bidder as the grand cause of enmity on this side, as having been aimed at this Minister's existence. He candidly acknowledged there was ground of dissatisfaction. I observed on the impolicy of not keeping terms with the Bhosla at such a time. He said that to reply fully might bear too hard on the wisdom of his own Court. I hinted that even now the nature of this State admitted of negotiations with that Chief, the advantage of which he seemed to admit. Whether through inadvertence or intention Meer Allum did not mention the substance of his conference with the Minister of the 9th, but throughout the whole of our conversation, which was prolonged through an interval of about 3 hours, repeated with much appearance of candour his assurances of making me fully acquainted with everything that occurred. I told him I had received an answer from the Durbar to my last message, but that it was in the usual language of evasion, obscure and unintelligible, and as by the enclosed copy of my letter of this date to the Governor General you will observe, there is a possibility of its undergoing some alteration, I will suspend further communication on that subject till favoured with the Durbar's definitive answer.

For your information regarding my mode of entertaining Meer Allum and my desire of thereby making as conspicuous as possible the cordiality of the two States, I enclose a list of the presents made to him, his son, and suite on the occasion.*

I should have proposed returning his visit ere now, but that my health is still so precarious and so weak as to make much exposure to the air unadvisable. Beside I wish that my first visits after my long confinement should be to the Peshwa and Minister, whom I have not seen since my return from Ellora.

No. 96—The Peshwa's Durbar informs Malet that it was not in a position to say how the negotiations with the Nizam's deputy would conclude.

12th August 1794.

Substance of a message from the Peshwa's Durbar in answer to Sir C. W. Malet's, of the 10th August, received the 12th instant.

"You observe that you do not rightly understand the Durbar's answers though in the Durbar's answers the substance of your messages has been replied to, so that your saying you do not understand them, is extraordinary. They are fit to be understood.

"A plenipotentiary is come from the Nabob who is negotiating; if the Circars' (Peshwa's) negotiations are settled, it is better. This was written in the first answer. In future whatever shall be settled, shall, agreeable to friendship, be communicated to you. You say that should the Nabob ask what you have done in his behalf, what answer can you give? The Plenipotentiaries that are come on his part are negotiating. How can the Nabob ask till their negotiations are settled?"

No. 97—Malet discusses Tipu's attitude towards the disputants and deploras the supremacy established by the Poona Court over Sindia's resources.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT THE NIZAM'S COURT.

Poona, 16th August 1794.

While on one hand we seem to be perfectly agreed as to the probable consequences of Azim-ul-Omra's adopting the desperate expedient of calling on the Nabob Tipu Sultan for assistance and his complying therewith, I am somewhat inclined to think, from some marks of assumption of superiority on the part of the Nizam's Minister and of Tipu Sultan's irksomeness under such assumption, which I have discovered in the course of their correspondence, that Tipu would feel a personal gratification in the humiliation of Azim-ul-Omra. Nor am I without a suspicion of this Court's having taken some measures to reconcile that Prince to its present measures, while it can not be doubted but his desire to see his neighbours embroiled would induce him cheerfully to give it any satisfaction it might desire under the reservation of his well-known facility of breaking any engagement that opportunity might prompt.

I ment on with great diffidence a whisper that has reached me that, even the Nizam himself is not averse to the hostile measures of this State, as furnishing him an opportunity of enquiring into the conduct, and thereby

emancipating himself from the absolute influence which Azim-ul-Omra has assumed over His Highness's person and most minute actions.

From a quarter of greater credibility I learn that the late Mahadji Sindia discovered to the Minister before his death the history of the intrigues that caused the movement to Bider, machinated between him and Azim-ul-Omra, with the view on the part of the latter to upset Nanna's ministry, but on the part of the former merely to make a tool of His Highness's power as a bugbear to solicit with effect, under impression of its approach, the Durbar's compliance with his demands, in which he actually succeeded in the passing of his accounts and ostensibly in several other points, while at the same time his services were amply paid for by the man that he was duping.

Nothing will give me greater pleasure than to receive from the Governor General a confirmation of your opinion that my interposition with this Court has not been premature, while without having recourse* to effects, I am disposed to flatter myself from the tenor of your letter of 19th June with your acquiescence in my not having been too late.

I greatly lament the very little prospect of the emancipation of the Sindia family and power from the strong grip of this Court's supremacy, at least during the Peshwa's present ministry, whose authority is so absolutely and firmly established that, extensive as the Senovec interest is in the Sindian Durbar, I apprehend, that were sufficient cause to arise, this ministry would find no great difficulty in compelling it to the rude alternative of annihilation or the most implicit obedience to the Bramin party. This authority will be still more firmly rivetted by the arrival of Jeajee Bucksly, whose presence will throw every man of consequence of that party under the immediate controul of this Court, the consciousness of which caused the Sinovees to contend warmly for his detention in the north at the head of the army and that Gopal Bhou should be summoned to Poona, in which they were foiled by the superior influence of Abba Chitnecse.

It is, I presume, hard to conjecture the effect that eventual hostilities between this Court and the Nazim and the reduction of the Maratta force in the north by the recall of Jeajee Bucksly and the large quota ordered to attend him, may have on the spirits of the rulers in those parts; but it is, in my humble opinion, devoutly to be wished for that they may always be in such a state of force and spirits as to interrupt the progress of these people, and prevent their firm establishment in a dangerous vicinity to our North West Frontier.

I am just returned from Meer Allum's, having been to repay his visit and met with a reception calculated to keep up the impression, which I have studied to diffuse, of the amity of the two States. I will communicate some particulars of our conference by an early opportunity

* He perhaps means "without regard, etc."

No. 98—Malet writes of his coming visit to Nana Fadnis for discussing the grave situation arising out of the differences between the Peshwa and the Nizam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 17th August 1794.

On the 13th I visited the Peshwa, Minister and Dadjee Furka, son of the late Hurry Punt, being the first time that my late indisposition had permitted my discharging that piece of civility since my return from Ellora.

Having gone through this necessary preparative to going abroad, I returned Meer Allum's visit on the 16th as noticed in the enclosed copy of my letter of that date to Captain Kirkpatrick, for the particulars of which permit me to refer you to the enclosed copy of my private address to that gentleman of this day.

I have desired a conference with the Minister tomorrow for the purpose of coming to a clear and friendly explanation with him on the present untoward prospect of affairs between this Court and that of Hyderabad, at which, notwithstanding the little ground of confidence that presents itself to my mind in the fidelity of the Nazim's Minister, I shall not fail to pursue the grand object of accommodation, agreeable to your commands, with the best and most zealous exercise of my ability.

As this conference, which will probably give me a clearer view than I at present possess of the practicability of promoting a reconciliation, is so near at hand, I shall defer till it has taken place troubling you with what has occurred between this Court and me in the course of messages since my last address.

It is reported that a grand council of the Chiefs of this Government is soon to be held, at which the plan of the projected campaign and the proper time of erecting the Peshwa's tent and standard, are to be the subjects of deliberation. Whatever may be the result here, the measure will at least be calculated to make an impression on the Court of Bidder.

The possibility that is established on these appearances, and the general preparations that have been long making of the Peshwa's actually taking the field, renders it necessary that I should make timely application for your intentions relative to accompanying him.

No. 99—Malet sends to Kirkpatrick an account of his conference with Meer Allum. The latter appeared quite pessimistic about the issue of his negotiations, the difficulty of which he ascribed to the arrogant and indiscreet conduct of Azim-ul-Omra.

FROM—C. W. MALET,
TO—THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Poona, 17th August 1794.

I now give an account of my conference with Meer Allum, which I shall do under the form of a private address as better suited to the extreme delicacy of the subjects and to the style of familiar conversation in which they were treated of.

Soon after being seated Meer Allum acquainted me that he had received answers to his letters advising this Durbar's demanding a further security as to his plenipotentiary character, in which he was directed to grant that security on condition of receiving a similar one from the Minister of this State, with a reservation however of reference to his (Meer Allum's) Court. He added, that on the point of personal reconciliation some latitude had been granted him by Azim-ul-Omra.

Upon the whole Meer Allum seemed to think his original powers rather contracted than enlarged by these dispatches.¹ And we agreed in opinion that the demand of a similar instrument from the Minister of this State with that to be granted by him, was rather calculated to promote controversy and obstruct the commencement of executive negotiations than to answer any good purpose, since from the circumstance of the Superior Being on the spot, all necessity for such an instrument was precluded, as would doubtless be done by this Court.

I begged to know whether he had yet thought of any mode of introducing the important point of personal reconciliation. He confessed himself totally at a loss how under the silence of this Minister to introduce it, adding in confidence that this difficulty was increased by his having learnt since his arrival here, that exclusive of the strong written engagements entered into by this State and the Nazim at Edghirej, (which Azim-ul-Omra so cautiously keeps from our knowledge) Azim-ul-Omra had by the most solemn oath on the Koran pledged himself for the observance of the most inviolable unanimity with the Minister, the breach of all which had been discovered by the latter in the letters, that had been exposed to him, of Azim-ul-Omra to Mahadji Sindia in the course of the intrigue that originated the movement to Bidder. "If, therefore," continued Meer Allum, "these letters should be produced in the course of discussion, how could I possibly controvert their truth or obviate their force, destitute as I am of even the shadow of previous complaint against this Court to justify Azim-ul-Omra's adoption of so exceptionable a measure?" "The same difficulty," added he, "extends to futurity; since should I promise amendment for the future, this Court will ask me the grounds of such a promise; if on my power to enforce it, it exists not; if on the strength of written engagements, they have been already broken; if on the sanctity of oath, they have been already scandalously violated." "This will of course be the language of this Court, should it ever enter into the discussion at present so studiously avoided with me," says Meer Allum, "which the Minister seems shy of, on two accounts; first, my supposed absolute devotion to Azim-ul-Omra; second, my attachment to and connection with your nation."

"To give you," continued Meer Allum, "a clearer view of my difficulties, it is necessary candidly to confess to you, that tho' I never heard of any just cause of complaint against

* Given in the appendix at page 321.

† For the text of this important treaty see Appendix

this Minister, Azim-ul-Omra has not scrupled on all occasions to use even publicly the most vaunting and irritating language toward him, nay, even in the presence of the late Hurry Punt, Appa Bulwant and many other Chiefs of this State." "On the other hand," said Meer Allum, "the conduct toward the Bhosla has been equally exceptionable. For tho' it was the constant usage of that Government and His Highness's to make mutual communications of intended movements, yet a total silence was observed to that Court on His Highness's march to Bidder, and when an expostulatory letter was received on the occasion from the Bhosla, the answer to it after laying the stress of the cause of movement on the necessity of change of air for His Highness's health, concluded, though strongly objected to by me, with an innuendo little short of a threat, that the movement might likewise be found convenient for the settlement of any business that His Highness might have with his (the Bhosla's) Government. Since the receipt of this letter by the Nagpore Durbar all correspondence had ceased."

"The impolicy of the connexion with the late Mahad'i Sindia," added Meer Allum, "was frequently insisted on not only by Sir John Kennaway to the Nazim but by His Lordship in person to the Minister, who did away the impression of such advise on his Master's mind by persuading him that the English were averse to see the union of two personages of such great power and splendid talents as His Highness and the Patell, and strange to tell," said Meer Allum, "even now (fallen as the Sindian Power is under the management of this State) does Babarou continue to impose on Azim-ul-Omra a persuasion that in the event of hostilities insuing Doulut Row's force will be at his devotion."

"Under these circumstances and this view of Azim-ul-Omra's councils and disposition, I think it necessary," added Meer Allum, "to undeceive you relative to the facility with which at our last meeting I gave you reason to think, Azim-ul-Omra might be induced to carry his Master back to Hyderabad as a prefatory act of conciliation on some cautionary stipulations with this Court, as I cannot in fact become in any shape responsible for his acceding to that measure."

Meer Allum informed me, that should this Court (as it seemed inclined) demand an explanation of the term Wajbee (rightful) as inserted in the Nabob's Powers to him, he was instructed to refer it to a third party. I observed that I supposed the Company must be thereby meant, but that from the disinclination already manifested by this Court to our interposition, I did not think it would readily accede to such a reference. That, however, in my last messages from the Durbar an assurance was given of a preference of settling the present disputes by negotiation with him, which, considering the former declaration of "no room for accommodation having been left by the Nizam's Ministers", I looked upon as rather a favourable circumstance, as also that, since my representations fresh orders had been issued to the Durbar Accountants to prepare the account demands on His Highness's Government with all possible expedition. That however

from what I could collect relative to the accounts, and from what I had just learnt from him of the causes and present state of the personal discontents between the executive parties, I could perceive no possible good to be effected by entering into a detail of either one or the other, but that if practicable a general composition of both was to be preferred, in the prosecution of which I should be happy if I could once bring about the Minister's acquiescence to his (Meer Allum's) holding conferences with me and Behro Punt, as thereby the first stone of reconciliation would be laid by opening a pure channel for interchanging the sentiments of the parties, which, I feared, was not the case at present. In this Meer Allum most readily acquiesced, expressing a warm desire of such a line of communication, and a total distrust of the honesty of every instrument at present employed in his negotiations, in which the smallest progress was not hitherto made.

On the point of proposing this Minister's entering into a mutual condition with him as to the power of terminating his present negotiation, I advised him by all means to represent the objections it was liable to, to Azim-ul-Omra, and if possible get the order revoked without mentioning it to this Government, as its discussion would only delay the entering on real business, and most likely ultimately subject him and his superior to the necessity of withdrawing so captious a proposal, so that the previous reference would in fact be saving time.

I scarce need repeat, that under this form of familiar address I have not only indulged myself in an informal style, but have, with the most unreserved freedom, communicated matters, that strictly speaking perhaps Meer Allum did not mean should be repeated, but the same motives that influenced him to expose his situation openly and candidly to me, teach me the necessity of repeating it to you and the Governor General.

Through the whole of Meer Allum's disclosure it is clearly perceptible, that he labours under the impression of being engaged in a bad cause and (what is still worse) under a distrust of the real disposition and intentions of his superior, Azim-ul-Omra, whence and from our own knowledge of the man there certainly arises ground of apprehension to us, that, in the event of ultimately succeeding in our endeavours to bring this Minister to a pacific disposition, his (Azim-ul-Omra's) extreme levity and arrogance may induce him to take an ungenerous advantage of it by some such vain exhibition of his force, as by mortifying this Court may subject us to the reproach of having caused it.

The multitude of suspicious instruments employed by His Highness at this and Mahadji Sindia's Durbar is doubtless a grand impediment to the good effects, that might otherwise be hoped from the candour and good sense of Meer Allum. Yet I know not how the evil is to be remedied or how the labyrinth of intrigue, in which everything that falls under their management is implicated, can be simplified, but by a radical reformation in His Highness's Government and administration.

No. 100—Malet reports to G. G. his interview with Nana Fadnis, in which he urged an amicable settlement of the dispute.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 19th August 1794.

Agreable to the intimation conveyed in my last address of the 17th instant, I shall proceed to give you the particulars of what has passed between this Durbar and me since my respects of the 12th instant, when I begged you to suspend your judgment on the last message then received from the Durbar in the hope of some amendment, as on receipt of it I had represented in the most conciliating and friendly manner to Behro Punt, that the tenor of the messages hitherto recd. from the Durbar seemed rather calculated to obscure than to elucidate any of the points on which, depending on the cordiality of the States, I had applied for information ; that my duty of watching over and promoting by all means in my power that cordiality, taught me to point out to him, that not the smallest notice had been taken in the Durbar's messages of the important points on which my late applications to it had been founded, viz., this Court's first application to Marquis Cornwallis by Hurry Punt for our good offices to effect a settlement of the dispute with the Nizam, its application for our interposition to preserve peace on the Nizam's advance to Bider,—its assurance to me that all future discussions with the Nizam should be communicated to me—and above all the attention due to the undisturbed preservation of the Triple Alliance, inseparably connected with the good understanding of its members.

In addition to these arguments, I begged Behro Punt particularly to point out to the Minister's notice the predicament we should stand in with respect to the Nazim, when on his asking the effect of our representations to his Court in his behalf, he should remind us of his attention to our instances made at its request on a similar occasion, when by this Court's reserve we should be left destitute not only of a satisfactory answer but even of the shadow of a rational reply.

On the 18th instant I visited the Minister, when after the usual complimentary discourse and delivery of your letters of condolence on the death of the late Hurry Punt whence I drew a new proof of your friendly attention, I begged the room might be cleared, and then addressed the Minister to the following purport.

“Your wisdom and experience must have strongly imprinted on your mind the blessings with which the friendship of States is pregnant as to obviate all necessity for enumeration.

“For the establishment and increase of this great good my appointment to this station took place, and by the Grace of God, has been

attended with the desired effect through a happy period of near nine years, the benefits of which are too well known to require recital.

“ In this period the Company's ancient connexion with the Nazim has also been improved into a degree of cordiality, the progress of which (agreeable to the friendship of the States) was regularly and frankly communicated to you, till at length its perfection was completed in an happy union of the three States in the recent treaties of Poona, Paungul and Puttun.

“ In the course of this unanimity the Chiefs of the Peshwa's and Nazim's Government applied with effect to those of the H'ble Company for their good offices in prevention of the evils and disagreement, the particulars of which will have been fully understood from the late Hurry Punt on his joint application with Azim-ul Omra to Marquis Cornwallis, and from Behro Punt on his requisition to me.

“ Unfortunately misunderstandings have again taken place, for the removal of which the Nazim has, with the approbation of this State, deputed one of his most confidential servants with plenipotentiary powers, and as a further proof of his pacific disposition has, through the Company's Resident at his Court, agreeable to the friendship of the three States and the example of this Court, solicited the interposition of the Company's good offices in aid of his ambassador's negotiations, with an assurance of his sincere disposition and readiness to accede to reasonable terms of accommodation.

“ During the occurrence of these events the news of the perils to which the peace of the triple alliance was exposed reached the Governor General, whose regard for the public good and the general welfare of mankind immediately induced him to lay his commands on me, to expose in the strongest manner possible to him (the Minister) the innumerable evils and the immeasurable dangers not only to the alliance of the three States but eventually to all Hindostan, which might attend a rupture between the two Goverts. For who, when once the flames of war are kindled, can prescribe bounds to their destructive havoc? To elucidate this general position let us advert to the Powers of the North and South, watchful for confusions to prosecute their own views. Let us suppose one of the belligerent Powers driven to extremity and in the hour of need calling on your neighbour for assistance. Will he let slip the opportunity? most probably not; whereas should he embrace it, what may be the consequence not only to the other party but to the H'ble Company's Government, that will be involved in the embarrassment of such a predicament.

“ But allowing that he be not called on, the necessary consequence of war is the weakening of one, if not both parties. In such a state what security has either for the forbearance of Tipu Sul'an from attacks, that will expose us to the embarrassing alternative of undertaking or declining the support of a friend.

“ The event of the most promising wars is at best doubtful. The most mighty force is pervious to fatal consequences from the most common accidents ; Death might derange it, Caprice might disorganize it and True Wisdom was slow to place any reliance on contingencies so far beyond the reach of human prudence to control or correct.

“ This is the language of truth and disinterested friendship, nor in applying it by the command of the Governor General shall I be suspected of a predilection for the Govt. of Hyderabad in preference to my attachment to the members of this Court, cultivated by an interchange of personal and official good offices through the long period of nine years.

“ In a word, the Governor General's language is not only that of truth, friendship and wisdom, but, as above explained, collaterally of self-preservation from the embarrassing predicaments to which the Hon'ble Company may be eventually exposed by the hostility of two branches of the Triple Alliance, a consideration that, added to the other important reason which I have lately by message and now verbally had the honour to detail, will, I doubt not, induce you to favour me with such a friendly reply ” as may be satisfactory to the Governor General.

This discourse was received by the Minister with very little interruption. The two points of the Nazim's application for our good offices and the deputation of Meer Allum being with the consent of this Govt. I laid particular stress on, the first to contradict an assertion that, I hear, is openly maintained by Govinrou Bugwunt at the Durbar, that our interposition is not with the Nazim's own approbation, the second to clear up a point that was lately controverted by Behro Punt, and who again excepting to it on the present occasion he was corrected by the Minister, who acknowledged with some marks of confession, that in answer to a signification of the intention Govinrou had been authorized to communicate assent. This circumstance verifys what I have long heard that B. Pt. has not been privy to the late councils of the Durbar respecting the Nazim, but whether his not being consulted has arisen from his original indisposition to hostile measures or his disinclination to them from not being consulted, I know not, but it is pretty certain that he is now an advocate for accommodation, and had a warm altercation with Govinrou a few days since in the presence of the Peshwa on the presumption of his (G.'s) supporting the Nazim's disinclination to our interposition.

Tho' the Minister seemed considerably affected with what I had said to him, yet on pressing him for an answer alleging that the subject had now been long under his consideration, he had recourse to his usual reserve on the plea of deliberation, to which on the present occasion was added that he would submit what had passed to the Peshwa, and give me an answer after being furnished with his sentiments and commands.

In the course of conversation on the subject of my application for an answer that might convey some satisfaction to you as to this Court's

intention, in which I embraced frequent opportunities of introducing assurances that it was by no means our wish that the smallest sacrifice of Right or Honor should be made by him or his Government, I collected that no progress had yet been made by Meer Allum, and took thence an opportunity of observing that points of little moment, tho' of some delicacy, might sometimes obstruct the prosecution of the most important affairs, that it occurred to me these difficulties might be obviated by a meeting of B. Pt. with M. A. at my house where all points of etiquette etc. might be freely discussed and speedily settled; but in this proposition I met with no better success than in my former request of an explanation of the Minister's sentiments, so that finding no further progress was to be made and recollecting that I had now fully discharged your commands of 3.d u timo, I took my leave.

Baba Furkia, Hurry Punt's 2nd son, coming in during our conference, I mentioned to him my having delivered to the Minister your letter of condolence to his brother.

You are fully apprized, H'ble Sir, of the little ground we possess for reliance on A. O.'s fidelity, and one of my late letters communicated a whisper that had reached me implying some doubt of his Master's honesty. Without however entering on the merits of their respective characters at present, I cannot help expressing my uneasiness that the H'ble Co's good offices under my direction should be exposed to that infinity of artful intrigue, to which the Nazim's negotiations with this Court are exposed by the numerous and various agency through which they are conducted, the danger of which cannot, I presume, be more strongly manifested than in Govindrow's daring to assert and maintain before the Peshwa (as I am informed he did through a very credible tho' secret channel) that the Nazim is personally averse to our interposition, an assertion so bold as almost to convey an idea that it could not possibly have been made without some foundation, and so extraordinary if founded, as not only to give some weight to the whisper above mentioned but even to the admission of the possibility of His Highness having been privy to the flight of Azim-ud-Daula, to avoid the jealousy with which Azim-ul-Omra looked on him as the only person whose abilities placed him on a footing of rivalry to him.

No. 101—The Peshwa expresses his inability to satisfy any of the queries of the Resident about the dispute with the Nizam, as discussions about the same were proceeding with the Nizam's deputies.

19th August 1794.

Translation of a message from the Peshwa's Durbar recd. the 17th August 1794, enclosed in the letter to the Govr. Genl. dated 19th August.

You have frequently repeated your enquiries relative to the negotiations with the Nazim. Now, in fact, the substance of everything was given in the

first (Durbar's) answer. Notwithstanding the friendship between the Circar (Peshwa's) and the Nabob, for some time past his conduct has been of a certain complexion. And the Circar's demand on account of participated territory (Aumil) etc. have been evaded and delayed. Therefore, for the purpose of terminating general and detail matters (Juzeat O Kuleat), forces etc., have been ordered to be in readiness. In this period a trusty and plenipotentiary person is arrived. How, therefore, without knowing what he has to propose, can we in the interim* communicate anything to you? This, on consideration, you will find worthy of admission in your mind.

* This is a studyd equivoque to be construed as the Durbar pleases, either in the interim previous to Meer Allum's proposals or during the whole interim of negotiation, and is supported by the indefiniteness of the subsequent query, "How can we communicate anything to you", which is purposely left unanswered.

No. 102—Malet requests the Poona Durbar to keep him informed of the course of negotiations to enable him to interpose his good offices in time.

Poona, 19th August 1794.

Answer of Sir C. W. Malet to the Peshwa's message of the 12th August† delivered the 19th following.

In the Durbar's answer to my first message an unequivocal declaration was made that the warlike preparations then and still on foot were with a view to hostilities with the Nazim, and tho' it was mentioned at the same time that, "if after the arrival of Meer Allum a termination by negotiation took place, it was well", yet in a subsequent message necessarily superseding the first, it was plainly asserted that the Nazim's Minister had left no room for accommodation. These circumstances conveyed an alarm that induced me to trouble the Durbar a second time, when I took the liberty of observing that probably a representation to the Nabob on the part of the Company of any cause of dissatisfaction to this State might be attended with a correction of the evil, an observation arising solely from the present motives of promoting a reconciliation. As therefore you have now resumed the assurance "that a termination by negotiation is better", my uneasiness is thereby greatly relieved in the confidence that from the labors of a person so wise and so much in the confidence of his Master as Meer Allum, a happy termination, on principles of right, will soon be effected of the differences relative to the participated territory etc. And should any future opportunity present of introducing my good offices in the settlement of any just cause of complaint to the promotion of

the welfare of the three States, the common friendship that at present so happily subsists will prevent my neglecting it, agreeable to the interest that it has become incumbent on me to take in preserving the particular cordiality of the two States from the time that the two Governments applyd to His Lordship on that subject, to which have recently been added the orders on the part of the Governor General, Sir John Shore, to promote the same desirable object founded on the necessity of preserving the unanimity of the Triple Alliance, on the obvious plea that a rupture cannot take place between two of the parties without uneasiness and probably prejudice to the third.

The Durbar has been pleased to favour me with friendly assurance of communicating intimation of whatever settlement may take place. But I make no doubt but that from a consideration of the above circumstances, should any obstacle arise in the course of the negotiation on the part of His Highness the Nizam to the just demands of this Government, in the removal of which and the re-establishment of good will, the good offices of the Hon'ble Company may be of service, it will be unreservedly communicated, agreeable to the original promise of the Minister to make me acquainted with whatever might hereafter occur in the course of the Nazim's business. In a word, the preservation of peace is the object of the Hon'ble Company's Government.

In reply to your observation of how can the Nabob ask (what we have said in his behalf and the effect thereof) till the (present) negotiations are settled, permit me to remark that it would be as vain for him to ask as for us to answer after a decision had taken place, when it is to be supposed no representations could have any effect. The season of friendly interposition can only be during the suspense of a dispute, and from His Highness's former attention to our representation on the part of this Government, I may with safety submit to the candour of the Durbar whether he has not some right to ask the effect of a similar one on his behalf to this Government.

No. 103 Malet sends Kirkpatrick a detailed report of his interview with Meer Allum. It explains A. O.'s obstinacy in refusing an understanding with the Poona Court and reveals that the Hyderabad Court was ultimately counting on British support.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Poona, 26th August 1794.

On the 25th I received a visit from Meer Allum the principal object of which was to talk over the subject of the late advice from his Court, but as a variety of other topics occurred in the course of our long conversation,

I shall endeavour in my familiar way to detail what passed, studying rather not to omit any material trait than pretending to observe the order in which it may have arisen in the course of conversation.

M. A. opened his discourse with a lively acknowledgment of my endeavours to promote a pacific termination of the present discussions; but from what had hitherto passed he could not flatter himself with a very speedy prospect of that desirable end. One month, he observed, had already elapsed on a frivolous preliminary point, the instrument regarding which, I collected, had been framed by this Court with his assent, which, I presume, sharpens the dissatisfaction that he did not scruple to express at A. O.'s late dispatches on the subject, which, differing widely from the explicit language of the Nabob himself on A. O.'s arzee, he thought, rather portended delay than decision. He complained of obscurity in A. O.'s last letter, translate of which was enclosed to me in yours of the 18, which, tho' he had carefully studied he could not elucidate. I begged an explanation of the Chout of the 4 Subas. He replied, that about 2 years ago on this subject being agitated, this demand of the Nabob's ministry of putting the Choute of the 4 subas of Aurungabad, Bidder, Berar and Bijapore on the footing of the time of Nizam al Mulk, had been agreed to by this Court on condition that every mode then practised by this State should also be resumed, meaning the sending bodies of troops to make their own collections, from which in consequence of the cordiality of the two Courts they had long desisted. They likewise insisted that on this mode being resumed, Ameens from His Highness should meet those of this State and proceeding through the said subas minutely ascertain the collections of the period in question, and that the execution of their commission should be limited to two years. That tho' this Court now assumes its liberation from its assent at that time by the failure of the arrival of the Nabob's Ameens and the lapse of the time specified for the completion of their work, yet was it still ready to abide by it.

Having received this explanation of what is mentioned in the Nizam's superscription of A. O.'s arzee, His Highness's unreserved acquiescence in the proposed instrument becomes more conspicuous, as of the two items he proposed insisting on, one, the word *wajbi*, had been previously admitted by this Court, and the Chout of the 4 subas as appears from the above was also a matter of mutual consent.

This circumstance throwing an additional appearance of mystery on A. O.'s conduct I begged M. A. to produce his late letters, but not having the last with him (the same as above mentioned) the first (of which I have already forwarded you a translate) became the subject of our consideration, when the 2nd form of an answer to this Court's proposal of M. A.'s executing a plenipotentiary engagement was agreed to by us both as the most proper to be presented in bar of any responsibility in a case of extreme delicacy attaching to anybody but the author of the instructions, and M. A. resolved to answer the Durbar accordingly.

In discussing this point I mentioned to M. A. the insertion of the word *Bija* and removing this Court's objections to reference by limiting the delay of an answer; but neither seemed to meet his approval. I likewise suggested an alteration of the sense of the proposed instrument by a transposition of words that would render it perfectly innocent, but 'his he observed, and I believe justly, would not escape the notice of this ministry.

I next enquired what was meant by his plenipotentiary powers, merely to adjust *details*; when, he confessed Faisleh Kulea' or general settlement was designedly omitted, and I could collect from his conversation that this is one of the means by which A. O. is studying to protract negotiation. For M. A. acknowledged, that he had not the smallest power to come to a general settlement for the future or give this Court any security on that head. He likewise pointed out to my notice the reserve with which A. O. had expressed himself as to the important point of a personal reconciliation, by which should his desire of succeeding in his present mission lead him to an unsuccessful advance through suspicious agents, it might end in his disgrace. He observed that the inveteracy which had taken place between the two Ministers had caused a stoppage of all intercourse by letter. I suggested the procural of a meeting between the Nizam and Peshwa as the only probable mode that occurred to me of extricating himself from a most difficult and delicate predicament and of effecting an amicable settlement. He assented and acknowledged that the Nazim himself had authorized his pursuing it; but the difficulty was in this Court's assent if A. O. were present; and how was it possible that his absence could be effected, whose vigilance in securing to himself the exclusive management of His Highness increased daily. I asked about the practicability of a meeting of the ministers, but this seemed more difficult than an interview of the superiors. Generally speaking M. A. seemed to think an advantageous or even an amicable settlement of the present disputes desperate but in this Court's admitting the persuasion of its ultimately drawing us into the support of His Highness, for which, on general principles of defensive alliance, I found him a warm advocate. I asked with such ideas entertained by him and his Court, how it happened that Govinrou Kishen had found means to collect for the information of his Court that we never should seriously support the Nabob's cause. He in reply disputed Govin Rou's having done so, unless on the ground that he recollected his having once assumed at the Nazim's Durbar our being precluded by the treaty of Salbyhe joining any Native Power against this State, as this State was precluded aiding any European Power against us,—of the truth of which he pretended ignorance as never having seen the treaty of Salbyhe.

On the subject of Govinrou Pingle's agency he acknowledged that tho' his confidence in it was very imperfect, yet was he constantly enjoined by his Master to do nothing without his knowledge.

On the subject of his Master's force of infantry he said there were 9 battalions under Monsr. Raymond, but hitherto they had not seen service, and that orders had been issued for raising 8 battalions more. I enquired the capability of his Master's Cavalry to ensure the means of its own and the Infantry's subsistence employed against an army of this State. He seemed doubtful of it and generally deprecated the insuing of hostilities, which, after the late dry years, he apprehended would end in almost the annihilation of his Court's respectability as a government and probably in a repetition of those dismemberments of His Highness's territory which had formerly been the consequence of these people's successes; but tho' M. A. seemed to think his Master's best hopes of avoiding these dangers rested on the appearances of our support, yet did he give me to understand that A. O. had expectations of protracting negotiations through the insuing dry season at the end of which this Court, exhausted by the heavy expenses of its preparations, would disband its forces, and His Highness would with new leisure be left to consult his safety and interests as occasion and expedient might suggest.

I observed, that these were expectations which this Court must be supposed aware of and prepared against, and that, at all events, should it forbear its hostile intentions at our instance, such a conduct on the part of A. O. might expose us to its very serious remonstrances. He said, in that case A. O. would be obliged to attend to what we might represent.

On the subject of expediting his correspondence with his Court by an horse Dauk I found that difficulties occurred in the objections of the Cavalry, and perhaps too great speed might not be desirable.

In reply to my query of his opinion as to the amount of this State's demands on his Master, he said about 50 or 60 lacs of rupees. I observed that his estimate was small. He added his opinion that all above would be found baseless.

Your discernment will easily enable you to distinguish between the confidential and official parts of this imperfect detail of a very long and a very interesting conversation, and to use them accordingly.

No. 104—Shore writing to Malet hopes that Meer Allum's embassy would accomplish the desirable object of accommodation.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—SIR C. W. MALET, BART.

Fort William, 1st September 1794.

I entirely approve the terms of your first answer to the message delivered by Behroo Punt, as well as your further reply to his delivery of the second message from the Durbar, as communicated in your assistant's

letter of the 29th July. My instructions of the 3rd of that month render it unnecessary to say more than that I have the fullest confidence in your prudent exercise of the discretion given you for effecting, if possible, an amicable adjustment of the differences between the Paishwa and Nizam, and I yet hope that the deputation of Meer Allum, which, the further authority vested in him by the Nizam at the desire of Balajee Pundit and the disposition shown by Azeem-ul-Omrah to a reconciliation with the latter cannot fail to assist, will, with the aid of our friendly interposition, lead to the accomplishment of this desirable object.

No. 105—In reply to his representations to the Peshwa, Malet is informed of the Peshwa's resolve to resort to hostilities in case of failure of negotiations.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

4th September 1794.

Translation of a paper taken in Persian, 4th Sept. 1794, by M. N. D.† Sir C. W. M.'s Moonshy, from a Marratta Paper read to him by Behro Pundit as the Durbar's answer to the verbal representations of Sir C. W. M. to the Minister on the 18th August and then referred for answer by the Minister to previous consultation with the Peshwa.

1. If your demands on the Nabob are adjusted, is it then your intention to stop or to commence hostilities? You have thus in friendship enquired the intentions of our heart.

Answer.

Meer Allum Bhadur and Reyno Rae Doandajee are come as the Nabob's plenipotentiaries. Let them, as those to whom it belongs, treat carefully. If according to this mode an equitable adjustment is made of the Juzeat including the Bhosla and an arrangement made for Juzeat and Kuleat* in future, hostilities are not absolutely ended.

But if these two, M. A. and R. D., do not settle these two points of adjustment and future arrangement, our (Peshwa's) demand (aunil) is on the country. From the country an adjustment of the past and the establishment (aunil) of the future will be taken. If the Nabob or his people should oppose, after that there is no remedy. Let this be confined to your breast, as it is communicated in friendship for your understanding the real state of the case.

2. You have asked what is to be done in the event of Tippoo's causing disturbances.

† Maulvi Nuruddin.

* Juzeat = detail.

Kulcat = general.

Answer.

An agreement has been made in the event of hostility with Tippoo agreeable to which, Firm.

3. It is your wish that you should have a meeting with Meer Allum and a confidential person of the Sirkar (Peshwa's).

Answer.

Two (vide supra) are come from the Nabob who are in negotiation with the Sirkar. And the Sirkar negotiates with them.

No. 106—Malet deprecates the idea of the Company embroiling itself in the Maratha-Nizam dispute.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 6th September 1794.

My accompanying public address has unawares run into so great length, that it is almost a sin to trouble you with anything more by this opportunity; yet I can't help thanking you for your favour of the 31st and repeating in reply to it, my astonishment, not only at Azim-al-Omra's expression of surprize to you on Meer Allum's silence, but that such silence should have existed after Meer Allum's frequent assurances to me of having fully explained his situation to Azim-al-Omra. My accompanying public dispatch will enable you to ease Azim-al-Omra's anxiety on the subject of this Court's answer to my verbal representations. Much might be rejoined, but I shall well consider whether to be silent or to say more will be most dignified and most effectual. I have not yet had time to read over the enclosure in your public letter of the 1st, but one or two parts that caught my eye indicate as much dissatisfaction on the part of Azim-al-Omra with Meer Allum as Meer Allum seems to feel against Azim-al-Omra. This portends no good to our pursuit. No man can be less an advocate for embroiling ourselves with this State than myself. Yet I am almost sorry to say, that (whatever may be due to our friendship) the success of our good offices in behalf of His Highness will have its origin in our power, and the danger that by a variety of contingencies (impossible now to predict or foresee) that power may in the course of hostilities be forced into action,—an idea of which I have taken care to mention but as a thing that of all others we most deprecate, particularly should it disturb our harmony here. With this I take the liberty of submitting to your perusal the memoranda that I made during my short stay at Ellora. Since I was driven by indisposition sore against

my will, after having been greatly impeded by it in the search of materials that I gathered together and which are submitted to your indulgence. Perhaps Mr. Hirst might also wish a sight of them. The references were meant for drawings that work is postponed.

No. 107—Malet writing to Kirkpatrick condemns A. O.'s insincere attitude in the dispute and expresses doubts about the usefulness of his further representations or of Meer Alam's embassy in the atmosphere of distrust all around.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 9th September 1794.

On a perusal of the detail of the conference of your Munshy with Azim-al-Omra the following remarks have occurred.

That Azim-al-Omra from the first has been averse to executing the instrument proposed by the Peshwa, and that all his subsequent perplexed instructions appear to me to be contrary to the spirit of the plain assent given by the Nazim himself in his superscription on A. O's arzee first communicating the subject to His Highness, and which indeed was so explicit as to give ground for an idea that His Highness was as desirous, as this Court can be, of preventing the dangers of ultimate reference to A. O.

Azim-ul-Omra's remark on Meer Allum's silence relative to preparations etc. betrays, as indeed does the whole of A. O.'s language, a strong indication of great dissatisfaction with M. A., whether just or not is not for me to scrutinize, but which, added to the distrust so plainly manifested by M. A. of A. O., certainly portends great evil, perhaps discredit to the important negotiations now on foot, and by which the original delicacy of our interposition is greatly increased.

As to A. O.'s answer to your intimation of the extent of our interposition, it appears just what might be expected from a man who has long seemed to be wrapt up in his own narrow conceits and short sighted expedients as to be incapable of allowing others a more comprehensive view or a more capacious field of action. His construction of and pretended reliance on an expression that may have dropt from Lord Cornwallis in the course of conversation, is a mixture of weakness and artifice so usual in his conduct as to preclude much surprise, and will not appear even extraordinary to those who recollect his reply to His Lordship's intimation of his intended departure for Europe.

But even in his argument of avoiding aggression on which he lays so much stress, A. O. seems to have forgot His Lordship's advice in person and frequently repeated through Sir John Kennaway to liquidate this State's

demands, and passes over in silence the still more exceptionable measure of his movement to Bidder and the obnoxious councils of that movement, in the course of which he so loudly protested against your predecessor. He was not ashamed to invite His Lordship to a coalescence with him in distressing this ministry by taking part with M. Sindia in intrigues the object of which was no less than the destruction of Nanna Furnavees's administration. But the negligence with which A. O.'s reliance on his friend, Mahadji Sindia, induced him to treat our friendly advice to avoid just cause of offence to this Government is fully depicted in my correspondence with your predecessor on the Bidder movement, and a plain intimation of the consequences of a further prosecution of the system of evasion was decidedly given in my letter to Sir J. K. so long ago as the 2nd August 1792.

As to A. O.'s assertion of this Government's having dissuaded His Highness from relinquishing the district of Guntoor it is not the first time it has been advanced, but without adverting to its non-application to the present subject either my recollection fails me much, or the fact which I will ascertain stands contradicted on my records, by this Court's having, on my signification of our intentions respecting that province, replied "that whatever was articulated by treaty should be complied with". I think likewise the Minister assured me that this had been given as an answer to the Nizam's letters on the same subject.

At all events A. O.'s solicitude for the issue of my representations, about which he has been so anxious while he has suffered his own negotiations to remain suspended, will have been terminated by the communication of what you may have thought proper from my last dispatch, agreeable to which I have signified the result of my interposition to M. A., whose answer on the occasion I have the pleasure to enclose, which should I reply, the substance shall be transmitted to you.

I am this morning honoured with your letter of the 4th, and now enclose copy of the Nizam's letter to M. A. enjoining his acting in concert with Govin Bugwunt in prosecuting the objects of his mission to this Court, which, I believe, (but without any authority from M. A.) reached him in the usual official channel through A. O.

This letter leads to a general view of the construction of His Highness's embassy at this Court, in which we perceive an extraordinary assemblage of discordance flowing from the weak and false councils of A. O.'s cabinet.

To the plenipotentiary character of M. A. is added a colleague of whose integrity and ability both A. O. and M. A. have expressed their doubts ; to this colleague is added another Govin Bugwunt in the character of a Counsellor, of whom the same great personages have very unequivocally declared their opinion ; to these primary is to be added a secondary confidential personage, Ragoteem Rou, of whose integrity M. A. has unreservedly expressed his distrust ; but the last surely not least, the

grand danger presents itself in those evident marks of dissatisfaction and distrust that have shewn themselves between A. O. and M. A. In a word, what good can be expected from an assemblage that has not a single atom of concord in its whole composition ?

These reflexions, added to the total suspense hitherto of all negotiation on the part of His Highness's embassy, convince me that I shall best consult the dignity of our Government by suspending all further interposition with this Court till the conduct of His Highness's counsels both at home and abroad shall furnish a prospect of introducing it with greater weight and effort than can be derived from their present construction and management.

No. 108—Malet conveys to Kirkpatrick the complaint of Meer Alam about the duplicity of A. O. in evading execution of the Instrument of delegatory powers required by the Poona Court.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,
TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 9th September 1794.

Impressed as I am with the clearest conviction of all your ideas originating in, and being directed by a desire of promoting the publick good, though I might be unfortunate to differ in opinion, I could not possibly cease to respect and esteem motives, to have been actuated by which is my own sole pride and merit. It would be hard, indeed, if the honourable contest in which we are engaged, in behalf of our country, with art and chicane, should, by any difference of mode, produce a diminution in our mutual good will. From having mentioned the Nabob's letter to you in mine of 26th and 30th ultimo, I have thought it best to send you a copy of it in the same channel. Mustakeem-ud-Doula has written Meer Allum, that one of the papers containing directions about the Instrument declaring powers, was superscribed "this mode is to be adopted in preference". Now Meer Allum declares to me he has never received this paper and even drops hints, that tho' it may have been shown you as to be sent to him it may have been purposely suppressed. He has likewise sent me extract of a letter from Mustakeem-ud-Doula, which I enclose for your own persual. Communicating it to your Munshy might originate ill-will between instruments, being in part an account of the same conference of which you have sent me all the particulars. Meer Allum says, and justly I think, how can the man, who, on being questioned on his assent to the Peshwa's Instrument, acknowledges he sent me one, two, three and four modes, pretend to say he has given one explicit assent to the specific one in question. From the same reason of not causing discordance between instruments, I have not shown Mahomed Ikram's

detail of the conference to Meer Allum. I was very sorry to observe by your letter to Sir John Shore, that you had reason to complain of indisposition, which will, I hope, have been removed ere this can reach you. You will observe by my last and present dispatch, that we agree exactly on the point of suspending all further interposition at present : and if His Highness's ministry were wise and his embassy of a construction to benefit by circumstances, I am inclined to think, what has been already said would conduct them happily through with their negotiation. I have not, to my recollection, seen the letter from Meer Allum to Azim-ul-Omra mentioned in the last paragraph of your letter to Sir John Shore.

No. 109—Shore suggests to the Hyderabad Resident that M. A.'s plenipotentiary powers should be sufficient for the discussion and settlement of all the disputed points ; also suggests a personal meeting or at least direct correspondence between the Peshwa and the Nizam, and gives instructions as to how he was to conduct himself in case hostilities broke out.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

Fort William, 18th September 1794.

Having before me your letters as well as those of the Resident at Poonah from the 12th August to the 28th of the same month inclusive and your mutual correspondence during this interval as noted in the margin, I have taken the whole into consideration and now reply to them.

2. Whilst the Marratta Minister maintains his reserve in explaining the grounds of altercation between the Peshwa and the Nizam and the extent of his claims upon His Highness's Government, any suggestions for promoting the desirable object of a reconciliation between the two States can only be safely formed on general principles under due consideration of their relative power and resources.

3. Little doubt can, I presume, be entertained of the superiority of the Marrattas in these respects, and consequently of the inability of the Nizam to maintain a successful war against them, and if this be admitted, it follows, that it is the interest of His Highness to avoid a contest, which will probably confirm his dependency on the Peshwa from which he so naturally wishes to emancipate himself.

4. With this view the deputation of Meer Allum was prudent and proper, and the powers with which he was on this occasion invested appeared to me sufficient for opening the negotiation with the Poona Ministry, and would probably have been deemed so by the latter if the disagreements between the two Courts were of a public nature only, without any mixture of personal jealousy and animosity.

5. Without considering in this place the probable motives of the Poona Ministry in requiring a declaration of plenary powers * from Meer Allum for concluding the articles of discussion between his Sovereign and the Peshwa without reference to the former, I shall only observe that the suggestion for demanding a similar declaration from Ballajee Pundit appears to me superfluous and unnecessary, that it was not calculated to answer any useful purpose and that the notification of the demand was very prudently suppressed by Meer Allum, as advantage might have been derived from it to protract the commencement of the negotiation, which cannot, with a view to the interests of the Nizam, be too earnestly urged, and here it may be proper to add as a general principle to be observed throughout the negotiation, that the Nizam and his Minister should be extremely cautious in suffering any demur to intervene on articles of mere etiquette or to show any hesitation or reluctance upon matters that are not of real importance.

6. In the instructions given to Meer Allum on this occasion the point of reference is still maintained, but subject to a further modification which is certainly reasonable and as such ought to satisfy the Poona Ministry. Of their determination you are at this time apprised, but as it is possible they may still adhere to their original requisition I give you my opinion that this point, if insisted upon as an absolute preliminary, ought to be conceded, and that I see less danger in it to the Nizam than to Meer Allum from the greatness of the responsibility which will, in consequence, devolve upon him.

7. This opinion suggested by the preceding observations may be supported by the following reasons. It does not follow from this delegation of plenipotentiary powers to Meer Allum that he is obliged to sacrifice the true interests of his master, or to yield more than justice or sound policy requires. His Highness may himself, if he judges it expedient, prescribe the limitations of his concessions, and the demands which he may think it right to insist upon. In all points where the grounds of altercation are known, the term required for discussion will occasionally afford opportunity for reference and time may even be gained for the purpose. If unforeseen subjects should occur the discretion of Meer Allum must be trusted, and the interests of the Nizam may perhaps be safer in his confidence than in the decisions of his Minister. The Resident at Poona, as far as prudence and propriety warrant, will afford him the advantage of his advice, and your communications will assist the former on the grounds of it.

8. The advantages to be expected from this measure are these : that it will bring the sincerity of the two Courts to a test, and, which is of the greatest importance to the Nizam, the real intentions of the Marratta Minister must be immediately developed. After this concession the

* See appendix for the form of the Instrument suggested by the Poona Court.

Peshwa, without a violation of the principles of propriety and equity, cannot longer decline or refuse a discussion of his claims with the representatives of His Highness.

I am not very apprehensive that the Nizam would evince great reluctance in conferring plenipotentiary powers on Meer Allum, as his Minister cannot but see that his pride and vanity will thus escape the mortification of those concessions, which sooner or later he will be compelled to make.

It is of the 'ast importance to the interests of the Nizam for him to ascertain the true grounds of the reserve of the Poona Ministry in stating their claims upon His Highness.

If, as I suspect, they originate in a distrust of Azim al Omra and Nana's animosity to him, the reflections which I have detailed, derive new force from this consideration; if, from a jealousy and dislike of our interposition, that m y be easily remedied, if it cannot be otherwise surmounted; but if the cause of this reserve should exist in motives that cannot be explained, such for instance as the removal of Azim al Omra from the control of His Highness's administration and the reduction of the Nizam to his former dependency on the Poona Government, or in an intention to gain time for the commencement of hostilities which have been predetermined, it behoves the Nizam to be well upon his guard and to weigh the consequences of submitting to these claims with his means and power to resist them. On such conjectures it is impossible to say to the Nizam more than will be sufficient to lead him to serious reflections on the perils of his situation. If, after yielding whatever equity requires and any points not of very material consequence which in equity he might refuse, the demands of the Poona government should remain unsatisfied, it remains with him to consider and determine how far he possesses power to resist those exactions, and whether a war with the Marattas would involve him in deeper embarrassment or extricate him from the thralldom they might wish to impose upon him.

I perfectly agree with Sir C. W. Malet, that in the event of a contest with the Marattas His Highness could entertain no hopes of assistance from Doulat Rou Sindia. It is further evident to me, that if the Berar Raja should take any part in the contest it would be against the Nizam, and that any expectations which he might form of assistance from Tippoo would in all probability prove visionary. The contempt of that Prince for the Nizam is sufficiently apparent in his late neglect of paying the same compliment to him as to the Court of Poona, and it may not be improper to inform you that I learn from Capt. Doveton that it was evident in the language of Tippoo's Officers. They did not hesitate to express these sentiments, adding that they considered the period of the Nizam's death as a signal of the dissolution of his State, making use of this expression that the game was prepared and would be soon begun.

By whom the Treaty of Edgheer was first infringed, or whether Nanna or Azim al Omra first gave cause of provocation or animosity, are questions of importance only as they may become subjects of discussion, and in this view, if the charge could be clearly ascertained to rest with Nanna, the imputation might be forcibly opposed in reply to those accusations which he has good grounds to urge on the intemperance and arrogance of Azim al Omra's language, on his connection with Sindia for a purpose which he disclaimed to the Poona Ministry and on his march to Bidder to support the objects of that connection. It is, therefore, proper that Meer Allum should be fully instructed on these points, but I would by no means recommend that they should be introduced by him, or that they should be discussed without necessity. It would be more prudent, if they should be brought forward by Nanna, to reply, that altho' he is satisfied he could vindicate his Court and the Minister to the satisfaction of Nanna by showing that the grounds of imputation were not on one side only, that he is instructed to waive the discussion by an offer of the personal friendship of Azim al Omra and a promise of the continuance of it in future. At the same time it may be possible that the discussion of the original infraction of the Treaty of Edgheer may be unavoidable, but this may be made on public, not personal, grounds.

I entirely agree with you, that your support of Meer Allum cannot be advantageously exerted unless his communications with Azim-al-Omra are candid and explicit, and I trust, Sir C. Malet has already explained the necessity of it to him.

Great embarrassment is stated to result from the variety of emissaries employed by His Highness at Poona. Whilst the conduct of Meer Allum merits His Highness's confidence, I would advise that he should be made the sole channel of communication if it be practicable, (of which you and Sir Charles Malet must judge) leaving it to him to employ such inferior agency as he may think necessary.

If the present dissensions should proceed to hostilities, I would recommend to you to continue with His Highness's person as long as he remains within his own territories, but not to accompany the Nizam into those of the Peshwa without his consent, leaving it at the same time to you to use your discretion in retiring to any situation which you may think proper. It is scarcely necessary to add that the Company's troops stationed with the Nizam cannot be employed offensively or defensively against the Marrattas. Under this restriction they may be of use to His Highness in suppressing or preventing internal commotion or in the protection of his Capital during his absence from it.

In the opinions which I have detailed, you will find, I imagine, instructions for your general guidance on most cases and in your conference with the Nizam and his Minister, but as we are absolutely precluded from assisting His Highness with the troops of the Company, and as our mediation is introduced under a restriction to avoid any implication in the

consequences if it should prove ineffectual, you will carefully attend to these principles.

For the same reasons it shou'd be left to the Nizam's reflection to deduce the advice which I wish to press upon him from quest ons and inferences rather than by direct communication, unless it should be requi ed in such unreserved terms as to render a candid explicit declaration in reply unavoidable.

Since writing the above I have received your dispatches of the 31st August and Sir C. W. Malet's of the 26th with a copy of his private letter to you of the same date, and from the tenor of them I am sorry to observe that the object of Meer Alum's negociations seems as remote as ever, and that the disagreement between the two Ministers appears to be so inveterate as scarcely to admit of reconciliation.

These circumstances plainly suggest a conclusion that the discussions of the two Courts will never be brought to an amicable termination whilst they continue to be immediately conducted by the two Ministers, and strongly point out the necessity of the measure which I have recommended for investing Meer Allum with plenipotentiary Powers, or that some other should be adopted to remove what appears to me insuperable obstacles to the conclusion of the negotiation as now carried on. For this purpose no better plan could be devised than a meeting of the Nizam and Peshwa without the presence of the Ministers, as it would relieve us from an interposition which will probably prove inefficacious, but in giving my opinion as to the expediency of the measure I by no means suppose it practicable. That the existing difficulties might be diminished even by a direct correspondence between the Nizam and Peshwa I have no doubt, but how far His Highness would be inclined to make the advances in terms calculated to promote the intended object, under an assurance even that they should be accepted, is a consideration which I leave to you, with a discretion to suggest it or not as from circumstances you may judge expedient.

You will observe that I have thought it necessary to put the names used in cypher, and I recommend to you to do the same whenever the nature of the communications may suggest the propriety of it.

No. 110—Malet discusses the limitations put on Meer Allum's delegatory powers and condemns A. O.'s duplicity in the matter.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 21st September 1794.

Without entering into a scrutiny of the justice of the impressions of the Nizam's Minister as to the danger to his His Highness's interests or

derogation from his dignity by granting such absolute powers to M. A. with regard even to the Juziat as should, by rendering his proceedings final, preclude the formality of previous sanction and confirmation, which as far as relates to ratification cannot be excepted to, permit me to observe that those impressions fully account for all the evasions we have witnessed in assenting to the declaratory instrument, yet that you should retain a persuasion and that A. O. should advance an assertion after granting that instrument. that M. A.'s powers are still limited, instead of affording hope of accommodation opens so wide a prospect of future discord, that in addition to what I have already said on the subject I cannot help recommending to your serious reconsideration the Nabob's letter of credence to M. A. transmitted to him in your letter of 3rd July and the declaratory Instrument formally presented to this Court by M. A. on the 10 inst., and should you after reconsidering these materials think the discordance between them and your persuasion and A. O.'s assertion relative to the limitation of M. A.'s powers reconciled by the verbal explanation that accompanied the written Instrument, permit me to ask who is to be judge between the Peshwa's Ministers and M. A., should a difference arise between them as to the reality or efficiency of such explanations, in discussing which every rational argument bears in favour of the validity of the Written Instrument, joined as it happens to be to the power of supporting it.

Without further insisting on these points which appear to me self-evident, I must observe that by the adoption of the plan suggested for a quicker correspondence every good purpose of reference will be answered without ground for complaint in the course of negotiation, after which I can see no good end that can be answered by such a man as A. O. reserving to his Court or rather himself more than the power of ratification of the ultimate settlement, which the greatest Powers of our part of the world have not thought derogatory to their dignity, nor do I think any discredit would attach to His Highness on the present occasion by following their example.

I have already given you my opinion very candidly on the Peshwa's demand of the Declaratory Instrument, the receipt and transmission of which by M. A. to his Court passed without any consultation with me. Had such a thing been proposed to us in a negotiation of our own we should have stopt it in its origin, but as by the accompanying papers it appears that M. A. felt that a difficult task, I think, it would have been better to have executed it of his own authority ; but whatever might have been done by a man perfectly confident in the honour and honesty of his superiors, it seems, M. A. thought its reference to his Court necessary, the notoriety of which and the concomitant circumstances have now been given a weight and sanction to its ultimate execution as amply to establish. . . . As to the comparative good and evil of now making a merit of pursuing with entire confidence in Meer Allum

the present negotiations to an issue or of limiting that confidence and the consequent powers as appears to be preferred, I shall not pretend to decide; for, with a very imperfect knowledge of these Juziyat discussions I am with you totally ignorant of the Kuleat that seems to be founded on the Treaty of Edgheer, which, from A. O.'s backwardness to communicate, may possibly furnish grounds for the extraordinary pretensions attributed to this Court by A. O. But at all events if A. O. is conscious of no infringement of the Kuleat on his part, why all this alarm on this Court's merely demanding a discussion, which it certainly has a right to insist on, of points of disagreement, and why by merely demanding justice, it is to be charged with the designs that, if not founded on some exact agreement between His Highness and the Peshwa, it seems at present rash to impute to it. Whereas if in these discussions that guilt should be fixed on A. O. of which he seems so afraid, what is then to be done or rather what will be due to a man, who, without providing as he ought to have done the means of defence, has, by his misconduct, created this Court's enmity and exposed friendship to the dilemma of sacrificing him to the increase of a dangerous power or of supporting him to the discredit of rectitude.—A predicament that cannot be sufficiently lamented when we consider how jealously the dangerous spirit of this Court ought to be observed, and how carefully its power should be deprived of all plea or field for exaction either by the weakness or the imprudence of its neighbours, by neglecting which, if such has been the case, or if by going a step further these enmities have been provoked by A. O., the consequences to the dignity, power and energy of His Highness's Government and the consequent dangers to other states are imputable to him, not through ignorance or inadvertence but wilfully making opposition to our advice.

It appears by the 2nd para of your favor of the 12th that M.A., you and myself perfectly agree in the expediency of a meeting of the Principals as the most probable mode of bringing about a reconciliation, which desirable object it might have been in my power to promote had my proposed meeting of Behro Pundit and M. A. succeeded, but which by the same rule would have been subversive of Govinrow's influence.

From my dispatches subsequent to the 6th inst. you will have learnt the substance of my communication to M. A. on the subject of this Court's answer to my verbal representation, and from what I am still disposed to think of the reasonable tenor of that (Peshwa's) answer, it appears to me that no other ground is left for suspicion of non-accommodation than arises from the probability of A. O.'s not being able or willing to justify his conduct on those points of the Kuleat and Juzeat on which this Court demands satisfaction, in its prosecution of which demands from what has yet passed I see no ground to judge that its determination will be more severe than the discussions it demands may justify, and the enclosed

papers will teach you that its expectation of an accommodation of Kuleat is not so recent or unexpected by your letter as by the suppression of the letter we have been left to suppose.

While almost every day furnishes to my mind new cause to suspect A. O.'s honesty and sincerity it was with concern I read your opinion of distrust being carryd too far in the present instance, an opinion, which will, I hope, have yielded to the specific proof of his duplicity with which, agreeable to your desire, you have been furnished since your letter of the 12 instant.

Disposed as I am from what I have heard and seen of M. A. to cherish an esteem for him, it was with concern that I read the 3rd para of your favour of the 12th, whence I collected cause to repeat my late complaint of his not having favoured me with a sight of such parts at least of his letters to A. O. as might relate to me. Had he observed this rule I should have been enabled to prevent his having been involved in so great an injustice to himself and me, as seems to attend to the criminal timidity o' asserting my opinion as his rule on a point of literal construction in his own language, which seems to imply a much greater degree of unreserve on my part than he has lately given me credit for.

The exteme weakness of such a conduct is aggravated by the palpability of the perplexed style of the orders in question, acknowledged by you and represented to A. O. by Roy Royan and Ragoteem Row with M. A.'s knowledge and by his direction. If then such is the state of the intercourse between M. A. and A. O. that the former's awe of the latter forces him to have recourse to subterfuge and dissimulation in his acts of affairs here, how sorry must I be to add a distrust of him to that hitherto confined to his Superior. Here then is a new string added to those discordant ones which I have already had occasion to enumerate, and a new proof of the irreconcilableness of our rectitude with their indispensable obliquity, whence it happens that an intercourse with men free from our responsibilities and careless of consequences must be replete with infinite peril and vexation.

It is but too clear that we do not agree in our opinion of the powers originally and ultimately delegated to M. A. My sense of what they are or rather what they ought to be agreeable to his letter of credence and subsequent declaratory Instrument, has been already fully explained in this and former letters; but how far A. O. may find such a devolution of power suitable to his past conduct and future views or to his opinion of the principles and fidelity of M. A. must, I apprehend, to us remain a secret, but that the restricted sense in which they are now construed seems inadequate to a speedy or happy termination of his mission cannot be concealed, and is, I think, virtually admitted in your address to the Governor General of the 6 instant.

From what I have observed in the course of your late intercourse with A. O. and mine with M. A. the following inference is pretty clear, that the latter tho' extremely hurt by the conduct of the former and tho' he thinks his cause a bad one, yet is he too much over-awed by the character and power of the former to speak his mind freely or describe things truly, while goaded by the irksomeness of so awkward a predicament and pressed by the weight of responsibility he by occasionally unburthening himself to us attempts by anticipation to escape, at least in our opinion, any culpability that might be supposed to attach to the failure of his negotiations.

Under this conclusion it may be necessary to add, that tho' I think it requisite for your and the Governor General's just idea of the real state of things to make known to you M. A.'s communications, yet as from what you have related and what I have seen of his letters to A. O. it appears that he writes a very different style to that Minister, it does not seem expedient that M. A.'s sentiments or intimations conveyed thro' me should be imparted by you to the Minister as from him, which, instead of conducing to his support, would only tend to produce contradiction and inconsistency, and to increase the dissatisfaction and distrust that seems to have already taken too deep root between them.

On the 18 inst. Meer Allum sent for my perusal copies of Azim-ul-Omra last letter to him and his answer; in the latter, which I enclose, you will observe that whatever use he may judge proper to make of his powers he thinks them full and absolute with respect to the Juziat, an opinion that seems to be amply confirmed by the language which at the end of A. O.'s letter is repeated as coming from the Nizam's own mouth and in which there appears a difference from that of the Minister in the same letter; nor is it the first time I have had occasion to mention a similar appearance in the language of His Highness and his Minister.

With these letters M. A. sent me copy of one from the Peshwa to the Nazim of which I enclose translate and copy. You will observe that this is the answer to M. A.'s complaints of this Court's mode of introducing the subject of Kuleat without previous notice, and was, as you will collect from the enclosed copy of M. A.'s answer to A. O.'s last letter, furnished him by this Court. This important document appears by the enclosed copy of M. A.'s letter to the Minister to have been equally a secret to him as to us its production now, and may not only account for this Court's disapproval at his having no instructions thereon, which, in your letter of the 10, you seem at a loss to comprehend, but serves to awaken us to general views of this Government as founded on its engagements of concert, etc., with the Nazim, of which A. O. has hitherto thought proper to keep us in the dark, thereby endeavouring to convert us into the blind supporters of his suspicious conduct with respect to those engagements, in discussing which

this Court so invariably and so pointedly makes a difference between the Nazim and His Minister as seems to corroborate an idea, that has already been mentioned in my correspondence, of this Court's having some secret understanding with His Highness in the present negotiations independent of his Minister, nor is this idea weakened by that difference of language on the subject of M. A.'s Powers, which I have noticed, between His Highness and his Minister. If such an understanding does exist, I am disposed to think that even admitting M. A. not to be concerned in it, A. O. would find him very lukewarm in his endeavours to counteract it.

In answer to my enquiries through what channel the letter from the Nazim enjoining concert with Govinrow Bugwunt came, M. A. has acquainted me that it came from the Darul Ensha, whom I apprehend to be entirely under A. O.'s direction.

Since writing the above your favour of the 15 has reached me, and in reply to its 2nd para I take the liberty to enclose translate of that part of your Munshy's report, which gave rise to the mention in my letter to you of 9 inst. of A. O.'s declared intention to evade, and if that part included in a parenthesis conveys any other sense to your mind than a desire to evade the execution of the instrument, it is more than I have been able, after the most attentive consideration, to discover.

But as this point has now been very fully discussed as the Instrument has been actually delivered, (with what explanations the Peshwa and Meer Allum can be the only judges) and M. A. seems perfectly satisfied on the subject and no dissatisfaction seems to have been expressed on presenting the Declaration or subsequent thereto by the Peshwa's Ministers, and as the investigation of the matter relates more to future possible consequences than present evils, I shall be happy if no further occasion presents for the agitation of this subject, while for my own part I shall leave M. A. in full possession of his present persuasion of the amplitude of his powers, since to be undeceived by a view of A. O.'s limited sense of them might increase that distrust already too prevalent.

I see no other ground for preference to the assertions of our respective Ministers relative to the Guntoor business than arises from the circumstances of time and object under which they have been advanced.

As I have already submitted to you my opinion of the Peshwa's answer to my verbal representations and acquainted you with the communication made on that subject to M. A., it only remains for me to add that should any evil consequences be incident to that communication, I trust, it will be corrected by yours to A. O., tho' I confess that did mine convey a recommendation of prompt acquiescence in the just demands of this Court, even Kuleat as well as Juzeat, I should not have conceived it exceptionable.

No. 111—Malet considers Meer Allam's powers inadequate for the purposes of his mission.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 23rd September 1794.

Notwithstanding M. A.'s letter of credence and declaratory instrument, I cannot from what has past and from what has come to my knowledge on this first point of discussion look upon his powers in any other light than nugatory and inadequate to the ostensible purposes of his mission.

Negotiations about this Court's claims of arrears on the Adoni district have commenced.

No. 112—Malet writes to the G. G. of the warlike preparations started by the Peshwa.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—G. G.

Poona, 23rd September 1794.

From the attention which this Court pays to its warlike preparations it seems well acquainted with the axiom, that "the longest sword makes the best treaties".

Pursaram Bhou is expected here tomorrow, and some days since camel couriers arrived from the Nabob Tippu Sultan charged, as B. Pt. assures me, only with letters to Hurry Punt enquiring after his health, dispatched previous to the news of his death having reached Puttun.

No. 113—This is a copy of a letter from Meer Alam to Azim-ul-Omra containing the discussion of the Adoni claims.

25th September 1794.

Translate of a letter from M. A. to A. O. dated 27 Suffar (25 Sept.), copy of which was delivered to C. W. M. the same day.

On the 25th Suffur Govinrow Bugwunt and Bowanny Sunkur brought the following message from Ballajee Pundit (Nanna Furnaweese) that the negotiations should be commenced and a settlement be made, article by article, which was assented. Accordingly G. B. brought forward the demand of the Chout of Adoni and its dependencies, on which much disputation and a multiplicity of arguments *pro* and *con* ensued, which to enumerate would require volumes. I shall therefore rest satisfied with communicating the substance of what passed. In the first place G. B. used a great deal of superfluous argument in urging the claim of Chout and Sirdeysmooke of Adonee and its dependencies, in which in fact there was no difficulty. But the substance of all which was that the demands

were not fixed, but that the Chout and Sirdeysmukee would be taken accordingly to the account of the Akar ain (by which I understand the whole collected from the landholder without deduction of charges etc.). At length, however, under pretence of his desire of promoting His Highness's welfare he declared the claim to amount to 1,75,000 per annum exclusive of the Mukkassa of Doulutrou Goarpurra, and that arrears were due from the beginning of the year 1183 Fussulee to 1203 F. It was answered that the demand was admitted (after deducting the loss on Hoons etc.) in the manner that it had formerly been paid, but that on this point three things were to be settled: first, that the districts that had fallen into the possession Hyder Ally Khan should be admitted in deduction; second, the said Khan twice exacted money from Adoni on the plea of its having been assigned to him by Ragonath Row and Badjeerou Burwe, which should be deducted; third, that for the balance after these deductions Kists (instalments) would be assigned in which the balance for the past and the current yearly amount should be paid annually until the arrears were discharged. G. B. replyd that the districts taken possession of by Hyder Ally Khan belonged to Polyghars, and in like manner as peshkush was levyd on them by the Nazim kundnee (tribute) was annually levyd on them by the Peshwa. But the article 1,75,000 is confined to 5 districts and one fort, viz., the districts of Adoni, Raichore, Bennore, Kutal, Sednore and the fort of Suggur. The Polygher districts have no connexion with the said article. As to what was taken by Hyder Ally Khan it was taken by force, what connexion has it with the Peshwa's Chout and Sirdeysmukee, notwithstanding which, if the Nazim is possessed of any voucher either from H. A. K. or Raghunath Row, let it be exhibited that an answer may be given. As to kists, (periodical assignments), great sums of money, also jewels and effects to a great amount, have been lately conveyed from Raichore to the Nazim. Such being the case, how can the Peshwa after suffering merely from regard for His Highness, the Chout and Sirdeysmukee to remain unpaid for the space of 21 years, by which means great sums have been paid and are still paying to Soucars so that the balance becomes a ready money concern, assent to periodical assignments?

I controverted these points to the utmost but without any other effect than vexation. For Govind Bugwan' repeated with greater minuteness and prolixity the above answers. After all I replied that I would select the accounts and give an answer, on which Govind Bugwant took his leave.

The style of the Peshwa's Ministers' negotiations and their minuteness (Dikkut) are of that kind that is exhibited, and in the other Juzeat discussions that will occur they will in this style insist on minutiae. It is too obvious that the termination of the Juzeat discussions will be in this manner, not in the easy manner that was desirable. In fact every thing is known to you (A. O.), there is no occasion for the representation, and with respect to the Chout of Adonee and other Juzeat that may occur it is necessary to advert to the real state of the case (assil) as no eligible

termination will be effected by unmeaning controversy. (capping of verses). I have represented what I thought incumbent, and what you may think proper to direct shall be done.

No. 114.—*Translate of another letter from the same to the same of the same date and received the evening of the same day by C. W. M.*

As the Peshwa's ministers will not admit the deduction of the money exacted by H. A. K., nor of the country taken possession of by him, nor assent to periodical payments (kists), in this case the affair takes this appearance, that a deduction for the loss on Hoons be made on the annual sum of 1,75,000 Rs., and that for the balance effects such as elephants and camels and the rest money be given. But tho' I have given G. B. to understand that it would be agreed to in the manner it used to be paid, by which I mean part in effects part in money, yet we are to learn what objections they make to effects.

At all events the settlement of Adoni takes place according to the above or a plain answer should be given "that without admitting the above three articles a settlement will not be made." Unless one of these modes is adopted every thing that can be said will be endless and useless (capping of verses) without any good consequence. On this head whatever you order will be done; either assent to the above settlement or a plain answer. This is represented for your information.

No. 115—Malet writing to Kirkpatrick expresses his conviction of the sincerity of the Poona Court for a peaceful accommodation of the dispute and urges Kirkpatrick to persuade the Nizam to satisfy its demands equitably.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 27th September 1794.

From your having again mentioned the circumstances of the difference in your communication to A. O. from mine to M. A. on the subject of this Court's answer to my last verbal representations, I have referred to the Durbar's answer and my communication, and on comparison find them so fully accordant that I could not wish to substitute one word in lieu of the present, and I humbly presume that in being the channel of this Court's formal declaration (unconnected as that office was with its suspected or imputed designs) it would have been wrong in me to have omitted pointing out the stress laid by this Court on M. A.'s plenipotentiary character, or to have passed over unnoticed its preference of an amicable termination as conveyed in its explicit disavowal of intended hostility on satisfaction being given by an equitable accommodation.

Dropping, therefore, for the present all discussion of designs to which this Court has itself prescribed the remedy, it will at least be admitted that by its solemn declaration of their extent an opening is clearly afforded to the Nizam's Govt. of fixing on this Court the stigma of injustice, should it prevaricate, by such a prompt and fair prosecution of the wished for accommodation of both Kuleat and Juzeat as is acknowledged by the Peshwa's ministers to be their sole object. But I cannot help confessing to you that there appears to me a backwardness and a desire on the part of His Highness's Government, that is incompatible with a good cause and still more so with his want of power to support a bad one.

It was not my wish to have troubled you further on the subject of our different modes of communicating this Court's answer to A. O. and M. A., but your repetition of the subject and the degree of importance that you seem to attribute to the difference of our communications has rendered this explanation necessary, and will, I think, prove satisfactory. In the mean time tho' I may be sorry for the difference that has occurred on such an occasion, I shall flatter myself with the persuasion that no evil consequences will insue.

The circumstances that you mention of Bijapore and Nalgonda were known to me, and as I have already acquainted you with my resolution to avoid future enquiries of M. A. that may not be absolutely necessary, it would not perhaps be consistent with that rule to apply to him for the authenticity of what has been repeated to you regarding those plans or relative to the first cause of the personal enmity of the Ministers of the two States. Certain it seems to be that no cause can have been antecedent to the evasion of this Court's demands, which, amongst a variety of other reasons, I sincerely lament as involving now the public acknowledgment of most obnoxious claims that should never have been suffered to become the subject of public description, or if suffered to go that length should have been prepared to be encountered with more incontrovertible* arguments than those which His Highness's ministers seem possessed and which at some future period we may probably find it necessary to urge.

But tho' I may not think it proper to consult M. A. as to the origin of offence, I may venture to repeat his opinion of this Minister as communicated to me in one of our conversations, that he did not seem a man likely to become an aggressor (which it is not probable he would have given had he known the contrary), an opinion worth while to compare with your own of A. O. and with what has actually come under your own observation.

After what has been already said on the subject of M. A's powers and the modes of restricting them adopted by your Court, which I trust will suffice to give Government a true idea of that whole subject, and of the competency of his powers to answer the end proposed of a speedy and an

* incontrovertible.

amicable termination of the present dispute, permit me to assure you, without troubling you with any further investigation of the conformity of A. O.'s instructions to M. A. on the point of verbal explanation of the written Declaratory Instrument with your idea thereof, that I think all those explanations (even admitting them for argument's sake, tho' I doubt the fact, to have been made by M. A. in as full a manner as mentioned in your letter of 7th) both nugatory and evasive, nugatory as inadequate to cancel a written instrument, evasive as being directed to such an attempt.

The consequences of these restrictions are yet to be developed, and you will have learnt from my last that by Meer Allum's reference of the first point that has fallen under discussion to A. O.'s judgment he has taken the earliest opportunity of letting this Government know that the Declaratory Instrument is to be a nullity.

By the enclosed copies of notes to and from M. A. you will observe the circumspection that experience has taught me to be necessary, and a deviation from which with a man whose powers are so restricted would not only be futile, but, by subjecting my opinion to the same referential dependence as M. A.'s, might not be suitable to the character I hold.

By the enclosed papers of intelligence you will collect some appearance of that discordance which was to be apprehended from the multiplicity of A. O.'s intelligence, each actuated by different motive, and few, I fear, proof against the offers or insinuations of art and intrigue.

No. 116—Shore authorizes Malet to proceed as far as he could for the purpose of effecting an accommodation without hazarding a rupture between the Peshwa and the Company.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET.

Fort William, 28th September 1794.

I entirely approve the style and manner as well as the substance of your communications with Meer Allum and the Peshwa, and I am happy in the confidence that, if the negotiations at Poona should ultimately succeed, it will be greatly due to the ability of your interposition.

The general principle of our interference to prevent hostilities between the Nizam and the Peshwa cannot be changed, and I can only say in conformity to it, that for the purpose of effecting an accommodation between the two States I authorize you to proceed as far as you can, without hazarding a rupture or any serious disagreement between the Peshwa and the Company.

In the present uncertainty of the extent of the Maratta claims and the cautious reserve maintained by the Minister I confess I do not see the

means by which an accommodation can be promoted ; I must leave it therefore to your discretion to take advantage of occurrences under the preceding restrictions to forward this desirable object.

If hostilities should actually take place between the Peshwa and the Nizam, I would recommend to you to remain with the Person of the Peshwa as long as he continues within his own territories, but not to proceed beyond them into those of the Nizam without His Highness's consent. In this respect however, I leave it to your own judgment to adopt my suggestion to remain at Poona.

If the Nizam should delegate plenipotentiary powers to Meer Allum he will naturally be more inclined to avail himself of your advice. Your sense of the delicacy of our situation will point out to you, in all cases, the necessary caution to be observed.

Since writing the above I have received your letter of the 26th ultimo enclosing copy of your letter of the same date to the Resident at Hyderabad. As I deem it wholly inconsistent with the principles of impartiality and good faith which we profess to suffer the Poona Court to remain under any suspicion of our taking a part with the Nizam, I have to request, that if any such idea should have been entertained by them in consequence of the intended destination of the troops to Madras, you will lose no time in removing it by an explicit declaration of our real intentions, and by a communication of our subsequent determination to postpone the measure.

You will observe that I have thought it necessary to put the names used in this letter in cypher, and I recommend to you to do the same whenever the nature of your communications may suggest the propriety of it.

I have directed such parts of your correspondence as can be of use to Major Palmer, to be communicated for his information.

No. 117—Malet informs the G. G. that the powers delegated to Meer Alam were not adequate and that reports were being circulated by interested parties about the British objecting to the Nizam's discharging the demands of the Peshwa.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 30th September 1794.

I had the honour to address you the 27th inst. when it escaped me to acknowledge receipt of your commands of the 1st, which gave me the real happiness of learning that my conduct in the first stages of promoting your wishes of effecting an accommodation between this Court and the Nizam had been thought worthy your approval, which, my consciousness of having acted for the best, induces me to hope will be extended to the

subsequent steps by which I have endeavoured to prosecute so desirable an object.

You will, however, Hon'ble Sir, have long since learned that the delegatory powers of M. A. are not understood by his Court to be so ample as could be wished or as we had been taught to expect, which tends to confirm the ground there is to think that A. O. would be much better pleased to evade than to settle the demands of this Court.

I hear nothing yet of Ragojee Bhosla's equipment. Tukojee Holcar has certainly crossed the Nurbudda, but his future movements seem doubtful and the state of his force is not very impressive of respect. Jeajee Bucshy had not reached Ugen by the latest accounts, and in my humble opinion much doubt may be entertained of any formidable part of the Sindean force ever reaching this place from that quarter in which we have yet to look for the consequences of the late change of Doulut Rou's ministry, and the shock that will thereby be given to the credit of the Sindean Power, not only in the councils of the different Rajas and Chieftains of those parts but in the opinion of the Sindean officers themselves, placed as they are at the head of armies not unequal to the task of disputing the validity of the acts of the present ministry.

This state of things is doubtless highly favourable to the Nazim's cause, and the beneficial effect of it on his administration cannot have been prejudiced by that exposition of dangers possibly incident to hostilities conveyed in my friendly representations. I am sorry, however, to say that founded on the appearance of our friendship for His Highness a report has reached me through a very respectable channel that we object to the Nazim's discharging this Court's demands, tho' from my pointed declaration to the Minister that we wished not by recommending peace to subject this Court to the smallest loss of property and honour, the Durbar ought to be convinced of its falsity, calculated, as it seems to be, to promote settlement advantageous to the Nazim at some expense of our fair dealing.

As the report of our encouraging the Nizam's rejection of this Court's demands is actually circulated by people of condition about the Durbar, I attribute its rise either to the art of the Nizam's Cabinet, or to the Durbar feeling a consciousness of some resentment being due to its rejection of our good offices, and this being the mode that most readily occurred to them, they of course attribute it to us. At all events, should circumstances enable Azim al Omra to beat down their demands, or to evade them entirely, their having declined our good offices leaves them no ground of complaint against us or to us. I am persuaded that had the Nazim spent half the money skilfully amongst the Sics and the Northern Rajas that he so foolishly threw away on Mhadjee Sindea, he might have stirred up a flame in the North that would have endangered the fabric of the Marratta Power there.

No. 118—Shore writing to Malet expresses a hope that the Resident's mediation may succeed if introduced in a friendly way.

FROM—SHORE, G. G.,

TO—SIR C. W. MALET, BART., RESIDENT AT POONA.

Fort William, 1st October 1794.

I cannot too strongly recommend to you to press upon Meer Allum the necessity of the most particular and unreserved communications to his own Court, not only of the details of his negotiations, but of his opinion on whatever may occur in the course of them. This is on every ground indispensably requisite.

If in the course of your discussion with the Poona Court, the Minister should wish to know my sentiments whether we are bound to take a part with one of our allies if in consequence of hostilities between them Tippoo should avail himself of the occasion to attack either the Nizam or Marrattas, it may be proper to waive a direct reply and inform the Minister that you are not prepared to answer the question without a reference to me.

The sentiments contained in the 5th paragraph of your letter of the 6th ultimo expressed the true principle of our interference, which ought never to be departed from, and I concur with you in thinking that although the Court of Poona may show a disinclination to our interposition to obviate the appearance of any authoritative influence, a pacific termination to the present discussion may be considerably promoted by a knowledge of our wishes intimated only in the friendly terms of good-will to our common allies and regard to our own security which have regulated, and will continue to regulate, our amicable mediation on this occasion. It certainly ought not to be pressed longer than there are grounds to believe it will be beneficial, nor in a mode to subject this Government to discredit.

No. 119—Shore asks Kirkpatrick to explain to the Nizam the principles and limitations of the interposition of his Government, that he might not entertain false hopes of support.

FROM—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fort William, 1st October 1794.

Your reply to Azeem-ul-Omra, that in the expostulation made by Sir C. Malet the utmost had been done that he could expect from us, was perfectly proper and agreeable to the general tenor of my instructions.

I am fully sensible of the caution you have observed in your communications with the Court of Hyderabad. The repetition of my instructions on this subject was not founded on any part of your conduct, but on the consideration that our interposition between the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad has a natural tendency to implicate us even by imperceptible degrees. This reflection suggested the recollection of a principle which cannot be too carefully observed.

I enclose for your information a copy of my letter of this date to the Resident at Poona, wherein I have strongly recommended to him to press upon Meer Allum the necessity of the most particular and unreserved communications not only of the details of his negotiations, but of his opinion on whatever may occur in the course of them.

I observe with pleasure several instances in which your sentiments have anticipated the opinion expressed in my letter of the 18th ultimo.

You are so thoroughly acquainted with the principles of our interposition for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between the Nizam and the Peshwa as well as the limitations under which it is made, that I do not think it necessary to remark on the various details in your correspondence with the Resident at Poonah. With these principles and limitations in view, I rely with perfect confidence on your efforts and those of Sir C. W. Malet to promote the accomplishment of what we have undertaken as favourable circumstances may occur for the purpose, and although I am thoroughly convinced the Nizam will never be able to secure his independence if hostilities should take place between him and the Marrattas, the extent of his concessions cannot be prescribed by us but must be left to his own judgment and decision.

If the Marrattas should proceed to extremities against the Nizam it can only be, I think, with a resolution to annihilate the independency of his authority, for notwithstanding the sense which they may entertain of their superiority in the field, I see nothing in the articles disputed between the two States, as far as they have appeared, that does not admit of adjustment or of sufficient magnitude to induce them to incur the risques of war. The preparations of the Nizam are necessary for his own safety and may contribute to suspend the Peshwa's resolution.

It is proper that the principles and limitations of our interference should be clearly understood both by the Nizam and Peshwa, and your explanations leave no room for misconception on this point. It would be equally improper that the Marhattas should have reason to apprehend our taking a part with the Nizam as that the latter should have reason to rely upon any such expectations. Instead of availing ourselves of that policy, which is too frequent to foment the existing disputes, we have shown our disposition to reconcile them, and the reflections of the Nizam and Peshwa at a future period must do justice to the impartiality of our conduct, although the feelings of the Nizam may now suggest to him

that we have done too little in his favour, and those of the Peshwa that we have done more than was required.

The forced construction put upon Lord Cornwallis's declaration has been properly and sufficiently explained, but if a future discussion should be unavoidable it may be necessary to add to what has already been said upon this subject, that if we had been previously informed without any reservation of the policy which the Nizam meant to pursue, and of the means by which it was proposed to obtain the object of it, our advice would have saved him from the dilemma in which he is now involved. It has frequently been communicated to him and subsequent events have justified the apprehensions which his measures naturally suggested.

No. 120—Malet writes to the G. G. about the unfavourable state of the negotiations.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, FORT WILLIAM.

Poona, 4th October 1794.

The enclosed copy of my address to the Resident at Bidder will convey to you in pretty strong colours the unfavourable state of the negotiations between this Court and the Nazim, the causes of which are equally lamentable and extraordinary, and for which, unless very different measures are soon adopted than have hitherto been pursued, I see no probable remedy.

No. 121—Malet speaks of the disrespectful conduct of Meer Allum's servants at Poona, thus unnecessarily offending the Poona Ministers.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—W. KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 4th October 1794.

Meer Allum's newspapers and the accompanying papers will convey to you, that his embassy is falling in a state of extreme discredit, not only by his want of the common powers of a ministerial character but by the imprudence of his people, whose language, I am told, is more obnoxious than their conduct, as they scruple not to boast in public that they will soon slaughter bullocks and cows in Poona.

It gave me much pleasure to find my memoranda of the Ellora Caves had not been unacceptable to you ; my indisposition at the time prevented their being more worthy of your notice. A copy was sent to Sir John

Shore which he was pleased to submit to the notice of the Society, but it is my intention to furnish him with one more worthy his and the Society's inspection, illustrated with drawings and plans. Mr. Wales, an European artist now with me, likewise has thought of paying a visit to Ellora, and adding to his already valuable collection the drawings of those Caves. I saw but one inscription that had the appearance of antiquity.

No. 122—Malet expresses his disgust with A. O. for having slighted his interposition with the Poona Ministers and for his evasive methods of conducting the negotiations.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Poona, 4th October 1794.

Had Azim-ul-Omra a spark of fairness in his composition he would not treat the friendly and disinterested countenance that he has received from us with so much slight, nor do I think the point, of having ascertained the extent of this Court's designs and thereby given the Nazim's ministry an opportunity of preventing hostility by fair negotiation or of throwing the odium of falsehood and injustice on this Court by deviating from its solemn declarations, so insignificant as your Minister affects to think, particularly when we advert to the real moderation and comparative satisfactoriness of their language to that held in the first stages of our interposition. But notwithstanding A. O. thus pretends to slight the effects of our interposition in his Master's behalf in a cause, the whole appearance of justice in which hitherto rests in favour of this Court, I am disposed to think he has greater reliance on it than he would wish to acknowledge in the prosecution of the evasive system that he is evidently practising. For, in addition to the suppression of this Court's letter plainly demanding an explanation of the Kuleat both from us and Meer Allum when the latter could have been very little advanced from Bidder, I learn by the enclosed papers communicated to me by M. A. on the 1st and 2nd instant, that neither is any written answer intended to be given to the letter containing that demand, nor is M. A. authorized to notice it, and that with every possible disinclination to satisfy this Court on the subject of Kuleat. The Adoni article of Juzeat (being the first that has been brought forward) instead of being decided on, is by the answer to Meer Allum's reference subjected to new discussion and further reference, without suggesting any new arguments and notwithstanding M. A.'s explicit declaration that he had exhausted his, and that further controversy would be fruitless.

This seems a mode of procrastination by which this Court (even should circumstances render hostilities objectionable to it) will be reduced to

the necessity of adopting coercive measures not only in support of its rights but of its honour after its declarations to us, and leads me to repeat the concern expressed in an early stage of M. A.'s mission at not being more particularly acquainted with his instructions, which would have given us a clear idea of the points in dispute and amongst the rest of the Adoni claim, in liquidating which I have learnt from M. A. he was ordered by A. O. not to exceed 50,000 rupees per annum, but making up the arrears at that rate to discharge them by the annual payment of that sum in addition to the same current sum for the future, making a sum of 1,00,000 per annum till the arrears were liquidated, and then to be continued at 50,000 per annum. On the other hand, this Court demands arrears in ready money—as the Nazim has seized the property of the late Nabob Darajah,—at 1,75,000 rupees per annum, being a mitigated settlement granted as an indulgence by Madarow in lieu of the Sirdeysmookkee and actual Choute or 4th, and in addition to the arguments officially stated by M. A. relative to Hyder's exactions and seizures this Court observed that, if even this reduced sum of 1,75,000 rupees per annum was exceptionable, they would rest contented with the establishment of their ancient claim of Choute on the present territorial collections.

I leave you to judge whether had this subject been ingenuously explained to you previous to M. A.'s leaving Bidder you would not have represented the absurdity of orders, that amount to an absolute preclusion of all accommodation, and I am inclined to think that it is to points like this that M. A. alludes in the translates of his letters, enclosed in mine of 27th ulto., when he so strongly urges A. O. to advert to the origin of things and the real matter of fact in preference to the introduction of frivolous cavilling, and that he thereby meant, as he dared to recommend, acquiescence in this Court's demand in opposition to the letter of the abovementioned extraordinary orders, the irreconcilableness of which with his own ideas of right and this Court's claim very fully explain the difference of difficulty between his present negotiations and those conducted with our Government.

By what has already passed on the first article of discussion you will have very clearly collected, that instead of the ultimate reference for approval, which you seem to think was the object of His Highness's ministry, they mean that every intermediate point of controversy shall be matter of reference, as is fully explained in the enclosures.

With respect to A. O.'s idea of what this Court should have done in consequence of my representation, I think it necessary to observe that had he shown that respect for our advice in discharging this Court's claims which he seems to think they should in prosecuting their rights, things would not have come to the present crisis, in which our solicitude for His Highness's welfare, howsoever shifting A. O. may be pleased to think it,

is either by act or accident become a serious object of speculation, if not alarm, to this Government.

As in your 7th paragraph of the same letter the Nazim assumes considerable merit with us for his alacrity in acceding to the late war against Tippo, permit me to remind you of His Highness's acknowledgment to your predecessor that hostilities against that Prince had been previously designed by him in concert with this Court, so that our becoming a party in the same cause was the most fortunate event that would have occurred for His Highness, and may be supposed to have operated at least as forcibly as the spring of action now assumed by him.

You will perceive by the enclosed copy of a message from M. A. that his uneasinesses are not confined to the very awkward circumstances of his negotiations. The great guns at which this Court has taken umbrage certainly seem to have been very unnecessary to the splendour of an embassy, and the super-abundant tone of M. A.'s equipment is disagreeably contrasted by the narrowness of his powers like an inflated body without energy. I knew not that this Court had excepted to his retaining the military part of his retinue till this morning, which, I apprehend, has been caused by some broils between them and the people here.

Having reperused my letter to you of the 21st ultimo the following expression seems liable to the construction of inconsistency with what I have had occasion to mention of M. A.'s general disgust, "M. A. seems perfectly satisfyd on the subject", by which I meant that he had not expressed any dissatisfaction to me on the subject of his powers from the time that he received the specific assent to execute the Declaratory Instrument.

But tho' no exception was made by him at the time that permission was granted to pass that Instrument, yet he on receipt of the enclosed answer to the Adoni reference expressed to me much chagrin on the extreme indecision and the narrowness of the instructions contained in it, the evasive spirit of which, will, I think, fully account to you for his manifest disinclination to assume a greater latitude. At all events it seems necessary, however exceptionable it may be, to give such advice to His Highness's Ministers that the Nazim's honour and credit can only be consulted by making his embassy respectable by its efficiency or by recalling it. For M. A. with the copy of his answer just received and now enclosed has frankly told me, that from the tenor of his last letters on the Adoni subject he has nothing to do in future but to assent to anything that may be prescribed, in which style you will observe his present answer is couched.

By what is mentioned on the subject of your apparent preference of limited powers to M. A. in the 6th paragraph of my letter of 21st, I meant that [as] you knew his Juzeat powers were limited and [as] you also know

your Court's extreme backwardness in giving ear to this Court's demands on the Kuleat subject, which certainly give that subject the appearance of greater importance than the other,—the sum of your message contained in the abovementioned paragraph, involved a preference of limited powers.

Without troubling you further on our interpretation of the word (Persian letters) which I do not think very different, I dare say you will, with me, have been concerned to observe that A. O.'s restrictive orders to M. A. are not confined in letter or spirit to the formality of final reference, tho' even that form further than for the express purpose of ratification would have been dangerous in the hands of such a man as A. O.

Ignorant as I am of the nature of this Court's Kuleat claims, I can only say, that if it has just grievances on those claims its right to demand satisfaction is indisputable, and if A. O.'s obliquities have reduced him to the miserable dilemma you suspect between this Court and our Govt., perhaps he may be necessitated to follow the example of a similar politician (I think Amadeus of Sardinia) who had so bewildered and entangled himself in intrigues as to admit of no liberation but by abdication.

If A. O. really is involved in so disagreeable a dilemma, it would, I presume, have been better to have explained to us in a frank and manly way the extent of his difficulties than thus long to have amused himself and abused us with mystery, reserve and undignified evasion. Our honest and disinterested friendship demanded at least this moderate return.

No. 123—The Nizam gives up his stand of having claims on the Poona Court counterbalancing theirs, and urges the merit of his attachment to the English for intervening in his behalf.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Poona, 11th October 1794.

With respect to the probability of presents being intended by Tipoo for this Court mentioned in your letter of 10th instant to the Governor General, I at present see no public reasons for such a compliment unless it be in consequence of an intercourse by letter and emissaries that has been some time on foot through the Farkia family, and in the course of which I think it very probable that this Court, notwithstanding its disavowal of all negotiation, may have adopted such conciliatory measures with respect to its claim of Chouth on that Prince as may have been best suited to prevent interruption from that quarter

in its meditated designs against your Court as mentioned in my letter to you of 16th August, and may also have drawn from him (Tippo) a complimentary present, tho' at the same time it is not improbable but that the late letter and present to Dadjee Furkia may have given rise to the report.

From the same letter it appears that the reciprocity of pecuniary demands which the Nabob had on all occasions boldly assumed as far amounting to a balance of accounts between him and this Government, is now abandoned; nay His Highness acknowledges, that it will be impossible for him to comply with the amount of this Court's reserved fourth in the single article of Bidder, if fully insisted on. This certainly conveys a very serious imputation on the honesty of His Highness's communication to us at a time when he was requiring so much from our friendship.

The subject of your letter of the 4th being founded on conjectures of this Court's designs leaves me only to repeat that however reasonable the most extensive conjectures with respect to its ambition may be, yet was no ground afforded thereby to deviate from the full extent and spirit of its formal declaration and its intentions in * * * as I was the mediatory channel of their communication.

It happens very unfortunately that A. O., who is now so strenuously urging the merits of attachment to us and of his endeavours to emancipate his master from dependence on this Government, is the very man who executed the treaty of Edgheer, on the mysterious contents of which the supposition of conditions inimical to our interests and his Master's independence is founded.

I apprehend, however, that the ground for greater urgency of our interposition would require a much firmer base for the Nizam's resistance of the exceptionableness of this Court's demands, since in my humble opinion the tenor of M. A.'s letters that conveyed the Adoni demand to his Master implied a strong persuasion of the right of this Court.

I have not heard from M. A. since my last so that I am of course ignorant of the state or progress of his negotiations, but observing from my newspapers that he has put off an intended conference with the Peshwa's Ministers on the plea of indisposition, I conclude he is still practising the favourite system of procrastination, as the nature of his powers precludes all benefit from a more frequent intercourse. I do not lament his silence on subjects that will of course be communicated to you by A. O. I am induced to avoid all appearance of solicitude for greater intimacy at the risk of increasing this Court's jealousy that might be generally prejudicial, if unbalanced by any efficient or specific benefit, to His Highness's affairs in the grand object of accommodation, of which were there any prospect it would doubtless be pursued by M. A.

No. 124—Malet controverts Kirkpatrick's argument that the Poona Court was pressing its demands to the point of extremity without consideration of right or wrong. Discussions pursued so far showed, he adds, that its case was based on right and justice.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 21st October 1794.

Nothing appears to me in the conduct of this Court to ground the very unlimited opinion of inevitable hostility conveyed in your letter, that the misunderstanding of the two Courts is too inveterate to yield either to considerations of prudence or of justice, and if any attention whatever is to be paid to this Durbar's formal declaration to me, no charge either of unreasonableness or injustice can be alleged against its intentions ; while as to its actual demands, the arguments on the only one hitherto agitated are, as you justly observe, unanswered by the Nizam's Ministers.

I apprehend I cannot be singular in thinking that A. O. has treated our good offices with slight, to which, I am sorry, they should have been exposed in behalf of a character whose unfeelingness of the obligation forces me to regret the necessity of pursuing even a good object in such bad company, that certainly exposes us to endless vexation, if not danger.

After the explanation furnished of the Adoni claim in my letter of the 4th, I have very little doubt of M. A.'s alluding to the origin of that claim where he urges to A. O. to advert to the origin or as you render it " consider of the root ", since the repeated evasions of these pecuniary demands have been the origin or root of all the enmities and difficulties that now prevail ; at all events A. O.'s conjecture as to the meaning of M. A.'s exhortation is inadmissible with respect to a demand the justice of which he had not been able to controvert, and consequently more descriptive of his own disposition to carry matters by foul means than of the Marrattas being manifestly bent on carrying them in their own way further than the right of that way might justify them.

I agree perfectly with you in the scantiness of our material to form a judgment on the general cause of our respective Courts, not doubting but that you will as readily agree that everything that has yet transpired (and concealment is not very favorable to your minr. as to the rest) is in favour of the right of this party, while as to the point of A. O.'s making his application to us in promoting his ends a rule of conduct for this Court in pursuing theirs, I humbly presume that by the same rule that he was free to adopt they are at liberty to reject such a line of conduct, in which the behaviour of both is fully accounted for by their respective predicaments.

As to the disagreeable circumstances of M. A.'s retinue, it seems the guns had on his first advance been left by this Court's desire a few miles from the city notwithstanding which they were subsequently brought forward, which, added to the awkward circumstances of accidental affrays and vaunting language, must be allowed to have been justly exceptionable to the administration of this Government, if not to the security of a town entirely open and on a declivity from the place where M. A.'s force was encamped.

It would certainly be very improper that we should suffer the important discussions in which we are engaged to degenerate into a dispute on words. Without therefore troubling you any further on our different interpretation of the word whether A. O. meant to acknowledge that evasion was his object or not, I trust, Government is possessed of sufficient materials to judge not only of what he meant to do but has actually done on the point of M. A.'s powers.

I entirely agree in the propriety of your idea that we are not to expect the conduct of native statesmen to be regulated by principles of true dignity or candour, but surely we may expect, that if they have been engaged in fabricating plans to our annoyance, as you suppose to be the case in the treaty of Edgheer,* that they should not have the effrontery to claim the merit of being entirely actuated by the purest and most disinterested friendship towards us on all occasions.

Nothing worthy notice has been communicated to me by M. A. since my letter of the 14th, but for some days there appeared a relaxation in the urgency with which this Court's preparations had been carrying on. The report of the intended erection of the Peshwa's tent on the Dussera has proved groundless, nor has the movement of Kundoo Withal yet taken place. It is not within my reach to account for this apparent lull, but from the style of these people's negotiations it would imply no great violation of probability to impute them to the influence of some secret intrigues, by which M. A. may have gained friends whose good offices may derive weight from the arguments of difficulty arising from the embarrassed state of the Sindiean force in the north, and the possible danger of our being ultimately drawn into the quarrel, the apprehension of which (notwithstanding my assurances) must have weight in the breast of this Minister as the articles of the Edgheer Treaty are really hostile to us, and he will naturally suppose they have been discovered to us by A. O. with a recantation of their object to procure our support in his breach of them toward this Court.

I am induced to lay the greater stress on this cause of the lull as I have heard of no public conferences between M. A. and the ministers of this Court that could have produced it, but since yesterday reports have

* See appendix.

again reached me that the symptoms of discordance are recurring, which (pursuing still the clue of conjecture) may possibly be owing to some drawing upon A. O.'s part as he may perceive relaxation on this, but whatever prospects A. O. may have, it is to be hoped that, should a probability of accommodation present, he will not, by straining it too far, expose the peace of India or the respectability of his Master's Government to further danger, and I sincerely hope that he will be sufficiently communicative to you to enable you to form some judgment of what we have to expect.

No. 125—Malet writes to Kirkpatrick that the Nizam appeared to be evading satisfaction of the Peshwa's claims by availing himself of the disturbances in Sindia's Northern provinces.

* * * * *

you will observe that confusions have taken place in the Sindian affairs in the North ; Gopal Bhau has taken refuge in De Boigne's camp, and Jivba Dada Bucsby had not, by the last advices reached Ugin, nor, as I am told, intended marching from the neighbourhood of Mundesore till joined by the regular brigade, of which I see but very little probability, and even should that take place (about three lines torn). * * *

* * * * *

cannot be calculated more than four months. In the interim there is a talk of detaching bodies of troops toward His Highness's frontiers, I have * * * you heard of Parashuram Bhau's having been introduced somehow or other into the negotiations, but whether in a legitimate or precarious way has not reached me, nor will I hope A. O.'s experience in the affair of Mahadji Sindia permit of his laying great stress on the good offices of Parashuram Bhau further than may be perfectly suitable to his advantage and convenience.

No. 126—Malet writes that however obnoxious the claims of the Poona Court might appear, they happened to be based on treaties, and in insisting on their fulfilment that Court was in no way going beyond treaties.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT WITH THE NIZAM.

Poona, 25th October 1794.

On the 24th I had a meeting with Balaji Pundit on the occasion of a visit of condolence, when he entered on the subject of the present discussions between this Court and yours in such a manner as gave me some reason to think that this Court is actually disposed to accommodate, but that the obstacles originating with A. O. are insurmountable. In the course of conversation he asked, why we should not advise him to adopt conciliatory

measures ; I replied that however well inclined we might be to repeat our exhortations on that head, yet the silence of this Court by depriving us of all knowledge of the justice of the cause of the parties, precluded all possible ground for urging any point of accommodation to A. O., who might reasonably impute the whole blame of irreconciliation to this Government without our being able to say a syllable in consideration of it by its having declined not only the use of our good offices with the Nazim's Government but all communication of its rights and claims.

You will observe, that this language, while it exposed to this Government its past coldness, is calculated to give an opening for any thing that it may wish to advance in future, and of which I should not fail to make the best possible application by the latitude granted in the Governor General's commands of the 18th September.

I do not recollect any direct exposition of the Kulcat subject being made to us by A. O. ; on the contrary, his suppression of the Peshwa's fresh mention of that subject conveyed a strong trait of very exceptionable concealment of that important point.

You may recollect, that relative to the Adoni districts seized by Hyder Ally this Court urges that they were only tributary ones to Bussalatjung, from which this Court also collected a tribute in common with the Adoni Government, consequently were not included in the districts of Adoni tributary to this Government. Beside, you may recollect, in the explanation of this claim conveyed to you in my letter of the 4th instant it is mentioned, that the sum of 1,75,000 rupees per annum was a settlement of indulgence, which this Court was again ready to commute for the ancient actual Choute on the districts as possessed by His Highness's Government. This explanation will, I presume, induce you to think A. O.'s requiring a writing in proof of the extent of the Adoni Chout or on what districts it was collected as rather the appearance of cavil than solid argument.

The reports of equipment and of the march of troops are again warmly circulated. But as I have received no communication from M. A. of the state of his negotiations I am totally in the dark as to their progress or the grounds of these rumours.

The enclosure in your * * * * letter to me dated 4th March 1790 will convey ample information of the Nazim's intended attack of Tippu previous to and independent of our proposal of hostilities—Consequently irrefragable proof of the disingenuousness of the motives assumed in his professions to you on the 16th ultimo.

From the serious consequences attributed by you in your letter to the Governor General to the accomplishment of the Kuleat in which your sentiments must, I presume, be founded on the supposition of the contents of the treaty of Edgheer, the ascertainment and explanation of which become of course highly desirable either from A. O. or through any other

channel for the purpose of enabling Government to take a full and distinct view of the important political predicament and contingencies attributed to that mysterious instrument, which, if of the complexion that you suppose, would argue full as great a degree of folly and subservience to this Court at that time in His Highness's present confidential servants as in any of their predecessors alluded to by His Highness in his conversation of the 16th ultimo. If such a covenanted subservience has been submitted to by His Highness's ministers, we are reduced to the disagreeable necessity by their folly of acknowledging this Court's right in insisting on it, however obnoxious its success therein may be to our interests, and however necessary its counteraction may be rendered by considerations of political expediency or the indispensableness of self-preservation.

The circumstance above mentioned of Balajee Pandit's advance to me gives ground as observed to hope that this Court, influenced by whatever motives, is not at present indisposed to accommodation, a spirit, that, should it be proved to exist, will not, I trust, be overcome by A. O.'s exultation on the appearance of unexpected liberation from the hard grip of this Court's power, for by the same rule that one train of circumstances may have induced a spirit of accommodation, so in the event of its being slighted another may lead to a resumption of ancient claims with increased rigour and confirmed animosity.

No. 127—Malet in his letter to Kirkpatrick expresses surprise at A. O. having resumed the channel of Govindrao Kale to prosecute the negotiations with the Poona Court, thus discrediting the embassy of Meer Allum.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT OF HYDERABAD.

Poona, 28th October 1794.

M. A.'s last letter to A. O. contains nothing material but a confirmation of the stagnation of the negotiations.

To a person less informed than yourself much might be said on the extraordinary trait of A. O.'s resuming the channel of the Govindrao to prosecute his negotiations with this Court, thereby perfecting with his own hand the discredit to which the conspicuous embassy of Meer Allum has been unfortunately subjected both from his own Court and this.

What appears particularly objectionable in the language of your Court is that under such an obnoxious act as you suppose the treaty of Edgheer to be, (and its concealment certainly justifies every suspicion), its merits should be so incessantly obtruded on us in contradistinction to His Highness's former administrations, and thereon claims assumed on us to assist

in emancipating them from chains forged very probably with their own hands, the moral for political justifiableness of breaking which can only be judged of from a knowledge of the engagements between the parties, while prescription at least on the part of this Government gives a palpable right incontrovertible by any argument but the war *ultima Ratio Regum**, the justifiableness of the Nizam's having recourse to which on the sole ground of polence to enforce it (right out of the question) must, I presume, be equally doubtful to you and me.

Some additional light is thrown on Govinrou's late secret audience of the Nizam and A. O.'s cheerfulness by M. A.'s enclosed communications. I am however glad to find, that the present appearances however flattering are not likely to lead A. O. into a dangerous relaxation of his military preparations, on which alone must he and all this State's neighbours depend for their security against its restless spirit and unbounded ambition.

No. 128—Meer Aluzo reports to the Nizam's Minister the progress of his negotiations at Poona.

31st October 1794.

Translation of a letter from M. A. to A. O., dated Poona 6 Rubbeeal-Sane, 31st October 1794.

On the 4 Rubbeeal Sane Govinrou Bugwunt paid me a visit, and having first apologized for his late delay in waiting on me proceeded to assure me of his sincere wish to settle the present discussions happily. I expressed my hopes that these assurances were not merely words, of course adding that as great obligations had been conferred on him by His Highness, God forbid that any reflexion should arise on the reality of his good wishes. He replied that to the utmost of his power no failure should occur in his observance of obligations. He then took up the subject of our discussions, observing that they had been delayed some time first by rainy weather, next by the indisposition of the Minister's wife and the Dewally holidays, and that they could not be resumed until the expiration of the term (10 days) of Nanna's mourning for his wife. "But" continued he, "I have to announce to you from my regard for His Highness's Government, procrastination must not now be practised as heretofore in negotiating, but on the contrary a settlement of the articles is advisable and highly necessary for His Highness's interest, because by delay the expense of preparation is daily increased to the Peshwa".—I replied, that having come here solely for this purpose my constant wish was to accelerate the desirable point of an accommodation, as by delay His Highness's

* Final argument of Kings

Government was also daily subjected to great additional expense. Having repeated his professions of attachment he took leave. I have represented these matters for your information. Having been much importuned to be present at the Peshwa's annual exhibition of fireworks on the festival of Dewalee at the hill of Purvuttee I attended, and afterward paid a visit of condolence to Ballajee Pundit.

No. 129—Malet attributes the apparent relaxation in the negotiations on the part of the Poona Court to its suspicion of the intentions of the Company's Government.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Poona, 3rd November 1794.

Notwithstanding all my assurances of the peacefulness of our intentions, this Court continues to betray considerable jealousy of our power and intentions, the source of which is to me mysterious as its admission is unjust. To this jealousy and to the demurs in the expected arrival of the Sindian force, may reasonably be attributed the late relaxation in the urgency of its negotiations with M. A. and its having recourse to an intrigue through Govinrou Kishen to answer its purpose, either of forcing A. O. to accede to its terms which it may be deemed proper to conceal from M. A., or of protracting the negotiation in such a manner as to prevent the Nazim's appealing to arms with greater advantage before than after this Court is joined by the Sindian quota, that part of which commanded by Jeajee Bucshy has at length, I understand, advanced from Mundasore toward Ugin without the reinforcement from De Boigne's brigades, of which it had been so long in expectation, and which, it seems, is to follow under the command of Monsr. Perron, but never, I sincerely hope, to arrive in these parts.

Since the above communications M. A. has imparted to me the Nazim's intention of making an excursion from Bider as signified to him in the note from Mustakeemal Doula, copy of which is enclosed.

Tho' I have given Balajee Pundit an opportunity of prosecuting his advance mentioned in my letter of the 25th ultimo nothing more explicit has yet reached me from that quarter.

As my intelligence gives ground to suppose that M. A.'s correspondence with his own Court is more frequent than would appear from his communications to me, I hope the real state of affairs and the causes of the late apparent suspension of negotiation or rather change of instrumentality will be made known to you by A. O.

No. 130—Malet writing to Kirkpatrick suggests that A. O.'s tactics of evading a fair discussion of the claims led one to disbelieve his contentions.

FROM—C. W. MALET ;

TO—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH THE NIZAM.

Poona, 7th November 1794.

After the frequency with which I have troubled you with my opinion of the reasonableness and moderation of this Court's last declaration to me of its objects of negotiation with your Court, in which the Nazim holds the place of a tributary, and after this Court's receding in that declaration from the language of personal inveteracy urged by it in the first stages of our interposition, all which is before you and Government, there can be no necessity for my writing you further on that subject, and as you acknowledge that this Court may be induced by prudential motives to admit a temporary accommodation, I apprehend the invincible inveteracy is granted to admit of a palliative in the degree of immediate danger and hostility that has been apprehended from it, and temporary remedies alone can be hoped for by us in bar of the causes of dissension that are radically permanently interwoven with the intercourse of our respective Courts.

You may recollect that in your Munshy's report of his conference with A. O. of the 8th September the latter declares that the General Affairs (Kuleat) concern treaties and engagements ; if therefore they are unreasonable or hostile to the independence of the Nazim's Government, surely their being insisted on by this Government cannot be alleged as a vice in any but the original framers of those treaties on the part of His Highness. As to this Court's aversion to admit an arbitration (of whose impartiality it has not perhaps the respectable opinion that ours deserved) on its tributary claims, were we to alter the case and make this Court the proposer of its mediation between us and one of our tributary in a predicament similar to that of the Nazim, we probably should not judge so harshly of its rejection, and tho' in answer it may be urged that no comparison can be made between the sincerity of an offer of mediation from us and this Court, I may with propriety reply that this Court is equally entitled with ourselves to form a favorable opinion of its own intentions.

The designs attributed to this Court by A. O. in your Munshy's conference of 8th September so far from appearing to me a direct exposition of the Kuleat never conveyed to my mind any thing but an inflammatory statement of what A. O. chose to impute to this ministry, which persuasion is confirmed by the mention in your favour of 10th September that the designs imputed by A. O. to the Marrattas did not appear to have any other foundation than his own suspicions, and as in the same conference A. O. himself has declared that Kuleat or general affairs concerned treaties

and engagements, consequently the designs imputed merely to his suspicions could not be understood as a direct exposition of those treaties and engagements.

Had the imputed designs been understood as a direct exposition of treaties or in other words of Kuleat, in my humble opinion, that exposition, without having recourse to other reasons, not only fully accounts for this Court's pertinacious rejection of our interposition but for its jealousy of our zealous representation in His Highness's favour, which, as observed in a former letter, it may reasonably attribute to A. O.'s sacrifice of his old covenanted dependency on this State to a new one for supporting him in violating engagements now become irksome to him.

Subsequent to my letter of 25th you will have learnt that tho' I had given B. Pt. an opening to prosecute his advance of the 24th he had not taken advantage of it, which gives ground to suppose that what he then said was mere matter of conversation. But even admitting this Court's impression of our having objection to the Nazim's compliance with the Peshwa's demands, (which it is to be observed has never been avowed) I think the language of B. Pt., admitting it also to have been authorized, may very reasonably be accounted for in a desire of collecting the probability of such reported objection from the tenor of my answers.

As to the justice of the claims and controversion of them by our respective Courts it is evident that we never shall be possessed of materials for forming a correct and circumstantial judgment of them. We must therefore be satisfyd with what we can collect from general appearances, and may, I think, upon the whole rejoice in our exemption from the arduous work of arbitration, of which, I apprehend, we have seen enough to convince us it could not have been undertaken even in the Juzeat articles without infinite risk of displeasing both parties, while an uninformed implication in the discussions of the Kuleat might have subjected us to the awkward dilemma of rivetting the Nabob's chains fabricated by his own administration, or of sanctioning a breach of them at the previous expense of the justice of our arbitrament.

But tho' we have now a full opening to avoid these great dangers by declining further interposition than our discoveries may render eligible, yet I lament my inability to acquiesce in your position that we cannot feel any inconvenience from the dangerous suspension of these mysterious covenants over the head of the Nazim's Government, since by that very suspended influence over his independence (if independence he has) are we now subjected to all the extensive evils that come within the scope of the threatened hostilities, or to those prospective dangers which present themselves in the Nazim's submission to a supposed covenanted dependency in avoidance of those hostilities.

On the 5th instant M. A. begged to see my Munshy by whom he sent for my perusal the papers, of which I enclose copies, and of one a translation

in part. I am induced to trouble you with the latter by the clear exposition contained in it of the political principles of A. O. which, in my humble opinion, are highly worthy of our particular notice as explanatory of his object if supported by us against this Government, or of what it might be if deprived of that support. He should be necessitated to alter the direction of his ambition with a change of support.

No. 131—Azim-ul-Omra tries to throw the blame for the break-down of the negotiations on the Poona Ministers and censures the English for not doing what friendship demanded.

5th November 1794.

(Enclosed in Malet's letter of 7th November.)

[Translate of a letter from Mustakeem-al-Doula to Meer Alum dated 3 Rubbeal Sane delivered to Sir C. W. M. the 5th Nov].

Yesterday on the 2nd instant Mouloviee Mahomed Ikram and Munshy Azeez Ulla waited on A. O., and on the part of Capt. Kirkpatrick represented that for some days nothing had transpired relative to the pending negotiations, but that if anything had taken place it should be communicated as he was a friend. A. O. asked if C. W. M. had written anything, it was replyd nothing but the behaviour of that quarter. A. O. then said that a letter had been received from you (M. A.) dated 27th Rubbealouval and gave it them for perusal, adding that nothing further had passed, they (Peshwa's Ministers) being silent and what would they say, for that you (M. A.) had given an answer according to your instructions on the subject of Adoni, which would be repeated should they again resume the subject, which they have understood, and are now taken up with the consideration of that. It is first proper to ascertain their force and then resume their demand. Whence two points are obvious. Either that on discovering their inability they will come to a settlement for more or less, or they will declare that unless their demand is complied with a settlement is inadmissible and desire you (M. A.) to depart. Mahomed Ikram observed that no settlement then would insue, for after many months everything was as the first day, particularly as for 20 days they (P.'s Minrs.) had been silent. Therefore it was proper to urge a settlement from hence. A. O. then said, I ask you is it your advice that I should press the affair, to which they will reply "settle according to our demands", in which case we shall have no other answer but to begin, that is to say dispatch a force. A. O. repeatedly asked an explanation on this point—and they replyd that they would give an answer after further deliberation. After this A. O. observed what could the English propose to themselves by withdrawing from such a Cirkar (the Nizam's) at such a time, as their advantage was obvious, for not to mention his expectations in case of hostilities it was proper in sincere friendship, that if one friend had a

difference with another and acted unjustly a third friend should make a representation. They (M. I. and A. U.) replyd that the dues of representation had been discharged and what more could be done—and this had been frequently repeated. A. O. then said, I now plainly and openly tell you that in a just cause you (the English Co.) should join me, and if the cause is unjust you should tell me that it is unjust, for the times are changeable and it may happen that (this junction) may be of the utmost advantage, and that new territories may be acquired. For no ruler is at rest from this employment, and when he thinks that he has procured rest what can he do. It is my opinion that these points should be repeatedly communicated to the Governor General, and that Sir C. W. M. also should write the same. For, the Gentlemen there and even in Europe act upon the intelligence communicated from them (i.e., Capt. K. and Sir C. W. M.) not having preternatural knowledge. For, even should this be forbidden (entering into war, I suppose) yet if what is matter of fact should be repeatedly written. Doubtless it will make an impression on the mind, and by the Grace of God, a force of cavalry is ready in His Highness's Government and of infantry in the Company's, and whatever should be found expedient would be completely executed. For theirs is a war of cavalry to oppose whom and scour the country His Highness's are ready, while your infantry are ready for towns and forts, and advantages arise to rulers from such things. For, in one's country there is nothing but the contingency of refractory zemindars, who on troops being sent against and sieging them the utmost will be one or two lacs acquisition, and the expense of the expedition double. All these things therefore are to be kept in * * the matter will be terminated somehow or other, and such an opportunity will be lost to you, the English Company.

No. 132—Negotiations are being carried on through other channels, thus discrediting Meer Alam's embassy.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

Poona, 10th November 1794.

It will certainly be a grand advantage to the Nazim if the Bhosla can, at almost any rate, be detached from taking a hostile part against His Highness in the threatened war with this State.

In A. O.'s communication of the Nagpore Vackeels' report to their Master of Roy Royan's having intrigues with this Court independent of M. A., he virtually acknowledges that the existence of such an intrigue must be discreditable to M. A., yet from tenderness to Roy Royan, the intriguer, he does not contradict it, tho' the

contradiction would seem as necessary both to A. O.'s and Roy Royan's credit as Meer Allum's, hence it becomes worth while to combine this circumstance with the former one, of the particular injunction in the Nazim's letter to M. A., to act in concert with Govin Bugwant, and with the recent close intercourse of your Court with Govin Kishen unexplained to M. A., all which and many other traits certainly tend to establish a persuasion that M. A.'s credit is not a very interesting consideration with A. O., and hence suggested an idea to me that the consciousness of being engaged in some such intrigues, as those alluded to, may have induced A. O. to sound us on our knowledge and sentiments of them under the assumed name of the Bhosla's Vackeels, tho' I think it very likely that the close and suspicious intimacy between Roy Royan and Govin Kishen, which you may recollect having been noticed by me in an early stage of the negotiations, may by the same rule have attracted the notice not only of the Bhosla's Vackeels but of all common observers.

A. O. in the ease with which he seems to resign all expectation of our support against Tipu in the event of that Prince's taking umbrage at his conduct toward Kurnool, appears to have forgotten that by the treaty of Pultun the Allies are engaged for the future preservation of the peace of that Prince's territories, as well as of each other against him.

No 133—Malet suspects Azim-ul-Omra of having discarded Meer Allum's negotiations and of his having opened intercourse with the Poona Court through Govind Krishna Kale.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

Poona, 14th November 1794.

I am sorry to observe A. O.'s silence toward you on the subject of his late intercourse with the Govinrous, since the object of his negotiations is equally interesting to us and equally connected with the part we have taken in his master's behalf, through whatever channel it may be prosecuted, to which, indeed, may be added some collateral interest in the credit of Meer Alam's mission so conspicuously supported as it has been by us.

At a visit that my Munshy paid M. A. on the 12th instant the latter acquainted him with your having advised A. O. to instruct him (M. A.) to press the pending negotiations, in consequence of which A. O. had desired you to favour him with the draft of a letter to that purport which you had accordingly done, but that instead of its having been forwarded (as in your letter of 3rd instant you suppose), it had been detained by the Nazim when presented for his approval, which M. A. imputes to His Highness's knowledge of the secret intercourse with Govin Kishen, and his consequent repugnance to admit the contradiction that would be involved by ordering M. A. to press negotiations now conducting through

another channel. At all events as no letter has been received by M. A. on this subject, tho' mentioned to have been dispatched in your letter of the 3 instant, the failure in such an assurance to you seems to corroborate the reason for not forwarding it as above assigned by M. A. to his Master, the Nazim, viz., the intrigues with Govin Kishen.

No 134—Malet reports to the G. G. of the Peshwa having commenced the movement of his troops.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENRAL.

Poona, 21st November 1794.

Baba Furkia took leave of the Peshwa on the 17th instant, entered his tent without the town, and the ensuing morning Doulut Sindia entered his advanced tent at about 3 miles from his cantonment which still remains occupyd, but will be gradually quitted as the equipments of its inhabitants are completed, which will not probably be much before the arrival of the advanced part of the reinforcements expected from the north.

No. 135—In analysing the exact relation between the Peshwa and the Nizam, Malet concludes that the position of the latter was no better than that of a tributary to the former.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT WITH THE NAZIM.

Poona, 21st November 1794.

On the subject of this Court's intentions regarding the removal of A. O. from the Nazim's ministry it seems a mere suspicion, and however justly desirous this Court may be of it, imputing to him, as it certainly does, the entire cause of all its complaints against the Nazim's Government, yet, as I have already frequently observed the pointed personal language relative to that Minister used by this Court in the first stages of my interposition is dropt in its last formal declaration, that it will rest satisfyd with an equitable settlement of its demands on general and detail points, founded, it is to be conceived, on treaty; I humbly presume, therefore, that if the dismissal of A. O. is not demandable on the ground of this Declaration, it may be adduced in bar of the demand whenever it may be brought forward, supposing His Highness in no point deviates from equity and engagements on his part. At all events whatever may have passed behind the scenes, this demand has not yet appeared on the stage of discussion, and I must leave you to judge, whether what we have

seen of A. O.'s treatment of the ostensible part of the negotiations is calculated to encourage reconciliation to induce this Court to relinquish personal antipathies.

What is mentioned in your letter on the subject of tribute opens a wide field for dissertation, but as the fact of His Highness's tributary amenability to this State is so very obvious not only on presumption, usage and covenant, but even on our own acknowledgment in the course of discussion, I merely hope that your reconsideration of the subject will induce your acquiescence in a fact, that I have hitherto considered equally beyond the reach of doubt and controversy.

As to the terms of the Company's tenure of the Northern Circars the origin is too recent to admit, I trust, a doubt or dispute. It was the preservation by the Lord Paramount of an annual condition, but without participation in the collection or management of the country, precluding all comparison between our relation to the Nizam as dischargers of that condition under the denomination of peshkush (which I think may be correctly called offer or oblation) and the Nizam's to this State as responsible to it under the various terms of Choute, Sardeshmukhi, Mokassa Sahotra, etc., etc.; for I am sorry to say near 50 per cent. of his revenues in the tributary provinces, and, what is still worse, with this State's collectors absolutely established throughout these provinces and even participating its government constituting a predicament, it should seem, infinitely more subordinate than that commonly designed by the word tributary, and presenting to the most cursory observer ideas of constant and inevitable discordance. These points have been so fully discussed in the course of my correspondence with your predecessor, that it is with real reluctance that I can prevail on myself again to trouble you on them.

The only part of His Highness's Government that appears to me strictly worthy the denomination of independent is the Subha of Hyderabad, which, I understand, is held clear of tribute or participation.

That the claim of and submission to the payment of tribute, whether under the denomination of the Indian words Choute and Khundanee or the Persian ones Baj and Peshkush, constitute the predicament of tributary, cannot be disputed in this point of view.

But tho' I think claim by one party and compliance by the other constitute a complete tributary predicament as in the above case, yet must I be permitted to decline acceding to the position of its being constituted by this Court's mere claim to whatever country they may extend it, as in the case of the Company's territories, where I apprehend the claim always has been, and I trust always will be, treated by them and their Govt. with a firm and positive rejection, and I will not hesitate to confess to you (from my knowledge of this State's dangerous spirit)

that my concern at the present threatening appearance of things is greatly increased by the apparent inadequateness of the Nazim's power and resources to support a cause, in which, it unfortunately happens, that both force and speciousness of pretence are on the side of a Power, whose increase cannot but give uneasiness to its neighbours.

(The concluding portion of the letter is missing.)

No. 136—Meer Allum expresses to Malet his chagrin at the awkwardness of his situation as a negotiator. In the course of conversation he recognised the justice of the Maratha demand of Chauth from Adoni.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Poona, 21st November 1794.

On the 18th M. A. favoured me with a visit, at which he expressed in terms of the most lively chagrin the awkwardness of his situation, and asked my opinion as to the propriety of his representing it to A. O., which I gave in the affirmative as the only mode of bringing things to a right understanding by enabling you to promote his just objects. He gave me to understand that he would prepare a letter on the subject and send it for my perusal, but I have not yet seen it.

He assured me that all negotiation with the Durbar had been dormant for upward of two months. That no intimation had been made to him of Doulut Rou's movement or B. Furkia's entering his tents, that tho' he had made this silence the ground of a friendly complaint of an individual nature to Govin Bugwant, yet was he prevented by the restricted circumstances of his predicament from taking any public notice of it, as he was from pressing the negotiations as explained in his former communication of the suppression of a letter on that subject by the Nazim himself, which, he said, was known to you. Thus situated, he observed, his remaining here was irksome, useless and discreditable, but that tho' he should represent it so, yet was he apprehensive that it might be attributed to a resentment of the intrigues carrying on unknown to him through the two Govinrous. I asked him if he thought things would have come this pass, had his powers been ample and confidential. He said not.

He then showed me a letter from Mustakeem-ud-Daula in which A. O. is said to have directed him, by order of the Nazim, to visit Alif Khan, Nabob of Kurnool, tho' enjoined by him (M.A.), as already explained to me, not to interfere in his business. This he imputed to A. O.'s desire of concealing our disapprobation of his conduct to Alif Khan.

Exclusive of the general uncertainty of hostility he expressed much apprehension for the issue of a war, as A. O. had frightened the Banjarras from his Master's country and service by his well-known design of

plundering them of part of the great profits gained by Lord Cornwallis's protection and indulgence during the last war, and that to supply their place he meant to depend on purchased bullocks. He seemed extremely doubtful of the disposition of the inhabitants of his Master's country, the safety of intercourse and communication throughout which, he was apprehensive, would be endangered and interrupted on the commencement of hostilities by this State's interest with the inhabitants and the predatory style of its warfare.

In reply to my query of the justice of this State's not including the tributary districts in the demands of Choute etc. on Adoni, he assured me that their demand for 1,75,000 Rupees was on the Aumilee districts exclusive of the tributary ones, and in proof of the usage he observed that they had formerly sequestered a portion of those districts to discharge arrears, which they had been prevented repeating merely by consideration for the Nazim; as a further proof of the justice of their demand, he observed that they were ready to relinquish their claim on 1,75,000 etc., to revert to the ancient collection of the actual Choute on the revenue of those districts, viz., Adoni, Raichore, Coutal, Sinoor, Suggar Killa and another that he did not recollect. I asked him why he had not stated these matters clearly to A. O. He said he has stated it clearly enough for a person who knew the matter of fact, but that his words were to be regulated by many considerations, and he has already made use of my name on some points to give efficacy to his object, alluding I suppose to A. O.'s equivocal orders about his powers.

He said that this Court constantly professed that its complaints did not originate with the Nazim but his Minister. He agreed, however, that as long as A. O. was Minister the responsibility of his acts reverted to his Master, the origin of his vicarious powers.

This, I believe, includes the substance of the material part of our conversation; it is at least all that occurs as sufficiently interesting to me to trouble you with.

No. 137—Malet expresses his surprise at the transfer of negotiations to another channel and the *volte face* in A. O.'s policy in proposing a joint attack on the British in combination with Tipu and the Marathas.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

Poona, 28th November 1794.

You seem not to think so perversely of the supercession of Meer Allum's ministry in the negotiations subsisting between our two Courts as I do, conveying to my mind not only a complete climax in the want of confidence on the part of his Court, which has so strongly marked his embassy from

the commencement in the suppression of the Peshwa's letter demanding a settlement of the Kuleat, but subjected it to discredit and degradation in the subsequent restriction of his powers and confinement to act in concert with Govind Bhagwant.

Had this series of reserve and concealment been at length qualified by a confidential communication to you and M. A. of the transference of the negotiation to another channel for reasons of convenience and expediency, I doubt not but the measure, however discreditable to the Nizam's Government, might have been made acceptable to us and M. A. on the ground of state necessity. But no such explanation having been made, the measure assumes in my opinion an appearance not only of discredit to M. A. but of exceptionable concealment from us, and this idea will probably be put in a stronger point of view by the following intelligence communicated to me last night by Meer Allum through my Munshy.

That intelligence had reached him on the first Jumadilouval (25 November), that at a private conference which A. O. had held with Govin Krishna he (A. O.) had observed that excessive charges had been incurred by the Nazim's Government in levying and maintaining troops ; that in like manner his (G. K.'s) Master, the Peshwa, must have been subjected to similar burthens, and that it became a matter of mutual concern to seek a reimbursement, and that instead of being enemies they might prosecute that object in concert, and that he would engage Tippo in the same pursuit, and forming a confederacy they would drive the English from India ; and as they (the English) were now engaged in Europe with the French and in India with the Rohillas there could not be a better opportunity. To this Govin Kishen replyd that it was a subject of too great delicacy to trust to writing ; that therefore he had committed the communication of it to an emissary here for the purpose. On receiving this intelligence he (M. A.) had sent a person to examine if any such person had lately arrived, who on the 26th evening had reported to him that such a person had actually arrived, and been conducted by Govin Bugwant to a nocturnal audience with the Minister (Nana Fadnis) at which no body was present but those three persons, so that nothing of the subject of it had transpired.

That this intelligence had given him (M. A.) great uneasiness on a variety of private and public grounds, as he had been the principal instrument of cementing the cordiality between his Master and the Company, the benefits of which need no explanation and were of a nature that made him anxious for their continuance. He had therefore thought the intimation necessary to enable me to form a judgment of the effect of such a proposal on these people, of whose temper my long acquaintance rendered me a better judge than he could be supposed to be, and on which point he requested my sentiments, as also on the subject of his conference with the Peshwa of the 29 Rubbeal Sane (23 instant).

Perplexing and bewildering as the vexatious and inexplicable curvities of these political tricksters must be to our minds, I trust that the firm rectitude of our system and the vigorous energy of our institutions will bear us through their machiavellian intricacies with safety and dignity, which desirable work will probably be considerably facilitated by the occasional lights that it may be in our power to throw on the possible views and dispositions of our respective Courts, on which subject I shall endeavour to trouble you in my next.

No. 138—Malet rejects the possibility of the Poona Court calling in Tipu to its assistance.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT'S ASSISTANT AT BIDER.

Poona, 29th November 1794.

As to any engagements taking place between this Court and Tipu, obnoxious to our interests, in this Court's pursuit of the conciliation of that Prince in bar of the consequences of an apprehended junction of our Power to the Nazim to support him through his present discussions with this State, I am inclined to think that the strong marks of irresolution betrayed by His Highness's Government and the consequent inference of ultimate success in their demands. will at once convince this Ministry of A. O.'s not having any just ground to expect our support, and relieve them from entering into engagements with Tipu that would deviate from the usual caution and circumspection of this Court. My late advice of an apparent return of confidence in this Government is corroborative of this opinion.

Doubtless predicaments of obvious self-preservation must be provided for and counteracted, as far as the state of power will permit. But I apprehend that in the event of a confederacy of this State and Tipu against the Nazim (which however I am happy to think is purely conjectural at present), we are bound by engagements of a much less equivocal tendency than state-expediency to defend him against the latter Power.

Knowing, as we well do, the matter of fact from His Highness's first movement to Bider and the subsequent process of preparation of both States, it would, I apprehend, be fruitless to agitate the subject.

In addition to the official matter contained in the enclosed copy and translate, M. A. has confidentially acquainted me that His Highness had written the orders for the present and future discharge of the reserved 4th or the Choute of Bider, and given them to Govin Kishen with his own hand ; that he had also assented in the same manner to the discharge of the Adoni demands without any mention of kists after deducting Hyder's collections.

M. A., with abundant expression of distress at the disreputable state to which he is reduced, has requested, my sentiment as to his going or staying, on which point had I only to consult his own feelings I should have little difficulty, but the case being otherwise, I will advise his waiting answers to the letter, of which I now enclose translate. From the tenor of his conversation it is clear that he feels what has past as disgraceful, as the future may be hurtful to his own and his Master's interests.

No. 139—Malet informs G. G. of the Peshwa's resolution to take the field, but adds that diplomatic conversations for finding a way out of the impasse were not yet cut off.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, FORT WILLIAM.

Poona, 1st December 1794.

On the 30th I received the following communication from the Durbar through Behro Punt.

That the Peshwa's taking the field was resolved on but the time was not yet fixed ; when it was, it should be communicated to me.

To this official communication Behro Punt added, under the veil of a private and confidential one, that as I was now informed of the Peshwa's resolution to take the field, it would be evident to me that matters were becoming serious. As therefore I had heretofore expressed an anxious desire to prevent the impending evils, and as he had in the same spirit assured me that the cause of contention originated with the Minister (meaning A. O.), so every subsequent intelligence corroborated his opinion that the Nazim himself was averse to hostilities. If, therefore, any intimation of the same kind had reached me either through the channels of my intelligence or from M. A. and Capt. K., it would be evident that a difference of opinion subsists between the Principal and his Minister, in which case weigh it well, and, if true, there will appear an opening to an accommodation.

On the first communication I have to remark, that compared with the time when it seems to have been made to others there seems an appearance of delay and want of cordiality, and the same spirit seems continued in the communication being unattended with any invitation for my accompanying the Peshwa.

Behro Punt's later communication suggests the following ideas, that this Court from whatever cause, is still desirous of avoiding or procrastinating extremities, and in this spirit is either desirous of sounding under a private cover our disposition to promote an accommodation, which in the first stages of negotiation it officially rejected, or of discovering by that means the truth of the reports that are circulated of our inclination to stimulate hostilities.

If its object through this channel is to procrastinate merely, it will originate in the desire of gaining time for the approach of the northern troops under Jeajee Buckshy and Perron, and the use of our agency, if granted, would be dropt when that end was answered.

If he is really disposed to accommodate and to make use of our agency therein (which past conduct gives little ground to expect), the private character now assumed by Behro Punt would be thrown aside on sufficient ground of hope being given by us of the efficacy and agreeableness of our interposition.

If its object is to discover our disposition to or aversion from hostilities, it may be founded in the jealousies still subsisting of our intentions, notwithstanding our plain, honourable and conciliatory conduct, jealousies that I am persuaded have been fomented with great industry and considerable effect, and, if the private intelligence of M. A. forwarded in my last letter to Capt. Kirkpatrick be true, may not be unconnected therewith.

At all events, Honourable Sir, aware as I am of the points and many others necessary to be adverted to, I shall endeavour to give such an answer to Behro Punt as may embrace every good and (as far as practicable with such people) avoid every bad consequence; in the mean time the communication of this letter to Capt. Kirkpatrick will enable him to favour me with any advice and information, that may appear possibly conducive to an happy extrication from the mysterious and threatening predicament in which affairs are at present involved, nor shall I omit to consult M. A. as far as, on a due consideration of the subject, may appear prudent.

No. 140—Malet discusses the rejection or acceptance by the Poona Court of the curious proposal of A. O. inviting it to concert an attack on the British.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT WITH THE NAZIM AT BIDER.

Poona, 1st December 1794.

In consequence of M. A.'s desire, expressed in my last, of learning my sentiments relative to his private intelligence of A. O.'s extraordinary proposal to this Court, I sent him the following message on the 30th ultimo;—

That I was very sensibly impressed with the friendship and importance of his communication, which, however, my desire of thinking well of the human kind induced me to hope, he would find unfounded. That as to the impression of such a proposal on this Court, the experience of 9 years taught me to expect from it the fruits of a friendship, happily

founded on reciprocal good and cemented by mutual good offices productive of the most important benefits; nor could I readily sacrifice the continuance of such an expectation to the impression of a proposal whose own nature appeared in the eye of wisdom to divert it of confidence; But tho' these were the impressions resulting from rational conceptions, yet if what he had communicated were true, it should seem that reason was to be discarded in weighing the motive of a certain portion of mankind; for, if such were the return made for that zealous and disinterested friendship which we had on all occasions shown to the Nazim's Government and administration, particularly in our late warm interposition with this Court in its behalf, on whose friendship were we to rely, on whose fidelity to depend, in whose honour to confide?

He replyd that tho' he had made the communication with pain the motives already assigned had convinced him of its necessity, and he should with me be glad to find it unfounded, as the emissary who had really arrived might possibly be employed on other business, and all intelligence was liable to doubt.

As to the private communication by M. A. of A. O.'s proposal to this Court of a confederacy against us, it follows that it must be true or false.

If true, it may have originated in A. O.'s reasoning that he is now reduced to the extremity of combating alone this State's force, or of extricating himself from that arduous necessity by concession. The former threatens ruin, the latter disgrace, and an expedient becomes necessary. By diverting the storm from himself to us the present evil is avoided, those arising out of the confederacy are in perspective,* and may also be avoided as they arise. If success attends the confederacy he follows the stream of fortune, if its course is checked by our Power that Power will always be glad to divide the confederacy, and his junction with us will be then acceptable, by which means he will acquire the very coalition that he has been so long and so industriously soliciting in vain.

Thus may A. O. have reconciled himself to a measure of perfidy in the possible avoidance of extreme peril; but if he has adopted the measure and made the proposal, his immediate danger has blinded him to the inference that will thereby be furnished to this Court, "that we cannot be engaged in his support." For, it must be well convinced that with that support A. O. will not make such a proposal, unless indeed with the insidious view of betraying its acquiescence, if granted, to us.

Thus, if the proposal has been made at all, its impression on this Court must either be that it is the suggestion of despair of our aid, or of an insidious attempt to draw it into a measure provocative of our resentment, to be converted by A. O. to his own purpose.

* He means prospective.

Both these ideas lead to rejection of the proposal by this Court. In the first case, relief from the fear of our interposition will encourage the prosecution of its enmity against a man whose conduct had deprived him of all faith. In the second, the nature of the attempt will naturally increase that enmity, and may even have suggested the idea of turning its attempt against its author by directing the intelligence into a channel that might reach us and thereby excite in us the same desire, as is ascribed to this Court, of removing so dangerous a man.

If the report of the proposal be false with respect to A. O., it will follow that it must have been fabricated by an interest inimical to that Minister, while innocent of any hostile direction against us. It can be productive of no other general consequence to us or particular danger to him than we may think proper to give it.

Thus, either true or false, it does not strike me as pregnant with any other immediate effect than that of throwing some additional light on the political character of these people, and of suggesting to us the necessity of increasing, if possible, the circumspection with which we ought ever to watch, and the vigilance with which we should ever be prepared to counteract, both their arts and their arms.

No. 141—Malet informs Kirkpatrick that Meer Alam had asked permission of the Peshwa to withdraw.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

5th December 1794.

I have the honour to enclose copies received the 4th instant from M. A. of letters from the Nazim and A. O. to him on the subject of his recall. From the copy of his accompanying answer you will collect that the requisite substance of them was imparted to this Court on the 1st instant.

No. 142—Meer Allum is recalled by the Nizam.

5th December 1794.

Translation of a letter from the Nizam to Meer Allum sent by him to Sir C. W. M. 4th December 1794.

After your arrival at Poona with what pertinacity did the Peshwa's Ministers insist on your granting Instrument declaratory of your power for a settlement of Juzeat, notwithstanding my plenipotentiary letter; but tho' this demand was irregular, yet was your compliance therewith assented to. A long interval has since elapsed, in which they did not open their lips on the business of negotiation.

Govinrou Kishen having been lately admitted to our Presence on an occasion of presenting a nuzzur, the conversation turned on the obligations

and favours that have been conferred and are indisputable, on the Peshwa, Ballajee Pundit and others. Govinrou Kishen said he would reply thereto on receiving an answer from Poona. But tho' the said G. K. has subsequently been admitted 3 or 4 audiences yet has he not given any decisive reply, and the Peshwa's Ministers having in the interim caused Doulut Rou Sindia and Hurry Punt's son to march, the pleasing prospect's of negotiations have disappeared.

As, therefore, notwithstanding your and Roy Royan's being resident on the spot, and their having received from you a security for the settlement of the Juzeat, they dispatched forces; in consequence of that previous step on their part, I (trusting in God) have this day, Thursday 3rd of Jumadaloul, dispatched from my presence Muzaffarul Mulk Bhadur (Assud Ally Khan) and three or four other Chiefs with only their own quotas of troops.

If it is the pleasure of the Peshwa to give you and Raja Roy Royan your dismissal, take leave and come hither. What more?

No. 143—Meer Alam informs A. O. of his not having yet received the Peshwa's permission to depart.

Translation of a letter from Meer Allum to Azim-ul-Omra received by C. W. M. 4th December, 10 Jumadaloul 1209.

I was honoured with your commands of the morning of the 4 Jumadaloul at 9 p.m. on the 7th of the same month on the subject of applying for leave to depart, without being pressing either on the point of going or staying, also with His Highness's commands.

On the 2nd day I sent Raghotum Rou with the approbation of Govin Bugwunt to make an application, agreeable to my instructions, to Ballajee Pundit, who having rested giving me an answer on a communication to the Peshwa, you shall hereafter be particularly informed of what reaches me.

In this period, when an interval of $2\frac{1}{2}$ months had elapsed without my having been honoured with a letter from you to support my feeble spirits, I have several times communicated to you what was worthy your notice. How could I designedly be deficient in my representations?

Lately, indeed, after so long a silence both on your part and of this Government, I had a meeting with Sir C. W. Malet at the end of Rubbeal Sane to consult with him whether it were better to apply for my recall, to remain silent, or to make a representation of my situation to you, and on his approving of the latter, it was my wish to have addressed you accordingly, but recollecting such instructions as circumstances might require I ventured not even on the steps. This is represented to your notice.

SECTION IV

Breakdown of Negotiations.

No. 144—Malet makes it plain to Kirkpatrick that the position in which the Nizam stood towards the Peshwa with all the latter's claims on his territories, was no better than that of a tributary.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT WITH THE NIZAM.

Poona, 8th December 1794.

Dropping with you a further examination of the reality of the object of this Court to effect the overthrow of Azim-ul-Omra's ministry, I will join you in lamenting that by a more wise conduct heretofore and a more conciliatory one in the present discussions he had not thrown the incontrovertible blame of injustice on this Court's pursuing that object. From what has hitherto passed he seems resolved to force them to the necessity of prosecuting it as the first indispensable step to the acquisition of their claims.

I really cannot discover that the expression of hostilities "not being absolutely designed", as used in this Court's Declaration to me, implied the reservation of a liberty of proceeding, even after the accomplishment of its just claims, to whatever length it might please.

I meant not by the general expression in my letter of 21st ultimo of His Highness's tributary amenability being admitted on our own acknowledgment to particularize yours. I alluded to the friendly advice first given by Lord Cornwallis that His Highness should discharge this Court's allowed

demands, which advice has been since uniformly repeated. Demands are acknowledged in the papers respecting the present disputes furnished by the Nizam himself, and the present Governor General's opinion thereon is contained in his letter to you of the 9th June last. The fact is that this Government has long been in the use of exacting from the Nizam pecuniary payments from his territories exclusive of its share in governing them, which it certainly will not relinquish unless compelled to do so by force. This being the state of the case, I think with you that it can be of no real importance to ascertain the terms under which these exactions and usurpations were introduced, which in my humble opinion constitute at this period a complete tributary predicament, tho' founded as you justly observe more on power than on treaty. In fact, the description of tributary is inseparable from an idea of superior force and power in the exactor, the irksomeness of which must, as you remark, be doubtless increased by the vexatious and derogatory circumstances of a participation in the government of the country.

The circumstance to which you allude, of the style of superiority assumed by the Nizam to the Peshwa and Nagpore Bhosla, is accounted for in their original intercourse with him being as servants of the Marhatta Rajas, descendants of Sewajee. I am sorry to have to add that their now using a different style or at least the Peshwa using a different style is a proof of the increase of their power and the decline of His Highness's, which, tho' we must lament, we cannot contradict. In the transfer of power the forms generally survive for a short season the fallen fortunes of rulers and princes, as may perhaps be exemplified in the person of the unfortunate Shah Allum.

I shall be extremely happy to find that the difficulty of procuring supplies for His Highness's army mentioned by Meer Allum has been obviated by Azim-ul-Omra's having a good understanding with the Bunjarras.

I can only account for Meer Allum's spontaneously noticing to me your having granted his Master a dustuck for arms, etc., in the general unreserve of his communications, which furnished me nothing further to particularise than was mentioned. With you I suppose the recommendation to the Madras Government to comply with the application of Azim-ul-Omra must have been understood by Meer Allum as a Dustuck, but in reply to your observation that the indulgence is equally open to this Court it may be proper to acquaint you, that so far from having a latitude of similar recommendation to the Bombay Government, I am directed to refer any application of the kind to the Governor General, but this restriction seems of little consequence as this Court gets clandestinely as many arms as it wants from Bombay, tho' that Government has been frequently apprized of the abuse.

No. 145—Azim-ul-Omra controverts the claims of the Poona Ministry and asks Meer Allum to withdraw.

FROM—AZIM-UL-OMRA,

TO—MEER ALLUM.

8th December 1794.

Your letter of the 2nd Jumaduloul containing an account of your meeting with the Peshwa by invitation on the 29th Rubbeal Sane reached me on the 5th Jumaduloul and made me acquainted with its contents. The enclosed letter from Babarou also arrived.

What was mentioned by Ballajee Pundit in the Peshwa's presence has been all made known to His Highness.

On the disputed points of the Aumilee* and tributary districts of Adoni His Highness observed that if they (the Peshwa's Government) have any voucher, it should be exhibited. The written voucher of the deceased Bussalut Jung should also be sent for and examined, and though you are better acquainted with these points than you can be by His Highness's orders, yet if they are not hearkened to, what remedy is there?

They (the Peshwa's Ministers) say their claim is on the country and that they do not intend to make war on His Highness, but will take their claims from the country, and if they are opposed there is no remedy.

The answer to this is,—that His Highness likewise has no intention to make war on the Peshwa, but that the protection of his own country is his object; if anybody makes a claim according to custom on his country, it will be discharged without delay; there can be no necessity to send forces to recover what is usual. In the event of unreasonable demands the protection of the country is incumbent, and should anybody oppose that protection there is no remedy.

Ballajee Pundit says that only here there [are] two shares in one country, and that neither is subject to the orders of the other but each is absolute in his own business. This may be, but from the commencement of the establishment of shares in the country, from that time proofs of obedience (i.e. of the Peshwa's officers) are on the records. The allegation of Ballajee Pundit is the language of force, to answer it is mere capping of verses.

Ballajee Pundit says that His Highness having reserved the rights of the Peshwa, has filled his own treasury, by which the Peshwa has been subjected to a loss of crores. The fullness of the treasures of both Governments is well known and requires no elucidation. How great have been the loss sustained by His Highness's Government by the large sums exacted by the Bhosla above the stipulations of treaty for

* Districts the revenues of which were shared with the Marathas.

near these 30 years, and in like manner several articles are annually exacted by the Peshwa's Government with the particulars of which Roy Royan and Ragotum Rou are acquainted.

Ballajee Pundit says that nobody makes a just settlement, and that if even now an equitable settlement of the former Aumil* is made, it is advisable. The answer of His Highness is that you (the Peshwa) look upon yourself as speaking the truth and think your claims just, I do the same; a third person then becomes necessary to decide on the right of both, which Ballajee Punt does not agree to. In this case God is the Judge of right and wrong between the two Governments, and his dispensations will be manifested.

Ballajee Pundit says that persons belonging to His Highness had designs to seduce the Peshwa's people and were accordingly imprisoned. The answer is that, thanks to God, it appears by Ballajee Punt's declaration that the said person is in confinement; let him be examined by threats, oaths or torture or in any other manner by which truth may be discovered, and let the dishonourable person that employed him be discovered. By the blessing of God, the forces of Islam are collected in His Highness's Government, and who sends for troops that do not of themselves desire service, and what service will they do who on an emergency quit their Master to join another?

His Highness signified that having finished the anniversary of his son he would on the 23rd proceed on an hunting excursion to Kumtana. On that side (the Peshwa's) it appears from the newspapers that on that day Doulut Rao had his audience of leave and marched. Thus, it seems that His Highness's proceeding to Kumtana had reached Poona in 3 pehrs (9 hours); that after receipt of that intelligence, the despatch of those Chiefs had been resolved and executed; nay more, it appears that those chiefs were dispatched the 18th. Immediately on learning their dispatch you and Roy Royan were directed to take your leave and return if the Peshwa assented thereto, and you are now again directed, that if leave is granted, to return.

On the Kuleat subject Ballajee Punt observes that it is also intended; His Highness signifies that the accommodation of Kuleat depends on friendship and cordiality, and as on account of the Juzeat cordiality no longer exists, and likewise as Ballajee Punt intimates that His Highness is not desirous of the friendship and brotherhood of the Peshwa, how can an accommodation of Kuleat take place where such a persuasion is admitted? If the accommodation of Kuleat is desired, first let them settle the Juzeat that no altercation may remain, and the breasts of both sides may be clear. When this is effected, then there will remain no dispute in the accommodation of Kuleat, which is as clear as a mirror and as current as the pure waters of the Ganges.

*Share or portion of revenue.

No. 146—Further discussion of A. O.'s project of a confederacy against the British.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—CAPTAIN WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK.

Poona, 12th December 1794.

In answer to the further enquiries that I have made concerning the secret intelligence of Azim-ul-Omra's project of a confederacy against us, Meer Allum has acquainted me that he has not been able to collect anything relative to its progress here, but that should the emissary dispatched hither by Govin Kishen be returned he has put things in a train to learn the issue of his commission.

To the former intelligence on this subject Meer Allum adds, that at the late audience of the Nizam at which Govin K. was questioned as to the answers to his letters on the general topic of the present negotiation, he was also urged as to the promotion of the secret project on the pleas of our great power and assumed superiority in the late settlement with Tippu, for reducing which there could not be a better time than the present, to all which Govin K. had replied that he would give an answer on the return of his emissary.

From other quarters I have learnt the arrival of an agent from Govin K. and his admission by the introduction of Govinrou Bugwunt to secret audiences of the Minister, a circumstance that merits some comparison with the late sudden appearance of tranquillity assumed by Azim-ul-Omra and the general indifference of his language to us.

No. 147—Malet informs the Governor General of Meer Allum having been requested by the Peshwa to postpone his departure.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Poona, 15th December 1794.

On the 13th I received a message from the Durbar intimating that Meer Allum had waited on the Peshwa and applied for leave to depart, to which the Peshwa had replied that as the Nazim, his Master, had made his dismissal optional with him (the Peshwa), and as he was extremely desirous of effecting an accommodation through him, who was vested with full powers for that purpose, he should for the present decline complying with his application in the hope that his future dismissal would be rendered more pleasing by a previous happy termination of the present disputes.

The detail of what passed on this occasion as communicated by Meer Allum is contained in the copy of my despatch of this date to Capt. Kirkpatrick, which I have the honour to enclose.

No. 148—Malet sees no prospect of success for the Nizam against the Peshwa and thinks the time for hostilities ill-chosen by the Nizam.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT WITH THE NIZAM.

Poona, 18th December 1794.

It would be a useless fact I apprehend to enter into an inquiry of the accordance of Azim-ul-Omra's conduct with his profession during the present discussions, in the course of which one point only has been yet brought forward, whose equity by Meer Allum's own acknowledgment rests entirely with this Court.

Circumstances give some ground to think, that Azim-ul-Omra, now feeling the impossibility of otherwise preserving the respectability of an independent state to his Master's govt. and consequent personal safety to himself, after the conspicuous point of view in which this important question is placed by the present discussions, may be resolved on the test of arms at a season when the state of his military preparations precludes the prospect of possible improvement.

This, I humbly conceive, is the ground Azim-ul-Omra's present conduct, without adverting to the origin of the altercation, can be placed on, and the admission of it politically speaking rather leaves us to regret the slender prospect of success than to condemn such an object, had it originated in a well-founded and well-timed opposition of encroachment.

I shall be extremely happy if the Sindean Durbar can be converted into a channel of beneficial mediation to His Highness, tho' from its present total subordination to the influence of this Government I see no reason to be sanguine in that expectation, whereas circumstances sanction the conjecture, that the late agitation of the mediatory advance and some other proposition may have originated in a desire of this Court to get a little more time to complete the arrival of its quotas and their equipments.

Meer Allum has signified to me his having received a positive order to take leave and return, but as this has arrived in the interim of the dispatch of his late proposal for suspending hostilities, he seemed inclined to think he should wait an answer to that proposal before he acts on these orders and wishes to have my sentiments thereon, which I have referred to a sight of the letter, which is promised.

No. 149—A. O. writes to Parashuram Bhow to bring about an accommodation of the dispute.

Confidential Communication.

17th December 1794.

On Ballajee Pundit's entering his tents the Nizam saw serious ground to apprehend disturbance, tho' Azim-al-Omra persists in his practices and does not explain matters. On Ballajee Pundit's entering his tents however, Azim-al-Omra waited on His Highness and observed it was now proper he should advance. His Highness replied that he came to Kumtana to hunt and had come out without previous consultation with the astronomers, and will move on in an happy hour. That therefore he meant to return to Bidder and to issue forth agreeable to an happy hour. Azim-al-Omra represented that this would have an awkward appearance. His Highness enquired what steps had been taken for insuring supplies, as he understood that tho' Assud Ally had only advanced 5 coss, yet was grain risen to 5 seers per rupee in his camp. What then would be the price for the whole army when hostilities began. Azim-al-Omra replied that he had issued orders to the collectors of the grain customs and that he was collecting grain, tho' he could not but acknowledge that two or three thousand bullocks that he had lately sent for that purpose to Berar had been forced by the Bhosla to leave their burthens, that in the mean time he was not inattentive to plans for this purpose. His Highness replied that by the blessing of God the plans would be successful. But that in his opinion it would be preferable that he (the Nizam) should first write the Peshwa that as there was no difference between them what was the cause of the disputes, and that whatever was to be done should be done on the receipt of an answer. Azim-al-Omra assented and proposed preparing the draft of a letter. His Highness assented. Accordingly he presented a draft stating that there was no difference between them (the Nizam and Peshwa), but that it was between their Ministers, that, therefore, whatever minister was to be blamed should be called to account. His Highness approved and ordered it to be sent. It was accordingly prepared, but it seems to have been only an experiment of His Highness's disposition. For, afterwards Azim-al-Omra proposed in preference to write a letter to Pursaram Bhou and not to dispatch the Peshwa's letter until Pursaram Bhou's answer was received. His Highness assented. Accordingly a letter from His Highness to Pursaram Bhou is arrived to the following purport, that there is no difference or discord between Nizam and the Peshwa, what dissatisfaction exists is between Ballajee Pundit and Azim-al-Omra, which, when I (the Nizam) arrive, I will do away. In the mean time do you, who are a well-wisher of both States, come to me.

I understand that no communication has been or is intended to be made to Capt. Kirkpatrick on the subject of Kurnool.

The emissary that was privately sent here by Govin Kishen has returned to his employer with answer to the following purport, "That it is not our custom (the Peshwa's) to violate our engagements; this conduct is suited to those who having pledged themselves by bread and the Koran (Nan Koran) attend not thereto".

To the above communications, which were under the pressing injunctions to secrecy, Meer Allum added an account of the late intrigue with Wenkojee Bhosla, differing however from the account given by Azim-al-Omra to Capt. Kirkpatrick in the particular, that instead of a kind and encouraging letter a critical letter of invitation had been written to him (Wenkojee) by the Nizam in answer to his first advance, in consequence of which letter from His Highness the subsequent letters containing the papers of requests were received from Wenkojee.

No. 150—Malet reports the arrival of Tukojee Holkar at Poona with his force.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, FORT WILLIAM.

Poona, 19th December 1794.

Tukojeè Holcar arrived in the neighbourhood of this City on the 16th inst. when according to custom the Peshwa went out to receive him.

The ceremony of a mutual visit formerly took place between this Chieftain and me, but if it can be waived with propriety I do not mean to repeat so expensive a ceremony.

No accounts that have reached me of his force exceed 6,000 fighting men, but his plundering followers are, it is said, numerous.

I am given to understand that he is much shaken by age and by the disasters of his unsuccessful rivalry with the late Mahadji Sind'a. If so, there may be probability of this chiefship soon falling as completely under the disposal and influence of this Court as the Sindean by the same fate of its head.

No. 151—In this important communication the experienced Maratha Commander Parshuram Bhau recounts to the Nizam a history of the past relations between the two States and earnestly implores him to adjust matters so as to avoid a recourse to arms.

*Translation of a letter from Pursaram Bhau to Nizam Ally Khan
from a copy recd. from Meer Allum by Charles W. Malet,
20th December 1794.*

Your gracious letter has been received mentioning the ancient friendship and cordiality between Your Highness and the deceased Peshwa; that after the disturbance of Narrain Rou, Ragonath Badjirou had usurped the Government and by his Ministers through the mediation of Hyder

Naik and Moodajee Bhosla and with the approbation of the chiefs of that quarter (i.e. Marattas) had sent you the most tempting offers, but that without giving ear to them but keeping in mind and preferring the friendship established with Nanna and Madarou (Peshwa) you had laboured beneficially in establishing the Government of Madarou Narrain (the present Peshwa) and directed your attention to the punishment of his enemy, and that what happened in those two years was well known to great and small ; a'so that the affairs of Juzeat long subsisting between the two States were uninterrupted, tho' there were some points that had been agreed to by both parties, in the settlement of which you meant no injury to this State and were desirous of terminating them ; but that if the Ministers of this State disregarded these obligatory claims and rejected equity it was certainly ground of complaint ; that the unanimity of the two States was an object of respect and dread to other Governments and their disagreement cause of mutual disrepute ; that as I (Pursaram) was a Chief of consequence in the Peshwa's Government you had thought the communication of these circumstances incumbent, and that you were not desirous of anything unjust. The receipt of these your commands honoured and rejoiced me.

Verily the friendship of the two mighty States is firm and lasting, and formerly when Hyder Jung caused disturbances in Your Highness's Government the deceased Nanna Peshwa purely from motives of friendship assisted you to the utmost, and after the death of Wittul Soondur (who was defeated and killed in battle by the Marrattas) the deceased Madarou still adhering to the friendly usages of his ancestors and giving no place to the allurements of ambition and covetousness presented by the fortune of the times, persevered from first to last in such a regard for friendship and in so generous a conduct as to require no explanation. Afterward when Ragonath Rou seduced by the suggestions of interested persons severed from his fidelity and adopted destructive measures, doubtless advances with tempting offers may have been made to Your Highness through Hyder Ally Khan, Moodajee Bhosla. But Your Highness having weighed the advantages of the offers of Ragonath Rou and the proposals of the Ministers of the State (of the infant Peshwa then in the fort of Poorrunder) in the scale of foresight thought proper to comply with the applications of the latter, and accordingly exerted yourself in pursuing Ragonath Rou. This is true.

The Ministers of the State (Peshwa's) likewise without making any excuse of their being subsequently called on by their master (the Peshwa) agreed to whatever Your Highness prescribed concerning territory, etc., after your arrival at Aurungabad during the lifetime of Rukunal-Doula, and were not deficient in conciliating and gratifying Your Highness. Subsequently in the formation of plans, etc., various great projects were set on foot, but the Ministers of the State (Peshwa's) remained heartily employed in cultivating Your Highness's good graces.

After that in the visit to Edgheer a firm covenant was entered into in concert with the regent Minister, Ballajee Pundit, and the firmness of friendship was persisted. Notwithstanding which the measures that have in these days been adopted by Your Highness's Government have caused a total want of confidence—God knows whether with or without Your Highness's privity. But it occurs to my humble understanding that these things may be without consultation with Your Highness, and should Your Highness ask what measures have been taken on your part, verily may it please Your Highness, the specification and particularization of such dark and hidden things cannot and ought not to be written.

The Juzeat affairs of my master the Peshwa are totally deranged and confused, and the non-recovery of them is extreme. The article of Adoni, for instance, which is appropriated to the maintenance of my quota of troops—near 20 years have elapsed that not an item has been recovered, tho' my service with the fixed quota is incumbent, so that raising loans from the shroffs the duty to the State is discharged, and the collections of 20 years will be swallowed up in interest.

The state of the Choute, etc., and other demands is in like manner a mere matter of words, and no other construction remains to be put on these points but that they are incorrigible.

I am an hereditary servant of his House (Peshwa's), but I am so honoured with the favour and regard of my master (the Peshwa); that though my business is that of service as a military chief, yet is no matter of consultation hidden from me. I am therefore enabled by means of this privity fully to represent whatever has occurred from the first.

Everything relative to this Government is clearly and perfectly impressed on the enlightened mind of my master the Peshwa, nor has the Prime Minister nor the other servants great or small kept anything private or hidden, and in what terms can I describe the munificence, great understanding, great designs, magnanimity with which it has pleased God to endow my honoured master. Your Highness at the season of an interview will be so pleased on the observance thereof as to speak its commendation.

Your Highness is not desirous of a different line, the love of friendship is preferable to all. And those endowed with wisdom well understand and fully comprehend the benefits and advantages incident to a cordial and sincere friendship of the two States. Former Masters and their Ministers have hitherto acted on and have been guided by these rules.

Two shares in one country and two Governments in one place, in such a predicament there can be no enjoyment but by a good understanding, otherwise there is no remedy. This is the constant expression of my master the Peshwa.

In a word, if Your Highness will advert to the Juzeat and Kuleat, what other step will be taken by the Circar (Peshwa)?

In the course of friendship any inimical interruption which increases daily depends on Your Highness's attention for clearing up, and by the blessing of God you are endowed with wisdom and foresight, and others have not even heard what has passed under Your Highness's observation ; the cordiality of the two states is matter of joy to friends and of apprehension to enemies, and as Your Highness has said the same thing, doubtless whatever may be conducive to the respectability of the two states will be pursued in a suitable manner on your part.

My occupation being that of a military chieftain I know that my duty is to sacrifice my life in executing the orders of my Master. If therefore in my humble representations more or less should have escaped me, your indulgence will excuse me ; look on me as one of your real well-wishers ; Your Highness's person is a blessing. What more can I say ?

No. 152—Malet communicates to the Governor of Madras the attempts of the Poona Court to conciliate Tipu in its struggle against the Nizam.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,

TO—THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD HOBART.

Poona, 22nd December 1794.

Ostensible pleas of friendly intercourse have been lately furnished to this Government and that of the Nabob Tippoo Sultan by the marr ages in the latter's family and by the deaths of Hurry Pundit and Mhadjee Sindia here, in consequence of which mutual compliments of congratulation and condolences have been exchanged by letters and agents charged with the presents usual on such occasions, and I think it very probable that this Court may have endeavoured to benefit by this intercourse to conciliate a favorable disposition on the part of Tippoo Sultan to its present claims on the Nizam, tho' this Court is perfectly aware that no other reliance is to be placed on that Chief's disposition than may be sanctioned by his interests and the extent of his power to prosecute them.

No. 153—Malet communicates to Kirkpatrick Meer Allum's desire to quit Poona.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE RESIDENT WITH NIZAM ALLY KHAN.

22nd December 1794.

In reply to Meer Allum's application for my advice on the point of taking leave I have pointed out that the letters on that subject from the Nabob and Azim-ul-Omrah differ materially, the former presenting the acquisition of permission, the latter mentioning his return without noticing

permission; that as I am at a loss to decide on which of these letters he should regulate his conduct, I necessarily cannot form an opinion on the line he should adopt; but that in his deliberation on this delicate point he will doubtless advert to what has lately passed, and that a sufficient time has now elapsed for receiving an answer from his Court on the subject of the Peshwa's reply to his former application of leave to depart and on the proposal to suspend hostilities.

I am sorry to observe that some acts of depredation have been committed on the Nizam's territories by some of the Sindean troops from the neighbourhood of Burhanpore.

Meer Allum expresses much embarrassment in consequence of an order he has received from Azim-ul-Omrah to compose the draft of a letter to the Governor General imputing the blame of the present threatening posture of affairs to this Court, on which he has also desired my advice, but which, from obvious motives, I have declined giving.

No. 154—Malet communicates to the Governor General the application of the Poona Court for a supply of arms and powder from Bombay.

*Extract of a private letter from Sir Charles Warre Malet
to Sir John Shore, dated 26th December 1794.*

By the last post I transmitted the account and drawings of Ellora, which had become incumbent by my former mention of an intention to do so. I shall be happy to hear of their safe arrival as they will at least convince of my wish to perform my promise.

I have received an advance from Behro Punt on the subject of furnishing the Durbar with a quantity of gunpowder from Bombay, but have not yet given any answer. The application being blended and indeed in a great measure rested on compliance having lately been granted to an application of Mr. Dick to purchase buffaloes in this country to make powder for this State, which appears extraordinary as to require explanation before any further step is taken.

No. 155—The failure of Meer Alam's embassy is attributed by Malet to Azim-ul-Omrah's intrigues.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—LT. WILLIAM STEUART.

Poona, 26th December 1794.

Since my last letter to the Resident of the 22nd I have been furnished by Meer Allum with copies of the Nizam's and Azim-ul-Omrah's letters to him in answer to the proposal of suspending hostilities, but observing by

your address of the 17 to the Governor General that you had been furnished with copies by Azim-ul-Omra I do not trouble you with either copy or translation.

In the idea, however, that you may not have been furnished with copy of the separate paper from Azim-ul-Omra to Meer Allum, confidentially sent to me by the latter, I take the liberty of troubling you with both copy and translate, as also of Meer Allum's answer to the letters of recall transmitted in my last.

Meer Allum intimated to me that he was totally unacquainted with the progress or terms of the settlement of the Bider article and of the reason of its being now concealed from Roy Royan and others.

He observed in confidence that the unintelligibility of the Bider article alluded to by Azim-ul-Omra arose from this Court's allegations that the districts having been ruined by the oppressions of the Nazim's Aumils and this Government's collections consequently lessened, the Peshwa's Ministers demanded that either some sum should be fixed on the average of former collections for the payment of this Government, or that both States should grant covenants of protection to the ryots and act up to them.

I have learnt from Meer Allum that Govin Bugwunt has been with him and produced some papers in proof of the Adoni claims, but I have not learnt how far they are admitted as conclusive.

He has also confirmed an account which I had previously received from B. Pt. (accompanied with enquiries as to my knowledge of the measure) of the approach of another Vacked from Azim-ul-Omra named Esswunt Rou. Meer Allum assures me he has received no official intimation of the dispatch or object of this person, but that from private intelligence he has learnt the mission of such an agent—of which, when I declared my ignorance B. Pt. in answer to inquiries expressed great surprise.

On a general observance of the various channels into which Azim-ul-Omra's negotiations have diverged, Meer Allum has in a very laudable spirit of disinterested zeal for the service of his master assured me that however his personal feelings may be affected, he has no wish but for an happy termination by whatever means it may be practicable. Your knowledge of the character of Esswunt Rou will probably enable you to form a judgment of the nature of negotiations for the management of which he has been solicited, the progress of which probably remains as unknown to us as his dispatch.

I am just told that Esswunt Rou arrived yesterday in the neighbourhood of the camp, where he awaits the arrival of a person of consequence to receive and assign him quarters.

On the 23rd instant I was honoured with your letter of 18th by which I was very sorry to learn the continuance of Captain Kirkpatrick's indisposition. Doubtless we must be equally desirous that Azim-ul-Omra should not be reduced to the necessity of complying with any demand of this Court that could be either prejudicial to his Master or operative against the interests of the Company. But I fear that we must also jointly lament that his extraordinary conduct should so imminently risk those obnoxious consequences which were predicted in the Governor General's letter to you of the 18th September, and while I cannot help expressing my concern that in his variegated and intriguing style of negotiation he has sacrificed his own consistency and the dignity of his Master, so has he suffered the season either for treating or acting to advantage to elapse, in prosecuting his own intrigues or in attending to the artful procrastinations of this Court.

What was mentioned in my letter of 8 instant in explanation of my instructions in the event of being applied to by this Court for arms or military apparatus, was not meant to infer that the same reservations extended to your Residency.

Sincerely do I hope that the project of a confederacy ascribed to Azim-ul-Omra may be unfounded. At all events, the answer attributed to this Court, transmitted in my letter of the 19th instant whether true or false, gives ground to conclude that it is not likely to be prosecuted at present, so that it becomes unnecessary to trouble you with any observations on that part of your letter of the 17 to the Governor General.

If the 12 lacs mentioned in the postscript of the same letter are the amount of the Polygher Kundni, you will observe by the enclosed copy of a separate note that Meer Allum is ordered to insist on its subtraction, tho' possibly the conception of it may have been mentioned to you subsequent to Azim-ul-Omra's writing that note.

From the papers of intelligence you will learn the expedition with which Perron's Brigade has joined Jivjee Bucshy, passed Ugin and is now prosecuting its march to the south, having it is said, crossed the Nurbudda.

From Meer Allum I have just learned that the stoppage of Perron's Brigade at Ugin is declined, but that it shall halt on the Gunga, that the proposal of a suspension came from His Highness's quarter, and if he does not desire to accede to the approach of the Sindian and Bhosla quotas this Court can have no objection to his moving, that a meeting of the Peshwa with His Highness is highly desirable but free from the instrumentality of Azim-ul-Omra.

No. 156—Mir Alam forwards a faithful report of his conference at Poona with the Peshwa, Nana, Bahiropant, Appa Balwant and Govindrao Bhagwant. The Peshwa personally took a spirited and prominent part in the discussion.

26th December 1794.

*Translate of a letter from Meer Allum to Azim-ul-Omra dated
4th Jumadal Sane 1209 received by Charles W. Malet,
26th December 1794.*

I formerly acquainted you that the Peshwa had appointed me an audience on the 1st Jumadal Sane for receiving the substance of His Highness's letter; accordingly a meeting took place on that day when Ballajee Pundit, Appa Bulwunt and Govindrou Bugwunt were present. Agreeable to His Highness's orders His Highness's letter was read and explained article by article, and after hearing it I was desired to communicate the substance which was accordingly done. The Peshwa in concert with Ballajee Pundit replied that with respect to what was mentioned regarding the halt of the forces of Hindostan at Uggin, those forces had now reached Burhanpore and probably advanced two or three marches on this side of it, but if notwithstanding, His Highness wished them to halt they should do so on the banks of the Gunga.* As to the requisition that the Bholsa should not move from his own place, his arrival could not be countermanded, because even in the event of the present negotiations being settled his presence is necessary, and should the demands be recovered from the country, then likewise his coming was necessary, so that at all events his arrival was unobjectionable.

As to the observation that should I (the Peshwa) think of moving toward Jejooree, etc., His Highness would make an excursion in his own domain, His Highness's territory extends to the banks of the Bhima and in that territory I also have some hereditaments.† Moreover the proposal for suspending the movement of the armies was not made on my part, but as you made a requisition for suspending the advance of my chiefs that negotiation might be commenced, it was then replied if His Highness's forces did not advance my chiefs should not advance beyond the Bhima, for as there is no difference between His Highness and me, and as I have no object but to settle the Juzeat and remove all misunderstanding of the Kuleat, I therefore assented to my forces not crossing the Bhima and to their not entering His Highness's territory. But as answers to this (foregoing) purport have not been received, what reply can I make?

His Highness's intentions and the movement of his forces are no ground of apprehension or dismay; His Highness is absolute on this point.

On the point of a meeting, what can be preferable? I am more desirous of it than His Highness, but, agreeable to what His Highness prescribes, first let the Juzeat be settled and the misunderstanding of

* The River Godavari.

† Inherited property.

the Kuleat be removed after which a mode of interview should be settled, that therein no discussion may occur, nor anything, to interrupt the happiness and increase of cordiality on such an occasion.

I (M.A.) replied that from the first day I had signified that I was acquainted with the Juzeat and was prepared to make a settlement thereof, and as to the Kuleat which by the Grace of God was firm, what interruption was there in it?

The Peshwa replied that His Highness was well acquainted with the interruption thereof, and that the removal of the misunderstanding and making an establishment of the Kuleat entirely rested on His Highness himself, and unless His Highness firmly and heartily resolved to remove misunderstandings and settle the matters between the two States and directed his own personal attention thereto, neither would a settlement be made nor misunderstandings removed. How then could anybody else enter on the business?

I replied, first let the Juzeat be settled and then let the mode of an interview be settled, when, by the blessing of God, the misunderstanding of Kuleat represented by this Court would on meeting be removed, and as it is clearly mentioned in His Highness's letter, what hesitation could there be?

Ballajee Pundit observed that it was not proper to enter into much discussion on this point as it was a point of privacy, and that a word to the wise was sufficient.

The Peshwa said to Ballajee Pundit, "What does it signify if some little explanation is made?" Ballajee Pundit replied that he should not be hasty. (In Meer Allum's confidential communication on the subject of this conference was the following addition to B. Pundit's speech which is omitted from tenderness to or apprehension of Azim-al-Omra. "That whoever was dependent on and partial to another, meaning Meer Allum relatively to Azim-al-Omra, was forced to conform himself to the other's pleasure, so that what good could there be in explaining to such a person?") He (B. Pt.) then turning to me (M. A.) asked if I felt any incumbency to discharge the obligations laid on me by His Highness's salt, and whether I would faithfully write what was imparted to me; I replied that doubtless those obligations were to be discharged as I was a faithful well-wisher of His Highness my master, that also I was a well-wisher of Azim-al-Omra, and what hesitation could I have to communicate what he imparted to me? Ballajee Pundit then turning to the Peshwa said it is as he had observed. But that he would say a little on the subject. He then, addressing himself to me, observed that His Highness had written that he had long been desirous of a meeting and that the misunderstandings of the Kuleat would be removed at an interview; what objection is there if in the manner as in the visit to Edgheer when a treaty sanctioned by the most solemn oath (Nan O Koran) was concluded His Highness

himself declared that he was personally absolute and attentive to his own affairs ; His Highness in that manner attending to his own affairs should desire an unparticipated meeting ; the Peshwa is with his whole heart ready for a meeting.

I observed that by further discussion on this point the negotiation would extend to something disagreeable. I therefore satisfied myself with observing that I was not present when that treaty was made and was totally ignorant of the subject.

Ballajee Pundit replied that what he had mentioned was perfectly known to His Highness, and should I (M. A.) represent it His Highness would assent thereto.

Afterward they brought forward the subject of the chout of Adoni. I observed that after allowing the deduction of the country seized by the Naik (Hyder, I suppose) whatever should appear on the usual article should be settled.

Ballajee Pundit asked what country that was ; I replied Kunnickgheery, Annagoondy, etc., tributary districts.

Ballajee Pundit said, " What need is there of an answer to this ? On a sight of the papers it will be understood."

The Peshwa observed, " If after an inspection of the papers a settlement will insue, the papers signed by Ballajee Rou and Madaraou (former Peshwas) shall be exhibited."

I replied that after seeing a reasonable point why should not a settlement be made ; accordingly the exhibition of the papers is settled.

After this conversation I took leave with Roy Royan, and whenever the papers agreeable to appointment are produced, I will represent the state of them. What more can I represent ?

No. 157—Malet consults the Governor of Bombay on the point whether gunpowder should be supplied to the Maratha Court from Bombay.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—THE HONOURABLE GEORGE DICK, ESQ.,
Governor of Bombay.

27th December 1794.

On the 24th instant I received the following message in a confidential form from the Minister of this Court charged with the transaction of business with me.

That some time since the Subadar of Kullianee received a letter from the Governor of Bombay, stating that having occasion for a number of buffaloes to work the powder mills being engaged to supply a quantity of powder to this Government, permission to purchase them was requested.

That accordingly the Subadar had granted permission for the purchase and exportation of a number of buffaloes.

This being the case, the Minister wished to be confidentially informed whether a quantity of powder could be spared to this Court, an application for which would be rested on the encouragement I might be able to give it.

To this message I have deferred replying until I had done myself the honour of consulting you.

No. 158—Kirkpatrick censures the Poona Court for its uncompromising attitude.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART

Kumtana, 1st January 1795.

The copy and translate of Azim-ul-Omra's separate letter of the 23rd Jamadi-ul-owal to Meer Allum were very acceptable to me as this curious document had not been communicated to me by the Minister. It would not, perhaps, be difficult to account with some plausibility for this concealment of the negotiation relative to the choute of Bider not only from me, but from the Roy Royan and Ragotim Row. The uncertainty, however, of all conjecture on a subject that would not besides appear to be of much importance to us, restrains me from troubling you with any speculations on the occasion; I shall content myself with observing that though it should be true that so great a progress has been actually made towards a settlement of the Juzeat, our Courts would nevertheless seem to be as far from an accommodation as ever. Admitting, however, the Bider article to be really adjusted, and adverting to the comparative facility of the remaining detail points, especially that of Adoni, I do not see how we can account for the still unpromising aspect of things otherwise than attributing it to a positive determination of your Court to rest satisfied with nothing short of Azim-ul-Omra's dismissal, a resolution, indeed, that was but too plainly signified by Nanna in Meer Allum's conference of the 26th ultimo.

The twelve lacks mentioned in the postscript of Mr. Stenart's letter of the 17th ultimo to the Governor General did not refer to the Polyghar Khundnee of Adoni, but to the claim set up by this Court on account of collection to that amount which it formerly insisted had been made by Hyder Ali Khan by virtue of authority from Ragonath Row, and for which sum it considered itself entitled to obtain credit.

I am told that Azim-ul-Omrah has it in contemplation to depute a person named Kutb Ali Baig to Poona, and from certain circumstances it would appear that this Mission, should it take place, will be to Pursaram

Bhow. Another person also called Izzut Tullub Khan has, I am informed, set off within these few days for Naugpore, but the nature of his errand, though it may be guessed, is not certainly known.

It appears to me that the various channels through which Azim-ul-Omra has endeavored to negotiate a settlement with your Court, however ill-adapted to the accomplishment of that object or incompatible with the dignity of his Master, are more in proof of his wretched policy than of his insincerity in the pursuit of peace. Neither these variegated negotiations, considering the end to which they seem to have been directed, nor his folly in allowing the season of treating or of acting with advantage to elapse rather than precipitate matters or incur the reproach of aggression, can well furnish to the Marrattas at least any ground of complaint against him. Hence, if your Court should persist in demanding his dismissal (whether openly or indirectly is not essential), it will be fair to conclude that it will not be for any offence that his conduct latterly has given them, but in prosecution of a determination long ago taken and not to be shaken even by the satisfactory adjustment of what it calls its *juzi* claims.

From what I have learned within these two days I am disposed to think that it is by no means improbable that the Nizam may consent to an interview with the Peshwa unattended by Azim-ul-Omra. The Minister himself indeed declared last night to my Moonshy that if an accommodation could be effected by such a measure, he would most heartily concur in it or even agree to accompany the Nizam and forbear to take any part in the negotiations for a general adjustment. Should so considerable a concession be made to the Marrattas, it is difficult to conceive that it should not soon be followed either by the dismissal or the voluntary retreat of the Minister. To some of the probable consequences of such an event, I have already, on more occasions than one, generally adverted, and shall only add here that, if I thought it as likely to be of indifferent tendency with respect to the future interests of the Company as it is to secure for the present at least the tranquillity of the Deccan, I should feel no other regret on the occasion than what might be due to the fall of a man, who had, however interestedly, so long and anxiously cultivated the friendship of our Nation. We must not, however, I fear, expect to find in his successor one actuated by the same views or dispositions with regard to us or so ready to unite with the Company in the event of any future war either with Marrattas or Tippos.*

* Kirkpatrick's partiality for the Nizam's Government and his minister is obvious. Unfortunately the Hyderabad Resident's correspondence for the year 1794 is wanting in the Poona Residency Records.

TOPOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

The village of *Khanda* is situated 18°38' N. 75°32' E., in the Jamkhed taluqa of the Ahmadnagar district, 13 miles south-east of Jamkhed town and 12 miles due south of Patoda town in the Bir district of the Nizam's Dominions. [*Indian Atlas*, sheet 39 N. E.]. The river *Manjera*, flowing north-west to south-east, forms a sharp loop, which encloses on its southern side the town of Patoda, 22 miles S. W. of Bir. Four miles south of Patoda is *Pangaon* in the fork formed by the *Manjera* and a small western affluent of it. After crossing this affluent, the road runs S. E. along the plain (*via Digal* etc.) for some six miles, when it takes a S. W. turn and enters, by the *Mohori pass*, the mass of hillocks (highest point 2,495 feet) encircling Jamkhed taluqa. The *Mohori village* stands at the junction of three feeders (all running westwards) of the *Khur Nadi*. On this *Khur Nadi* is *Telangsi*, 4 miles N. W. of *Mohori*. Moving S. W. of *Mohori* and skirting the short hill ranges by a circuit along their western edge, at the end of about six miles we reach the village of *Khanda*, the brook *Kauti Nadi* (another eastern feeder of the *Khur*) running through it and separating the two walled square blocks which compose the village.


The fort of *Pavenda* is 26 miles south of *Khanda*.

J. Sarkar.

KHARDA

SCALE

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 MILES.



REFERENCES

Pucca Road	—●—	Boundary	- - - - -
Cart-track	- - - - -	Contour lines
Rivers	~~~~~	Feet above sea-level	2000

(G. P. Z. O. P. O. R. 122)

SECTION V

The Battle of Kharda.

No. 159—Kirkpatrick expresses surprise at the apprehensions entertained by Meer Allum for his personal safety on his return. He informs Malet of the Nizam having resolved on war.

FROM—WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Kumtana, 4th January 1795.

I can easily conceive Meer Allum to be considerably hurt at the too many painful and mortifying circumstances which have attended his mission to Poona, but I cannot say that I comprehend so clearly the grounds of his apprehensions with regard to his own future personal safety. If the original purpose of his deputation has been defeated, it does not appear how its failure can in the remotest manner be attributed to him, whatever share of it may be fairly imputable either to the implacability and pertinacity of Nanna Furnavees or to the miserable management of Azim-ul-Omra; at all events before I can enter into his fears on this head I must understand the foundation of them better than I do at present.

Permit me to submit to your consideration whether the answer you propose giving to your Court's application for a supply of powder may not just now have the effect of confirming or reviving its jealousy of our partiality to this State, since it may possibly be informed of my having transmitted the requisitions of the latter for Military stores directly to

Madras without any previous reference to Bengal. You will not of course suppose me capable of so much presumption as to think that the practice of this Residency either on the present or any other point ought, taken in the abstract, to weigh with you in the smallest degree ; but perhaps you may deem it better for once to follow even an irregular example than to risk the embarrassments which might in this delicate juncture result from a more exact conduct.

But whatever your final opinion on the matter may be, it is proper I should acquaint you that no such application as that made to you by Nanna Furnavees has ever been complied with either by me, or (as I believe) by my predecessor. Similar requests have, indeed, been once preferred to me to which, however, I have replied, "that it was not the custom of the Company to spare military stores whatsoever from their own arsenals : and that therefore the utmost which could be expected from their friendship was occasional permission to purchase them at their Settlements".

His Highness moved yesterday to Secunderpoor, a place at the distance of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Kumtanah. I have not yet learned when he proposes marching again, or whether any answer has been sent to Meer Allum's last letter. Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah, however, intimated to me that it was not intended to reply to it : and it is at least certain that His Highness (whether seriously or not) declared on receipt of it in a note to Azim-ul-Omra that there was nothing left but to try the fortune of War.

No. 160—A personal meeting between Azim-ul-Omra and Nana for adjusting the dispute and its advantages and disadvantages are discussed by Kirkpatrick.

FROM—WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

19th January 1795.

I was apprized of Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah's design of writing to Meer Allum to the effect mentioned in your 3rd paragraph, but the idea, as he himself stated it, appeared to me to be so wild that I did not think it worth noticing. His project was that Azim-ul-Omra should repair suddenly to the Peishwa's camp without announcing his intention to your Court, which was, by this means, to be surprised into the necessity of receiving and treating him in a suitable manner. Such an unequivocal mark of confidence on the part of this Minister would, it was expected, by inspiring Balajee Pundit with corresponding sentiments, lead to a happy and easy accommodation of all differences. The reasonableness of the scheme was argued solely from the success which, according to Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah, had attended a similar experiment when resorted to by Rokun-

ud-Dowlah* ; after having rendered himself extremely obnoxious to the Court of Poonah, he had, by a decided measure of this kind, most completely conciliated it.

It seems that Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah hinted sometime since to Azim-ul-Omra that he thought nothing so likely to restore the harmony of the two Courts as a meeting between himself and Balajee. To this hint the Minister replying that it was impossible for him to stoop to solicit an interview, Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah observed that it was not necessary he should appear in the business, as it might be previously arranged by means of Meer Allum, to whom he could privately write on the subject. Azim-ul-Omra answered that he was at liberty to write what he pleased from himself, and this, according to Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah's own account of the matter, is all the sanction he obtained on the occasion. Possibly the scheme of a visit on the plan of Rokun-ud-Dowlah's may have been subsequently abandoned by Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah, but be this as it will, it is not easy to believe, and perhaps, is not to be wished that Azim-ul-Omrah should ever be prevailed on to adopt it.

No. 161—**Kirkpatrick** reports to Malet about the Nizam having commenced strategic dispositions of his forces.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Camp Boligong on the Munjera 33½ miles north, 66 west of Bidder.

22nd January 1795.

The strictures on the conduct of Azim-ul-Omrah contained in Meer Allum's letter to Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah are not new to me. I have long known that he disapproved in a very unreserved manner of the measures pursued by the Minister in concert with, or in compliance to Mahdajee Sindia, the impolicy and danger of which he foresaw very early, as it was sufficiently easy indeed for a person of his discernment to do.

I agree with you in thinking it desirable that we should remain with our respective Courts in the event alluded to in your 5th paragraph ; and therefore shall make the necessary requisition on the occasion to this Durbar sometime between the 28th and 31st instant. But although a regard to consistency may require that a similar application be made by you in my behalf, the necessity of it would not otherwise appear to be pressing ; since we have no reason at present to believe that the Nizam has any intention of entering the Peshwa's territories hostilely or any other design than that of protecting his own from invasion.

* A former minister of the Nizam.

The depredations recently committed in the District of Bheer by a detachment (as I understand) of Jeajee Bukshy's army are said to be warmly resented by the Nizam; but I trust that they have not been attended with all the aggravating circumstances reported here. I hope also it is not true (though mentioned in your intelligence from Doulut Row's Durbar) that the Nizam's Jagere (Dasneh) in the neighbourhood of Dehly has been sequestered by Lukwa Dada, since it is difficult to conceive that, that Chieftain should take a step of such open and unqualified hostility without orders from Poona.

Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah informs me that the advanced army under Taje Wunt is directed to proceed to and take post at the pass of Dasore, a movement which would appear to indicate a suspicion that some attempt was intended by the Marrattas on the Doulutabad side. Should Azim-ul-Mulk*, indeed, be actually in the Peshwa's camp, as accounts from thence gave reason to believe, it does not seem improbable that he should have suggested such an enterprize or that he should be employed in the execution of it. I hope there is less likelihood of his ever obtaining the office of Minister at this Court through the influence of yours. It is a situation to which he is supposed to have once aspired and not without some prospect of ultimate success.

No. 162—Malet reports to the Governor General the failure of the negotiations and the movement of Maratha armies towards their eastern frontier.

FROM—C. W. MALET,

TO—GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp at Bhelwur, 1st February 1795.

Having expressed a desire of waiting on the Peshwa on joining the army, the 30th was appointed for that purpose. My visit took place accordingly, having previously called on the Minister, from whom I learnt that, by the latest accounts, Jeajee Bukshy was still at Peytun, but that the party under Dewjee Goleh had advanced to within 18 coss. Subsequent advices mention his having joined Doulut Row Sindea, who, I understand, has entered the Nazim's country, 15 coss in advance from hence, on the Sena River. He added that Ragojee Bhonsla was by the last accounts about 35 coss distant from Peytun. In reply to my enquiries of the situation of the Nazim's forces, he said that His Highness had made six marches, and a seventh was intended which would bring him into the neighbourhood of Ousa; but that he had not heard of his advanced army having passed Daroor.†

* Another nobleman of the Nizam's Court, not Azim-ul-Omra.

† For details of the Peshwa's march see No. 460 of *Kavya-Itihas Sangraha-Lehkh*.

I then enquired the state of the negotiations between the two Courts, to which the Minister replied, that though negotiations were still on foot, yet with so little appearance of sincerity (alluding to the Nizam's Ministry) as to afford no prospect of success.

To my enquiries about Tippoo and the state of the Kurnool affair he replied, that no recent intelligence had reached him from that quarter, and as this Court had not yet received an answer from the Nizam on which it had rested its reply to Tippoo's letter on the subject, no answer had yet been given to that Prince.

In my visit to the Peshwa I introduced the subject of Captain Kirkpatrick's accompanying the Nizam's Court in the possible event of that Prince's entering this State's territories in the course of hostilities and explained my wish of its meeting with this Court's approval, as the requisition was made in observance of the respect due on all occasions from one state to another, and particularly, under the present unfortunate appearance of things, from a State like the Company's equally friendly to both the hostile Powers and anxiously desirous of effecting an accommodation of the impending evils of war.

After some conversation between the Peshwa, Minister, and some others that were present, it was intimated to me, that the Peshwa would take my proposition into his consideration, and communicate the result thereof to me.

At the same meeting I was told, that the Peshwa would march in the morning to Adul, 6 coss eastward; but I was soon apprized that this resolution was changed to that of despatching the advance only, which took place on the 31st.

On which day I received the Durbar's answer to my application for its assent to Captain Kirkpatrick's accompanying the Nizam, which I have the honor to submit to your notice in copy of my letter to Captain Kirkpatrick of that date.

By the extraordinary tenor of this official communication, you will perceive, Hon'ble Sir, that this Court actually assumes the dependency of the Nizam on it in his intercourse with us evidently on the strength of the tenth Article of the Treaty of Salbyhe, of which our Government has hitherto been so cautious to avoid giving it an opening as actually to have waived all claim on the same clause with respect to Tippoo at the commencement of the late war and on other occasions, lest reference to it by us relative to that Prince might, amongst other reasons for waiving it, suggest or in some degree sanction its pretensions now brought forward with respect to the Nizam—pretensions that, should force and opportunity permit, will undoubtedly be extended to similar length, with respect to

the King, Doulut Rou Sindea, Ragojee Bhonsla, etc., and should certainly interest those Chieftains (as far as relates to themselves, though with respect to the King Sindea may adopt the principles) in their counteraction, and might be made the subject of particular reference to Doulut Row Sindea as guarantee of the Treaty of Salbyhe, should the wisdom of Government think the object of sufficient importance to risk the dissatisfaction of this Government, and our knowledge of the power and dispositions of the Maharatta Chiefs, particularly the two above-mentioned, justify the attempt.

No. 163—Kirkpatrick informs Malet of the Nizam having assented to his (M's) entry into the Nizam's territory with the Maratha army. He also writes about the military activities of the Nizam.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Camp at Boorgong on the bank of the Manjara.

4th February 1795.

To my representation to this Court on the subject of your accompanying the Peshwa in the event of his entering the dominions of Nizam Ally Khan in a hostile manner, I have received for answer that His Highness has no objection to it. The Minister having signified to me on this occasion that he supposed your Court had in like manner acquiesced in my attending His Highness under corresponding circumstances, I replied that although no application had yet been made to that effect, it was not to be doubted but the Peshwa would consent to it whenever it might be necessary to address him for the purpose.

I never heard till now the most distant hint of your Court's having been in the least degree instrumental to the advancement of Azim-ul-Omra to his present situation, and though I will not pretend that the credibility of the fact is at all affected by my ignorance of it, yet there are some very weighty considerations which oppose themselves strongly in my mind to its admission. Among these is the circumstance of his predecessor Rokun-ud-Dowlah's having fallen a victim, as has always been believed, to the suspicion of his having united himself too closely to the Marattas, who in such a case cannot easily be conceived to have had any great share in the nomination of his successor.

Taje Wunt had received directions to descend the Ghaut of Dasore for the purpose, as I understand, of intercepting Jeajee Bukshi and the Bhossillah, and was on the point of executing this movement when it was countermanded. I have reason to believe that this change of measures

originated entirely with the Nizam, who would appear to be averse to the division of his forces and to have but little confidence in the military talents of any of the Chieftains stationed with the advanced army. Assud Ali Khan and Monsr. Raymond arrived in camp this morning, having been summoned hither, as is imagined, for the purpose of assisting at a council of war. The advance is about 10 coss from hence.

No. 164—Kirkpatrick writes to the Governor General how he was pressed by the Nizam to advise about certain military dispositions and how he evaded the point in a diplomatic manner.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.

Camp near Kullum 9 coss south of Dharore,

10th February 1795.

A considerable time having elapsed owing to my late indisposition since I had waited on the Nizam, I visited him by particular appointment on the 4th instant. Assud Ali Khan and Monsr. Raymond had arrived in camp the same day from the advanced army at Dharore, and were present at my public audience. After the usual compliments His Highness proceeded to inform me that, having judged it necessary on account of the great change which had taken place in the nature of the Marhatta forces since his last rupture with the Peshwa to make a suitable alteration in the order of his encampment and battle, he had sent for Assud Ali Khan and Monsr. Raymond to confer with them on the occasion, and also thought it right, in regard to the friendship subsisting between himself and the Company, to communicate his intentions to me. He then explained the disposition which he had planned, asking me in conclusion what I thought of it. I replied that my inexperience in tactics totally disqualified me for judging of such matters. Soon after this I was invited to retire with His Highness to a private tent on pretence of showing me the river Manjerah from a remarkably favourable point of view. Here Azim-ul-Omra, after various observations on the conduct of the Marhattas during the course of the late negotiations (in which his Master occasionally joined), and after lamenting that notwithstanding His Highness continued as ready as ever to come to a reasonable accommodation, hostilities appeared to be no longer avoidable, entered upon a description of the several passes by which the army might descend from the Balaghaut. To this account he added some remarks illustrative of the effects which would most probably follow from each several route, finishing with a request in the name of His Highness that I would deliver my sentiments as to that which appeared me the most eligible. When he had ended, I answered, addressing myself to Nizam Ali Khan, that although the

respect due to His Highness made me attend without interruption to the details of Azim-ul-Omra, yet I must appeal to his candour whether I could with the smallest propriety, considering the friendship subsisting between Company and the Peshwa, offer any opinion on so delicate a subject. The Minister demanding what was to prevent me and observing that the privacy of my present audience had been purposely calculated to guard against the disclosure of my advice, I replied, still addressing myself chiefly to Nizam Ally Khan, by demanding in my turn what His Highness would expect from Sir Charles Malet were the Peshwa to consult with him concerning the best mode of attacking this army. "I know", interrupted Azim-ul-Omra, "that the answer of Sir Charles Malet would be the same that you have already so often given here. It would recommend a speedy accommodation of all subsisting differences as absolutely necessary to the welfare of both states". "And this," said I "is the only reply it is now possible for me to give to the question which has been put to me."

His Highness was silent, appearing indeed to be satisfied with the reasonableness of what I had urged: and the Minister did not press the point any farther. He observed, however, that it was to no purpose to insist so strenuously on the expediency of accommodating matters while it was so evident from the impracticableness of the Marrattas that nothing was left in the power of His Highness, and added that, I, as well as all the world, would be astonished to learn (and it would become known in time) what length His Highness had gone in order to satisfy the Peshwa. He alluded especially to the late conditional settlement of the Adoni and Bidder articles but without throwing any light on the particulars of that secret negotiation. His Highness remarked more than once in the course of this conference that he was certain no negotiation would be of any avail till the Marrattas should be experimentally convinced of his ability to defend his honour and his dominions against their most united and vigorous efforts.

Should the Peshwa, as his position according to the latest accounts indicates to be his intention, proceed in the direction of Aurungabad, I am inclined to think it probable that Nizam Ally Khan will move by Purrinda towards Poona. In this event, my continuing with him till the moment perhaps when he is about to pass into the Marratta territories, may no doubt prove inconvenient in more respects than one; and possibly even expose my party, no longer under the protection of this army, to some insults from the Marratta marauders who can hardly be expected to respect either my public character, or the neutrality of our nation in the present disputes. For these reasons, as well as on account of the little likelihood there appears to be of my attendance on His Highness to the borders answering any other purpose besides that of enabling Azim-ul-Omra to continue his mock consultations with me, I could have wished

(under the sanction of the discretionary power entrusted to me by your commands of the 18th September last, in the event of the Peshwa's refusing h's consent to my entering h's dominions with this army) to have retired from this place towards Bider or Hyderabad till such time as it might be advisable for me to rejoin the Court. You will perceive, however, Honourable Sir, from the enclosed copy of my letter of this date to Sir Charles Malet I have judged it necessary to drop my design for the present; and although it may fairly be doubted whether my taking leave immediately would be liable to any construction unfavourable to the affairs of Nizam Ally Khan (which was the apprehension affected by the Minister) yet I trust you will approve of my resolution to humour this Court to the extent which was demanded on this occasion.

I cannot conclude this address without taking the freedom to remark on the extraordinary answer of the Poona Durbar to the late application of Sir Charles Malet, that it appears to me to be tantamount to a declaration that the Company have no right to employ a minister at this court, their business with which ought to be transacted either through the Peshwa or by the agency of the British Resident at Poona. The extravagance of this pretension, which seems to be but ill-supported by the treaty of Sa'hye and certainly in no shape or degree at all by the subsequent treaties of Edgheer, Paangul and Syrungputtun, may be considered as no indifferent clue to the nature of the Peshwa's designs against this State, as far as the independency of its intercourse and connection with our Government is concerned.

No. 165—Kirkpatrick describes the movements of the Nizam's forces.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.

Camp Pargong, 15th February 1795.

The advanced army is encamped about four coss in front of this place and nearly the same distance from Moorighaut, which has been ascended already by some of the light cavalry of the Mahrattah army who have begun their customary operations by attacking the foraging parties from this. A body of two or three thousand are said to be posted at the bottom of the ghaut.

I am informed that Govind Kishen, the Marratta Vakeel at this Court, is likely to proceed shortly to the Peshwa's camp accompanied by Sidi Imaum, who is aumil of Bider and the person that has been principally employed of late by Azim-ul-Omra in his separate negotiations with Govind Kishen.

I have seen a news-paper that the Peshwa had advanced to the banks of the Seena and encamped within the Dominions of the Nizam, but my latest accounts from Sir Charles Malet are of the 6th instant when the Mahratta army was still at Bhelwur.

No. 166—Kirkpatrick reports that the Maratha Vakeel was greatly impressed with the Nizam's military preparations when he accompanied the latter on the occasion of the review of his forces and in consequence suggested to the Nizam certain changes intended to benefit his (the Poona) Court.

FROM—W KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.

Pargong, 23rd February 1795.

The Nizam arrived here on the 14th instant, and on the 16th proceeded to review the advanced army, the most forward wing of which (or Mons. Raymond's corps consisting of twenty eight Battalions) was then, and is still, encamped within about two coss of the head of Moorighaut.

Nizam Ally Khan thought proper on this occasion to require the attendance of Govind Kishen, the Marratta Vakeel, who accordingly was seated with Azim-ul-Omra in the khawasi* during the whole of the review, and if some late advices which I have seen from the Peshwa's camp may be relied on, this curious artifice was not without its effect, since Govind Kishen is said to have transmitted such accounts of the forces of this state to his own Court as have occasioned it a good deal of anxiety. In point of numbers and general equipment, indeed, it is probable that this army is little if any thing inferior to that of the Peshwa; it is certain that Monsieur Raymond's line has at least a very imposing appearance.

But whatever may have been the impression of the Marratta Vakeel on this head, he would seem very desirous of preventing Nizam Ally Khan descending Moorighaut or in other words from taking the Purrinda route, and with this view made a most extraordinary proposal on the 16th instant to Nizam Ali Khan, who was with some difficulty prevailed on by Azim ul Omra to accede to it. He introduced it with many professions of attachment to Nizam Ally Khan and of devotion to the interests of both states. He then deprecated the consequences which would inevitably follow upon this army's descending Moorighaut. Nothing, he said, could then avert an immediate action or prevent the veil of friendship from being rent. He wished therefore before it became too late to be permitted to make another attempt at negotiation; but as the discussions for this purpose would necessarily be somewhat tedious, and the Nizam could not conveniently, on account of the increasing scarcity of forage in this neighbourhood, remain in his present camp much longer, it was desirable that both armies should occupy such a situation as would admit, without distress to either, of the requisite delay. Nizam Ally Khan, he observed, could not proceed to the banks of the Seena without the Peshwa's falling back as well, because such a movement would bring the armies too close to one another as because the valley of the Seena would hardly afford subsistence to them both, and with respect to the Peshwa's falling back that was at present impossible. It occurred to him therefore

*The back seat (for a Servant) on a *howdah*.

that no place was so eligible for the purpose in question as the banks of the Godavery. He concluded with mentioning Moongiputtum as a station that would be proper for the Peshwa and Shahgur for Nizam Alli Khan, the former 15 coss, the latter 26 coss from Aurangabad and distant from each other about 14 coss. This project being assented to by Nizam Ally Khan, he engaged to obtain the determination of his own Court upon it in five days.

Accordingly on the 21st he announced to Azim ul Omra that the Peshwa had generally agreed to the suggestions which he had transmitted, and would in a day or two more signify his wishes with respect to the situations to be respectively occupied by the two armies during the proposed negotiations. On this point the Minister expects, he informs me, to learn the determination of the Mahratta Court in the course of this day.

Upon first learning these particulars from the Minister I could not persuade myself that he seriously meant to concur in a scheme, that, though extremely agreeable to the views of the Mahrattas, (and which I doubted not had accordingly been prompted by the Peshwa's Court), seemed on every account to be pregnant with nothing but mischief to Nizam Ally Khan's affairs. It would appear to have been from the beginning the intention of the Peshwa to proceed towards Aurangabad, and under this supposition the movement of Nizam Ally Khan in the direction of Purrinda was no doubt a very judicious measure; since as long as he occupied that position the Mahrattas could not persist in their design without exposing their rear and endangering the safety of Poona. An early action therefore between the two armies seemed to be generally expected, and would, indeed, in all probability have soon taken place, had not the Mahrattas contrived to transfer the operations of the war to a quarter where they will be more at liberty to regulate them in the manner most suitable to their views. What the considerations are which have influenced Azim-ul-Omra to accede to this singular arrangement, I do not yet know; the circumspection which I judged it right to observe in my intercourse with him equally restraining me from expressing either surprise or curiosity on so nice an occasion. His conduct appears at present to be referable only to an extreme solicitude for peace, but as there is some reason to believe that he is in secret correspondence with Pursaram Bhow and other Mahratta chieftains, it is by no means improbable that it may have other springs.

I am credibly informed that Umjid ud Dowlah, the guardian of Shums ul Omrah, very lately received a letter from the Roy Royan (Meer Allum's colleague), in which after representing that the Peshwa was desirous of nothing so much as an accommodation of all differences with Nizam Ally Khan but that it was necessary some other agency than that of Azim-ul-Omrah should be employed to effect it, he exhorts the person addressed to solicit and engage the attention of Nizam Ally Khan to this indispensable point. Umjid ud Dowlah having put this letter into the hands

of Nizam Ally Khan, it soon passed into those of the Minister, whose remarks on the conduct of the Roy Royan on this occasion are said to have been such as might be expected.

My latest letter from Sir Charles Malet is of the 15th instant which I received on the day following. The intercourse between this and the Mahrattah Camp is rendered extremely difficult by the Pindarah parties which have been hovering about this army ever since its arrival here. This I conclude has hitherto prevented me from learning the result of his message of the 14th instant to the Peshwa.

I had settled with Azim-ul-Omrah in the event of this army's proceeding to Purrinda to take leave of Nizam Ally Khan previous to his descending the ghaut, both because should Sir Charles Malet have left the Marratta Camp my continuing subsequently with this Court might have given rise to erroneous surmises, and because it was not clear that I should afterwards be able to retire, whatever necessity there might be for my doing so. As, however, there does not appear to be the same objection to my remaining with Nizam Ally Khan in the case of his turning towards Godavery, it is my intention at present to accompany him at least part of the way thither. Should I judge a temporary separation necessary till I can communicate with Sir Charles Malet on the subject or on any other account, I mean to fix my residence at Dharore, where in every event, I shall be within an easy distance of Nizam Ally Khan's army.

I have the honour to enclose a list of the Mahrattah forces according to the information received by this Durbār, and also an account of the current prices of grain, etc., in this bazar, which has hitherto been very well supplied.

No. 167.

** List of the Mahrattah army at present with the Paishwa.*

	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Guns.
Belonging to the Paishwa,	6,000
Ballajee Punt etc. Paishwa's			
Pagah or Household troops.			
Paugah	3,000
Hoojarat or Imtiaz	5,000
New levies	8,000
Ballajee Pundit's	2,000
Baba Phurkia and his brother's	1,000
Rung Rao's	1,000

*This statement already appears in Fraser's book '*Our Faithful Ally the Nizam*', but has been inserted here for the purpose of ready reference.

		Cavalry	Infantry	Guns
Seevajee Vitul's	1,500
Ramchander Powar's	500
Jahdov's	300
Pirtiniddy's	2,000
Rausta's	3,000
Purseram Bhow's etc.	3,000
Durrekar's	300
Paishwa's (armed with Musquets etc.).	with	15,000	44
Purseram Bhow's etc.	2,000
	Total ..	36,600	17,000	44
Beloining to Dowlat Rao Sindeah.		20,000 ^b	12,000 [†]	98
Beloining to Tucojee Holcar	5,000	3,000	35
Beloining to Ragojee Bhonsla		12,000	6,000	15
	Grand Total ..	73,600	38,000	192

To the above will be added about 10,000 horse and foot belonging to Purseram Bhow and Apa Sailokar who have not as yet joined.

* Including those lately joined with Jajee Bucksly

† Including 6 Battalions of sepoys under Mons. Perron (of De Bourge's corps) and independent Battalions under Michael.

No. 168.

The Bazar price of grain etc. in the Nizam's Camp at Pargong on the 21st February 1795.

Coarse Rice	5½ seers per rupee.
Middling Rice	5 Do. do.
Fine Rice	3 Do. do.
Wheat	15 Do. do.
Wheat flour	10 to 10½ do.
Horse grain (Chunna)	7½ Do. do.
Jowary	18 Do. do.
Ghee	1 seer and 6 Chuttacks per Re.
Oil	2½ seers per rupee.
Salt	9½ Do. do.
Dal	10½ Do. do.
Horse gram (Moong)	9 Do. do.
Goor	3 Do. do.

N.B.—A seer is equal to the weight of eighty Hyderabad rupees.

No. 169.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—C. W. MALET.

Pargong, 24th February 1795.

Azim ul Omra has appeared to think for sometime past that the Peshwa, rather than part with you in the present conjuncture, would revoke his determination respecting me; but if he knew the ground on which that resolution was taken, he probably would be of a different opinion.

In case this army should turn towards the Godavery, I have some idea of remaining at Dharore till I hear from you how you have arranged with your Court, and whether or not the route between your present camp and Moongyputtun is such as to admit of your accompanying the Peshwa to the latter station, consistently with the notice conveyed to you in my letter of the 10th instant.

No. 170—Under the guise of seeking recognition of Kuleat or general claims, the Poona Court was aiming at ascendancy in the Nizam's Councils, —such is the interpretation of the dispute by Kirkpatrick.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—C. W. MALET.

Camb at Pargong, 1st March 1795.

I see no reason for Meer Allum's imagining that Azim ul Omra would not like the Governor General's late enquiry respecting the Kuleat. The Minister observed upon the occasion, that there were no other Kuleat but what were comprehended in the Treaty of Edgheer, and that it was not in his power to give any other explanations on the subject than what he had already occasionally furnished. The truth, indeed, appears to me to be that the Marrattas alone are competent to afford any satisfactory explanation on this point, since it is they only who have built any complaint or accusation upon it, nor do I think it unfair to infer from their extraordinary reserve on the occasion that, they themselves have all along been conscious that they were in pursuit of an object of political expediency or of ambition, rather than one of well founded right. In fine, I have for a considerable time past been persuaded that your Court entertains views upon this Staté, which are by no means warranted by any existing treaties, and that among these the foremost is, if not totally to annihilate, at least to reduce the connection subsisting between Nizam Ally Khan and the Company within such narrow limits as shall suit with the free exercise of that sway over the councils of Nizam Ally Khan, to which I have no doubt of Nanna's aspiring.

You will be better able to judge than I am, whether or not it be likely that Meer Allum would have any objection to furnishing us with a general idea of the channel, through which his repeated intelligence concerning the hostile project of Azim ul Omra against the Company has reached him. It is doubtlessly desirable to obtain some light on this point. Since, besides the credibility of the information depending a good deal on the quarter whence it proceeds, a knowledge of this would contribute considerably to the proper and successful direction of our own enquiries on the subject. At present it is perfectly uncertain whether his accounts of this matter are derived from Marratta authority, or from his own Court.

Although it might no doubt be necessary to repeal the general prohibition, at present in force, relative to the sale of military stores at the several Presidencies, in order to enable the agents whether of Nizam Ally Khan or the Peshwa to purchase such articles in whatever quantities or at whatever periods they pleased, yet such a measure does not appear to be at all requisite, as the business has hitherto been managed with regard to this Court, whose agents make no purchases at Madras but with the special permission of that Government previously granted, if judged proper, on a formal requisition through this Residency, and it does not occur to me that there can ever be any difficulty in a temporary suspension of the regulations in question in behalf of those native princes, whom it may occasionally be thought advisable to accommodate in this respect. In determining on the expediency of such compliances it will no doubt, as far as this State is concerned, be always recollected that the existence of our cavalry in the Carnatic depends at present, in a considerable degree, on a similar sort of indulgence that we experience from Nizam Ally Khan.

No. 171- Kirkpatrick proposes a private meeting with Malet at a convenient place between the two camps.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—C. W. MALET.

Camp at Pargaon, 1st March 1795.

I wish to be favoured with your opinion as to the practicableness of our having a meeting in the event of Govind Kishen's proceeding to the Paishwa's camp. No doubt in this case a sort of suspension of hostilities will take place, during which it appears to me that we might pitch our tents half way between the two camps for two or three days at least. Possibly your Court might not come into such a measure so readily as I think it likely this would do. I cannot help, nevertheless, wishing that the thing were feasible, since in addition to the personal satisfaction I should have in the meeting it would be of no inconsiderable advantage in a geographical and

consequently a public view as it would enable Messrs. Mackenzie and Emmet to connect their very useful surveys.

P. S.—If we could meet half way it would be no more to either of us than one ordinary day's march.

No. 172—Kirkpatrick is allowed to enter Maratha dominions along with the Nizam's army.

FROM—W KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Camp Pargong, 2nd March 1795.

I am very happy to learn that your Court has revoked its prohibition of my eventually entering its dominions in company with the Nizam. It appears probable that this concession has been made in consequence of the representations of Gobind Kishen on the subject.

Having only this instant received your letter of the 27th February I am not yet able to signify to you personally the renewal of this Court's original permission for your attending the Paishwa in case he entered the territories of the Nizam, but there can be no doubt of its being readily and cheerfully granted.

Gobind Kishen's departure for your camp is said to be fixed for the day after tomorrow.

No. 173—Kirkpatrick reports to the G. G. of the Nizam having despaired of a peaceful accommodation and of his preparing to meet the Maratha army.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL,

Camp near Pargong, 3rd March 1795.

I have this moment learned that Gobind Kishen had an audience of the Nizam last night, but of what passed on the occasion I can only judge from the nature of the orders issued this morning, which Mustakeem ud Doula has just accounted to me. The advanced army, he informs me, has been directed to descend the ghaut immediately, and Nizam Ally Khan is to move from hence in an hour or two; intending, it would seem, to occupy the ground to be quitted by the advance.

You will have learned from Sir Charles Malet of Azim ul Doula's very recent public presentation to the Peshwa, and it does not appear to me improbable that this extraordinary circumstance occurring in the moment of a pretended arrangement for serious negotiations towards an accommodation, may have persuaded the Nizam that the Marrattas meant only to amuse him.

In consequence of Sir Charles Malet's letter to me of the 29th ultimo I consider myself at liberty to proceed with this Court.

No. 174—Kirkpatrick reports of the Nizam's army having suddenly descended by the Moori pass to the plain of Kharda.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Camp at the foot of Moori Ghaut, 5th March 1795.

I was prevented by the suddenness of the march from Pargong from advising you immediately of that movement, and the same reason operated against my informing you of His Highness's descent of the ghaut yesterday, which it was not thought would have been so speedy.

This army now occupies the banks of an inconsiderable stream called the Khyree, stretching in a western direction from the bottom of Moory Ghaut with the town of Khurda about two miles in its rear. The Menkullah† under Taje Wunt is said to be about three miles in front of the most advanced wing and not above nine or ten miles from the forces under Doulut Row.

I have not yet ascertained with any certainty the immediate cause of the Nizam's sudden determination to descend the ghaut, having had no opportunity of communication with Azim ul Omra since moving from Pargong, nor have I yet been able, owing to the hurry incident to this occasion, to obtain the renewal of this Durbar's original permission for your accompanying the Peshwa. It is what, however, you may confidently rely on being granted.

I cannot think that the long silence of Meer Allum relative to Azim ul Omra's obligations to your Court for his ministerial situation sufficiently accounted for by what is stated in the last paragraph of your letter of the 28th ultimo: since he has for a considerable time past been in the habit of constantly inveighing against the conduct of this Minister as well with respect to the Marrattas as in a variety of other cases.

†Advance guard.

No. 175—Kirkpatrick informs the G. G. that it was with a view to marching to Parenda that the Nizam selected the route of the Moori pass for his march.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—THE HONOURABLE SIR JOHN SHORE, BART.

Camp at the foot of Moori pass, 6th March 1795.

I had last the honour of addressing you on the 3rd instant, on which day Nizam Ally Khan proceeded to within a mile of the head of Moorighaut, which the advanced army had previously descended early the same morning. His Highness with the main body of his forces followed the next day, taking up his ground at Telingsee, a village situated on the banks of the Khyree and about two miles to the westward of Moori, which stands at the foot of the Ghaut bearing the same name. The fortress of Parinda* is about twenty miles from the present encampment in a direction a little westerly of south, and the Peshwa's main army, according to the latest accounts, at nearly the same distance and somewhat to the southward of west. With respect, however, to Parinda it may not be amiss to notice that it would appear to be laid down by Major Rennell considerably wide of its true position, which is about S. S. W. 28 miles of that assigned to it in his latest general map or the edition of 1791.

Last night my Moonshies had an audience of Azim ul Omra. An extract from their report of what passed on this occasion is enclosed for your information.

Towards midnight Mustakeem ud Dowlah by order of the Minister sent me word that accounts had been received from the Peshwa's army, which led to a suspicion that the Marrattas had it in contemplation to assault Nizam Ally Khan's camp immediately. This notice was accompanied by a recommendation to be upon my guard. The night, however, passed without any alarm: and the Hooly, contrary to general expectation, is now over without any attempt on the part of the Marrattas to surprise or otherwise materially to disturb this army.

No. 176—The G. G. is informed of a little skirmishing having taken place between the advance sections of the two armies.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE G. G.

Camp at the foot of Moori Ghaut, 7th March 1795.

The return of the Dawk Hircarabs with my dispatch of yesterday's date (which was intercepted and broke open by the Mahrattah Pindaras last night at the distance of a few miles from camp) enables me to add to the

* Osmanabad district, Hyderabad.

information in that letter that this army has been drawn up in front of the Paishwa's advance ever since morning with the Nizam himself at its head. I have not yet heard, however, that any thing material has occurred, and have reason indeed to believe that nothing more than a distant cannonade and a little skirmishing has taken place.

No. 177—Kirkpatrick informs Malet of the Nizam's resolution to proceed to Paranda. He considers that the operation could be successfully performed if carried out promptly.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—C. W. MALET.

Camp at the foot of Moori Ghaut, 8th March 1795.

Without examining whether or not it would be just or liberal in this Court to regulate its indulgence to us with respect to the purchasing of horses within its dominions by our conduct in the case of the military stores it may occasionally wish to procure from the Carnatic, I think, it may be reasonably supposed that it is prepared to do so, if not openly, at least indirectly, which last mode would answer its purpose equally well.

I was not aware of the practicableness you allude to of supplying our Madras Cavalry from other quarters, but till a new channel for this purpose be actually opened, it would not appear advisable to hazard the closing the only one, that I understand, to be depended on at present.

What you observe with regard to our horse purchases in the Northward being at the mercy of the Marratta Government, is no doubt very just, but it may also at the same time be remarked that our cavalry in that quarter is, at present at least, of no great consideration. Besides, I have reason to believe, that Sindca's agents have been allowed by the Bengal Government to purchase such articles of military supply as they required more than once.

As it is certain that Nizam Ally Khan cannot occupy his present position much longer, and as I perceive no inclination to force the Marrattas to action, I think it probable that he will soon determine on proceeding to Paranda if it be only for the sake of widening his foraging range, nor do I imagine that such a movement would be attended just now with any great difficulty, which, however, might doubtlessly be the case were it to be delayed even for a few days more, since in the interim the Marrattas might throw a considerable body of troops between that town and Nizam Ally Khan's operations, which I thought to be indicated by some of their manoeuvres yesterday.

I am obliged to delay answering the 7th paragraph of your favour of yesterday till you are so good as to inform me what you mean by the

responsibility that I *seem* to expect from Meer Allum, as at present I am by no means clear that I understand the passage rightly.

It is proper I should observe that when I mentioned the habit that Meer Allum had been in of inveighing against Azim ul Omra, I did not mean to confine the remark to the period of his Mission to Poona. It is a habit that he had been in long before my succession to this Residency, and though it should be easy to account for it in a manner entirely creditable to him, yet I cannot help thinking that it may be right to limit our confidence in his authority on certain points; his opinions and information must always be entitled to the greatest attention; but there are circumstances under which it may, perhaps, be allowable for us to refuse implicit credit even to very wise and good men.

To enable you to reply to any misrepresentations that may reach you on the occasion, I think it proper to apprise you that my little party has already been unfortunate enough to have two encounters with the Marratta Pindarras. The first of these took place a few hours after our arrival at this ground, when from our tents we perceived some Pindarras endeavouring to drive off our elephants and camels that had just gone out to forage. The escort set out to extricate them, but the marauders had retired without their booty before it came up, though not till they had wounded one of the people attending the cattle. The other affair happened last night when a part of the escort, in returning from a village to which they had been sent for the purpose of protecting some of our supplies that had arrived from Bider, were surrounded by a body of Pindarras, through whom they were not able to pass without discharging a few muskets. I thought it right to state both circumstances to Gobind Kishen (who happens to be my neighbour) immediately as they occurred; and he treated them as might be expected from a sensible man, mentioning on the occasion that even a party of his own had very recently been assaulted and plundered and some of them killed by these marauders, who, as they respected neither friends nor foes, were, in their turn, considered as enemies by all.

This Durbar has again formally signified to me its consent to your accompanying the Peshwa.

I have the honour to enclose copies of my letters of the 6th and 7th instant to the Governor General and to be, etc.

No. 178—The decisive action of the campaign took place on 11th March 1795. An eye-witness of the engagement submits a report of the same to Malet.

Khorda, 12th March 1795.

It is difficult to give any comprehensive view of the operations of such an amazing host as the Marratta army, especially when we consider the extraordinary manner in which our* army is organized. We broke ground

* Maratha army.

about sunrise and by the time we were in the enemy's front, the Naugpore Horse and the cavalry of Holkar were skirmishing but without any effect. After some slight actions the Marrattas retreated and our Battalion took post on an eminence from whence we cannonaded a party of Raymond's Foot, and were fortunate enough to blow up two tumbrils. About 12 o'clock a severe fire was kept up between De Boigne's Brigade and the Battalions of Raymond which continued all day. At the same time, the Marratta Horse having rallied, made a charge on the cavalry of the enemy and in this business Row Rumba was killed, being run through the body with a spear as he sat on his elephant. It is reported also that Assud Ally Khan is killed, but this wants confirmation. About four in the afternoon the infantry were driven from their post, which was a very advantageous one, and the Cavalry, upon seeing this, gave way. The whole body of the Marratta Army pursued them till they were effectually driven from the heights which they possessed all day, and about sunset they retreated to their own camp, from whence they returned but a very slack fire in answer to a very heavy one, which was maintained by the whole of the artillery of the Marratta army. Last night the enemy's camp was stormed by Bappoo Holkar, and five pieces of cannon and some tumbrils were taken and the entire bazaar plundered; and this morning the Moguls are not to be seen, but most of the camp is left standing.

After all, I conceive there have been but few lives lost in this action, as the whole of the business was decided by artillery. The ground on which the battle was fought was all hills and nullas and exceedingly stony. The enemy having the choice of the ground were strongly posted, and had a very long line. Mr. Boyd's battalion was three times engaged in the course of the day and was in the front of the pursuit, being posted to the right of the Peshwa's infantry. At midnight we arrived at our present post which is a nulla about [] coss from the field of battle.

You will pardon the inaccuracies of this letter when I inform you it is written while the battalion is falling into marching in order to take possession of the enemy's ground. In all probability we shall commence the pursuit of the enemy in the morning.

No. 178A—This paper reports details of the action of 11th March.

11th March 1795.

Enclosure from the Resident at Hyderabad.

Received 2nd April 1795.

Intelligence from the Camp of His Highness the Nizam, 11th March.—Early in the morning having ordered the Nukkaura* for marching to be beat and directed his retinue to be made ready, His Highness at 3 ghurries of

* Kettle-drums.

the day held a private Durbar at which the courtiers attended, and at 5 ghurries his Highness mounted his elephant taking Auzem ul Omra in the Khowaussy. The Princes and Chiefs made their obeisance as His Highness passed. When the Sawauree had got the length of a coss the army of the enemy appeared in sight, upon which the Sawaree halted and the Marhattas opened an effective cannonade. Monsr. Raymond who had advanced agreeably to orders, in consequence of repeated directions now turned back, and marching to an eminence where some cavalry of the enemy was assembled, he put them to flight and took possession of it. A heavy cannonade took place from the enemy upon Monsr. Raymond, who was not behind hand in returning it. Mohummud Alif Khan with his small body of cavalry without His Highness's orders charged the enemy and entered warmly into the combat, which when His Highness was informed of, he sent a horseman on, who called him off, and His Highness placing him in his Khawaussy spoke to him in terms of applause. After this Assud Alli Khan, Roshun Khan, Teij Wunt and Vizier Khan made an united attack, at which time a ball from the enemy's army struck the standard elephant of Roshun Khaun, and another ball immediately succeeding came among Assud Alli Khan's corps and the men began to disperse,—o' Assud Alli Khan's corps 20 cavalry and as many of that of Soobhaun Khan remained with their leaders. The rest were dispersed different ways. In the meantime a rocket from the enemy struck the breast of Vizier Khaun and killed him. The other Sirdars seeing this collected their cavalry and fell upon Rogojee Bhonsla's troops, whom they engaged in close action. Many of the former were killed, and as their advanced party was not deficient in their exertions, Assud Alli Khan and the rest finding themselves unable to keep their ground retreated and the Khan's standard elephant was taken; but Ghullaum Alli Khan, nephew of Assud Alli Khan, immediately attacking the enemy with a body of men he retook the elephant. As the enemy in the meantime kept up a heavy fire of cannon and musquetry upon the eminence which Monsr. Raymond had taken possession of, his situation becoming very critical, he was unable to keep it and was obliged to descend and was pursued by the enemy's horse. Hereupon Rajah Row Rumba, Sezawaur-ud-dowla Zuffer-ud-doula and Mohummud Laul Khan went by orders to the assistance of Monsr. Raymond and charging the enemy, a severe conflict continued some time. The elephant on which Row Rumba was mounted getting amongst the Marhattas was much wounded, upon which Rajah Row Rumba dismounted and taking to his horse he with his followers attacked Pursuram Bhow, whom he severely wounded in two places with his own hand, and then returned. Rajah Row Rumba himself also received two wounds, one from a musquet ball and another from a spear. The enemy surrounded Laul Khan's elephant and carried it off, and as the Khaun, notwithstanding that, still continued to fight, he was dispatched. As Monsr. Raymond was galled very much by the enemy, and the situation

of the Sirdars who went to his assistance was such as is described, he was unable to keep his ground; he retreated and crossed the nulla. Dillawur ud-dowla also agreeably to orders went to his assistance and a fire was kept up on both sides; at length the setting in of the evening put an end to the firing, and the enemy deceiving them into security, at two ghurries of the night, Jeajee Bukshee with a body of infantry and guns approached Monsr. Raymond's Camp and suddenly opened a fire of cannon and musquetry, which being warmly answered by cannon and musquetry from this side, the former retreated and kept up a distant cannonade, as did also the other party. His Highness at this time asked Mohummud Auzim Khaun what was now to be done, to which the Khaun replied that, the nulla being on the right of the army it was advisable to set up his standard and let the army remain that night where it was, and see what the morning presented. Noor Mohummud Khaun then came to His Highness and said if he would order him he could go to Govin Kishen, to which His Highness returned no answer. Azim-ul-Omra, therefore, asked him what orders he pleased to give to Noor Mohummud Khaun, to which His Highness replied, "Do you devise and know your own work, what answer should I give". Azim-ul-Omra then said something to Noor Mohummud Khaun, who went to Govin Kishen. His Highness's Sawaurec continued on the field till two ghurries of the night, when at Azim-ul-Omra's suggestion it set forward towards the fort of Khurda; as it was night and the road not discovered, it was not till 6 gurries of the night remaining that they reached the fort. All the Sirdars who were entrenched to stop the progress of the enemy except Monsr. Raymond after the return of His Highness's Sawaurec returned also. A great part of the baggage and stores and tumbrils of powder fell into the hands of the enemy. At four ghurries of the night remaining, Jeajee Bukshee attacked Monsr. Raymond, who being upon his guard, a severe fire of cannonade and musquetry was kept up on both sides; at length Jeajee Bukshee retreated. Monsr. Raymond remained where he was till two ghurries of the day when he collected the baggage of his troops and marched away, but for want of bullocks two large guns and several tumbrils of powder were left behind in the course of the march, and he reached his place of encampment with the rest of the army. 12th March:—At one ghurri of the morning His Highness came out. Azim-ul-Omrah, Govin Kishen and the Sirdars of the Paugah Khauss (household cavalry) paid their respects. Azim-ul-Omrah and Govin Kishen had a private audience at 3 ghurries. His Highness broke up the conference. Orders were issued for the patrollers and pickets of the army to be stationed on all sides. At night the enemy's Pindaras made their appearance on all sides and the Sirdars stationed in the entrenchments were engaged in keeping them off with cannon and musquetry. Azim-ul-Omrah after his usual exercise repaired to the Presence, and after the Durbar was over returned, took a repast and retired to sleep. At one prahar and four ghurries of the day the usual

courtiers attended with whom he retired. At three prahar he again came out and sat upon a bastion of the fort, where he conversed with Mullec Esaw' Khan; after two ghurries he rose and at night repaired to the Presence and after the Durbar returned and went into the Muhl.

The enemy's Pindaras set fire to the tumbrils and other articles which were scattered all over the plain. Of Monsr. Raymond's corps five or six* hundred men were killed and twelve hundred wounded. Of the corps of Assud Alli Khan and of Row Rumba forty or fifty men were killed and near one hundred and fifty wounded.

No. 179—Malet submits to the G. G. a report of the fighting on 11th March gathered from a message of the Minister. It was the cannonade from Sindia's guns that won the day for the Marathas.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp on the Svena River, 12th March 1795.

In my address of yesterday it was mentioned that the report of a warm cannonade was heard in the evening.

At 2 a.m. this morning a message reached me from the Minister that an action had happened with the Nazim's forces, in which the Peshwa's army was victorious. At the same time, and subsequently, various reports have reached me, of which the following is the substance.

That the Nazim had begun to move in the morning, with an intention to change his ground. That the Marrattas, in pursuit of the advantages of such an occasion, had likewise got in motion. That the centre, under Pursaram Bhou and Baba Furkia, joined by Kassi Rou Holkar, had attacked a part of His Highness's line of march about 3 p.m., but had met with so warm a reception, that they were obliged to retreat with precipitation after Pursaram Bhou had been wounded and lost some of his nearest relations and companions. That the Nazim's troops pursuing and having driven the flying party beyond the Marratta line, of which Doulut Rou Sindea formed the left, and Rogojee Bhonsla the right wing, their flank and rear became necessarily exposed to the fire of the numerous cannons of Doulut Row Sindea, and to the no less numerous rockets of Ragojee Bhonsla, by which their career being checked, they were on the close of the day forced to retreat, with some precipitation and considerable loss, to their own army.

*Remark of Captain Kirlpatrick written upon the original paper. "Better authority states the loss of Raymond's corps at no more than 300 killed and wounded."

It is reported that great numbers fell on both sides ; that a chief of eminence on the part of the Nazim was slain ; that Raja Teyj Wunt is a prisoner ; and Rou Rumba wounded : but these reports want confirmation ; as also, those of the capture of five elephants and two guns by the Marrattas.

In addition to this unfavourable news, I am sorry to learn that Govin Rou Pingleh, the person despatched hence on the 9th for the ostensible purpose of visiting the Nazim's Camp with a view to an accommodation, returned hither this morning, which I attribute to his having been prevented moving on at the time intended, while subsequent events have rendered his mission unnecessary.

Having detained this letter till this afternoon in hopes of further information, I have the concern to add, that advice has just reached me of His Highness having retreated precipitately by the Mohuree Ghaut, through which he descended the 3rd and 4th instant, by which means great part of his camp and artillery have fallen into the hands of this army.

No. 180—Kirkpatrick expresses concern at the advantage gained by the Maratha advance troops over the Nizam's army on the night of 11th March. The Mogul army fled leaving behind its guns and baggage, while the Nizam shut himself up in the fort of Kharda.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—SHORE, G. G.

Camp at Khurda, 12th March 1795.

I am extremely concerned to inform you that the Marratta advance gained an advantage last night over this army which at present promises to be of the most decisive nature.

His Highness moved between 8 and 9 in the morning from his camp at Wakigong in the direction of Perrinda : and, as might have been foreseen, the rear of his army was somewhat annoyed by a distant cannonade, which the Mahrattas opened upon it from the heights which they occupied along the right of his line of march. Either, however, this operation was thought of so much consequence, or the enemy were supposed to be so much in force in this quarter and their design to be so serious that the whole line was halted till Monsieur Raymond's Corps and several bodies of cavalry were brought from the left and opposed to them. After this the troops and baggage, which were almost every where blended together, were again put in motion, but stopped as often as the Marrattas fired a gun. By this means it was sunset before the army approached the river, on which

it was proposed to encamp ; and about this time the Mahrattahs and the advance of this army had got so near each other as to admit of some skirmishing between the cavalry, which had no other appearance of being smart than what arose from the circumstance of two or three chiefs of some distinction having been slain and Assud Ally and one or two others wounded. The Marratta cannonade was also by this time become rather warmer than before, which would seem to have been one of the causes of Raymond's corps quitting the ground it had gained and falling back to the river, which was to be occupied by the army. It is not improbable that another and more powerful one, was the ill support he received from the cavalry. Be this as it may, there appeared to be no obstacle in the world to the army's remaining during the night where it was and resuming its march towards Perrinda this morning. It is true that some time after dark and when the action was supposed to be over, the enemy pushed on a body of infantry towards Raymond's line, which it saluted with a discharge of musquetry and a pretty smart renewal of the cannonade with the addition of some rockets. But though this attack would not seem to have made any great impression on Raymond's corps, yet it had a very different effect on the Nizam, who in a most unaccountable manner gave orders a little after eleven o'clock for a retreat to Kurdlah, leading the way himself, accompanied by the ladies of his mahl. The immediate consequences were not so serious as might have been expected, owing probably to the Marratta chieftains never conceiving it possible that the Nizam should be so causelessly dismayed. They were, however, but too bad, and the greater part of the army without any thing entitled to the name of a battle and without experiencing any thing deserving to be called a discomfiture, shamefully fled. Towards the morning the light troops of the enemy discovered this unlooked for movement and took advantage of it accordingly. The reports of the loss of baggage, guns, bunjarahs etc., sustained on this occasion are too vague and various at present to be mentioned, but I am well persuaded it must have been extremely considerable.

The Nizam has shut himself up with his family in the small fort of Khurdlah situated under a ghaut of the same name, and within two or three miles of Moori : and the Marratta army appears to have accompanied him back. Gobind Kishen has been with him during a great part of the morning. As it is not probable that his cavalry will be brought to face the Marrattas again, Raymond's corps must be necessarily greatly dispirited : and as the army can neither be subsisted here much longer, nor retreat farther but with the greatest difficulty, it seems but too likely that this fatal want of firmness manifested by him last night will be followed by his purchasing peace at the Peshwa's own price, or rather on the terms which the united Marratta chieftains may consider expedient, with a view to their own interests as well as those of their Lord Paramount,

This is a very imperfect account of an event so highly important, but when the circumstances of the case are adverted to and you are informed that I have confined my narrative to what I was an eye-witness of, (having as yet had little or no communication with my ordinary channels of intelligence in camp) I assure myself of your indulgent consideration.

No. 181—A News-letter report about Kharda.

12th March 1795.

INTELLIGENCE from Tuckojee Holkar dated 20th Shabaun (or 12 March), Camp as before within the Nizam's territory.

At four ghurries of the night an Hircarrah came with advice that at six ghurries of the day remaining (between 4 and 5 on the afternoon) a cannonade between the troops of the Peishwah and Nizam was begun, and that the balls of the Nizam's great guns annoyed the troops of Kashee Row Holkar. That Bapoojee Holkar repaired to an eminence, whence he opened his guns and silenced those of the Nawab. In the middle of the night a shooter sawaur¹ came with information that the action between Peishwa's and Nizam's troops continued very warm until 4 ghurries of the night. That Purseram Bhow was wounded and a great many men both killed and wounded. That troops were sent from Dowlat Row Sindea's camp to the support of Purseram Bhow. That the Nawaub's army retreated to their camp. That several elephants and guns of the Nizam's were taken. That Row Rumba was wounded and Bhara Mull† both belonging to the Nizam killed, and that the victory was the Peishwah's.

INTELLIGENCE from Dowlat Row Sindea's Camp dated the 20th Shabaun (12 March) at Paulooda six coss distant from the Nizam's Camp.

Yesterday an Hircarrah came from the Nizam's Camp and brought intelligence to Jyajee Bukshee that the Nizam had ordered a march to be made towards his quarter and sent the baggage towards the fort of Pooranda‡, that it was his intention in person with Assud Alli Khaun and Monsr. Raymond to attack Perron's Camp, that the Nawaub had sent Roshun Zemaun Khan, Roy Bhara Mull and Kow Rumba towards Purseram Bhow &c forces of the Peishwah, that the Nizam talked of making marches of ten coss and plundering Poona.

On receiving this intelligence Jyajee Bukshee expressed himself in terms of defiance and drew out his force for action, which afterwards became general with field pieces and rockets. The Nawaub's troops made

¹Camel-ride.

†Taj Wunt.

‡Parenda.

an attack upon those of Pursuram Bhow and " Dadjee Phurkea, and cannonade and fire of musketry took place between them. Pursuram Bhow &c retreated one coss. He was wounded and his nephew killed, Michael and Mr. * * * * who were advanced with their battalions before all (of Dowlut Row's Troops) on learning this marched with their guns to oppose the Nizam's troops. They were engaged during two ghurries after which the latter took to flight. In the meantime Pursuram Bhow having recovered, his troops from their parties pursued the Nizam's and continued the engagement with swords for two ghurries; hundreds on both sides were killed and wounded. At this time a shooter sawaur came with intelligence that Jyajee Bukshee with a select body of 5,000 men charged the Nawaub's army, which unable to withstand them fled two coss to the place where the baggage was; several guns, forty elephants and a person of rank, some Europeans and Portuguese were taken. It is said that the Nawaub has retreated to the Fort of Kurdla whence he intends at sun rise to remove to which is fifteen coss from Dowlut Row's army. Assud Alli Khan &c is surrounded by the troops of the Sirkar (Dowlut Row's). Another shooter sawaur came and reported that Roy Bhara Mull was killed and Row Rumba mortally wounded, that Perron had gone and plundered the baggage. In fine the Nizam has sustained a signal defeat. To-day the Peishwah had resolved upon advancing three coss.

No. 181A—Uththoff's survey of the battle of Kharda.

FROM—J. UTHTHOFF,

TO—SIR C. W. MALET, RESIDENT, POONA.

Camp near Kharda about 20th March 1795.

Agreeable to my promise I shall now trouble you with the observations resulting from my survey of the scene of action of the 11th inst. and under the sanction of a private address, may perhaps indulge myself in a latitude of conjecture and opinion that might not be quite consistent with official communication.

On the 17th at 3 a.m. I proceeded from my station in the Peshwa's camp on the Issurna, about $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles from whence passed through the baggage camp of the Marhatta advance one small stagnate Nolla called Gora Gaum nolla. Daulut Rou Sindia and Raghojee Bhonsla are now encamped here, but when the affair of the 11 happened, they and the baggage camp were 3 miles eastward. We cleared the very stony and

*Names illegible in the original.

uneven ground which extends about that distance to the east and west of the Nolla, and, passing a pretty valley well watered with wells, came to an eminence on which we found seven dead bodies, two of which were Europeans; and what seems very extraordinary two wounded men living, one with a leg carryd entirely off the *****wounded; this poor creature when we found him had lost the power of speech, but a little water revived him wonderfully and he recovered his utterance. The other unfortunate man's thigh was broke and shattered by a ball, but having had occasional assistance of bread and water from accidental passengers he was perfectly in his senses. Both said they belonged to the Nizam's army, and that they had advanced where they lay with an European corps of Infantry (and commanded by an European, I suppose), and a body of horse. I had them both removed to a neighbouring village, which tho' deserted was a place of such general resort as to give them the advantage of the humane assistance of all passengers, but on sending them some dressings for their wounds two days after I found that one had died. This eminence is about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from the Keyree river or nalla by a gradual and pretty even descent. From this spot we proceeded to another small round eminence about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the south, passing in the interval some dead men and horses. Round this eminence were several dead bodies of men and horses, the former of whom had been covered with earth and stones,—from hence we proceeded eastward about 2 miles passing some dead horses that seemed to have fallen in their retreat from the round eminence (to the river) to that part of the Keyree river which, we were told, had been occupyd by the Nizam's army the evening of the 11th, but was now covered by the right wing of the Marratta army, being the Bhonsla's troops under Wittul Pundit. From this place the fort of Kurda appeared to be about six miles, of which we had a distinct view as also of the Nizam's camp around it and of the Marratta army, the left wing of which composed of Sindia's troops under Jeajee Bucshy seemed to occupy the ground and possess the river to the westward of the fort. From this spot we returned toward the eminence where we had seen the first bodies, having made a circuit from it of about 5 miles including the whole scene of action, whence it appears that supposing the Mogul army to have been marching on the Keyree nalla, the excursions of their parties *****even Infantry extended $\frac{1}{2}$ or two miles to their right involving unnecessary delay to the march of the army and danger to themselves. My survey of the scene of action convinces me that the dead horses did not exceed 60, the loss of which must, of course, be divided between both parties, as even these people allow that the Moguls had the advantage in the first onset. The slain men were fewer including buryd and unburyd, so that allowing some bodies to have been carryd off for burial and others to have escaped our notice, also that some of the wounded had been carryd off, tho' from my finding two of that description on the field at the expiration of 8 days they cannot be supposed to have been many. When I say, these circumstances

are considered, (and allowing that all the dead bodies that we saw belonging to the Moguls as it is most likely the Marattas carryd off theirs) I cannot by the most ample estimate suppose His Highness's loss to have exceeded 100 killed and wounded, while that of the Marrattas is so trifling that I have not heard it even mentioned.

After taking this general view I rested the middle of the day in the pleasant little valley between the Gora Gaum nalla and the field of action, and in the evening returned to camp.

From the foregoing account of the affair of the 11th we are necessarily astonished at the important consequence that insued in the unaccountable flight of the Nazim's army, by which not only the respectability of his personal character and Government was sacrificed, but the very existence of himself and army endangered. This most extraordinary event, therefore, necessarily leads to a retrospect of the circumstances immediately preceding it, and in doing this, it must be recollected that negotiations were set on foot by Govin Kishen for accommodation, which ended abruptly and hitherto unaccounted for, on the Nazim's descending the Mohuree Ghaut and thereby approaching so near the Marratta army as necessarily to draw on hostilities. Without attempting to conjecture the causes of this measure, I must allow that at that period His Highness's force was held in considerable respect by the Marratta army, which, it may be supposed, would be increased by so bold a movement, consequently it became incumbent on His Highness to keep up this impression by immediate vigorous measures against the Marratta army, or by taking advantage of its being unprepared to stop him, as was the case, to have pursued his march to Parenda, thereby carrying the war under cover of that fortress toward the enemy's country and getting an untouched range of forage. But instead of either of these measures His Highness lay totally inactive from the 4th day of his descent of the ghaut to the 11th March, during which the Marrattas formed their advance and straitened his quarters. At length when His Highness marched on the 11th March, the most common order of march, not to talk of advantage of ground, seems to have been neglected. For it should seem that had His Highness kept his army to the eastward of the rivulet, on which his route lay, it would have been extremely well secured from the Marratta attempts to interrupt its march, even had they been able to come up with him in force, which I greatly doubt, as His Highness's route lay at least 5 miles from their camp, three of which nearest their camp the ground was so exceedingly uneven and stony as to be highly inimical to the movement of artillery. By this disposition of his line of march it would have been covered by a range of hills on the left and the river on his right, and as that was fordable in all parts, the right wing might have been proportionately strengthened to such a degree as to have kept the enemy's cavalry in awe. By moving thus the Nizam's army would have been amply supplyd with water, while the enemy would have been distressed for it, as there was

not a sufficient supply for their army between the river on which the Nizam was marching and the Nolla from which they had to march to interrupt his progress, by which means great part of their army was actually forced to fall back to it after the affair of the 11th. It seems however, that His Highness instead of thus pursuing his point and gaining Parenda by a forced march in the course of the 12th, suffered himself to be unnecessarily interrupted and amused by the enemy's cavalry till their infantry and artillery came up, when by imprudently advancing detachments of his cavalry and infantry so far from his Right as to render their remaining or retreating equally unsafe, the evil consequences of delay and dismay necessarily followed--delay by waiting for their return and dismay by their being forced to retreat. But tho' this was bad, yet as the Nizam's cavalry had shown considerable share of spirit in the commencement of their excursion and actually forced large bodies of the enemy to fall back, it might have been hoped that delay should have been the greatest misconduct of the day, and have enabled His Highness to make a disposition for the next march that should have re-established the spirits and confidence of his army. But, instead of this, how are we possibly to account for the precipitate and disorderly retreat that commenced the same night towards the small and defenceless fort of Kurda? But this unfortunate step might possibly have been remedied or corrected had it been executed with common steadiness; so far from which the (the rest of the portion missing).

No. 182 Report of an audience granted to Meer Allum by the Peshwa, making it plain that the Poona ministers looked upon A.O. as their arch-enemy, on whose dismissal they insisted as a necessary step for restoring friendly relations.

13th March 1795.

REPORT by Sir Charles Warre Malet's Munshy of a conference with Meer Allum on the 13th March 1795.

Yeste day the Peshwa summoned me to an audience. I at first hesitated, seeing that all pleasure in going was at an end, but Ragotum Row observing I ought to attend, I did so, with Roy Royan. We were taken to a private audience, at which were present Appa Bulwunt, Behroo Pundit and his son, Govin Row Pingleh, the Peshwa and Minister. The Peshwa ordered the minister to open the business of my summons. He accordingly addressed himself to me thus :--

“The Peshwa commands me to say, that news is arrived of the Nizam's having recanded the Ghaut, and that his baggage &c. has fallen into great confusion. That this news has afflicted him greatly, and he is

surprized at His Highness's subjecting himself to so great inconvenience, which might have been avoided by his halting, and writing him (the Peshwa) on the subject that a negotiation might have been set on foot ; a note from His Highness on this point would have been sufficient to have induced the Peshwa's ordering a cessation of arms, for the Peshwa is extremely grieved at these events, and was never desirous of such an issue, as he does not think the States separate, but looks on His Highness's loss as his own ; nor does he now attribute what has happened to the force of his army but to the evil disposition of His Highness's companion Azeem ul Omrah, by whom these things have been brought to pass, who wished to throw the Paishwa's Government into confusion, and was in fact engaged in the confusion of both States, and scrupled not to violate the engagements he had made under the most sacred oaths on the Koran. But these evil designs have, by the blessing of God, which is on this state, reverted on himself, and even now the Peshwa is desirous of avoiding war with His Highness, and only wishes that His Highness should, agreeably to his engagements with the Peshwa, attend in person to affairs with him (the Peshwa), and that the person who has brought things to this pass should be no longer the channel. It is proper that you should represent these things to your master in writing, and the Peshwa will also write, and expects, that these letters be conveyed to His Highness without any other person's interposition.

To the above speech of the Minister, Meer Allum replied in terms of civility and acquiescence, adding that the two States were so intimate, that their joint efforts would have been more suitable against strangers. To this the Minister replied that attempts of that kind had also been made by Azeem ul Omrah.

On this Meer Allum remarked that this moderate language was mere satire in disguise, and though they pretended to have no object but the expulsion of Azeem ul Omrah, yet there was no dependence to be placed thereon and that could be a compensation for the disgrace that had already taken place.

No. 183—A British news-agent's revelations of Nana's durbar after the victory.

13th March 1795.

Communication from a quarter of undoubted credibility to Sir C. Malet's Munshy, 13 March 1795.

Addressing himself to me he said where is now your Islam and the credit of your sect ? It is at an end in Hindostan. I went yesterday to present my nuzzur with others to the Peshwa on his victory, at which time Meer Allam's approach was announced. I asked the Minister if he

was coming to present a nuzzur also ? He replied no ; that he came by summons : adding, why don't you ask for what purpose he was summoned ? I replied doubtless you have summoned him on business. The Minister then explained the cause of his being summoned in nearly the same terms, as detailed in the separate account of the conference with Meer Allum. In the meantime Meer Allum arrived and was taken to a private audience when I prepared to depart, but was sent for back being present when he came, meaning if he had not been accidentally there, he would not have been sent for. I accordingly went and heard what the Minister had before mentioned to me, repeated to Meer Allum. But in what terms shall I describe the exulting ridicule with which, after Meer Allum had withdrawn, the Nizam's character and conduct were treated for near three hours, at the end of which, it being resolved to march in the morning, it was observed that it should be communicated to the British Resident. the Minister replied, there was no occasion for such intimation from the Durbar, but that Behroo Punt might from himself communicate it. This was rejected by the latter, observing as no communication was necessary according to the Minister, he would follow the Peshwa of course. The Peshwa then observed, it was proper to apprize him of it officially, and Behroo Punt was directed accordingly.

The communicator then asked if these events, meaning the Nizam's defeat, would be acceptable to the English, and whether they thought themselves uninterested therein ? The Munshy replied they were desirous of the misfortune of no friend, but that victory and defeat were in the hands of God. The communicator then said, that the Minister had already taunted Behroo Punt with his having been the channel of the English in advising different measures : observing that he, (Behroo Punt), now saw who was right. The communicator closed with saying who will now be suffered to remain quiet, meaning by this State.

No. 184 --Kirkpatrick comments on the strange retreat which the Nizam beat to the fort of Kharda and sees little hope that the Nizam would be able to extricate himself from his awkward situation.

FROM W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO--SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Camp Kharda, 13th March 1795.

The greatest part of yesterday had elapsed before I had the means of writing or sending to you owing to the dispersed condition of my people and baggage. Of course you will have heard long before this reaches you of the strange retreat of this army to its present position from which

it does not appear possible for it to extricate itself without a much more vigorous and spirited conduct, both on the part of the troops and their chieftains and especially the Nizam himself, than can well be expected from any of them after the events of the night before last. The Nizam with his family is shut up in the small fort of Kurdla, before and close to the walls of which Monsieur Raymond's corps is encamped. The baggage camp is between the fort and the foot of the Khurdlah gaut, the ascent of which, I understand, to be but ill practicable to an army and not at all to carriages of any sort. I am not certain whether or not the Moorighaut is in the possession of the Marrattas, but I see no appearance of any intention in the Nizam to secure it and doubt much his ability to do it at present. The Marrattas are encamped in sight and directly in front of the fort; their distance from it not exceeding three miles. They harassed the camp a good deal last night by their flying parties on whom the outposts of this army were pretty constantly firing. Today every thing is still: but whether this mutual inactivity be owing to any negotiations that may be on foot or to some other cause I do not know.

No. 185—Kirkpatrick reports to the G. G. the distressful plight of the Nizam and of his having requested Govindrao Kale to negotiate an accommodation.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.

Camp Khardah, 15th March 1795.

My last address was dated the 12th instant, and on the 13th I acquainted Mr. Secretary Hay for your information that Gobind Kishen had set out on the afternoon of that day for the Peshwa's camp fully empowered by the Nizam to settle the terms of peace. He is said to have made His Highness repeat three times the assurance that he would agree to whatever settlement he (Gobind Kishen) should make, and to have got this assurance confirmed by a union of hands. Previous to his dismissal he is reported to have received a letter from Nanna Furnavees, written subsequently to the retreat of this army and containing strong protestations that that event would not be found by His Highness to occasion either any abatement in the sentiments of attachment he had always professed for him, or any alteration in the original demands or wishes of the Peshwa. It also contained, however, a pretty plain intimation that the negotiations for an accommodation must positively be carried on through some other agency than that of Azem ul Omra. To this point the Nizam, I understand, answered that he was ready to consider and reply to all propositions himself.

It is confidently affirmed that Azem ul Omra has lost much of his credit with the Nizam since the fatal retreat of the 11th instant, of which he is pretty generally supposed to have been the principal adviser, and that Mahomed Azem Khan, one of the Chiefs of Shums-ul-Omra's party, is the person at present most consulted by the Nizam.

The distress of this army for water and forage is extremely great and increasing hourly, the Khyree nulla being in possession of the Marrattas and the cavalry being so dispirited, that they cannot, it is said, be prevailed upon to cover the foragers. The current price of provisions will be seen from the accompanying table.

The account in my last mentioning that Monsieur Raymond's corps had maintained its ground near the Nulla till the morning of the 12th was from the country intelligences, but I have since learned from better authority that it began its retreat by order of the Nizam very soon after His Highness himself.

Accounts have been just received here of Gobind Kishen's arrival in the Peshwa's Camp which is about 6 coss from hence.

No. 186.

Price account of grain etc. in the Nizam's Camp at Khurdah the 15th March 1795.†

Rice fine	.. 2 seirs per Rupee.
Rice ordinary	.. 2½ seirs per Rupee.
Wheat	.. 5 seirs per Rupee.
Wheat flour	.. 3½ seirs per Rupee.
Chunna	.. 3½ seirs per Rupee.
Maize (Jowar)	.. 6½ seirs per Rupee.
Bazrie	.. 5 seirs per Rupee.
Horse Grain	.. 4½ seirs per Rupee.
Dal of Ashur (?)	.. 4 seirs per Rupee.
Moong Gram	.. 6 seers per Rupee.
Dal of Moong	.. 3½ seers per Rupee.
Mushoor	.. 4 seers per Rupee.
Flour of Maize	.. 4½ seers per Rupee.
Sugar crude	.. 1½ seers per Rupee.
Salt	.. 1½ seers per Rupee.
Ghee	.. 1 seer and 1 Chuttack per Rupee.
Oil	.. 2¼ seers per Rupee.

†The scarcity in the Nizam's camp went on increasing as is shown by the rates for 20 March and 25 March. These, however, are not printed here.

No. 187—A few more details about the actual fighting and the subsequent negotiations.

FROM—SIR CHARLES MALET,

TO—SIR J. SHORE, G. G.

16th March 1795.

* * * * *

I had the honour to address you on the 12th instant. On the 13th the Peshwa moved, not as then advised, on the Seena, but to the Issorna, which falls into the Seena about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles south from hence.

From Captain Kirkpatrick's account of the affair of the 11th, you will have learnt that there was no ground for the reports of the considerable loss, said, in my address of the 12th, to have been sustained by the Nizam's army. Indeed I am taught to believe by the concurring testimony of people who have traversed the field of battle, that the number of His Highness's killed and wounded left on it did not exceed 400 : nor have I met with any body that has counted above 150.

Nothing has transpired regarding Govin Kishen's visit to this Camp, but I hear he has been sent back, accompanied by Govin Pingleh, to the Nazim, who remains in the fort of Kurda with his army encamped around it ; the advance of this army being within $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile of His Highness's camp and about 7 coss in front of Head Quarters.

It is confidently reported that the Nizam has confined his Minister Azeem ul Omrah, but I shall suspend my belief until better informed.

* * * * *

Camp on the Issorna River about 94 miles to the eastward of Poona.

No. 188—Kirkpatrick attributes the Nizam's discomfiture to his delay in proceeding to Parenda in good time and to the fatal mistake he committed in retreating and shutting himself up in the fort of Kharda.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES MALET.

Camp at Kharda, 16th March 1795.

It was no doubt very reasonable to expect that the sudden resolution of the Nizam to descend the ghaut would have been followed up immediately by a conduct corresponding with the vigour of that measure. The fears of the Minister, however, still inclining him to pursue his negotiations, the determination to proceed to Parinda was unfortunately delayed, till, as I am assured, Gobind Kishen plainly declined undertaking the mission to the Peshwa's camp (which continued to be pressed on him by Azim ul Omra) unless all the essential points of accommodation were previously

adjusted. He would appear indeed to have signified an expectation, or at least desire, of being entrusted with absolute and definitive powers for the purpose. But although much valuable time was lost in these fruitless negotiations there was nothing after all, in my humble opinion, that need have prevented this army from reaching Parinda on the 12th or 13th instant. Annoyed it no doubt would have been on its way thither, but with proper dispositions I see no reason to think that the Marrattas could have made any material impression on it.

The account of the late affair by an European officer in the service of Holkar and inclosed in your letter of the 14th instant is in some respects very erroneous, but in none more so than in the particular of the Mogul camp (as it is called) being left standing. The fact is that had the Nizam encamped on the ground he occupied in the evening of the 11th, or even erected a few tents and flags, it is not probable that any material disorder would have taken place. His omitting this last precaution, (which is said to have been suggested to him), as it seemed to denote indecision and anxiety on his part, may be easily conceived to have had a corresponding effect on the army in general.

As it would be to very little purpose to offer any conjectures with regard to the probable issue of the pending negotiations, I shall only observe, that however disadvantageous it is no doubt likely to prove for this state, an early accommodation promises at least to have the effect of restraining Tippoo from any attempt to profit by the recent disaster of the Nizam.

Your country intelligence, I observe, mentions the Peshwa's having written a short time ago to Tippoo desiring him to employ the troops he had collected at Gooti in ravaging the vicinity of Hyderabad, but I trust that there was no foundation for that report.

Gobind Kishen is expected back here this afternoon.

No. 189—Kirkpatrick reports the progress of negotiations and adds a few more details of the action of 11th March.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, G. G.

Camp Kharda, 17th March 1795.

Gobind Kishen returned hither yesterday afternoon and had an audience of the Nizam in the evening. Nothing, however, regarding the nature of the demands he has been charged with, has yet transpired.

From the situation I happen to be in I have a complete view of this camp which I perceive to be very considerably diminished. Indeed, since the day of our arrival here, it is affirmed that not less than ten thousand horses have disappeared since the night of the retreat.

The only chiefs of this army that fell in the action of the 11th were Wizeer Khan and Loll Khan. Rao Rumbha, Acsud Ali Khan, and Soobhan Khan (an adoptive brother of Roshun Khan) were wounded, but none of them, I believe, dangerously. Monsieur Raymond had not a single officer hurt, and only five of his European Company were killed. He brought off all his guns except two heavy ones from His Highness's train which had been forced upon him a few days before the action.

I find that the firing which took place some time after dark (and noticed in my address of the 12th) was not from the Marrattas but from Raymond's line, and that it was occasioned by a false alarm that arose from the appearance of a few of the enemy.

No. 190—The Maratha Court delivers its demands.

17th March 1795.

Substance of intelligence received from Mulharjee Naiq, Captain Kirkpatrick's news-writer, on the 17th March 1795.

Gobind Kishen waited on His Highness yesterday evening when His Highness directed Azim ul Omra, Rao Rumbha and the officers of the Pagah who were present to be seated at a distance. Gobind Kishen for privacy's sake held the Nizam's punkha* and after addressing himself to His Highness he produced a paper containing the demands of his Court, to which His Highness having given answers Gobind Kishen took them down in writing, and promised to procure replies to them from his Court this evening, the 17th, and after a conference of about three hours he returned to his tent. After Gobind Kishen's departure His Highness summoned Azim ul Omra and Row Rumbha and informed them that the Marratta demands were for sixty five lacks of rupees of country, including the forts of Doulutabad and Perrinda ;

Three crores of rupees for arrears of chout ;

Two do. for the expenses of military preparations ;

Two do. for the damages done to the Marrattas country in bringing troops from Hindostan etc. ;

Fifty lacs of rupees for grass and gram and fifty do. of rupees to Doulut Row Sindia.

His Highness added that the districts demanded had not been particularized, but that Gobind Kishen said he would bring him a list of them this morning. His Highness was silent to Azim ul Omra in regard to the answers he had given Gobind Kishen.

Azim ul Omra, upon hearing the above, observed that formerly wise men had not been wanting in the Marratta councils to attend to His Highness's pleasure, but that now there being none such His Highness had better act considerately for himself, and as far as he was able, to comply with their demands; that as for the enmity against him (Azim ul Omra), if they (the Marrattas) should even at this time require his delivery, His Highness should by no means hesitate in giving him up to them, as he had no wish but for His Highness's welfare; that if notwithstanding all the concessions that could be made the Marrattas should persevere in demanding impossibilities, it would be better for His Highness in this case to leave his sons and family in Kurdla fort, summon his chieftains, offer dismission to such of them as did not chuse to risk their lives in his defence, and rewards to those who might be inclined to stand by him in case of his success. He added that His Highness should bid adieu to his family on setting out for the field in person. His Highness expressed his doubts of the strength of Khurdla and seemed apprehensive that it was rather too weak to afford shelter to his family, observing at the same time that the enemy's Brigade of infantry was very strong. Azim ul Omra replied that His Highness might contrive to avoid falling in with it by a circuit of eight or ten coss to engage the enemy's horse.

After this Rou Rumbha stated that if His Highness was for fighting, this was a fortunate day for it, and that he had better set out for the field, the more particularly as delay only tended to reduce the strength of the cattle, to which His Highness replied that as Gobind Kishen had promised an answer this evening it would not be proper to take any step of the kind till then.

No. 191—Kirkpatrick reports Maratha tactics for intimidating the Nizam and thereby accelerating the negotiations.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR J. SHORE, G. G.

Camp at Kharda, 19th March 1795.

The Marratta army were observed to be in motion yesterday forenoon, and by the evening a considerable body of them had occupied the high grounds immediately in front of their camp where they continue to be seen this morning. Those movements occasioned some alarm and uneasiness here which, I conclude, was the object of them, and they have besides somewhat straitened the quarters of this army. I have been told that they were suggested by Gobind Kishen with a view to intimidating the Nizam and thereby forwarding his negotiations. This Agent proceeded

again yesterday afternoon to the Peshwa's camp, from whence he is expected back by tomorrow.

No forage of cattle has yet been ventured upon, though certainly there was nothing in the rear that ought to prevent one.

No. 192—Kirkpatrick discusses the causes of the Nizam's defeat.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Camp at Khairda, 20th March 1795.

There were doubtlessly many serious imperfections in the constitution of the military force of this state, as there are in that of every other eastern army. Among the rest the troops composing it were for the most part raw and inexperienced; but that was a defect by no means of a radical kind and which might have been sufficiently removed (I speak with a reference to the enemy they had to oppose) in the course of a single campaign. I cannot think the affair of the 11th to be in any degree fairly attributable to the behaviour of the army but to have been occasioned primarily, if not solely, by the pusillanimity of the Nizam and of those who advised his retreat, if any one did recommend that fatal measure, which I own, I think, it but too likely that Azim ul Omra did. As far, therefore, as the army is concerned, I continue to think that it might have easily and safely reached Perrinda. The panic with which it has been struck was produced by the retreat, a fatal error chargeable only to the Nizam, and in no shape, I think, justly ascribable to any discomfiture of his troops or to any advantage obtained over them by the enemy.

If we suppose that the same imbecility which governed the operations of the army on the 11th was likely to be manifested throughout the contest, it will readily be granted that the safe arrival of the army at Perrinda would hardly have prevented, though it would somewhat have delayed, the misfortunes which have happened. This, however, is an event upon which I confess I did not calculate: and at the appearance of which my astonishment could only be equalled by my concern. After all it is possible that the weakness shown by the Nizam on this occasion arose entirely from solicitude on the score of the ladies of his Mahal, and if there be any foundation for this surmise, it may not be unreasonable to presume that after having disposed of them (as well as of all his heavy baggage) in the fort of Perrinda, which it was his intention to have done, he would in the following operations of the campaign have displayed a suitable degree of firmness,

especially as this is a quality in which he has never till now, I believe, been suspected of any deficiency.

This Court very readily acquiesced in my request to be permitted to give you a meeting at a convenient place beyond the limits of the camp. I am sorry that your's is likely to be more difficult on the occasion.

No. 193—Kirkpatrick reports to G. G. of the Nizam having agreed to the dismissal of his minister Azim-ul-Omra.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR J. SHORE, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp at Kharda, 20th March 1795.

2. It now appears that Gobind Kishen did not proceed immediately on the 18th instant to the Peshwa's camp, but he stopped at the advance of the Marratta army, from whence he caused it to be signified to the Nizam that, as His Highness had thought proper to decline compliance with the main demand of the Peshwa (namely the dismissal of Azim ul Omra), he neither saw any advantage that could result from his going farther, nor could venture, under such circumstances, to appear again in the presence of his master.

3. The effect of this message may be inferred from the fact of Gobind Kishen's having subsequently resumed his route to the Peshwa's camp. In short, it is said that His Highness has consented to the dismissal of his Minister, requiring only sufficient time for adjusting arrears of accounts etc. with him.

4. Provisions are not quite so dear today in this camp as they were when the last Nirkh* was transmitted to you; but the cattle continue as much distressed as ever for forage. The scarcity of water also increases daily.

No. 194—Kirkpatrick reports that the negotiations were being held up by the Nizam's unwillingness to give up his minister A. O.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp at Kharda, 22nd March 1795.

Gobind Kishen returned hither in the evening of the 20th when the Pagah chiefs Mahomed Azem Khan, Umjid ud Doula and Ghassi Meah were sent to confer with him. Yesterday in the forenoon he attended

*Bazar rates.

the Nizam, previous to which such orders had been issued for the preparation of jewels, elephants, horses and dresses as indicated an early interview with the Peshwa. It would appear, however, that in the personal discussions which took place between him and the Nizam some disagreement occurred, that occasioned an abrupt conclusion of the conference on the part of the Vakeel. Some accounts state that the difference arose from certain of the territorial or pecuniary demands of the Peshwa, while others, which I most incline to believe, make it turn upon the Nizam wishing to defer the dismissal of Azim al Omra for two or three months, and upon the Marrattas insisting on the immediate concession of this point.

Upon Gobind Kishen's retiring from this audience, he signified his intention of retiring to the Peshwa's Camp, without leaving behind him as on former occasions either of his agents, (Ethul Pundit and Kunri Pundit). He was afterwards, however, by the Nizam's direction (but with much apparent reluctance on his part) introduced to a second audience, at which it is not known what passed. He soon after proceeded to the Marratta camp, but I find this morning that Kunri Punt remains.

The agent mentioned in my last dispatch to have been sent by Azim al Omra to Doulut Row Sindhea is said to have returned yesterday without effecting anything.

I understand (what was always indeed to have been expected) that the formal nomination of Ali Jah as successor to the Nizam is among the demands of the Peshwa.

I am just informed that the Marratta army is making its appearance in the same manner as on the 18th instant, and I suppose with the same view of intimidating the Nizam as then.

No. 195—Kirkpatrick reports to Malet the deputation of a new agent to the Peshwa by the Nizam.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES MALET.

Khorda, 23rd March 1795.

Shurf ul Omra (Tuhuwur Jung), the brother of the Prime Minister, Rokun ud Doulah, was sent for and closeted with the Nizam this morning for about an hour. It is reported in consequence, that he is to be deputed to the Paishwa, with most of whose chieftains he is said to have long cultivated habits of friendship. It is remarkable that he has not appeared at the Durbar till today for some years past.

No. 196—The report conveys the bitter reproaches of the Nizam against the British for letting him down in his hour of need.

23rd March 1795.

Translate of Captain Kirkpatrick's Moonshy's report of his conference with Mustakeem ud Doula.

Mustakeem ud Doula informed me that having sent the written answer the preceding evening to the Presence, His Highness after perusing it summoned him to a private audience at the gate-room (and) informed him that he had read and understood the letter ; that he (Mustakeem ud Doula) should say thus much to Captain Kirkpatrick on his (the Nizam) part, namely, that he had hoped much from the friendship and union of the Company ; that from the first he had been very careful with respect to the negociations of the Marrattas, in order that no blame or reproach from the Company should fall on him ; that accordingly he had refrained from committing aggression ; that if he had aggressed when the Marratta forces were not assembled, he could have finished their business ; that notwithstanding this, matters have now come to their present pitch ; that it was well every thing had an end, and every up and down of life was to be got over ; but that his reproach against the English would remain forever. Mustakeem ud Doula observed to me that, though the above message was unfit to be reported, particularly as he knew the answer to it himself, yet that out of respect for the Nizam he made no attempt to reply, and agreeably to the Nizam's orders he now communicated it. I observed in reply that I also could give an answer, but that in the same manner as he had communicated the message would I state it to you (my master) ; but that it was proper he (Mustakeem ud Doula) should satisfy me with respect to the real meaning and intent of the Nizam's message, and of what might be the nature of the reproach against the Company, because in regard to aid, in every case the Nizam was perfectly informed on various occasions this matter had been discussed, plain answers and hints had been repeatedly given, both verbally and in writing, and some of them even in the Nizam's presence ; herefore, notwithstanding all this, the Nizam's making such an observation is surprising. Mustakeem ud Doula said that His Highness might mean that the English had not mediated to the extent that they ought, I replied that the Nizam had been repeatedly informed of the exertions which had been made as far as was possible by the Company. Mustakeem ud Doula rejoined that the utmost extent of the mediation of the Company should have been a declaration to the Marrattas that, if they did not relinquish their hostile intentions, there would be an end to the friendship subsisting between the two States.* I said, that this could have been done only by a power that should have first

*Meaning the Peshwa and the Company.

prepared for war with the view of commencing hostilities without delay in the event of such declaration not having effect. Mustakeem ud Doula said that, it was very true and that my observation would have every weight with wise men.

No. 197—Kirkpatrick writes to G. G. how in his interview with the Nizam he tried to exonerate the British from the blame cast upon them by the Nawab.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., G. G.

Camp at Khanda, 24th March 1795.

I have the honour to enclose translate of the report of my Moulavee of a conference which he had yesterday with Mustakeem ud Doula in consequence of the reply I had sent to the Nizam's message of the 22nd.

Upon reading this report I directed the Moulavee to address Mustakeem ud Doula to the following effect.

"That I had comprehended the purport of the Nizam's second message, on which I had first to observe that, the Nizam was already too well acquainted with the reasons which had precluded the possibility of the supreme Government's affording him the kind of assistance which had been alluded to, to make it necessary for me to trouble him any further on that head. In the second place, with respect to the interposition of the Governor General's good offices with the Marratta Court, I had to remark that the Nizam must also be aware that this had been as active and as earnest as was possible, since he was neither ignorant of the repeated efforts of Sir Charles Malet to bring about an amicable settlement of all disputes, nor of the terms in which the Governor General himself had addressed the Peshwa with the same friendly view. This being the case, I found myself obliged to say that I could not perceive on what grounds the English Government was liable to the reproach of indifference or inattention towards the Nizam, and I must therefore be permitted to declare my astonishment at the charge. Should the Nizam ever have imagined, that the English Government ought to have carried its interposition to the length of declaring to the Marrattas, that if they did not desist from their intentions or designs there would be an end to the friendship subsisting between them and the Company, I was confident, that upon a cool and candid consideration of the matter, his well known attachment to truth and justice would make him acknowledge, that such language could on'y be held by those who had previously determined on following up this menace, in the event of its proving unavailing, by open hostility, the utter impossibility of which had frequently and fairly been stated."

You will readily perceive, Honourable Sir, that there is nothing new in these complaints. They have been frequently made by Azim al Omra in spite of being as often refuted and their unreasonableness repeatedly shown. I certainly might have replied to them on the present occasion much fully than I have done, but as I had no doubt of the messages having been prompted by Azim al Omra I saw no advantage that could attend a reiteration of arguments and declarations, (which) it was impossible that the Nizam or his Minister have either forgotten or misunderstood.

I have not heard any further from Azim al Omra since my answer to his late message.

No. 198 Kirkpatrick reports to the G. G. how very greatly the Marathas continued to distrust the British attitude in the dispute to the last.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., G. G.

Camp at Khanda, 25th March 1795.

I have to request your pardon for having omitted till now to report to you the substance of a message, which I received from Gobind Kishen on the night of the 10th instant, and of my answer to it. This delay has proceeded principally from the more interesting occurrences which immediately followed, and which it became my more special duty to attend to and communicate.

Gobind Kishen and myself had for some time been in the habit of interchanging offices of civility; but the ostensible ground of his message to me on the evening of the 10th was to inform me that he had communicated what had passed between us on the subject of the Pindarras to the Peshwa, who had in return expressed much satisfaction at the scrupulous consideration which I had manifested on the occasion towards his Government, than which there could not be a clearer proof of the firm friendship subsisting between him and the Company. To this was added a repetition of what Gobind Kishen himself had previously signified to me on the score of the Pindaras, and which I mentioned in my letter of the 8th instant to Sir Charles Malet.

What followed, however, plainly showed that there was little or no sincerity in this compliment, since the messenger proceeded to observe that, it being confidently reported in the Nizam's camp that there were several of our Battalions expected to join the Nizam's army in a few days, Gobind Kishen would esteem it a personal favour if I would let him know whether or not there was any foundation for the rumour. He also wished

to be informed, whether in the probable case of the Pindaras of his Master's army making any attempt upon Hyderabad, the detachment of the Company's troops stationed there would oppose them.

This message being communicated to my Moonshy (for the person charged with it was not introduced to me), I directed him to reply to it in the following terms which he accordingly did :—

“ If the report alluded to by Rou Saheb had reached him from his Master's Camp, I should have contented myself with referring him for the information he required to Sir Charles Malet ; but as he had stated it as a recent rumour that he himself had heard in this camp, I thought it right to remark that, the proposing such a question, while it agreed but ill with the confidence which was expressed in our friendship, implied a suspicion of our good faith, which the uniform tenor of our conduct was far from deserving.”

To the second query I instructed my Moonshi to reply that, with respect to the Detachment of the Company's troops now at Hyderabad it was impossible that the Ministers of the Peshwa could stand in need of any information at this time ; since they had obtained the most complete satisfaction on that head at the period of its formation.

In conclusion I desired Gobind Kishen to be told, that it was my respect for his station and character alone which had induced me to receive and notice, in the brief manner I had done, the message with which he had favoured me ; and that if further information on the points in question was required, the proper person to apply to for it was Sir Charles Malet, who, I could assure him, would be as unreserved on the occasion as might be wished.

No. 199—Kirkpatrick writes about the peace negotiations.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART.

Camp at Kharda, 27th March 1795.

You will collect from the inclosed copy of my letter of this date to Sir Charles Malet that, the Marratta Court after obliging the Nizam to consent to the dismissal of his Minister, has been prevailed upon to withdraw its demand, and to reconcile itself to the man, whose ruin every one as late as yesterday imagined it to be inflexibly bent upon.

By whatever means the Nizam or Azim ul Omra may have produced this sudden, and all things considered, surprizing change, its importance is certainly very considerable. It would be premature at present, however,

to offer any reflections with regard to its probable influence on the political interests of the Deccan in general, or those of the Company in particular, since the nature of the new situation in which Azim ul Omra is to stand is as yet by no means well understood. Thus some people affirm that he is after all never to meddle in Marratta affairs.

No. 200—Kirkpatrick informs G. G. of A. O. having surrendered himself to the Marathas.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART, G. G.

Kharda, 28th March 1795.

In the account which I transmitted to you yesterday of the motives and object of Azim ul Omra's visit to the Peshwa's Camp, I followed the universal report and impression of the hour, which the Nizam himself would appear to have encouraged with a view, probably, to the prevention of any ferment on the occasion.

The history of this interesting transaction, however, as given by Sir Charles Malet upon the authority of Meer Allum, is unquestionably infinitely better authenticated, as well as much more credible.

I had obtained some light into the true nature of the affair previous to my receipt of Sir Charles Malet's letter of the 27th instant, and from what I have been able to collect I cannot otherwise account for the extraordinary resolution taken by Azim ul Omra than by referring it to an extreme attachment to life which, he might think, would be more secure in his present situation than in any other. It is confidently said, indeed, that he had for some time past entertained serious apprehensions of an attempt on his person from his numerous enemies at this Court, and particularly from the chiefs of the Pagah party*, who not only looked to succeed to his influence but had latterly been drawn by circumstances to act such an open part against him as they were persuaded he never would forgive.

Thus has ended, and not less ingloriously for the Nizam than miserably for himself, the administration of Azim al Omra.

His Highness appears to be extremely anxious to return to Hyderabad, and an early day is talked of for the commencement of his march thither. His interview with the Peshwa is expected to take place tomorrow or next day. Whether or not the final settlement of the remaining articles of peace has been arranged I have not learned, but it is not imagined that any difficulty can now occur on that head.

*The party of Shums-ul-Omra, a former rival of the Minister.

No. 201—Kirkpatrick reports to G. G. that the negotiations were at a stand still owing to the absence of Govind Krishna in the Peshwa's Camp.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART.

Camp at Kharda, 30th March 1795.

Gobind Kishen is not returned from the Peshwa's Camp although he has been anxiously expected by the Nizam these three days past.

This unlooked for circumstance is variously accounted for, some referring it to his being sick, others to a design of reducing the Nizam to as low an ebb as possible, and many to personal considerations of safety awakened by apprehensions of some attempt upon him, either open or secret, by the partizans of the late Minister as Assud Ali and others.

In the meantime the distress of this camp is very great and increasing so rapidly, that if the army should be confined only a few days longer in its present straitened quarters, very serious consequences are but too likely to ensue.

Inclosed is the price current of the bazar for the day, on which, however, it is proper to observe that it is with great difficulty even a seer of grain is procured.

No. 202—Sir Charles Malet's report on the Maratha army at Kharda, its strength, organisation, equipment and quality.

March 1795.

*Memoranda relative to Maratta army taken on the spot in the Peshwa's Army in the Campaign against the Nazim (i.e., the Nizam), A.D. 1795.

As a few words on the constitution, organization, movement, etc., of a Maratta army, differing so essentially from the arrangement of our own, may not be unacceptable to others, while the commitment of a few hints on the subject to paper may be occasionally useful to myself, I shall here endeavour to prevent the treachery of memory by writing a few lines on the subject.

And first as to the computed number of the Maratha army now assembled under the Peshwa as executive head, and all the other great chiefs of the Empire, except the Gaikwad and the sons of Govind Bundeale, Balaji and Gangadhar, now employed in concert with Ali

[†]Sir C. W. Malet's despatches as Resident of Poona are wanting for the entire year 1795 among the Residency records in the Alienation Office, Poona. But the India Office, London, possesses among other papers, his memorandum written from the Peshwa's camp near Kharda in March 1795 (Home Miscellaneous, Vol. 242, pp 25-55). It gives a very accurate and detailed estimate of the various contingents of the army then gathered round the Peshwa's banner for the last great Maratha victory, and makes a most penetrating analysis of the organisation, discipline and efficiency of the old indigenous army of the South. Sir Jadunath Sarkar secured a transcript of this important and illuminating paper from London, which is presented here.

Bahadar in subduing the country of Bundelkhand to the Peshwa's obedience.

The Peshwa's own force, viz. —

Ranga Rao Raja Bundelkhand, quota 2,000 horse and 100 foot	1,200
Khanderao Vittal 1,000 horse	1,500
Haribhoirao Puar, 4,000 horse	1,900
Anand Rao Raste, jagirdar	3,000
Krishna Rao Balyant	1,000
Aba Solkar Huzrat	.
Krishna Rao Panshe, Master of Ordnance	.
Cownd Rao Ban Bahadur
Mohdaji Panth Pagar, horse and foot	8,000
Shahaji Bhoirde of Akalgarh, horse	5,000
Pratapsingh	4,000
Madaji Risa Chorpave	1,200
The sons of Pilaji Jadhav	500
Anant Singh Jadhav	1,200
Hiroji Patankar	500
Trimbal Rao Pente	200
Pandurangrao Bumpatkar	1,000
Balwunt Rao Dond Deo	1,500
Balwunt Rao Munde, para	200
Jan Rao Nimalkar	400
Sadashiv Puar	500
Bachaba Solkar Nana's troops	3,000
Moro Pandit Sane	1,200
Husse (?) Pant Manna, foot	1,000
Ragopant Garhole, 100 horse and 2,000 foot	2,100
Khanderao Urekar, horse	1,000
Manaji Phakre, horse and foot	200
Gulzar Khan, horse	10
Lakshman Rao Solkar, horse and foot detached	5,000
Bahirji Fouet ? (Thorat ?) horse	200
Sharza Rao, para	400
Yashwant Rao Maheshwarkar	1,000
Monsieur Motiram, (Norenha?) foot	1,000
Shah Mir Khan, 50 horse and 200 foot	750
Haibat Rao Samkar horse	300
Moro Vishwanath, para	200
Gumpat Rao Gajerao, para	100
Rajpaga, or the Raja of Satara's para	300
Mir Siraj-ud-din	25
Baba Mahwut	100
Manaji Pandara	500
Khando Shivaram, horse and foot	2,000
Vinayak Narayan Paranjape, foot	1,500
Nago Shamrao	500
Ranga Rao Satve, para	100

Umaji Raja Mungikar	300
Gangaji Raja Jellukar (Jintikar?) horse	100
Anand Rao Godka	400
Sunkraji Raja Ghorpare	1,000
Pilaji Junjar Rao	1,000
Manmohan Rao Pingle	100
Santaji Wag	100
Dawidur Khan Tonke	50
Sahib Khan Tonke	30
Aslam Khan horse and foot	100
The sons of Darkoji Nimalkar	1,000
Madarao Ramchandra	1,000
Bhagwant Singh Vis, paga	100
Vinkoji Dhola	1,000
Yashwant Rao Thorat	500
Mada Rao Dubara	1,000
Ramchandra Pandit paga	100
Ragho Bappaji paga	200
Shrinivas Rao paga	150
Santaji Vag paga	200
Beluji Bhonsle paga	200
Dawal Mahwut	50
Gangaram, foot	500
Ramchandra Ghorpare, horse	500
Bhagwant Rao Kadam, horse	1,000
Madarao Bande	1,000
Amrit Rao Pandera	1,000
Baji Rao Barve	200
Sub Rao Toanka	500
Ram Rao Gutikar	200
Son of Rukmaji Baji Bhonsle	100
Kanhoji Pisal	400
Morarji Lambhate	500
Jiwba Kouree	1,000
Siaji Perotee	1,000
Nilkant Rao Jagtap	

70,665

Daulat Rao Sindhia, exclusive of his force in the North, horse and foot	..	25,000
Tukoji Holkar	..	10,000
Raghuji Bhonsle	..	15,000
Parasuram Bhao Patwardhan	..	7,000

Total horse and foot .. 127,665

British Embassy,
Maratha Camp,
March 1795.

}

(Signed) C. W. MALET.

Organization.

The foregoing bodies of troops are either under the command of feudatory chieftains whose authority over their own troops is absolute and without appeal, as the four last and many others, or under leaders of corps paid by Government either in money or land, under the denomination of Nukdee or Tunkaw (land assignments resumable at pleasure), and in the same manner as the mass of the force of the Marratta Empire is thus composed, so the force of the various chieftains is in like manner composed in a smaller or greater degree of the same materials. Thus, for instance, the general Marratta force is composed of Jagheerdars like Sindia and Holcar, of Nugdee or ready money corps as Sha Meer Khan, Monsieur Naronha and Buchaba Sirolkur or of Tunkadars as Bugwunt Sing Weys, etc., Paugahs. Now all these different descriptions are again detailed in the composition of the Sindean or other Jaghiredars' forces ; that is to say, it contains every species of service, but the number is generally far short of the quota stipulated by the original feudal tenure. But though the Nagdee or ready money corps are not looked upon in so respectable a light as those paid in lands, the general term for which is saranjamce, yet are the commanders absolute in the management of them and in the disposal of the sums they receive for their payment, which generally runs to a certain rate per man and a fixed sum for the commander ; and, as in the management of these corps the payment by Government is generally very tardy, the commanders have recourse to every trick by which they can possibly elude the checks by which Government attempts to insure faithful service, viz., by the appointment of Duan, Furnavees, etc., government officers to every corps throughout whom the most scandalous venality prevails, which is practised in collusion with the commander, by which means it happens (but this must be understood more particularly to the Peshwa's service) that a corps of 100 has seldom more than 50 effectives, while the allowance of Government is reduced to half before it reaches the sepoy.

The corps of the Paughees,* that is, commanders of bodies of cavalry paid either in ready money or land assignments or Tunka, are smaller or greater according to the interest of the Paughee, as for instance, one has a Paugha of 50, another of 500, reckoning the whole at a certain sum per head, with a distinct allowance for the chief, who again distributes that allowance at his pleasure, giving to one 20, to another 200 rupees per month. Properly speaking, the Paugahs should be composed of the horses of the Government or the chief, mounted by Bargheers, i.e., hired troopers, but this is not always the case, for Silladars (literally, bearers of arms), that is, horsemen with their own horses, often compose a large portion of a Paugha, and though every horseman throughout

*Commander of a Paugah.

Marratta army looks upon himself as company for his chieftain and always sits down with him, yet is the Silladar looked upon in rather a superior light to the Bargheer. To the Paughas, as to the Nugdee corps, there is an establishment of civil officers to enforce justice between Government and its servants, but the multiplication of checks seems to have had no other end than the increase of corruption, for not only is half the grain and forage allowed to the horses embezzled, but horses are changed, reported dead and every species of the most flagitious speculation practised with impunity arising from the general interest and participation therein, insomuch that I have sometimes been inclined to think that the Government must have some mode of reimbursing itself for these palpable dilapidations by withholding the pay due to its troops, for the clamors arise therefrom; yet from the ample profits of speculation, the chief is generally wise enough to keep his complaints within bounds, since his illicit profits are secure, and his tardy receipt of payment from Government furnishes a specious pretext for not paying the poor sepoy who through poverty is often forced to take another service with the loss of all his arrears, which his chief collects as he can, or to compound the whole for a part, which is generally anticipated by loans taken up of his Jummadar (chief) or the Karkuns (civil officers) of his corps at an exorbitant interest.

Besides Bargheers and Silladars, there is another description of horsemen known in Marratta armies by the denomination Yekandias, which signifies single. These are generally men of family, who with a few attendants go in quest of service, and are frequently entertained on the footing of companions by the great Chiefs on most ample allowances, for instance, from 100 Rs. to 1,000 Rs. per month with one or two horses from the Chief's stable at their command.

The arms of the Marratta cavalry are swords, spears (bhallas), matchlocks and a few bows and arrows. The sword is universal and indispensable; the matchlock frequent and almost universal in the Paughas and seems to daily gaining ground of the long spear or bhalla, long a favourite weapon of the Marattas; but many of the Silladars, Yekandias and those who claim or affect superiority of birth and rank seldom encumber themselves with anything but a sword or two. It must, however, be understood that the arms, accoutrements and clothing of the horseman being his own property, there is not the smallest uniformity, every individual being equipped as his taste or circumstances suggest.

The Paughas have [seldom] more than one large routy, the most common kind of tent, and perhaps a shameana or canopy belonging to the Paughah pitched at one end of a street formed by the horses of the troops picketed in two lines fronting each other. This routy serves to shelter the troopers and their furniture in bad weather and as a place of assembly for the corps morning and evening. At other times the trooper generally posts

himself with his saddle, arms, etc. in front of his horse, where also he sleeps having nothing but what he can conveniently dispose of and convey to any distance on his horse. There are however generally a number of tuttoos (little horses) attached to each Paugha, that while the army is marching are dispatched with the syces (grooms) to forage, by which means they generally get to the ground as soon as the main body of the army reaches the camp laden with provender for the Paugha horses, or they sally forth in quest of it as soon as they have disposed of their burthen, though the failure of this reliance would not distress the Mahrattas, who are not yet sufficiently pumpered by wealth to despise that necessary part of military duty or to affect being above providing provender for the noble animal who administers so effectually to their ease and advantage.

Over and above the foregoing constituent parts of the Maratta Army, it is to be observed that they have now introduced large trains of artillery and formidable bodies of regular infantry, the organization of which being copies of our own, needs no particular explanation. I shall therefore proceed to the description of the army while on march. Orders for marching (abstracted from emergencies) are directed by chitts (notes) to the Chieftains and promulgated by a cryer to the Army the preceding night, and about 4 the ensuing morning the signal for moving is given by the great nobut or drum, on the 2nd beating of which the Benec Walla, (corresponding in some measure with our Quarter Master General) sets out with the Peshwa's or Chief's flag, escorted by his own corps, occasionally strengthened as circumstances may require. With him or a little before proceed parties from all the different Chieftains with their respective flags, followers, bazar, infantry, artillery, etc. This mass is called Beheer and Boongha. These all proceed promiscuously in vast multitudes and without the smallest order till they see the Peshwa's or Chief's Dhall Flag, which is erected at the option of the Benec Walla always in a situation in which the convenience of water is the principal consideration without regard to evenness or unevenness, defensibleness or not of ground, etc.. By this flag the erection of all the others of the army, and every Chief has one, is regulated for the (camp?) except in the line of the bazar which generally forms a fine street in front of the Chief's tent. There is not the smallest internal regularity in the pitching of a Mharatta camp, yet with respect to Head Quarters all the Chiefs have their relative stations to the right and left, from which a deviation is by no means allowable, that is to say, if my station is next to Head Quarters, none must come between me and them, and so on; but tho' this carries the appearance of a general line of regularity, yet, as no distances are marked out, and the numbers of no Chief are definitely known, the whole exhibits an appearance of utter confusion, for if the camp is on a fordable

river both banks are constantly occupied, nor do they care how far they advance in front or rear, their only object being to preserve their right and left vicinity.

The Head Quarters being ascertained as above mentioned by the erection of the flag, all the flags of the other Chieftains are pitched as fast as they arrive, also their tents, and their followers dispose of themselves as they can with their numerous herds of cattle, women, children etc. in their respective stations. The Chief or Chiefs in the mean time remain on the former ground, reserving a small tent or shameana for the purpose of eating their first meal, which, barring emergencies, is an indispensable custom, and going through their Pooja (religious ceremonies), whereas the bulk of the army, having dispatched their tents with the Beenee Walla, remain unsheltered with their horses in their hands. These avocations Pooja, Ashmun, Rooswal, devotion ablution and eating, which are more indispensable with the Bramins than the Mharrattas, being discharged, the Chief, if a Bramin, is generally ready to proceed by 9 or 10 o'clock; if a Maharatta, perhaps earlier, when he sets out generally on an elephant in great state, as far as numbers can supply the want of order, accompanied by all the cavalry except the corps advanced with the flags (Dhalls), and reaches his new ground according to the distance of the march, where he finds his tents etc. ready pitched. But though this mode may suit the convenience of the Chiefs and principal Bramins for their eating and religious ceremonies, particularly as they are generally sufficiently provided with baggage to reserve a small covering for that purpose, and with elephants or palanquins for the march, yet is it much complained of by the bulk of the army, deprived as it thereby is of shelter for the greatest part of the (day?) and obliged to march at the hottest time, which, if through an open and arid country, is frequently the cause of the loss of many men.

Encampment of a Maratta Army.

The Flag or Dhall of the Chief being erected, as mentioned in the foregoing account of the march, the flags of all the other Chiefs and leaders of corps are pitched as fast as possible by their respective Benee Wallas or Quarter-Masters, and all the different commanders of little corps dispatching proper people with the flags of their respective Chiefs they secure the quarters of their respective masters as well as they can, though in this general scramble severe affrays frequently happen. The only part of the camp that carries the appearance of regularity is the bazar, which generally forms a very long and broad street to the tent of the Chief and of each Chief of any consequence, whereas the rest of the camp is so straggled and destitute of all order that it is a most difficult thing to get through the crowds of camels, bullocks, horses, etc., to the

interior of the camp, which subjects them to the utmost confusion in case of an alarm, and so totally is all disposition or regard to place neglected, that I have even seen the artillery park so stationed as to be surrounded and to be rendered totally useless but by the sacrifice of their own people. As soon as the camp is pitched, the baggage tatloes attached in great quantities to the Paughas gallop off with wonderful activity in quest of forage if an opportunity has not offered of picking any up on the march, nor are the camels far behind hand with them, so that they generally return laden by the time that the Souarree of the Chief reaches the ground or shortly afterward. These foraging parties are more destructive to a country than locusts and so bold and active as often to overwhelm large villages. Nor are territories of friend or foe exempted from their depredations, the wood and forage being allowed to be collected even from their own villages, insomuch that I suppose there was scarce a piece of wood or a blade of grass or hay left in the villages round the Peshwa's Camp, after a short time's continuance, for the space of 12 miles, in which circuit a great number of villages were totally desolated. The safety which Mharatta armies enjoy as to their communications from the multiplicity of their cavalry, insures them such ample supplies from vast droves of Bunjarries (grain merchants) constantly marching with and hovering round their armies, as to render them totally indifferent to every other circumstance of encampment but water, and as to magazines either of grain or forage or dependency on the protection or supply of fortified cities they seem unacquainted with those grand objects of consideration to an European army. This security gives a peculiar character to their camp and armies, for so little danger seems to attach to following their camp that shop-keepers, handicrafts and every species of profession carry on their callings seemingly as much at their ease as in their cities, which gives a conveniency and facility to a military life not to be met with perhaps amongst any other people, and may (added to the simplicity and absence of wants of Mharatta manners) account for their spending their lives as happily in the field as other nations do in towns: a circumstance, which while done with so great ease to them, gives them a vast advantage over all other people, who, while they are in the field, are in a constant state of exertion and hostility with their convenience. This is a point in which the military of this nation merits particular comparison with ours softened in fine quarters, which on the frontier of our Northern Provinces are grown into seats of luxury by the enjoyment of the highest allowances of actual service, whereas the stimulus to actual service by the increase of allowance, on its occurring, thereby becomes dormant. DeBoigne's Brigade has been in brisk and actual service ever since it was raised, without many of the conveniences annexed to our service, yet we do not hear amongst them of the difficulties and exceptions that are often started and the pecuniary demands often broached in our armies.

The safety of the Mharatta camps is to be attributed to the vast numbers of their cavalry hovering round in every direction, rather than to any of the precautionary measures of trenches, posts, guards, etc., systematically used in our armies. They have indeed, at night, patrols of Horse (Shabeena) sent out in different directions. But the ampleness of their equipment, at least of the host with which I marched, and of which I now write, enabled them always to keep up a large army under the denomination of Vanguard (Harole) in advance, and when they approached the enemy to divide that again by an advance under the denomination Chiny Fougé or Fougé Jereed, which signifies the unincumbered army, being literally so much so as scarce to have a tent in it, every thing but the immediate apparatus for service being left at a convenient distance and under a very slender guard in what they call the Baggage Camp (Beheer or Boonga), so that at the time of the action with the Nizam on the 11th March the Mharatta Army consisted of 3 camps, the Peshwa's or Head Quarter Camp, being upward of 20 miles in the rear of the Chiny Fougé whose Beheer or Baggage Camp was between both; it will be easily understood that while this division of force both in marching and encamping opens a field of great advantage to an active enemy provided with cavalry, yet little advantage can be taken of it by armies of infantry or much inferior in cavalry, whose camps must constantly be blockaded if they make a proper use of their advantage by their more numerous cavalry in so much as to prevent the smallest movement without discovery; for exclusive of their hosts of cavalry serving on pay there are always great numbers of Pindarras or Predatory* Horse that march with Mharatta armies, who instead of receiving pay actually purchase of the Chief the privilege of plunder at their own risk and charge, a predicament that gives a singular edge to their appetite for depredation and renders them infinitely more active and destructive than those who by receiving pay have not an equal stimulus to rapacity. But tho' bold and active plunderers, little account is to be made of their military prowess, since desirous only of collecting plunder with tolerable safety they carefully avoid all situations of danger not pregnant with the grand objects of their plundering spirit. These people have their distinct quarters and encamp with the Chiefs to whom they are attached. Those that fell under my observation were generally Mahomedans, but, as may be supposed, not very religious observers of any tenets. But tho' generally Mahomedans, all tribes are to be found amongst them, as nothing seems wanting but will to join, so that it is generally composed of such minds and bodies as are best suited to their practices. They reside principally in Malwa and generally attach themselves to the armies of Holkar and Scindea, and generally speaking they are poor (for those who are lucky enough to get wealth seldom expose

*Looties.

themselves while it lasts). Their horses are small but hardy and their equipment mean, so that they are by no means a match for any cavalry tolerably appointed. The depredations of these troublesome people are so dreaded throughout all the countries that are in the habit of being exposed to them that all the villages in such countries are walled, generally have a little citadel or gurry in the center.

Battle order of the Marattas.

I have heard but of two instances in which the forces of this State may be said to have engaged in pitched battles: one at Panniput, where, previously reduced to straits by the superior activity of the Pathan and Mogul cavalry, which was numerous enough to beat them in their own style of cutting off their supplies, they were forced into a desperate attempt to extricate themselves, and failing, were subjected to one of the most bloody defeats that we read of; the other was the battle in which Trimbuk Mamma defeated Hyder, not far from Seringputtun. But I am unacquainted with the order of battle observed on those two occasions. It is reasonable to suppose that the introduction of infantry and artillery, forming so large a part as they now do in armies of this Empire, must cause a material alteration, if not a total change, in this part of their military service; while by giving to their armies a kind of base or center of union it alters their former predatory and desultory style of warfare. And while on one hand this alteration makes their invasions infinitely more formidable to states unprovided with the means of opposing an increase of that description of strength, I am not without an idea, that as such increase of strength is necessarily attended with increasing incumbrances hostile to rapidity, that increase of strength may be disserviceable to their operations against a State such as ours in the degree that the increase of strength is inferior in effect to the effect of the decrease of the former desultory velocity. The decision of this point in which, I suppose, (tho' perhaps rather straining the point) our infantry and artillery are as light and rapid as this State's, whenever the contest happens, will form an epoch of the most critical interest to the welfare, I may say, existence of our Empire in the East, and I confess when I view the different manners of the rivals and the advantages which these people possess in the most unexampled simplicity, absence of wants in food and clothing, absolute submission to the will of their superiors, and constant inurement to the most laborious field service, when I say, I observe these things and put them in contrast with the opposite traits in our manners, and add thereto the immeasurable difference and disproportion of our numbers, I confess that I cannot help feeling some anxiety for the issue; but without anticipating the event of so great a struggle, let me revert to the order of battle observed by this State's army on the 11th March, when, with

so little loss or gain on either side, such immense and inconceivable advantages insued to this State by the Nizam's pusillanimity. From concurring testimony it appears, that on the news of the Nizam's marching on the 11th the Mahratta light army* advanced in the order in which it was encamped, about six miles off to hang on and embarrass his line of march. The movement of such an immense line, such a distance over very broken and difficult ground, must necessarily have been exceedingly irregular in point of distance of the different bodies from each other and the time of their approaching the Mogul army. But this does not appear to have precluded an ultimate and effectual co-operation. For, it seems that Parasram Bhow being entirely unencumbered with infantry or artillery, having advanced too near the enemy, was forced back with considerable precipitation. But this untoward event, instead of evil, appears to have produced good, for in this interval of time it seems all the other bodies both of horse and foot had advanced so far as on Pursaram Bhow's retreat to present an insurmountable obstacle to the advance of his pursuers, who indeed seem to have been very few. It also appears that tho' doubtless the whole mass of Mahratta cavalry might have overwhelmed that small part of the Mogul army that had advanced, yet so far from taking that advantage it is certain that the cavalry did not advance after Pursaram Bhow's retreat, and that the falling back of the corps advanced from the Mogul army was caused entirely by the cannon of Sindea's infantry on the left, to which some reports add the effect of the Bhoosla's rockets on the right. At all events, there does not appear to have been a concerted plan of action or order of battle, but that (except in the act of general advance) every chief acted as circumstances and inclination prompted. In like manner I have no reason to think that except the small parties left at the different baggage camps, and the body with the Peshwa, upward of 20 miles off, there was any corps allotted for reserve, any plan fixed for retreat or place appointed for rendezvous in case of defeat.

But tho' there appears a total deficiency in the common measures used by armies on such occasions, yet am I assured that the particular division of the army, consisting of Sindea's quota, including the brigade of infantry of Perron and the corps of Michael and John with their guns, which were very numerous, preserved a tolerable degree of order both in their march and during the action, being supported by their horse drawn up in the rear and extending far enough to cover and protect both their flanks.

*Dowlut Row Sindea on the left, Ragojee Bhoosla on the right, the intervening space being occupied by Tuckoji Holkar, Pursaram Bhow and various other Chieftains.

I am, however, from a general observation of the manners of the people and extreme looseness of particular discipline or general arrangement amongst them, strongly of opinion that they would afford very easy conquest to any army of a more rigorous composition that could bring a sufficient number of cavalry to prevent their making a sport of war and retreating, when they are no longer disposed to maintain the contest, in safety and leisure.

British Embassy,
Maratha Camp.
March 1795. }

(Signed) C. W. MALET.

SECTION 6

Peace Terms

No. 203—Kirkpatrick reports to Malet the Nizam's anxiety to get back to his capital.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—C. W. MALET.

Camp Kharda, 1st April 1795.

I have just received your favour by the hands of Mr. Emmet and assure you that I am more vexed than I can well express at the obstacles which now oppose themselves to my having the satisfaction, I have so long reckoned upon, of a meeting with you.

Our Courts have, contrary to expectation, come to the resolution of a parting without an interview; and nothing can exceed the Nizam's eagerness to get away from hence. He accordingly, it is confidently affirmed, will move tomorrow to Moori; and from thence, as fast as he can, to Hyderabad. At this rate, were I to indulge myself in the pleasure of a meeting with you, the consequence, I am afraid, would be that I should find myself thrown in the rear of this army at a distance that might prove very inconvenient and perhaps distressing owing to the great probability there is of the Pindarabs following it for some time.

No. 204—Kirkpatrick reports to G. G. the terms exacted by the Marathas from their humbled opponent, as gathered by him privately.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART.

Kharda, 1st April 1795.

Govind Kishen returned hither in the evening of the 30th ultimo on which day I had last the honour of addressing you. He has been

engaged pretty constantly ever since, sometimes with the Nizam and at others with the Pagah chieftains, in discussing and arranging the articles of accommodation, which I understand to be now finally adjusted. My information does not enable me to enumerate these with any confidence as to exactness. It seems generally believed, however, that they principally consist of, 1st, the cession of a country yielding sixty-five lacks annual revenue, 2nd, and of the fort of Perrinda to the Peshwa, 3rd, the cession of Bheer to Doulut Row Sindia, 4th, the payment of four crores of rupees in discharge of all pecuniary demands whatsoever to be liquidated by instalments. I have not yet learned how the Bhossillah's claims have been settled.

All idea of an interview between the Nizam and the Peshwa appears to be relinquished, and chiefly, it is said, through considerations of a prudential kind on the part of Nanna, who is supposed to have had his fears lest the Nizam should personally urge himself and his master to certain compliances with his wishes, which they might have found it embarrassing to decline. It is expected that the Maratta army will fall back in the course of this day, in which case it is the Nizam's intention to reascend Moori gaut tomorrow, and after making two or three short marches to pursue his way to Hyderabad with all expedition.

It is supposed that Mahomed Azim Khan (one of the Pagah Chieftains) will succeed Azeem-ul-Omrah in the management of the revenue and military details, but that Gobind Kishen will more or less directly superintend all political affairs.

No. 205—Kirkpatrick informs Malet of the Nizam having started for his capital.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Camp at Ettegong 2nd April 1795.

I ought to have acknowledged my receipt of your letter of the 17th ultimo when I last wrote you. Your favour of the 31st reached me this morning on my way hither, and I decline making any particular reply to it for the present that I may not carry your cossids who brought it farther. I may as well mention here, however, that I have never recovered any of the papers which I lost in the rout of the 11th March, so that either there is some mistake in what the European officer in Holkar's service has communicated to you, or his good intentions have been frustrated by some accident.

Mustakeem-ud-Dowla informed me last night by direction of the Nizam that the army was to march to-day to Pukoorah, in consequence

of which intimation I moved this morning to this place, which is about a mile and a half to the eastward of Pukoorah. I have not yet learned the reason of the Nizam's having changed his first purpose of reascending the gauts by Moori. The road we came to-day, though not impracticable (as I was told on our return to Khurdlah) for Gurramcondah, is nevertheless the next thing to being so.

All the face of the country between this and the head of the gaut we ascended (a distance of about three miles) is covered with fine forage for cattle, a fact that but too strongly proves the extent of the panic which this army laboured under all the while it remained in the valley of Khurdla, where it allowed itself to be starved, as it were, in the midst of plenty by a few hundred Pindarahs.

No. 206—The G. G. is informed of the Nizam's departure for his capital.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp at Peepulgoan, 6th April 1795.

Late in the night of the 1st instant I received an official notice from Mustakeem-ud Dowlah of the Nizam's intention to march the following morning on his return to Hyderabad.

It being noon, however, next day, before the Maratta army retired from the camp it occupied in front of Khurdlah, and His Highness thinking it then too late to commence his march, he did not ascend the ghauts till the morning of the 3rd. It will be perceived that in spite of the Treaty of Peace so recently concluded he did not consider it safe to move while the Marathas continued in their position before Khurdlah. He is supposed to have been particularly fearful on this occasion of some hostile proceeding on the part of Doulat Row, among whose Ministers Jeajee Buckshy is reported to have been extremely dissatisfied with the moderate terms granted to the Nizam by the Peshwa.

The Pindarahs still hover about the army, but not, I believe, in any great force.

Since my address of the 1st instant I have received various accounts relative to the conditions of the treaty lately concluded, but I shall forbear troubling you further on the subject till I am better informed with respect to it than I am at present.

Meer Allum and the Roy Royan arrived in the camp late last night.

No. 207—Kirkpatrick writes to Malet of the Nizam's march back to his capital.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART, RESIDENT WITH THE PAISHWA.

Camp at Joolah, 10th April 1795,

Gobind Kishen reached the Nizam's camp at Paranadora the night before last. My accounts say that the Nizam was reluctantly obliged to wait at that place till his arrival, but that it was expected that all details remaining to be adjusted would be finally arranged on the 9th (yesterday), and that the army would resume its march towards Hyderabad to-day. Possibly the suspicions of the Nizam's unsteadiness to his late engagements might have arisen from the impatience which he manifested to get back to his capital; but the facility with which Koonri Pundit in the absence of Govin Kishen arrested his march, would not appear to afford any confirmation to those apprehensions.

I have proceeded slowly in front of the army since it reascended the ghauts with a view to the convenience of my people, among whom I am concerned to say that there has been an extraordinary mortality since the rout of the 11th ultimo. The disorder which has principally proved fatal to them is a kind of inflammatory fever: and from the numerous casualties in my small party, it may, I think, be safely presumed that those in the army of the Nizam during its stay at Khurdlah must have been very considerable indeed.

I cannot better discharge the commission given me by Meer Allum, to apologize to you for his quitting the Peshwa's camp without taking leave of you than by transmitting to you a copy of his letter to me on the occasion, which I have accordingly the pleasure to do.

I have no grounds for supposing that Meer Allum received his congee from your Court on the footing represented by your intelligence, though not having seen him since his return I cannot speak confidently to the point. Letters, I know, were dispatched by the Nizam on the 1st or 2nd instant to the Peshwa and Nanna Furnavees requiring that he and his colleague (the Roy Royan) should be dismissed with all convenient expedition, a request that seems accordingly to have been promptly enough complied with. It certainly, however, was reported that the Peshwa was likely to make some difficulty in parting with Meer Allum on account of apprehensions pretended to be entertained of future intrigues by his means with the English; but I doubt much whether there was even any foundation for such an idea.

This army was not ignorant of the vicinity of forage to its camp at Khurdlah. The case was still more discreditable to it, since though possessing this knowledge it had not spirit enough to profit by it. The elephants

and camels attached to this Residency foraged three times above the Ghautts during the stay of the army in the valley of Khurdlah; they were the only cattle that ventured out in all that period and did not once meet with the slightest interruption though but moderately escorted.

No. 208—Kirkpatrick sends to Malet details of the late treaty as reported to him by the Nizam's Minister.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR C. W. MALET, BART.

Hyderabad, 23rd April 1795.

I reached this place the day before yesterday. The Nizam is expected here towards the end of the month.

Gobind Row Kishen accompanied by Ghasi Meea (one of the Pagah Chieftains) and Ragotim Row proceeded from the Nizam's camp towards the Paishwa's on the 15th instant. He carried with him, I understand, a copy of the late Treaty duly executed by the Nizam, Sunnuds for the ceded forts and territory, a Koran with solemn protestations of inviolable friendship for the Paishwa and some presents for the latter and Balajee Pundit.

On his departure His Highness charged him to bring with him on his return (which it is expected will be without delay) the female part of his family, for whose conveyance he presented him with a covered Amari or canopied elephant.

I have been for some time in possession of a paper containing an enunciation of the ceded mahals or districts, but though I have no reason to suspect its accuracy, I think it best to defer the communication of it till I shall have had an opportunity of discoursing with Meer Allum on the subject of the late Treaty in general. In the interim he has given me to understand through my Moonshy Syed Uzeez Ullah (who accompanies the Durbar) that the whole of the Treaty of Edgheer has been incorporated into that recently concluded at Kullum, with the exception of those articles relative to Tippoo Suldaun, in place of which a single article has been substituted, providing that in case that Prince should at any time violate the peace at present subsisting between him and the contracting parties, he shall be dealt with agreeably to the terms of the Treaties of Poonah, Paangul and Seringapatam.

It seems the Bhoissillah's claims are to be satisfied out of the three crores of rupees to be paid by the Nizam to the Paishwah. The following particulars relative to the division of this sum are on the authority of Meer Allum.

On account of arrears of choute—One crore of Rupees.

On account indemnification—One crore of Rupees.

On account of Doulut Row Saindiah—Fifty lacks.

On account of Grass and gram to the Bhossillah—Twenty-five lacks.

To Balajee Pundit and Durbar charges—Twenty-five lacks.

I enclose copy of my letter of yesterday's date to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George. Meer Allum affects to put the dismissal of our detachment solely on the footing of an economical arrangement, but I have no doubt of its having been insisted on by your Court.

No. 209—The Nizam expresses his desire to dismiss the detachment of the Co.'s troops hitherto employed by him.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—LORD HOBART, GOVERNOR, FORT ST. GEORGE.

Hyderabad, 23rd April 1795.

I have the honour to inform you that His Highness the Nizam has caused it to be officially signified to me that having at present no further occasion for the services of the Detachment of the Company's troops employed in his country, it is his desire that it should be directed to return to the Dominions of the Company with all convenient expedition.

I have, in consequence, given the necessary notice to Major Roberts and instructed him to proceed slowly to the neighbourhood of Mungaal, a place about a hundred miles from hence and on the Company's borders. It being also conveniently situated for his taking either the route of the Sircars or that of the Carnatic, according as Government may direct, he will here wait Your Lordship's orders for his further guidance.

No. 210—The Nizam sends his agent Ghasi Miya to the Peshwa to suggest suitable changes in the territory ceded by him at Kharda.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES W. MALET, BART.

Hyderabad, 30th April 1795.

Meer Allum having, according to his own accounts, thoroughly satisfied Balajee Pundit that he had invariably opposed, as far as he could, the intrigues of Azim-ul-Omra with Mhadajee Sindeah, it is possible that your Court may no longer look on him with that jealousy and distrust which it may have entertained while it considered him as blindly attached to the late Minister. And if it be sincere in its recent declarations of solicitude for the future prudent administration of the affairs of this State, it is perhaps the less likely that it should have any serious objection to the Nizam's benefiting by the counsel of so able a man.

I am willing to hope that Gobind Rao Kishen may not have taken the offence stated by your intelligence at the distinction conferred on Meer Allum by His Highness soon after his return from the Paishwa's Court : since had this been actually the case, it is rather unlikely (in the present conjuncture) that he should have retained his seat in the Khuwasi during the whole of the march to Bider, which he certainly did, Umjid-ud-Doula, however, sharing this honour with him.

I am assured that symptoms of variance have already shown themselves between Umjid-ud-Doulah and Mahommed Azeem Khan, both of whom, it is said, aspire to the chief direction of the affairs of this Government. The latter of them has been most usually considered as the person most likely to obtain this pre-eminence : yet circumstances would of late appear to indicate a preference (whether on the part of the Nizam himself or of your Court I know not) in favour of the former.

Ghasi Meea, I understand, was charged to represent to Balajee Pundit the great inconveniences which would result from the peculiar situation of most or many of the districts demanded by the Paishwa and agreed to be ceded by the Nizam, blended as they would be with the territories of this State. This, it is said, he accordingly did : soliciting at the same time as a personal favour, that others, to which the same objections did not lie, might be selected in their stead. Balajee is reported to have received this representation and request very favourably : but as the territory in question would seem to have been chosen with a particular view to the attainment of the very point complained of, I own I should be somewhat surprised at the success of Ghasi Mea's negotiations.

His Highness was expected to leave Bider yesterday, and to reach this place on the 3rd or 4th of May.

No. 211 Kirkpatrick writes to Malet of the Nizam having disbanded his new levies and of his having called his officials to account for the sums spent on war preparations.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR C. W. MALET, BART.

Hyderabad, 3rd May 1795.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter addressed to me by Captain Mackenzie who, as you know, accompanied me in the late expedition of the Nizam to the westward with a view to the improvement of the Geography of the Deccan.

Aware as I am of your earnestness to contribute by every means in your power to the advancement of this useful object, I have not scrupled to assure Captain Mackenzie that he may rely on your procuring him from Lieut. Emmett all the information he requires.

Mons. Raymond's corps arrived here yesterday evening with the Jinsi or ordnance of the Nizam. His Highness after halting some days at Bider for the purpose of searching for and taking possession of all the effects of the late Minister at that place, marched from thence on the 29th ultimo. It is supposed he will enter Hyderabad tomorrow.

I understand that your Court has made it a particular point with the Nizam that he should withdraw his protection from Alif Khan and leave it to proceed with regard to that chief as it shall judge proper. Its resentment against him is said to have sprung from certain menacing and otherwise disrespectful language which he made use of to the Paishwa's Vakeel at the time he was summoned to repair to the army of the Nizam. His Highness would appear, although very reluctantly, to have given Gobind Kishen sufficient reason to expect a compliance with this demand. But however this may be, Alif Khan having lately solicited and obtained permission to make a religious visit to a Durgah of some sanctity at Goolburgah, is reported to have proceeded from thence to Karnoul. He had previously applied two or three times for leave to return to his principality but without success.

My intelligence from Camp states that His Highness has at length at the repeated instance of your Court granted a formal *Farigh-khutti*, or full acquittance, to Azeem-ud-Doulah, the late Soubah of Aurangabad.

It is some time since His Highness directed all the new levies to be discharged, and a strict account to be required from Assud Alli Khan and Roshun Khan of all their receipts and disbursements for a considerable period back. The former of these chiefs had even a *Suzawal* at 50 Rs. per diem placed at his quarters for some days. He had soon address enough, however, not only to get rid of this officer, but to obtain His Highness's permission to remain behind the army at Bider for the purpose of quelling a mutinous disposition, which he pretended had appeared among his followers on account of the heavy arrears due to them; though it is reasonable to believe from his unbounded credit with the late Minister, and from the extent to which in pecuniary matters he notoriously availed himself of it, that he would be found on a fair enquiry considerably indebted to Government. I should not, therefore, be at all surprised, if instead of following the Nizam to Hyderabad he were to proceed, on some slight pretext or other, directly to Kurpah.

It has been very confidently rumoured particularly this month past that Ali Jah was to be appointed Naib Soubah and to have the Roy Royan for his assistant in the Department of Finance. Mustakeem-ud-Doulah, however, declared only a few days since to my Moonshy that such an arrangement was, in his opinion, the last thing in the world that His Highness would think of, or agree to.

No. 212—Kirkpatrick communicates to the G. G. the great aversion the Nizam had begun to entertain for his former favourite A. O.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART. GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Hyderabad, 6th May 1795.

I am inclined to suspect from what is said of Azeem-ul-Omra in the inclosed translate of my Moonshi Syed Azeezulla's latest advices, joined to other accounts of a similar tendency, that the Mahrattahs wish to encourage the idea of its being still possible that they may, at no distant period, restore that Minister to his freedom: since adverting to the very close restraint under which he is universally believed to be kept, it is difficult to conceive that he should be able to write to the Nizam, excepting with their knowledge and permission. Their view in this policy may be to mould the present administrators of this Government the more effectually to their purposes by means of the apprehensions which it will be easy for them to excite, as often as may be necessary, of Azeem-ul-Omra's return.

That the suggestions of this kind which have been occasionally thrown out since the extraordinary retreat of the late Minister have made a considerable impression would seem evident from the solicitude repeatedly expressed by Mustakeem-ud-Dowlah and others on this head, and but ill-disguised by their ostensible opinions on the subject. I should not suppose, however, that there could be any longer much substantial ground for this sort of anxiety, because whatever the policy of the Poonah Court may be in this respect, the Nizam himself has of late manifested so hostile a disposition towards Azem-ul-Omra and most of his connections as would appear to preclude all possibility of his re-establishing himself in His Highness's favour; even though the Mahrattas (than which nothing, certainly, can be more improbable) were to become his advocates.

The confiscation of the late Minister's property at this place has been extended to every article in the possession of his adopted son, Gazi-ul-Mulk, over whose person even a guard has been posted. The same rigorous measures have been taken with respect to several of Azim-ul-Omra's adherents, and especially Neemwunt, his Dewan. The amount of these sequestration is not known, the property having been generally secured under the seals of His Highness's officers, without any particular inventory of it having been taken; the whole being intended to be opened and examined in the presence of the Nizam himself. The jewels which Azem-ul-Omra took with him on his departure for the Paishwa's Camp, and as it is now affirmed, unknown to His Highness, are said to be worth near a crore of rupees.

The Nizam arrived at Goberdhun, a place about 2 miles to the westward of the city, this morning.

No. 213—Kirkpatrick informs Malet of the rebellion of Sadashiv Reddy and discusses on whom the choice of the Nizam was likely to fall as his next Minister.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR CHARLES WARRE MALET, BART.

Hyderabad, 10th May 1795.

The Nizam entered this City on the 7th instant under a salute of all the ordnance mounted on its walls.

Sudasew Reddy* was not detained long by His Highness. The claim brought against him by the Government Mutsuddees amounts to about thirty-three lacs. He has made very fair promises of liquidating any balance that may be justly established against him, engaged to remit five lacs immediately and left one of his brothers behind him a sort of hostage. He demands a very large deduction on account of Sibundy which he pretends to have raised by direction of the late Minister, but whatever authority he may have had for making such levies there is reason to believe that as many as were actually embodied were employed in plundering rather than in protecting the country during the absence of the Nizam on the western frontier.

Assud Ally Khan, as I suspected to be his intention, has proceeded from Bider towards Kurpah. He was in such haste that he made a march of fourteen coss the first day. I have not heard whether he has accounted to the Nizam for this extraordinary and contumacious step, but I think it likely he will pretend that he was compelled to adopt it by his mutinous troops.

I learn from a quarter of great credibility that this chieftain has within this year and half or two years past received from the public treasury no less a sum than eighty-five lacs of rupees, independently of the revenues of the districts under his charge, and that during all this time he has never once given a muster of his troops, or furnished a regular or intelligible account of his receipts and disbursements. The fact is that he could always do what he pleased with Azim-ul-Omra, who was either very much attached or very much in awe of him.

I understand that it is in contemplation with this Durbar to deprive him immediately of his talooks of Kurpah etc., if not his personal Jaghires also. Dilawar-ud-Dowla (the Gunjeecottah Amil and a man of very respectable character) is talked of as his successor in the Government of Kurpah, and Mullick Essau Khan (Essaw Meah) in that of Khumnum. I shall hope, however, and indeed have some reason to think, that the latter is not likely to gain any ground under the new administration expected to be formed shortly.

* A Zemindar.

Several other changes are, I am told, intended : but I refrain from particularizing them till more confident in my information.

With respect to the new Ministry it would perhaps be premature to offer any conjecture, previous to the return of Gobind Rou Kishen ; since whatever Meer Allum may say of the independence of his Master in the choice of his servants and Counsellors, I think it very likely that the Nizam would not make any selection against which this Vakeel were to remonstrate with any degree of plausibility or steadiness. In the meantime, however, I cannot omit observing that several circumstances lead me to suspect that Meer Allum himself indulges sanguine expectations of being imminently distinguished in the approaching arrangements. Be this as it may, I must confess that I would rather see him assisting at and influencing in all material affairs the deliberations of this Durbar than filling the office, either of sole or ostensible Minister, because I fear not only that the general state of his health and some of his habits disqualify him, in a great degree, for so laborious a situation, but that he would scarcely be able to maintain himself in it against such powerful rivals as the Pagah Chieftains, who would be but too likely to unite their endeavours to precipitate him from a height to which they themselves have so long aspired.

Notwithstanding the answer which the Nizam gave to Ghasi Mea on his demanding permission to negotiate with the Poona Court for the recovery of the territory recently ceded to the Peshwa, I understand that accounts have been received by this Durbar of Gobind Kishen's having actually agitated such a measure on the grounds briefly stated in my Moonshi's communication of the 3rd instant, and that there is even some probability of its being adopted. Should your Court really prove to be in this disposition, it is reasonable to suppose that it will require in requital of so considerable a dereliction of its late advantages some more substantial return than that of a body of troops to be employed in Hindostan.

No. 214 This official communiqué from Bēhro Pundit to Malet sets forth the reasons for the differences between the two Courts and their subsequent settlement by the convention of Kharda.

11th May 1795.

Translation of an official communication made by Behroo Pundit, on the part of the Peshwa, to Sir Charles Warre Malet, on the part of the Honourable Company, on the 11th May 1795.

Notwithstanding the most cordial friendship between the Nazim and the State (the Peshwa's) yet His Highness's Ministers have for some years

past acted in such a manner as to need no recital, and will probably be known to you. This State's affairs have been left unnoticed and neglected, and the matters of Kuleat have been protracted and evaded; nor has anything been omitted in machinating plans of unkindness, which has been treated by the State with a deliberate forbearance, without ceasing to apprise and caution His Highness thereof. Hostilities at length ensuing, His Highness's force was terrified and dispersed, and a suspension of hostilities was requested. At that season, advances were made for Azim-ul-Omra's surrendering himself to this State, and he came on condition of submitting to the pleasure of the Peshwa. Reflecting, therefore, on the ancient friendship with the Nazim, hostilities were suspended, and negotiations ensuing, a Jagheer of thirty-two lacs of rupees per annum, with the fort of Doulutabad, were ceded by His Highness, with one crore of rupees indemnification for expenses, and one crore on account of ancient claims in the interim of settling them ultimately when the balances that may be struck will be given and taken, under condition of the just claims—Aumil Wajbee,—being current in future. These two crores to be discharged in the space of three years. Thus has a settlement been made, and a trusty person (Ghasi Meah) coming from the Nazim, has re-established the ancient friendship, and presented a covenant, sanctified with Bread and the Koran (Nan o Koran), and the friendship of friends is settled according to ancient usage, and the communication of these glad tidings should be made to friends.

True copy,

(Signed) J. UHTHOFF,

Assistant.

No. 215—Poona Court's reply to Malet's queries.

14th May 1795.

Translation of the Peshwa's reply, delivered by Behroo Pundit, 14th May 1795, to Sir Charles Warre Malet's official queries of the 11th of the same month.

The Nazim is to pay the Bhonsla twenty-nine lacs of rupees, from which are to be deducted monies formerly received by the Bhonsla and the sums levied by the Bhonsla on the Nazim's districts, in his late march from Naugpore. The balance to be made good in three years. In future, the Bhonsla's Aumil to be admitted as heretofore. The two districts taken possession of by the Nazim have been restored.

Fifty lacs of rupees are to be paid by the Nazim to Doulut Row Sindea, deducting the sums paid by the Nazim to the late Patell. The balance to be discharged in three years.

N.B.—I understand the amount acknowledged by Doulut Row Sindea's Ministers to have been received by the late Patell from the Nazim, was only twenty-seven lacs.

The Nazim's cession of thirty-two lacs of territory was in consequence of its being the Peshwa's first campaign.

No. 216 Kirkpatrick submits to the G. G. a detailed report relative to the strength and general equipment of the Nizam's army during the late campaign.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,
TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART.

Hyderabad, 22nd May 1795.

I have now, the honour to transmit you the fullest and most accurate information that I have been able to procure relative to the strength of His Highness's army as well as to the state of its general equipment, during the late campaign against the Mahrattahs.

This information is contained in the inclosures of which,

*No. 1 exhibits, first, an account of cavalry and infantry attached to the several native chiefs, distinguishing the new levies from the ordinary establishment; and secondly a view of the ordnance and ammunition with which each was provided under the several heads of guns, mortars, tumbrils (including powder), round shot and rockets; at the end is a note showing the strength of the advance under Taj Wunt on the 11th of March last. This is followed by some illustrations of the general statement referred to in the course of it by the affixed letters a, b, etc.

No. 2 exhibits the actual strength of Mons. Raymond's corps in the action of the 11th March together with an account of its ordnance, ammunition, stores, artillery, (or Golandazes attached to the guns) and bullocks. The establishment of a Regiment properly consists of a thousand rank and file—including sick and absent. The total strength of the corps did not, I imagine, greatly exceed eleven thousand men.

I have taken occasion to annex to this statement (though foreign to the present enquiry) an account of the monthly pay of the several ranks in a regiment of this corps, which may possibly prove not altogether useless.

* Statement no. 1 is not included here as its mss. pages are mutilated.

No. 3 contains an account of the *Jinsi* or ordnance of the Sircar ;— to this is annexed a memorandum showing the number of flints in store, and the establishment of Golandauzes or native artillery attached to the *Jinsi*.

No. 4 shows the number of Draft Bullocks belonging to the *Jinsi*. Of those employed with the guns of the different chiefs no account has been obtained, but there is reason to believe that they were not ill-provided in this particular.

No. 5 exhibits the quantity of grain and Kiraneh* with the army at the time of its descending the ghauts.

No. 6 is an abstract of the whole.

It is only necessary for me to add on this subject that, with very few exceptions, the infantry enumerated in No. 1 were extremely contemptible in point of discipline and general equipment, although no doubt, on a footing in these respects with those opposed to them. With regard to the cavalry we need not, perhaps, seek and at all events I see no probability of procuring a better standard for judging of its condition than what is afforded by the late experience of Lieut. Forbes, (the company's horse agent at this place), who informs me, " that out of about four hundred horses which have been tendered to him for sale since the return of the army, not more than one hundred and twenty would at all answer for our service ". It is true that he took measures for preventing any but the best from being brought to him; but on the other hand, it is reasonable to suppose that of three hundred which he rejected on account of their being under fourteen hands, or because their age exceeded eight years, there might be many strong serviceable horses. It is further proper to remark here that far the greater part of those brought to him for sale were most probably among the new levies.

References.

(a) The Rissalah Khas is a kind of Gendarmerie or band of gentlemen pensioners, composed of persons of some distinction. They are not all mounted ; some of them going in palankeen and others on elephants. Many of them have Jagires, the rest have salaries which are paid from the public treasury. They are mustered occasionally by the Badshah Dewan, which office, as well as that of Badshah Bukhsi, is still kept up at this Court. There would not appear, however, to be any particular officer at their head.

* Groccry.

(b) The nominal head of the Pagah party is the son of the late Shumse-ul-Omrah. He is a youth of about twelve years of age and bears the title of his father.

(c) Of the 6,000 horse forming the Pagah division 4,000 only are properly Pagah or stable horse, the remaining 2,000 are Sillahdars or hired horse. They are distributed and commanded thus.

	Pagah.	Sillahdars.
Umjid-ud-Dowlah, maternal uncle to Shumse-ul-Omrah .	1,000	500
Mahomed Azeem Khan	1,000	500
Ghasi Meea uncle (by marriage) to Shumse-ul-Omrah .	1,000	500
Imauni Khan, a nephew of the late Shumse-ul-Omrah ..	1,000	500
	<hr/> 4,000	<hr/> 2,000

(d) The whole of the body of infantry is attached exclusively to Umjid-ud-Dowlah. It consisted originally of no more than 1,200 men, to which have latterly been added 1,200 sepoys that belonged to the establishment of the late Dara Jah. These troops are all armed with musquets such as they are. A Frenchman named Berthier and lately deceased had charge of them on the 11th of March.

(e) Of the guns five were received by Umjid-ud-Dowlah a short time before the army marched from Bider along with the infantry mentioned in the preceding note. The whole are brass and, one only excepted, of small calibre.

(f) The tumbrils as well as the gun carriages of the whole army are for the most part very indifferent; owing as much at least to the green wood with which they are usually made as to the badness of the workmanship.

Of the tumbrils belonging to Umjid-ud-Dowlah 4 were loaded with musket cartridges and the remainder with powder. They each contained nine leathern koopies filled either with powder or cartridges weighing twelve maunds.

(g) Three hundred of the rockets were transported on bullocks, the rest on camels. A camel load of rockets is called a Kynchi and consists of five and twenty rockets.

(h) Near 1,500 of the Minister's Pagah were distributed in commands among his principal Khedmutgars or valets. The rest were in charge of Secunder-ud-Dowlah, Loll Khan, Ushjai-ul-Moolk, and Ameen-ul Moolk, the two former of whom (with their divisions) were detached to the support of the advance on the 11th March.

(i) Of the Sillahdars belonging to Azem-ul-Omrah the new levies, amounting to a thousand were commanded by Ghasi Meea, who, though one of the Pagah Party, affected to pay his Court to the late Minister. Of the old Sillahdars two divisions were with the advance under the Command of Taij Wunt and Azim Khan of Beer. Altogether Taij Wunt had not less than 4,000 of the Minister's horse stationed with him in the advance, exclusive of the reinforcements which joined him on the 11th March under Loll Khan and Secunder-ud-Dowlah.

(k) There were several matchlockmen among Zuffer-ud-Dowlah's new levies of infantry; but far the greater part were armed with bad and probably unserviceable muskets.

No. 217—The Nizam's Army at Kharda.

Statement of the forces, ordnance and ammunition with which the Nizam descended Moorighautt, 4th March 1795.

No. 2.

General strength of Monsr. Raymond's corps on the 11th of March 1795
(exclusive of sick and absent).

1st Regiment	. Monsr. Miller	. 850	This Regiment is composed of Europeans, topasses and Rohilahs The Europeans who amount to about 87, are formed into a Company.
2nd do.	. Do. Piron	.. 800	
3rd do.	. Do. Mutar adjutant	. 340	
4th do.	. Do. Castan	.. 940	
5th do.	. Do. Talhiade	.. 910	
6th do.	.. Do. Chemtie	. 870	
7th do.	. Do. Le Baigne	. 840	
8th do.	. Do. Govin	.. 860	
9th do.	. (Vacant) Serjeant Major	870	
10th do.	. Monsr. Salmave	. 750	
11th do.	. Do. Tardivell	760	
12th do.	.. Do. Devarnicourt	. 650	
13th do.	.. Do. Le Tellier	.. 520	
14th do.	.. Do. Lejourmey	730	
Cavalry (Native regular).	. Do. Majors	. 80	
(a Milanese)			

The General's Company (a kind of body guard) .. 70

Total .. 10,840

N.B.—In the above are included all descriptions of Europeans and likewise the Lascars and Golandazes attached to the ordnance Department.

*Account of the Ordnance, ammunition and stores belonging to Monstr. Raymond's
corps, 11th March 1795.*

Ordnance.

Brass 6 and 4 pounders including also a few amusettes	22	
Large gun (called Kallapchar) belonging to the Nizam	1	
Eighteen pounders (the same which Lord Cornwallis presented to the Nizam)	4	
Mortar	1	
			<hr/>	28

Tumbrils

Attached to the field pieces	44	
Spare, small, laden with musket balls	2	
				<hr/>	46

Rockets

12 Kynchies or Camel loads		300
					<hr/>

N.B —A particular account of the ammunition, stores and bullocks belonging to each Regiment not being procurable we must be content to collect the general equipment of the whole corps in these respects from the following detail which has been obtained of the state of the 9th Regiment, which will also, there is reason to think, apply pretty well to that of the 1st Regiment. These two corps, however, would appear to have been rather better provided than the generality of the rest.

6 pounder shot, round	687	} Carried on bullocks. Carried in the Tumbrils attached to the Regiment.
6 pounder blunt cartridges	700	
Musquet Cartridges	2,000	
Musket balls, with paper, twine etc. for making them up into cartridges.			3,000	
Flints, none excepting one in use with each sepoy.				
Port fires (out of repair)	4	It may be proper to observe here that this was almost the only regiment which had any port fires and that even these were not used in the action.
Matches	40	
Match sticks or Handles	2	
Heap for making matches packs or bundles			2	
Ladders	2	16 Tumbrils attached to the park or heavy guns and from whence the several corps were supplied according to their wants.
Worms	2	
Drag Ropes	4	
Powder	
Priming tubes	None.	

Establishment of Bullocks.

To 2 six pounders at 14 to each	28
Spare Bullocks ..	4
To three tumbrils 14 to each	42
Spare bullocks	6
To carry the shot	26
Spare Bullocks	9
To carry the tents of the Regiment (being 10 in number) ..	15
	<hr/>
	130
	<hr/>

General establishment of Artillery for the service of the Guns.

To every two field pieces.

Jemadar	1
Havildar .. .	1
Native Golandazes	13
	<hr/>
	15
	<hr/>

To the four eighteen pounders.

Serjeant	1
Corporal	1
Privates European .. .	4
Jemadar	1
Havildars .. .	1
Native Golandazes .. .	20
	<hr/>
	28
	<hr/>
	43
	<hr/>

Remarks.

Of the Musquets of the 12th Regiment only 270, and those of the 9th only 475 were serviceable.

The Grenadier and Light Infantry Companies had 15 rounds of ammunition per man in their pouches. The Battalion Companies only 12 rounds per man. The tumbrils of the several Regiments contained made up cartridges sufficient to complete the number of 60 rounds per man.

*Account of the Monthly pay of the different ranks composing a Regiment and Establishment
of Monsr. Raymond.*

European Commandant ordinarily	.	.	.	From 200 to 300 Rs. per mensem.
Sergeant Major	30
Serjeants 2nd	.	.	.	30
Do. 1st	20
Fife Major	30
Drum Major	12
Adjutant Native		..		15
Standard Bearer	..		.	10
Writer	10
Carpenter 1
Blacksmith 1
Subedar	20
Court Havildar	8
Havildar	7
Naique	6
Fifer	9
Drummer 1	12
Do. 1	10
Sepoy	5

Pay not known.

N.B.—There are attached to each Company 1 Bheasty*, and 1 Mussulchie,† pay not known.

*Pay of the artillery attached to the field pieces
of the corps.*

1 Jetnadar of Golandazes	12
12 Golandazes	6
2 do.	..	.		5
18 Lascars	4

N.B.—The pay said to have been held out to the different ranks whenever the stipulated respective quotas of recruits should be completed was to—

a Subedar	30 Rs. per mensem.
a Court Havildar		12
a Havildar	10
an Aumuldar or Naique	.	..		8
a Sepoy	6

* Water-carrier.

† Flambeau carrier.

*Statement of the Forces, Ordnance and ammunition with which the
Nizam descended Moorighaut, 4th March 1795—contd.*

No. 3.

Account of the Jinsi, a General Park exclusive of the ordnance attached to
a few of the chiefs included in No. 1

<i>Ordnance.</i>				<i>Remarks.</i>	
Heavy	11		
Mortars	2		
Pieces of various calibers	..	.	18		
			<hr/>	31	
				<hr/>	
<i>Tumbrils.</i>					
Laden with Cartridges	..	.	100		
Laden with powder	.	..	350		
			<hr/>	450	Exclusive of 41 attached as in No. 1. Each tumbril containing from 9 to 12 maunds.
Shot of sizes	..	.	74,700		Exclusive of 6,300 with the detached guns. These are carried on about 4,500 bullocks.
				<hr/>	
<i>Rockets.</i>					
Carried on 19 hackeries ⁴	..		2,850		
Carried on camels viz:					
With the Nizam's swari, 20 Kynchies..			500	}	A Kynchir or camel load of Rockets is 25.
With the 4 princes, 20 Kynchies			500		
			<hr/>	3,850	
				<hr/>	
Hackeries	..	.	300		With ordnance stores as iron, charcoal, rope, smith's and carpenter's tools, lead, wood spare wheels etc., etc., etc.

The powder is manufactured principally at Hyderabad and Neermul and is in general of a very bad quality. The cannon shot are made in the vicinity of Bider and in a few other places producing iron.

The brass guns are cast by a Venetian named Mathias Tuban who had erected a foundry at Hyderabad. He is an ingenious man and entirely independent of Monsr. Raymond.

⁴ Bullock-carts.

No. 4.

Account of Draft Bullocks.

To each Tumbrels 14 including two employed to carry forage for the whole gives	6,426
Add spare Bullocks	400
	<hr/> 6,826
To each Hackery 6 vizt.	
4 Draft, 1 for forage and 1 spare ..	1,800
	<hr/> 8,626

Attached to the guns.

To Dhool-dour (a remarkable gun) ..	250	}	These eight guns had also each an elephant attached to it.
To Luchimer	200		
To 3 Large 150 each. ..	450		
To 3 Large 100 each. ..	300		
To 3 Large. 60 each. ..	180		
To 1 Mortar. 150 ..			
To 1 Mortar. 100 ..	250		
To 18 smaller guns from 14 to 32 each.	400		
	<hr/> 2,030		
To 19 detached guns with different chiefs from 16 to 32 bullocks each. .	450		
Total, Draft bullocks	11,106		

Memorandum respecting Flints and Golandazes.

	Flints.	Flints.
On leaving Bider there were in the Jinsi	1,10,000
Of which on the march to Moorighaut were served out to,		
Monsr. Raymond	12,000	
Zuffer ud Dowlah	3,000	
Abdul Kurreem Khan	2,000	
Ruffiat ul Moolk.. ..	2,000	
Noor Mahomed Khan	2,000	
Alif Khan	500	
Mahomed Ameen Khan Arab ..	500	
Mullic Esaw	2,000	
Gunaishwunt	3,000	
Dilawar ud Dowlah	2,000	
Wuzeer Khan	1,000	
Assud Ali Khan.. ..	2,000	
Several Petty Chiefs	4,000	
	<hr/> 36,000	

These are exclusive of what each chief had previously provided himself with, but which most probably did not exceed the rate of a flint per man.

The flints are Europe but for the most part very indifferent. No one has ever thought of working those with which the country abounds.

There were only 330 Golandazes belonging to the Jinsi, of which from 40 to 50 were employed with the guns of the Sircar attached to different corps.

The Golandazes employed with the guns belonging immediately to the chiefs themselves are included in the statement of their infantry, each having had more or less of this description according to the number of his guns, but none of them a sufficient establishment.

Umjid ud Dowlah appears to have been far better provided with ordnance stores of all kinds than any other chief in the army.

No. 5.

Grain.

Remarks.

Bunjarah bullocks	55,000	The Bunjarah bullock load is from 95 to 100 seers.
Sircar bullocks of which, however only 12,000 were present	16,000	
Belonging to Kirranees, retailers of every denomination	6,000	
			77,000	About 1,100 bullock loads of grain were required for the daily expenditure of the army.

N.B.—Nearly 11000 Bunjarah Bullocks and 2000 of the Sircars were said to have been lost between the descent of the ghautt and the 12th March—almost the whole of the former on the night of the 11th.

The supplies of grain and ghee were chiefly drawn from Berar and Nandair.

His Highness had somewhat less than 300, and Azem-ul-Omrah about 70 elephants in the field.

No. 6.

Abstract account of the forces, ordnance and ammunition with which the Nizam descended Moorighaut, 4th March 1795—contd.

*Cavalry and Infantry.**Cavalry.*

Under the Native chiefs—

Ordinary establishment	32,550	
New levies	12,100	
				44,650
				44,650

Infantry.

Under the Native Chiefs—

Ordinary establishment	23,700	
New levies	9,000	
				32,700
Under Monsr. Raymond	10,840
				43,540
				88,190

*Ordnance and ammunition.**Guns and Mortars.*

With the Native Chiefs	49	
Attached to the Jinsi	31	
Attached to Monsr. Raymond's corps	..		28	
				108

Tumbrils.

With the Native Chiefs	101	
Belonging to the Jinsi	459	
Attached to Monsr. Raymond's corps	..		46	
				606

Round Shot of sizes.

With the Native Chiefs .. .	22,800	
With the Jinsi	74,700	
With Monsr. Raymond's corps say ..	10,000	
	—	107,500

Rockets

With the Native Chiefs	2,575	
Belonging to the Jinsi	3,850	
With Monsr. Raymond's corps ..	300	
	—	6,725

Flints.

Including those served out to different chiefs and exclusive of what each chief had previously provided himself with..

.... 110,000

*Draft and Carriage Bullocks.**Draft Bullocks.*

Attached to the Jinsi	11,106	
Attached to Monsr. Raymond's corps ..	1,200	
With the native chiefs (not particularly known)	12,306	

Carriage Bullocks.

Attached to the Jinsi	4,500	
Attached to Monsr. Raymond's corps ..	700	
Attached with the Native Chiefs (not particularly known)	
		5,200
	—	17,506

Grain and Kurraneh

Bullock loads	73,000
---------------------	------	------	--------

A true copy,
(Signed) WM. STEUART,
Assistant.

No. 218—Kirkpatrick offers an explanation of the late treaty of Kharda.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Hyderabad, 24th May 1795.

1. I have the honour to inclose translation of a paper purporting to be a copy of the treaty lately concluded between the Peshwa and the Nizam. It was communicated to me yesterday in consequence of the express order of His Highness, delivered at the suggestion of Meer Allum to the Roy Royan previous to the return of the Court to this place and lately repeated upon that officer's manifesting great backwardness in furnishing it.

2. You will observe, Honourable Sir, that this convention consists only of one article confirming all the stipulations of the Treaty of Edgheer,* excepting those contained in the 3rd article, which is now modified by the present instrument. It is remarkable enough, however, that the altered article instead of being declared to be rescinded, is only said to be suspended.

3. Upon my remarking to Meer Allum that it appeared to me extraordinary that the Treaty should be totally silent with regard to the late cessions of Country and adjustment of pecuniary demands, he replied that those were *juzeat* or detail matters which had been deemed of too little importance, to be enumerated in an instrument, the object of which was to restore the ancient political union of the two States. They had therefore been provided for by a separate convention, which was not entitled to the name of a Treaty, because in the case of two such Governments of those of his Master and the Peshwah, which were in the constant habit of mutually giving and taking, it was daily liable to alteration.

4. This explanation, however, has not prevented me from applying for a copy of the subsidiary engagements entered into by the Nizam on this occasion; but although I have reason to think His Highness meant that I should be informed of everything, yet it is not certain that the Roy Royan will be prevailed upon to be so communicative as his Master is (or at least was not long since) inclined to be.

No. 219—The Treaty of Kharda, 1795.

10th April 1795.

Translate of copy of a treaty concluded between His Highness the Nizam and Row Pundit Purdhaun under the seal and signature of the

* See appendix.

former, the 19th of Rumzaun 1209 Hijiree, corresponding with the 10th of April 1795, A.D.

“On the first of Shabban 1198 Hejiree in camp at the fort of Edgheer a solemn treaty consisting of seventeen articles was concluded between the Nabob Nizam Ali Khan and Row Pundit Perdhaun, which removed the then existing disturbances. Now in the year 1209 of the Hejiree answering to 1204 Fussily, of the aforesaid seventeen articles it is settled that the third article running thus, “whenever the joint attack of the Carnatic (meaning, as the context shows, the upper Carnatic) may be determined on by both parties, whatever country, forts, gurrries, property, kundnies, treasure, etc., may in consequence fall into our hands, the mahals of which the Jumma Kamil or gross revenues is 53,83,000 rupees belonging to the Government of the late Mahderow for which Hyder Ali Khan agreed to pay a paishcush of fifteen lacks of rupees, shall appertain independently to the Peshwa without the Nizam’s having any participation therein : and the talooks of Kurpah etc. of Abdul Hulim Khan etc., including his relations, the talooks of Kurnoul etc. (the Jageer of Runmust Khan Behadur) including his son and relations, and likewise whatever of the talooks of Adoni etc., have been attached by Hyder since the Fussily year 1182 and are now in the possession of Futteh Ali Khan (Tippoo) shall remain independently the property of His Highness’s Sircar without the Peshwa’s having any participation therein : over and above these whatever may fall into our hands shall be equally divided half and half, both parties to draw lots for his respective share of country, and in the share of the country that may come to His Highness the Peshwa shall have no participation on the score of choute or other heads, except that whatever choute and mukta the Peshwa received from the talooks of Adoni and Kurnoul shall continue to be paid him,”—shall for the present be suspended on account of the treaty concluded by the two States and the English Company, that is to say by the three States with Tippoo Suldaun. Henceforth let the Mukta (or fixed chote) of Adoni and Kurnoul be discharged annually conformably to custom. Should it not be duly discharged Row Pundit Perdhaun will take it (meaning by force), and His Highness shall not be displeased at his doing so. Between the two States (i.e., the present contracting parties), the English Company and Tippoo Suldaun treaties have been concluded ; agreeably to which let all matters respecting Tippoo Suldaun be conducted. Furthermore the sixteen articles of the Treaty of Edgheer and the present above written engagement being settled, matters shall be conducted conformably thereto. Bread and the Koran are sworn, by that no deviation shall take place therein. Done at Oaplah Boorgong, on the bank of the Manjerah, under the date before mentioned ”.

His Highness’s signature affixed.

No. 220—Kirkpatrick transmits to the G. G. the particulars of the late cessions to the Marathas.

FROM—W. KIRKPATRICK,

TO—SIR JOHN SHORE, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Hyderabad, 2nd June 1795.

1. I am at length enabled to transmit you the particulars of the late cessions of this State to the Marrattas referred to in my address of the 27th ultimo.

2. It will be perceived that in translating these documents I have, instead of adhering to the arrangement of the original, classed the ceded districts and towns according to Soubahs and Sircars, by which means the respective geographical positions of the whole will be the more easily distinguishable at one view.

3. I have also added a column exhibiting the Jumma Kamil of most of the enumerated Mahals according to the revenue register of this State compiled in the time of Nizam-ul-Moolk.

4. The ceded territory consisting principally of broken portions of various districts, this additional column will serve to furnish a general idea of the relative extent of the cessions in the Mahals so broken or divided. It may also, in some measure, help to show how far the valuation at which the Peshwa has taken the ceded countries in general may be considered reasonable or otherwise.

5. No administration has yet been formed by His Highness. The struggles for power are likely, according to Meer Allum, to assume a serious face. Gobind Kishen having manifested a desire to bring Mahomed Azeem Khan forward, the Roy Royan commenced a violent opposition to the project and has conducted it hitherto in such a manner as apparently to have laid the seeds of mortal discord between himself and the Marratta Vakeel as well as with the Pagah Chieftains. He has now unreservedly accused the latter to His Highness of secretly intriguing with the Marrattas for the purpose of usurping the Government in conjunction with Gobind Kishen, nor do his representations appear to have been ineffectual, the Nizam having a few nights ago been so indiscreet (to use the words of Meer Allum) as to upbraid the Vakeel to his face with ingratitude and deceit. He has also signified some suspicion respecting the past conduct of the Pagah party, the communication of which was

certainly but ill-calculated to allay the ferment excited by the recent intrigues. Accordingly this unadvised step is said to have occasioned on one side a distant menace of calling in a Marraita force with the view of obliging His Highness to listen to reason, and on the other (that is the Roy Royan) a threat to apply the money lately stipulated to be paid to the Peshwa to the prosecution of a fresh war against him.

6. Meer Allum does not dissemble either the disgust or the apprehension with which these proceedings have inspired him. He has on this occasion gone so far as to say, that he thinks the speedy and complete wreck of this State can only be prevented by the Company's taking it under their protection on the same footing as they have done in the case of Asoph-ud-Doulah, and has even requested of my Moonshi to take an early opportunity of ascertaining from me whether or not such a measure was practicable.

In this state of things it doubtlessly appears most probable that the present contest will terminate in favour of the Marraita faction; and it must be confessed that even such an issue could not well be more unfavourable to the future prosperity of this State than the ascendancy of such a Minister as the Roy Royan would necessarily prove.

No. 221—Financial gains of the Marathas.

Account of the sums to be paid and the territorial cessions to be made by the Nizam to the Mahrattahs, conformably to the convention of Khurdah, officially communicated to the British Resident by order of His Highness.

No. 1.*Account of the pecuniary stipulations.*

1. On account of the reserved fourth or the choute of Bider, arrears of choute of Adoni, Berar, etc. 1 Crore and 1 Rupee.
2. On account damages (or compensation) 1 Crore and 1 Rupee.
3. On account Durbar Charges to the Minister (Balajee Pundit). 25 Lacks and 1 Rupee.
4. On account Dowlut Rao Sindeah etc. 60 Lacks and 3 Rupees.
vizr.
To a Zeafut or entertainment to Sindeah, to be discharged by two equal payments—50 Lacks and 2 Rupees.
To Durbar charges to Dowlut Rao, Tukojee Holkar, and Raghojee Bhosillah—10 Lacks and 1 Rupee.

N.B.—Gobind Rao Kishen's engagement was to deliver only such furds* as should be necessary to be delivered, and to bring back the rest (meaning that he would use his endeavours to procure some abatement of these terms).

5. On account Balance of the Bhosillah's 25 Lacks and 1 Rupee.
Gahs-daneh (or grass and grain).claims.

Total .. 3 Crores, 10 Lacks and
7 Rupees.

No. 2.*Account of the Territorial Cessions.*

- To Madho Rao Narain Pundit Perdhaun, 32 Lacks of Rupees.
Districts yielding annually.
- To Balajee Junardan Furnuveese and 2½ Lacks, Kamil.
others, Mutsuddies and Brahmuns,
servants of Rao Pundit Perdhaun,
Districts yielding annually.

Total .. 34½ Lacks.

* Paper, list, inventory.

Particulars of the above.

Names of the Mahals ceded to Rao Pundit Perdhau.	Rated amounts of cessions.	Jumma Kaamil according to the Assuffee register.
1. SOUBAH OF AURUNGABAD.		
<i>Sircar Dowlatabad.</i>		
The Kusbah of Furkabad ..	6,570 0 0
From the Havilly Pergunnah of Sircar Dowlatabad (including the Fortress of Dowlatabad) to the amount of— ..	6,690 7 6 10,730 0 3
From Pergunnah Gandapoor ..	3,48,093 0 9 4,01,680 13 3
From the Pergunnah of Rajdehur to the amount of— ..	29,076 13 6 31,647 6 0
From the Pergaunnah of Chaleesagaon to the amount of— ..	25,236 9 6 46,537 11 3
Village of Bunhora, Pergunnah Untoor ..	2,243 13 0
The whole Pergunnah of Jategong	9,136 6 9 9,136 6 9
	4,27,047 3 0	

Sircar Perrainda.

From the Havilly Pergunnah of Sircar Perrainda to the amount of— ..	1,68,964 6 0 3,44,408 5 0
The Pergunnah of Maundwa (Madha ?) ..	66,643 13 6 66,641 6 0
From the Pergunnah of Mohool to the amount of— ..	1,08,801 7 3 1,64,860 0 0
From the Pergunnah of Barsee to the amount of— ..	6,234 11 0 81,058 2 0
	3,50,644 5 9	

Carried over

Names of the Mehals ceded to Rao Pundit Perdhau.	Rated amounts of cessions.	Jumna Kaumil according to the Assuffee register.
---	-------------------------------	---

SOUBAH OF AURUNGABAD—
contd.

*Sircar Futtahabad commonly
called Dharour.*

From the Pergunnah of Ambah					
Jogahi to the amount of—	.. 1,34,691	0 6	1,39,671 10 0
The Pergunnah of Purrauli	.. 44,000	0 0	44,000 0 0
The Pergunnah of Pangong	.. 15,357	3 6	15,342 6 0
The Pergunnah of Furdapoor	.. 97,134	3 0	97,134 2 0
The Kusbah of Renapoor	.. 9,396	4 0	9,396 4 0
From the Kusbah of Khirlwaira to the amount of—	.. 5,156	14 0	5,556 14 0
					3,05,735 9 0

Sircar Peytun.

From the Havilly Pergaunnah of Sircar Jalnapoor to the amount of—			.. 1,57,206	6 0	1,66,056 3 9
Villages of the Pergaunnah of Purtoor	.. 25,000	0 0	
							1,82,206 6 0

Sircar Peytun.

From the Havilly Pergaunnah of Sircar Peytan to the amount of—			.. 2,07,835	14 6	2,70,077 10 6
The Pergunnah of Dawur Waree	31,978	9 9	31,979 1 0
From the Pergunnah of Sindore Warah to the amount of—			.. 22,041	14 6	23,896 4 3
							2,61,356 6 9

Sircar Beer.

From the Havilly Pergunnah of Beer to the amount of—			.. 6,06,360	0 9	6,89,135 0
							6,06,360 0 9

21,33,849 15 3

Names of the Mehals ceded to Rao Pundit Perdhann.	Rated amounts of cessions.	Jumna Kaumil according to the Assuffee register.
2. SOUBAH OF BIDER.		
<i>Sircar Nandair.</i>		
The Pergunnah of Indoor ..	2,40,813 15 0 2,04,813 15 0
The Pergunnah of Bodun ..	1,47,765 4 9 1,48,765 5 6
From the Pergunnah of Mhysa to the amount of— ..	1,11,811 6 6 1,12,478 15 0
Village of Neillegong Pergunna of Oudegheer ..	5,387 11 0 5,05,778 5 3
3. SOUBAH OF BEEJAPPOOR.		
<i>Sircar Neldroog.</i>		
From the Hawilly Pergunnah of Neldroog to the amount of— 5,624 4 3
4. SOUBAH OF KHANDAISH.		
<i>Sircar Assere.</i>		
The Pergunnah of Warrungong ..	60,676 6 0 55,441 10 0
The Pergunnah of Sindoornee ..	21,909 0 0 25,009 0 0
The Pergunnah of Panjarah ..	42,878 13 6 42,785 9 0
	 1,25,464 3 6
5. SOUBAH OF BERAR BALAGHANT.		
<i>Sircar Basim.</i>		
From the Pergunnah of Oundha, to the amount of— ..	32,353 5 6 36,317 10 0
Village of Oomurkhair Pergaunnah Charthana ..	871 4 6
		33,224 10 0
<i>Sircar Maikhker.</i>		
From the Pergunnah of Umropoor to the amount of— 50,350 15 0
<i>Sircar Pathree.</i>		
From the Haveli Pergunnah of Pathree to the amount of— 3,53,988 7 0
	3,48,064 11 3	4,29,283 3 9
Total Carried over 32,00,000 0 0

Names of Mehals ceded to Balajee Junardhan Furnavese and others, Mutsuddies and Brahmuns servants of Rao Pundit Perdhaun.	Rated amounts of cessions.	Jumna Kaumil according to Assuffee register.
---	----------------------------	--

1. SOUBAH OF AURUNGABAD.

Sircar Dharour.

From the Havilly Pergunnah of Dharour (towards Kaij) to the amount of— ..	66,087 11 6	1,66,280 9 0
	66,087 11 6			

Sircar Perrainda.

The whole Pergunnah of Feerkhair	8,100 11 6	7,100 11 6
From the Pergunnah Mardee to the amount of— ..	5,708 5 6	25,341 8 0
The Pergunnah of Warsee ..	14,492 10 9	35,950 3 0
	28,301 11 9			

Sircar Ahmednuggur.

The Pergunnah of Ashtee ..	50,664 4 6	50,674 13 6
From the Pergunnah of Mandah Pairgonig to the amount of— ..	55,783 14 0	3,78,666 6 6
From the Pergunnah of Newassa to the amount of— ..	17,189 8 9
	1,23,637 11 3			

Sircar Beer.

Village of Pungnoor, Pergunnah Havilly	1,000 0 0
		2,19,027 2 6		

Name of Mehals ceded to Balajee Junardhan Furbavese and others, Mutsuddies and Brahmuns servants of Rao Pundit Perdhaun.	Rated amounts of cessions.	Jumna Kaumil according to Assuffee register.
--	-------------------------------	---

2. SOUBAH OF BIDER.

Sircar Nandair.

From the Pergunnah of Soonpait to the amount of—	13,605 7 9	14,435 7 0
--	------	------	------------	------------

3. SOUBAH OF BEEJAPPOOR.

Sircar Neldroog.

* From the Havilly Pergunnah of Neldroog to the amount of—	17,367 5 9
--	------	------------

2,50,000 0 0

Grand Total	34,50,000 0 0
----------------	------	---------------	------	------

* The Jumma Kaumil of the whole of the Havilly Pergunnah of Neldroog is stated in the Register at 2,12,432-14-9.

A true copy,

(Signed) Wm. Steuart,
Assistant.

No. 222

8th June 1795.

List of the Districts said to be ceded by the Nazim to the Peshwa, in consequence of the Convention of Khurda 1795—1209 Hejree, as supplied by the Peshwa's Diwan Behro Punt to Sir Charles Malet.

						Rupees.
Hawelly Parenda	1,65,000
Purgunna Mohul	90,000
Do. Maundeva	63,000
Do. Teerkeyra	8,100
Do. Ambah Joguy	1,34,401
Do. Purlee	44,200
Do. Reynapore	9,396
Do. Seyr Salla ?	25,700
Do. Paungaum Baria Boodee	15,000
Do. Peytum	2,30,608
Do. Sindore Warra	22,041
Do. Dawia Warree	31,878
Do. Jahnapore	1,57,206
Do. Purtoor	3,19,077
Do. Wurrungaum	55,563
Do. Palharry ?	42,878
Do. Siddomee	21,050
Do. Ownda	32,353
Do. Omarkeyra	700
Do. Ombrapore	47,941
Do. Wurnee	47,864
Do. Jamkeyra	19,227
Cusba Korarree	6,750
Hawelly Doulutabad	6,690
Purgunna Gandapore	3,49,394
Do. Raj Dehur	26,000
Do. Chalis Gaum	21,000
Do. Indoor	2,40,000
Do. Oodgheer	2,00,000
Do. Bheer	6,00,000
Do. Bodun	1,47,765
Do. Ghautgaum	2,260
Moujeh Nibbarree, in the Purgunna of Antoor	2,010
Cusba Jottagaum	9,136
Purgunna Myna	1,09,543

Total .. 33,03,731

N.B.—The Cessions on account Durbar Charges, said to be three Lacs of Rupees per annum, are not included. To which is to be added twenty-five Lacs ready money over and above the acknowledged two crores.

True copy,
(Signed) J. Uthhoff,
Assistant.

Appendix 1

(Treaty of Edgheree, 20th June 1784.)

This important treaty marks the friendly relations existing between the Nizam and the Peshwa before the English came on the scene. It is often referred to in the papers and forms as it were the basis of the conflict between the two Courts of Poona and Hyderabad.

The treaty was concluded by Nana Fadnis with the Nizam at Edgheer on the Bhima on 20th June 1784 and was mainly directed against Tipu.

It is mutually agreed to abide by the 17 articles underwritten :—

Articles of a Treaty settled between His Highness the Nizam Ali Khan Bahadur and His Highness Row Pundit Purdhan Madhoo Row Naraen dated 1st of Shaban 1198 of the Hijree corresponding with 1194 of the Fuslee and to 1785 Dekkunnee [— 20 June, 1784].

1ST.—Whatever shall be mutually determined upon must be carried into execution without further reference to probable advantage or disadvantages. When the contracting parties shall have commenced any undertaking, if His Highness the Row Pundit Purdhan Behaudur should be disposed to practice evasion, and His Highness the Nizam on the contrary should resolve to persevere in such undertaking, it will be the duty of His Highness the Row Pundit Purdhan to co-operate with the Nizam and to prosecute the measures in progress to a conclusion. In like manner, if His Highness the Paishwa should resolve to persevere in any mutually preconcerted object, the Nizam is not to be at liberty to hesitate, but is to co-operate with His Highness Pundit Purdhan in prosecuting the measures in progress to their original purpose. But if both parties should be disposed to recede from their original determination, it is of no consequence. Whatever is mutually determined upon, can be abandoned by mutual consent.

2ND.—If in the judgment of His Highness the Nizam any measure shall appear to be necessary which may be deemed inexpedient by His Highness the Paishwah, but the adoption of which the Nizam shall insist upon, in that case His Highness Pundit Purdhan must consent and co-operate with His Highness the Nizam in the execution of such measure. In like manner if His Highness Pundit Purdhan insist upon the adoption of any measure to which His Highness the Nizam may not be disposed to accede, His Highness the Nizam must yield his consent to that measure and proceed in the execution of it.

3RD.—When the combined forces of the contracting parties shall attack the Carnatic, whatever territory, forts, money or property shall be captured, His Highness Pundit Purdhan shall receive out of the same

the Mohauls, the Jumma of which in the time of the late Madhoo Row amounted to fifty-three lacks and eighty-three thousand rupees ; and from which Hyder Ally Khaun agreed to pay a chout of fifteen lacks of rupees to the said deceased Madhoo Row ; and His Highness the Pundit Purdhan shall enjoy the possession of them without any participation on the part of the Nizam. The Taalook Kurpah, etc., belonging to Abdul Huleem and his relations and the Taalook Kurnool, etc., composing the Jageer of Runmust Khaun and of his sons and relations, together with such portion of Adonee as has remained in the possession of Hyder Ally Khawn from the year 1182 Fuslee and which is now in the possession of Fuiteh Alli Khawn (Tippoo Sultaun), shall be taken possession of by His Highness the Nizam, without any participation on the part of the Paishwah, the remaining acquisitions shall be divided equally between the two contracting parties, and the question regarding what territory shall belong to each shall be decided by drawing lots. His Highness Row Pundit Purdhan is not to demand Chout from that part of the territory which may be halved by the Nizam ; but the Chout which has always been collected from Adonee and Kurnool by Row Pundit Purdhan shall be paid as usual.

4TH.—If an attack shall be made upon the state of either of the contracting parties they shall unite in repelling the invader. When one party shall require the aid of the other to repel any attack, such aid shall be afforded without delay. The party furnishing assistance, must act in conformity to the counsel and advice of the party whose territory is attacked.

5TH.—If both states should be attacked at once, the two contracting parties must unite to repel such aggression, and they mutually engage to hold no separate intercourse with the offending party, and that they will always act in concert with each other.

6TH.—All points of inferior moments such as Chout, Surdeshmukhi, etc., having been adjusted, let the collectors of the Paishwah and the Aumils and Jaggeerdars of the Nizam abide by that adjustment. If, however, at any time, any person should violate the present agreement by committing any excess the two contracting parties will proceed to settle such point by amicable correspondence, since trifling points should not be permitted to interfere with others of importance.

7TH.—Whenever either State shall require the aid of the troops of the other, such aid shall be afforded.

8TH.—Neither party shall ever adopt any measure of hostility against the other. If either party shall entertain a design of subverting the Government of the other, that design must be abandoned ; no attention shall be paid to the representations of any individual, and any such representation shall be communicated by one to the other.

9TH.—All the negotiation must be carried on by detailed written correspondence from one to the other, without the intervention of Vakeels. If, however, reference should be made to any communication contained in a letter to a Vakeel the original letter shall remain with the Vakeel, and copies of the same shall be furnished to the contracting parties.

10TH.—If when engaged in pursuit of any object which shall have been mutually agreed upon, an enemy shall attack either State, the prosecution of the original object shall be suspended until measures shall have been adopted for repelling and punishing the enemies who may have committed such act of aggression.

11TH.—The Sirdars of one state shall not be admitted to the counsels of the other, but there is no objection to the maintenance of the relations of a general friendship between them.

12TH.—If His Highness the Row Pundit Purdhan should propose any measure which may not be agreeable to His Highness the Nizam, who may be desirous of adopting some other measure, they must not admit into their minds any sentiment of displeasure, but must direct their attention to that measure which may be most salutary.

13TH.—Let His Highness the Nizam demand from the British Government payment of the seven lacks of rupees due to him by that Government on account of Rajmundree, and let His Highness the Paishwah demand payment of the Chout of 15 lacks of rupees due to him from Futteh Alli Khaun (Tippoo Suldaun). A treaty exists between the Nizam, the Paishwah, and the English. If at any time the English should act contrary to that Treaty and it should become necessary to make war against them the four Sircars of Mustafa Nuggur, Vellore, Sekakole, and Rajmundree shall belong exclusively to the Nizam and the Taalook Nachawar shall belong to the Paishwah without any participation whatever. The remaining acquisitions of territory, forts or other property shall be equally divided.

14TH.—With regard to lands solicited on this side of the Toombuddra, which His Highness the Nizam or His Highness the Paishwah may seize, without the aid and assistance of each other, such of them as shall be conquered by the Nizam shall remain in his possession, His Highness paying Chout for the same together with the Babuttee, Surdeshmokhee and other customs, to His Highness the Paishwah, and such of them as shall be conquered by His Highness the Paishwah, shall be retained by His Highness, on the condition of paying to the Nizam the established Peshcush due from those lands. With regard to lands situated on the other side of the Toombuddra, whether the possession of them be acquired by one party without the assistance of the other or by the exertions of the combined armies of both, they shall

be equally divided and His Highness the Paishwah, after receiving half of such territory, shall make no demand against the Nizam for Chout from his share of the lands.

15TH.—The brothers and relations of either party who may seek protection with the other, shall not only be refused an asylum, but shall be seized and delivered up. This condition shall be strictly fulfilled by both.

16TH.—If when engaged in any particular object an enemy should attack either state, the prosecution of that object must be suspended, and both parties must proceed to repel and punish the enemies, and any loss which may be sustained either in revenue or territory must be borne in equal proportion.

17TH.—The partition of any territory, etc., which may be acquired in war with the English and Futteh Ali Khaun shall be made in conformity to the 3rd and 13th articles of this treaty but any other territory which shall be acquired either by negotiation, intimidation or other means, shall in conformity to those articles, be equally divided.

[A true copy]

Appendix 2

No. 1

C. W. MALET,

To—The Resident with the Nazim.

Poona, 23rd August 1794.

On the 21st I was favoured by Meer Allum with a sight of Azim-ul-Omra's answer to his first letters. He at the same time intimated to me that though he should suspend his ultimate opinion on the subject of them till he received answers to those letters that accompanied the Draft of the Instrument proposed by the Peshwa for his execution, yet the fuller consideration that he had given them since he saw me last was far, he candidly observed, from furnishing agreeable ideas as to his situation or the sincerity of his superiors.

He requested my sentiments on the general appearance of things and the particular circumstances of his case, to which I generally replied by resting every thing on the receipt of his expected answer to this Court's proposed instrument, observing at the same time that the weighty language with which I had preferred to this Court the expediency of preserving peace could not prove totally nugatory unless rendered so by some unaccountable conduct on the part of his Court or its numerous Agents.

Having thus endeavored to satisfy Meer Allum, perm't me between ourselves to observe that Azim-ul-Omra's letter appears to me strongly tinctured with art, evasion and even inconsistency.

In your favour of 11th August the Minister's distrust of the honesty of the two Govinrous and of the integrity and ability of Roy Royan is mentioned, and Meer Allum's resolution of not trusting the former was signified to you ere he left you and strong expressions of distrust have been made by him to me, yet does Azim-ul-Omra propose Govinrou Bugwunt as the Peshwa's Plenipotentiary and he most pointedly includes Roy Royan as Meer Allum's colleague upon a footing of equality.

As to Azim-ul-Omra's treatment of the Peshwa's proposed Instrument for Meer Allum's execution I shall defer my judgment till the receipt of the Nazim's decision on that Instrument, confessing in the interim that the letter of which I now enclose translate, so far from being an accession to it, is in my conception not only a total evasion of that proposition but amounts to such a contraction of Meer Allum's powers as to render his mission an absolute nullity, since they extend only to Juzeat (Detail) and that under the limitation of reference, while Kuleat or general accommodation is not once mentioned, and even the important point of restoring personal confidence between the two Ministers is still rested on his discovering it to be the wish of Nanna without granting any latitude for an advance, by which alone I apprehend that discovery can be made if the wish existed. In a word if Meer Allum was to be thus wrapt up in reserve and restrictions I certainly think he had better have staid at home, while on the other hand I am strongly of opinion that the good effect of our frank and zealous interposition is thereby totally hazarded.

If by Mugfirrut Mab is meant the Nazim's father, as I have at a venture translated it, I humbly conceive the reference to that period will be irreconcilable with this Court's Demands which will certainly be founded on its last collections, so that while the Nabob will be pleading for a settlement in the infancy of their encroachments they will demand the amount of their collections in their most advanced stage of exaction, consequently drawing the line of Right (Wajbee) between them will, I fear, be a most arduous task, tho' as the Nabob will have found that word inserted in the Peshwa's draft which, previous to seeing it, was the only thing except the Chout of the 4 Subas that he proposed to be added for the procural of his assent to the Instrument, I most sincerely hope neither he nor his Minister will have raised further difficulties but will signify their assent to Meer Allum's acquiescence in a proposal to which I can in fact see no objection, for tho' it stipulates against delay and evasion on the plea of reference, yet reference on any important point is not actually thereby precluded, since the short interval of writing and receiving an answer may, on any knotty case, be easily attributed to any other cause. The plain terms of the Nabob's assent seem in my mind to be strongly contrasted by his Minister's studied evasions of it.

In a word I am of opinion that this Court's anxiety to ascertain a pleni-potentiary power in Meer Allum is to obviate in some degree the arts and evasions that they expect to encounter in Azim-ul-Omra and that, till this point is effected, every thing except this Court's preparations will remain at a stand.

Having written thus far, the confidential person that I had sent to return the letters submitted to my perusal by Meer Allum returned with Azim-ul-Omra's answer to his (Meer Allum's) dispatch covering the Draft of the Instrument proposed by the Peshwa. I have not time to transmit you a translation of this letter by this opportunity, but I cannot help acquainting you that Meer Allum has not scrupled to assure me that it is extremely unsatisfactory to him, and in reply to my application for permission to take copies of Azim-ul-Omra's or any other letters for your information that he may submit to my notice, he has not only assented but requested me so to do, as on the confidence of your support he accepted his present mission. He has likewise frankly and honestly told me that from the spirit of evasion that he has already experienced and from his utter aversion to our being engaged in its consequences, he thinks we should come to some very explicit explanation with Azim-ul-Omra, nor expose ourselves to a single consequence beyond the stipulations of such an explanation.

The circumstances of Tippo's having neither answered the Nazim's invitation, nor sent him one on the similar occasion of his son's nuptials, are strongly corroborative of the idea I have long had of his entertaining an inveterate personal enmity toward his Highness's administration.

On the subject of the Instrument proposed by this Government for Meer Allum's execution, I entirely agree in the opinion given by the Nazim; for agreeable to His Highness's opinion as the demand is novel so is it in itself and from the character of the proposers liable to suspicion. But, on the other hand, tho' novel I can see no inconvenience in Meer Allum's acceding to it equal to that, which I apprehend will ensue, of the delay and total stagnation of all negotiation until it is executed. My grounds for this opinion are explained in a former part of this letter, viz., that I think correspondence with his Master and a proper degree of consultation will not be precluded by it. Meer Allum likewise has particularly expressed his concern at the restrictive reference under which his negotiations are laid in Azim-ul-Omra's late letters after having in his first letter to that Minister on the subject assured him that his correspondence, consequent to consultation with his Court should not be interrupted. In fact the Peshwa's proposal is absurd, since as Meer Allum can confer no powers on himself, the execution of the Peshwa's proposed instrument is a superfluity or a nullity, superfluous if warranted by the Nazim's letter of credence as only springing from the power therein delegated, or null as exceeding those powers.

But tho' I may thus freely trouble you with my opinion of the Instrument and the execution of it, I shall be extremely cautious of venturing to incur the sole responsibility of advising compliance with a proposal declined by the Nabob's Ministry and the consequences of which amongst these Machiavels are to be suspected of every danger. But exclusive of my particular objections to becoming an adviser on the present delicate predicament, I am generally adverse to such a line of conduct which by implicating us in any embarrassments that may eventually ensue lays us under a kind of obligation to assist in surmounting them, a situation which the utmost art and industry of Azim-ul-Omra have long been exerted to place us in.

Azim-ul-Omra, I observe, in all his letters keeps fast hold of having an ultimate decision after discovering by previous agreement between this Court and Meer Allum the sentiments of the Peshwa's ministers, a predicament to which their knowledge of him will, I apprehend, prevent their ever consciously submitting.

No. 2

Translation of a letter from Azim-ul-Omra to Meer Allum dated 14th Mohurum 1209, original of which was sent by Meer Allum to Sir C. W. M. on the 21st August 1794.

I have received your two letters the second of which mentions your second visit to the Peshwa to deliver His Highness's letter, in which visit an Instrument acknowledging your full Powers was demanded from you relative to the termination of details (Juzeat), to which after deliberation you had replied, "let a draft be prepared and it should be written", but that to the time of your dispatch the draft had not been received. That however you understood the intention in demanding the said Instrument was that the Detail should be settled on your full Power without waiting for further orders from His Highness.

The demand of the Instrument was made known to His Highness by sending your own letter enclosed in an arzee from myself for His Highness's notice, and I now enclose for your notice His Highness's orders relative to the aforesaid Instrument as superscribed on my arzee, which you will understand; in fact the Instrument demanded may be formed thereon.

The first answer to the demand of an Instrument may be thus given. "My full Powers for negotiating a termination of the mutual Detail claims agreeable to right is fully declared by His Highness's letter. But should, notwithstanding a writing be required, there are two modes, the first thus,—“I am invested with full powers for rightfully terminating the Detail of the Peshwa's Demands on the part of my Master, the Nizam.

Agreeable to Right the Detail will be terminated on my powers and let Ballajee Pundit give a writing on the part of His Master, the Peshwa to the same purport relative to the Detail claims of his Highness on his Master, the Peshwa." An exchange of Powers admits of no objection and may be entered into. But should Ballajee Pundit hesitate to give a writing with his seal, let Govindrow Bugwant or any other, as for instance, the son of Hurry Pundit, give a writing to the above purport.

The second mode is thus : in the Instrument that you may execute let this be the purport, " I am invested with full powers for terminating agreeable to Right the Detail Demands of the Peshwa that may be due on my Master. In like manner I am also vested with full powers for settling agreeable to Right the Detail Demands of my Master on the Peshwa, as for instance, on account the Choute for the 4 Subas agreeable to the Govt. (Aumil) of Nizam al Mulk, as also any other outstanding Details. Agreeable to Right let a settlement of the Detail Demands of the Peshwa be taken from me and in like rightful manner let a settlement of my master's Detail Demands on the Peshwa be granted to me."

If anybody on the word (Wajbee) rightful, which you will insert in the Instrument, should question the mode of ascertainment of Right, the mode is thus,—that if agreeable to our granting the Peshwa's Detail Demands conformable to right and in like manner the Peshwa will conformable to right grant His Highness's Detail Demands, it will be preferable. But otherwise let a third person be appointed who may consider the Right of the Demands on both sides and determine accordingly on the discovery of a failure of right.

The particularising all this from such a distance is merely because it is necessary to reply to your letters ; were it not for this, what occasion for it ? As you are wise, a wellwisher and have our fullest confidence, matters on both sides are with you, there is no necessity for writing.

Signature of Azim-ul-Omra.

A continuation of the same letter.

I shall point out another mode to you of making them understand the word Muktarree (Plenipotentiary) in settling Juzzeat (Detail) agreeable to Right (Wajbee), and you may introduce this first, reserving for the second place the introduction of the proposition of a third person. It is thus, should anybody ask what is meant by full powers (Muktarree) agreeable to Right (Wajbee) this answer is to be first given, that His Highness's meaning in this expression is this, that we (that is to say you and Raja Sam Raja Bhadur) on a full enquiry and ascertainment of the Juzeat and the Rights on both sides in concert with the Peshwa's ministry may without excuse or delay agree to whatever Rights agreeable to equity

(Wajbee) may in our conscience be found to appertain to the Peshwa and make such a representation thereof to His Highness our master, that being there approved of it may be agreed to, and that in like manner the Peshwa's Ministers should make a representation for the acquiescence of their Master.

Another separate continuation.

Should it so happen that an arrangement of Juzeat (Detail) being admitted by you as Right (Wajbee) and should not be assented to by the Peshwa's Ministers, then the appointment of a third person to discriminate the Right of the parties may be proposed agreeable to my separate note.

Another separate continuation.

You write that a settlement of Juzeat depends on the re-establishment of mutual cordiality, but that agreeable to my instructions you had not without an advance on their part made any mention thereof. My prohibition of an advance was from an apprehension of being held light, but should you perceive any disposition thereto on their part, you may seriously agitate it, for I am at your disposal.

*Translation of Azim-ul-Omra's Arzee to the Nazim with
His Highness's superscription, Original received from
Meer Allum 21st August 1794.*

I present for Your Highness's notice a letter from Meer Allum to your humble servant and a paper of news sent by Raja Raghotum Rou. Whatever Your Highness is pleased to direct on the subject of their (the Peshwa's) demand of a writing from Meer Allum shall be written.

Nabob's superscription.

"It has been perused. There is no objection to give a writing if the word Wajbee be inserted therein. The mention of the Choute of the 4 Subas may also be inserted.

*Translation of the Draft of the Instrument proposed by the Peshwa
for Meer Allum's executing, from a Persian translation
of the Hindoo original, received from Meer Allum
the 21st August 1794.*

"His Highness the Nizam has deputed me vested with full powers for the settlement of (Juzeat) Details to your Court. Agreeable thereto whatever may become the subject of negotiation shall be settled agreeable to Right (Wajbee) without having recourse to the plea of reference to His Highness, my Master. On this account I have full powers. Written 7 Moharrum 1195.

No. 3**C. W. MALET to the Resident, Hyderabad.***30th August 1794.*

To my messenger Meer Allum said that his acceptance of his present mission was in compliance with your advice which had induced him to revoke his previous refusal of Azim-ul-Omra's application, that his whole hope of an honourable termination of his Embassy rested on the Company's support, in the course of which he expected to be aided by my best and constant council. Were it not for these persuasions, added he, why should I have accepted an office for which His Highness's Durbar furnished many, equally if not more proper than me.

On the subject of advice which Meer Allum seems to think should be so unreservedly granted on all occasions that he may think proper to apply for it, I have already given you my sentiments in my letters, and after taking into deliberate consideration the implication and responsibility attendant thereon in measures the springs and agents of which are far removed from our knowledge and control, I flatter myself you will acquiesce in the propriety of my intention to regulate my conduct on this point by a degree of circumspection, which, to the sanguine expectations of Meer Allum, may look like reserve, but in which I shall never lose sight of the Governor General's instructions.

No. 4**C. W. MALET to the Resident at Hyderabad.***Poona, 6th September 1794.*

Meer Allum has furnished me a copy of the substance of his conference with the Peshwa and his Minister of the 1st instant.

From this paper you will observe that this Government does not confine itself merely to the discussion of the Juzeat.

In consequence of the mention of Kuleat by the Durbar, Meer Allum by my Munshy desired my opinion as to his making it the channel to introduce the subject of Suffae (personal reconciliation of the Ministers) implying thereby that he thought it a part of the Kuleat. I replied that without particularly adverting to the prematurity of my giving an opinion on his proceeding to treat of Kuleat before he was ascertained as to his powers in Juzeat, he might recollect at our last meeting he had told me plainly that he had not the smallest power to enter on the subject of

Kuleat, whereas Azim-ul-Omra had given him in his first letter a certain latitude on the point of Suffae, reconciliation, whence it followed that he (Azim-ul-Omra) thought them unconnected, which implied a material difference from the idea, conveyed in his query, of the connection between reconciliation and Kuleat, on which I begged his sentiments.

To enable you to make your communications to Azim-ul-Omra as far as you may think proper in unison with mine to Meer Allum, I shall advise the latter "that in reply to my representations of the 18th ultimo the Durbar has again signified to me its expectation of an amicable termination of the present discussions through his plenipotentiary exertions and its preference of such a mode to that of hostility. That it perseveres in its disinclination to the ostensible admission of our interposition in the negotiations, tho' by the general friendly tenor of its reply and declaration of preferring amicable adjustment to hostility we have reason to be satisfied with the respect shewn to our friendly representations, and trust that any good impression that may have been made by them will be promoted by the sincerity and equity of Meer Allum's negotiations."

INDEX

MARATHA-NIZAM RELATIONS, 1792-95.

[The figures denote numbers of letters and not pages.]

A

- Aba Chitnis**, Sindia's diwan—75; 97.
- Ali Jah**, Nizam's eldest son—9; 18; 70; 74; 212.
- Alif Khan**, Nawab of Karnoul—212.
- Asad Ali**—163; 164; 178; 179; 181; 189; 212; 214.
- Azim-ul-Omra**, Nizam's Minister—8; 15; his interference in Maratha affairs resented by Governor General 16; disavows hostile intentions towards the Poona Government 17; his intrigues with Mahadji Sindia 18; objects to the treaty of guarantee 19; 21; pursues intrigues with Sindia 22; 37; 42; his political character assailed by Malet 54 and suspected by the Governor General 64, 65; 66; attitude towards Maratha demands condemned by the Governor General 68; 69; his tortuous conduct about Meer Alam's deputation 70, 72-74, 79; his retirement suggested to conciliate the Poona Government 78; reliance on British support in the last extremity 81; 82; 83; alarmed at Maratha preparations 84; 86; 88; his reprehensible conduct criticised 90; 94; 95; Tipu's hostility to him 97; his impolitic conduct of affairs and arrogant behaviour towards the Poona Minister 99; evading real issues of the dispute 103; 106-7; 109; duplicity in the matter of Meer Alam's delegatory powers 110; 117; dishonest conduct in the negotiations 122; solicitous of British intervention 123; 124; 131; 126; 127; 130; 132; 136; his strange proposal of attacking the British 137, 140, 146; 139; 144; unaccommodating reply to Maratha demands 145; 148; anxious to avoid a contest 149; 151; 153; 155; 158; personal meeting with Nana advised 160; 164; beguiled by the Maratha agent 166; advises the Nizam to retreat to Kharda 178-A; 179; his dismissal insisted upon by the Poona Government 182; his influence waning 185; 187; 188; 190; 192; surrenders 193; 194; 199; 200; his property confiscated 213; 215.

B

- Baba Phadke (Furkia)**—enters tents 134; 136; 142; 179.
- MO-I Bk Ca 25—23

B—contd

- Bapu Holkar**—178, 181.
- Behropant Mehendale**—83; 88; 95; 101; 126; 129; 139.
- Boyd**—178.
- British policy towards the dispute**—1; 3-5; Resident's views about the Nizam's independence 8; 10; 16; 20; Cornwallis's ideas of the guarantee engagement 21; 24; 25; 28; 43; 44; 48; separate engagement with the Nizam opposed by Malet 50; 52; 53; impolicy of assisting the Nizam against the Marathas explained 54; 59; 62; 62-A; 62-B; Shore's views about supporting the Nizam 63; limits of British intervention stated 64; 68; relations between Poona and Hyderabad examined and ways suggested to emancipate the Nizam 72; a friendly adjustment pressed on the Nizam 73; 74; 76; Nizam's claim to British support refuted 79; grounds of Br. interposition 80; Governor General's policy of non-intervention 81; 82; Malet's friendly mediation 85, 88; non-intervention policy 93-94; 100; 102; Br. anxiety for a pacific termination of the dispute 109; 116; 118; 119; 138; 144; 196; 197.
- C**
- Cornwallis, Earl, Governor General**—1; 10; discountenances Nizam's interference in the affairs of the Maratha Government 16; 21; 24; declines separate engagements with the Nizam 28; satisfied with the Poona Declaration 29; his draft of the treaty of guarantee 30.
- D**
- Daulat Rao Sindia**—63; 72; subservient to the Peshwa's Government 89; 97; 109; 117; 125; enters tents 134; 142; 145; 148; enters Nizam's territory 162; 167; the fighting on 11th March 178-181-A; 190; 206; gains by the settlement 208; 216.

Dewaji Gauri—162.

Dilawar-ud-daula—214.

G

Ghasi Mea—211.

Ghulam Ali Khan—178-A.

Govind Bhagwant Pingle—54; 82; 83; 91; his ministry in the Nizam's affairs suspected 95; 100; 103; associated with Meer Alam in his embassy 107; discussion of the Adoni claim 113; 127; 128; 132; 137; 155; 156; 179.

Govind Krishna Kale, Poona envoy at the Nizam's Court—54; 82; 83; 86; 90; his ministry in the Nizam's affairs suspected 95; 127; fresh negotiations started through him 129; 132; 133; Azim-ul-Omra's strange proposal of attacking the English 137; 142; 146; 165; advises the Nizam to change his dispositions 166; 173; 178-A; 180; 181-A; negotiates peace 185; 187; 188; delivers the demands of the Poona Court 190; 191; 193-94; 198; 201; 204; 207; treaty ratified 208; 214; 221.

Guarantee, proposal of a treaty of—preliminaries discussed 2; material for its draft 3-5; 8; 10; 12; Governor General's draft presented to the Nizam 13; objected to by the Nizam's Minister 19; 20; the proposal declined by the Poona Government 23; 24; a separate engagement with the Nizam suggested 26; disapproved by the Governor General 28; Governor General's draft of the proposed treaty 30; Poona Government's modifications of the draft 32; 33; 41; 42; 44; 45; separate engagement with the Nizam pressed by the Hyderabad Resident 44; 48; opposed by Malet 50; 51; 54; 55; 56; 57; 59; 62; 62-B.

H

Haripant Phadke—1; 21; 69; 76; 78.

J

Jeajee Bukhshy—called from the North 97; 117; 125; 129; 155; 161; 162; 163; fighting of 11th March 178-A-181-A; 206.

K

Kashi Rao Holkar—179, 181.

Kennaway, Sir John—his views about preserving the Nizam's independence 8; 13; 22; 25; urges a separate engagement with the Nizam 26; 41; 42; 44; 48; 49; his retirement 47; his proposal opposed by Malet 50.

Kharda, battle of—180-192; convention of 220-222.

Kirkpatrick, Capt. William—58; 85; 88; criticises the uncompromising attitude of the Poona Court 158; permission to enter Maratha territory refused 162; 163;

K—contd.

declines advising the Nizam on his military dispositions 164; 166; suspects Maratha intentions 170; 171; 172; 177; reports the fighting on 11th March and subsequent events 180, 184, 188, 189, 191; the causes of the Nizam's defeat discussed 192; replies to the Nizam's reproaches 197; 198; the details of the treaty 204; 208; 219; 220; submits particulars of the late cessions 221; 221-A.

L

Lal Khan, Nizam's sardar—killed in action 178-A; 189.

M

Mahadji Sindia—15; 18; 22, advises the Poona Government to reject the treaty of guarantee 31; 43; 53; opposes separate engagements between the Company and the Nizam's Government 56; 59; 61; 70; 74; his intrigues with Azim-ul-Omra 97, 99.

Malet, Sir Charles—discusses preliminaries of the treaty of guarantee 2, suggests material for the proposal 3-5; disapproves separate engagements with the Nizam 7; 20; 50; 54; 59; 60; 66; anxious to introduce his mediation in the dispute 74-77; 83; makes a friendly remonstrance to the Poona Durbar 85; 88; 89; 90; his mediation declined by the Poona Durbar 92; his first meeting with the Nizam's mission 95; 98; persists in friendly interposition 100, 102; discusses Meer Alam's delegatory powers 103; his remarks on the result of his interposition 107, 108; his awkward predicament as a mediatory 110, 122, 124, 126, 130, 135; comments on Azim-ul-Omra's volte-face 137; 140; 146; 144; reports the action of 11th March 179; his asst.'s important survey of the action 181-A; 187; his important report on the strength, organisation and equipment of the Maratha army 202.

Maratha army—its organisation, equipment and quality (Sir Charles Malet's report) 202.

Maratha Government—resents the Nizam's move to Bedar 14; 18; Declaration declining further engagements with the Co. 23, 31; consults the Nizam's Government about the proposed treaty of guarantee 32; its political superiority and strength over the Nizam's Government 54; objects to a separate treaty between the Nizam and the Co. 55; ascendancy over Sindia's resources 61; 62; British attitude to its differences with the Nizam 63; 66; 68; firm stand about its demands; commences preparations for hostilities 69; 71; causes

M—contd.

of its enmity with the Nizam explained 72-73; luke warm about British mediation in the dispute 74; 75; 76; 78; 82; declares its hostile intentions towards the Nizam 83, 86, 88; 85; its resources 89; nature of its authority over the Nizam analysed 90; declines Malet's mediation in the dispute 92, 96, 98, 101, 102; questions Meer Alam's delegatory powers 99; willing to adjust the dispute by friendly negotiations 105; its reserved attitude 109; Adoni claim discussed 113; general claims neglected in the discussion 115; suspicious of British impartiality 117; driven to coercive measures 122, 123; justice of its claims recognised by the Governor General 124, 126; 129; its fair and firm attitude in the dispute 130; 135; commences military operations 134; 136; 143; 145; 146-47; 149; 151; conciliates Tipu 152; 156; army marching to the frontier 162-65; descriptive list of the Maratha army 167; 173; the decisive action of 11th March: the Nizam forced back from his ground 178-181-A; insists on Azim-ul-Omra's dismissal 182; delivers its demands 190; the siege pressed 191; 193; its suspicions of British attitude 198; Malet's important report on its military organisation 202; 203; 208, 216; official explanation of the late transactions:—causes of hostility and the settlement 215; convention of Kharda 220; financial and territorial gains by the treaty 221-A; 222.

Maratha policy towards the Nizam—2; 8; 31; 33; 59; 69; 72; 88; 94; 105; 109; 138; 151; 156; 170.

Meer Alam—his deputation to Poona discussed 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76-77, 79-87; arrives in Poona 87; doubts expressed about the utility of the embassy 88; 89; 90-92; 94; his first audience of the Peshwa and interview with the Poona Resident 95; his delegatory powers questioned 99-100, 103-106, delicate position of the embassy 108; Governor General's suggestions about conducting the negotiations 109; 110; 112; discussions of the Adoni claims 113; 115; 117; 118; 119; unfavourable state of the negotiations 120-129; his embassy discredited 132-33; 136-38; recalled 141-43; 147-48; 153; 155; an important conference with the Peshwa 156; 159; 161; 170; 182; returns to the Nizam 206; 207; 211; 214; 219; 221.

Muhammad Azim Khan—178-A; 185; 204; 211; 221.

Mullick Essau—214.

N

Nana Fadnis alias Balaji Janardan—15; 17; 18; rejects the proposed treaty of guarantee 31; 37; his enmity to the Nizam's Minister 65; 68; 70; 72; 88; 95; 100-1; 109; his correct attitude in the dispute 115; 145; 146; 149; 151; 156; 160; 167; insists on the dismissal of Azim-ul-Omra 182, 193; his personal gains by the settlement 208; 221-A; 222.

Nizam, the—his sickness and intrigues in his harem 9; 11; his move to Bedar resented 14, 15, discountenanced by the Governor General 16; 18; 25; 31; 35; 42; 43; turns down the Poona draft of the guarantee engagement 45; 66; 76; 97; a personal meeting with the Peshwa urged 109; 138; 139; withdraws his ambassador from Poona 142, 145; his anxiety to avoid a contest 149; 155; 156; 158; resolves on war 159, moves with the army 161-63; seeks British Resident's advice regarding military dispositions 164; 165; beguiled by the Maratha agent to change his strategy 166; negotiations broken off 173; descends the Moori Ghat 174-177; discomfited and forced back from his ground 178-181A; asked to dismiss his Minister 182; besieged in the fort of Kharda 184; seeks terms 185-188; demands of the Poona Court delivered 190; the siege pressed 191; causes of his defeat 192; 194; reproaches the English for letting him down 196; 200; 203; 204, marches back 205-8; dismisses the English detachment 209; discharges his new levies 212; 213; formation of the new ministry 214; strength and general organisation of his army at Kharda 217, 218; the convention of Kharda 220;—his losses by the treaty 221-A-222.

Nizam's Government—2; 7; British solicitude for its preservation 8; 13; Minister's intrigues with Mahadji Sindia 18; 22; resents Bhonsla's encroachments 25; its willingness to the guarantee proposal 33; 39; cost of the British contingent 40; 43; 46; 52-3; its weakness exposed 54; separate treaty with the Co. objected to by the Poona Government 55; 60; 62-A; Shore's judgment of its position 62-B; British view about its independence 63; 64; 66; causes of its enmity with the Marathas: means discussed to emancipate it 72; its claim on the British Government for support refuted 79; 82; 83; commutation of Maratha demands suggested 88; 89; evasive attitude in the dispute 96; desirous to implicate the British Government 94; 95; 100; 102; weakness of its political and military position 103; 109; evading issues 115; Governor General declines to be implicated 119; unwilling to recognise the Peshwa's Kuleat claims 115, 122; 123; anxious for

N—contd.

British support 124-26; 127; its tributary relation to the Poona Government 135, 144; Meer Alam's mission recalled 142; 145; a fair adjustment urged on it 151; 155; resolves on war 159; army dispositions 161, 163, 164; the action of 11th March 178-181-A; the Nizam besieged in the fort of Kharda 184-188; demands of the Poona Court 190; the causes of the defeat 192; 203; strength and general equipment of its army 217-18; its losses by the treaty 208, 216; convention of Kharda 220; details of the cessions 221-A, 222.

Noor Muhammad Khan—178-A.

P

Parashuram Bhau Patwardhan—summoned from Tasgaon 78; 89; his arrival in Poona 112; 125; his interposition sought in the dispute 149; advises a pacific termination 151; 166; 167; wounded in the action of 11th March 178-A-181-A.

Perron, Monsr.—129; 155.

Peshwa, the—66; 72; 74; 78; 98; a personal meeting with the Nizam urged 109; 139; 150; willingness for a fair adjustment of the dispute 156; 158; commences march 162; moves on to the Seena 165; gains a tactical advantage over the Nizam 166; a descriptive list of the Maratha army 167; 176; the action of 11th March 178-181-A; insists on the dismissal of Azim-ul-Omra 182; holds up the Nizam in Kharda 184; 203; 204; the convention of Kharda 220; financial and territorial gains 221-A, 222.

Poona Government—See Maratha Government.

R

Raghuji Bhosle—differences with the Nizam 25; 28; 31; 35; 43; 52; 71; 74; 82; his co-operation with the Poona Government 89; 95; 99; 109; 156; 162; 163; 167; the action of 11th March 178-181-A; his gains by the settlement 208; 216.

Raghuttam Rao, Nizam's agent at the Poona Durbar—54; 107; 145.

Raja of Berar—See Raghuji Bhosle.

Rao Rambha—wounded in fight 178, 178-A, 179, 181.; 189-90.

Raymond, Monsr.—46; strength of his corps 103; arrives in camp 163; 164; 166; fighting of 11th March 178-181-A; 184; 189; 212; details of his corps 217; 218; his letters xxii.

Roberts, Major—209.

R—contd.

Roshan Khan—178-A; 212.

Roy Royan, Meer Alam's asst.—83, 86; arrival in Poona 87; his intimate relations with the Poona Durbar suspected 91; 92; 105; 107; 132; 142; 145; 156; 166; 182; 206; 212; aspires to the Ministership 221.

S

Sadashiv Reddy, a zemindar—revolts 214.

Shore, Sir John, Governor General—declines help to the Nizam against Sindia 53; opposes separate engagements with the Nizam 62-A; 62-B; views about the Nizam's independence and attitude to the dispute 63; defines limits of British mediation 64; acknowledges the justice of the Maratha claims 68; an amicable adjustment urged on the Marathas 73; the grounds of British interposition stated 80; his policy of non-intervention 81, 93, 94, 104; makes suggestions about the delegation 109; 116; 118; refuses to be implicated in the dispute 119.

Shurf-ul-Omra—195.

Sikandar Jah—9; 70; 74.

Steuart, Lt., Kennaway's assistant—26; 27.

Subhan Khan—178-A, 189.

T

Tej Wunt—161; 163; 174; 178-A; 179; 181.

Tipu Sultan—33; intercourse between him and the Nizam suggested as a counterpoise to Maratha influence 60; 62; 63; 72; 90; hostile attitude towards the Nizam's Minister 97; 105; 109; 123; 138; 152; 188.

Tukoji Holkar—89; 117; 150; 167; 178; 181.

U

Uhthoff, Joshua—66; 70; important suggestions to emancipate the Nizam 72; urges the dismissal of Azim-ul-Omra 78; refutes the Nizam's claim to British support 79; 82; 84; reports the decisive action of 11th March 178; important survey of the action 181.

Umjid-ud-daula—211.

V

Vazir Khan—Killed in action 178-A; 189.

Y

Yashwant Rao, new agent from the Nizam—155.

Z

Zaffar-ud-daula—178-A.